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PREFACE 
Due to the combustion of fossil fuels and other industrial activities, 
atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases are 
increasing. Recent research suggests that mean global surface temperature 
will increase by one to four degrees Celsius in the early decades of the 
next century. Over this period, the atmospheric level of carbon dioxide 
should increase to about 160 percent of the preindustrial level. A sig-
nificant reduction of soil moisture throughout much of the middle latitudes 
will accompany these increased temperatures. Significant impacts are likely 
in the corning decades. 
Despite the potential severity of impacts, no governmental policy has 
been developed to slow or limit the releases of carbon dioxide or of the 
other gases to the atmosphere. If the atmospheric level of carbon dioxide 
is to be limited to 500 parts per million (pprnv), effective steps will have 
to be taken soon. The lack of an accepted conceptual structure through 
which to consider the policy implications of the greenhouse problem may be 
in part responsible for this inactivity. 
Adaptation to climatic change, another possible 
anthropogenic changes in the climate, would likewise 
soon. Many adaptive measures have long lead times. 
program for adaptation to large-scale climate change 
and the potential limits of such a strategy have yet 
policy response to 
have to begin fairly 
However, an integrated 
has not been layed out, 
to be considered. 
In 1983 reports of the National Academy of Sciences and the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency initiated a discussion about the relative 
merits of adaptive and preventive policy responses. Neither study 
thoroughly considered the factors which might limit the success of the 
different policy responses. Therefore, the Humphrey Institute of Public 
Affairs, the National Center for Atmospheric Research, the World Resources 
Institute, and the Ecosystems Center of the Marine Biological Laboratory 
sponsored a symposium, of which these are the proceedings, to continue the 
process of defining the larger policy context in which the greenhouse prob-
lem is embedded. The participants sought to redefine the problem in terms 
of the factors that might limit any one set of policy strategies, the 
criteria that might be of most use in the choice of policy options, and the 
time frame within which actions must be taken. 
It was assumed that policies to limit the atmospheric accumulation of 
greenhouse gases should take into account the potential for limiting green-
house gas concentrations to different levels, and the risk associated with 
different atmospheric concentrations. The potential for limiting future 
releases of carbon dioxide varies inversely with continued growth in the 
rate of fossil fuel consumption and with the time of policy action. Also, 
it was assumed that there is probably,a set of adaptive measures which will 
be limited by the time of their implementation and by other factors. 
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The symposium addressed eight major topics: 
• realizable rates at which growth in global fossil fuel consumption 
can be slowed and finally reversed; 
• the required timing of policy initiatives to limit atmospheric carbon 
dioxide concentrations to various ceiling amounts; 
• the extent of the risk and cost to society of different rates of 
fossil fuel deceleration; 
• the types of adaptive measures that might help society ameliorate the 
impacts of global climate change on society; 
• the factors that potentially limit the set of adaptive measures and 
the costs and risks involved in such adaptation; 
• the risks of an extended period of inaction; 
• short-term and long-term actions which should be taken; 
• critical issues in the policy analysis of the greenhouse issue. 
Unfortunately, several factors contributed to a considerable delay 
between the symposium and the publication of these proceedings. The editors 
apologize for this delay. The authors have had the opportunity to revise 
their papers following the symposium. In some cases, the papers were sub-
stantially revised. 
There have been a number of developments since the symposium. Elements 
of the U.S. Congress have begun to recognize the issue, and hearings have 
been held. In October 1985, an expert conference of the World Meteorologi-
cal Organization, the United Nations Environmental Programme, and the Inter-
national Council of Scientific Unions called for a long-term policy response 
to the problem. Recent work has continued to refine the scientific basis 
for the problem. 
Only one of these developments has, however, fundamentally changed the 
policy issues which the symposium addressed. It is now clear that the 
greenhouse gases other than carbon dioxide are much more important than had 
previously been recognized. This recognition, together with the realization 
that most of the other gases will be exceedingly difficult to control, may 
increase the urgency of efforts to limit the releases of carbon dioxide if 
indeed society decides to limit global warming. The warming caused by the 
other gases has dramatically advanced the time of the overall projected glo-
bal warming. Hence, any adaptive response might also need to be implemented 
sooner than has been anticipated. 
The editors gratefully acknowledge the support which made this work 
possible. Financial support was provided by the University of Minnesota's 
Center for Urban and Regional Affairs and the Hubert H. Humphrey Institute 
of Public Affairs; by the National Center for Atmospheric Research; by the 
World Resources Institute; and by a generous grant from the Joyce Mertz-
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Gilmore Foundation. Publication of the symposium proceedings would not have 
been possible without the dedicated work of editors Judith Weir, Ellen 
Hawley, and Chris McKee, and typists Chris McKee and Louise Duncan. 
This work would have not been possible without the help and encourage-
ment provided by the Symposium Organizing Committee, which included, in 
addition to the editors: John Firor, National Center for Atmospheric 
Research; Gus Speth and Irving Mintzer, World Resources Institute; and 
George M. Woodwell, Ecosystems Center, Marine Biological Laboratories. 
The editors also acknowledge the contributions of those symposium 
participants who did not write papers and of several others who assisted 
with the reviewing and editing of the papers. The organization of these 
proceedings and the introductions to each section are the sole responsi-
bility of the editors. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Global warming resulting from the atmospheric release of gases 
collectively called greenhouse gases may prove to be one of the most vexing 
problems facing contemporary society. The most important greenhouse gases, 
carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide result from the most basic of 
human activities--energy conversion and changing land-use. 
A substantial warming is possible within the next few decades. Even 
conservative analyses indicate that, if vigorous efforts are not made to 
constrain the production and release of the greenhouse gases, well before the 
end of the next century we may be committed to an increase in average global 
temperature of over 6 degrees Celsius. A warming of 2 or 3 degrees is 
plausible within the next few decades. This would result in climate changes 
greater than any experienced since the beginning of written history. Study 
after study shows that a warming of several degrees and rates of warming 
approaching 0.5 degrees Celsius per decade are possible in the relatively 
near future. 
At least seven federal agencies, including the Environmental Protection 
Agency, the Department of Energy, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the 
National Science Foundation, and the Department of State, and about a dozen 
executive branch offices, are said to have programs related to global 
warming. Congress has held several informational hearings and more are 
scheduled. On the international scene, the World Meteorological Organiza-
tion, the United Nations Environmental Programme, the International Council 
of Scientific Unions, and other coordinating and consulting bodies have 
programs. Articles are beginning to appear in the popular press and in other 
media. The nonprofit sector has recognized the issue but has not yet given 
global warming more than casual attention. In the private sector, even those 
interests likely to feel the heaviest impact of global warming, for example 
the electric utilities and the coal industry, have given no indication that 
they are aware of its importance. 
The full implications of global warming are not yet generally appre-
ciated. Although awareness of the problem is increasing, governmental and 
private sector policies are as yet largely unaffected. As was the case in 
1984, when the symposium that gave rise to this volume was held, suggested 
policy responses are based on individual preferences. Only two responses are 
open to society--the preventive and the adaptive response. Some analysts 
assert that the preventive option simply does not exist because growth in the 
activities which produce the greenhouse gases are so central to human well-
being. Also, it has been suggested that it has not been proven that a warmer 
earth is undesirable. Others are attempting to show that, given the mag-
nitude and rates of warming that ~re likely, only a vigorous preventive 
strategy, mounted in the very near future, can prevent massive disruption of 
social, economic, and ecological systems. 
This issue puts society between a rock and a hard place. Neither 
prevention nor the adaptive response is particularly attractive. Given that 
there are, for all practical purposes, no scrubbers to control the release of 
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industrially-produced greenhouse gases, to implement a preventive response, 
it may be necessary to curtail the activities which give rise to the gases. 
Many of the lesser greenhouse gases are associated with activities which it 
would b~ problematic to curtail like tropical and subtropical agriculture. 
Hence, prevention may depend on the extent to which the use of fossil fuels, 
particularly coal use, can be reduced. Given the inherent unattractiveness 
of nuclear power and the perception that solar and other renewable energy 
technologies are either immature or very expensive, agreement on the need to 
reduce global coal use may require prolonged discussion. Preventive 
strategies are, therefore, intimately intertwined with energy policy. 
There are several approaches to the adaptive response. Society can rely 
on the market; it can anticipate climate change and rely on a long-range 
planning response; or it can muddle through. As the editors attempt to show 
in their paper on the role of uncertainty, market and anticipatory planning 
strategies are unlikely to be successful because of considerations involving 
informational requirements, positive discount rates, and rates of climate 
change. 
This volume addresses possible policy responses to global warming. The 
first paper represents the editors' understanding of the physical basis of 
global warming, and they have also prepared brief introductions to each 
section of the volume. The second section of the book contains a series of 
papers by Robert Williams et al., by John Hoffman and Stephen Seidel, by John 
Laurmann, and by John Firor which focus on matters directly relating to the 
feasibility of a preventive response. In the third section, papers by 
William Riebsame, by Charles Crist and Daniel Reinartz, and by James Titus 
address the adaptive response. The fourth section contains three quite 
different attempts, by Irving Mintzer and Alan Miller, by Lester Lave, and by 
the editors to formulate frameworks within which policies may be considered. 
The final section contains a single paper by Thomas Johansson and Robert 
Williams, outlining an energy strategy for industrialized countries, which, 
if followed, would substantially reduce emissions of carbon dioxide, the most 
important of the greenhouse gases. 
The editors hope that these discussions will contribute to the evolving 
policy debate. Policy initiatives must be based on assessments of society's 
ability to respond, without unnecessary disruption, to either the conse-
quences of the warming or to the stresses associated with actions taken to 
limit the emissions of carbon dioxide and the other greenhouse gases. We 
hope that these issues will be addressed and be given the emphasis which they 
deserve and will soon demand. 
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SECTION 1: PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION OF THE PROBLEM 
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THE GLOBAL GREENHOUSE PROBLEM 
Peter Ciborowski 
University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota 
Dean Abrahamson 
University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota 
INTRODUCTION 
The global climate is on the verge of a major alteration. As a result of 
the combustion of fossil fuel and of other industrial processes, the level of 
carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases in the atmosphere is increasing. 
These gases are radiatively active, and when increased in concentration in the 
atmosphere, they act to increase the resistance of the atmosphere to the loss 
of heat, thereby warming the surface of the planet. The average global 
surface temperature of the earth is expected to increase by 4 to 5 degrees 
Celsius over the next 100 years as a result of emission of these infrared 
active gases to the atmosphere. Such a warming would be unprecedented in the 
experience of society. 
People influence climate in many ways: by releasing waste heat from urban 
areas; by introducing aerosols into the troposphere; and by effecting changes 
in surface vegetation that can change local radiation budgets. However, none 
of these influences have ever affected climate on a global scale. In the 
future, human effects on climate will be global in nature, and may result in 
the most pervasive set of environmental changes ever experienced by humanity. 
THE ENERGY BALANCE AND CLIMATE CHANGE 
Climate is the long-term set of atmospheric conditions pertaining to sur-
face warmth; available moisture; the movements of air, humidity, storminess, 
and so on. It results from the energy balance of the planet. The surface 
heat, or energy, balance in turn results from the interplay of a number of 
factors: the amount of radiant energy that strikes the earth- atmosphere 
system; the amount of energy reflected back to space; the rate at which energy 
is lost to space by the atmosphere-surface system; and any resistance encoun-
tered by the surface in the loss of heat to space. The first of these is a 
well known quantity. Averaged over an entire year, the earth intercepts about 
343 watts per square meter (w/m2) at the top of the atmosphere. The albedo, 
or reflectivity of the planet, is likewise a well known quantity. Of all 
radiant energy incident at the top of the atmosphere, about 100 w/m2 , or 30 
percent, is reflected back to space, 25 percent by the earth's cloud cover and 
5 percent by snow and ice cover. 1 
The rate at which energy is lost by the atmosphere-surface system is 
fairly well known. In order to maintain a constant temperature, the earth's 
atmosphere-surface system must radiate an amount of energy equal to that 
absorbed. Hence, the net emission to space is 240 w/m2 . 
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By contrast, the.resistance of the surface-atmosphere system to the loss 
of heat is more complex. Like any body of its size, the earth loses energy 
through the emission of heat, or long-wave (thermal) radiation, to space. As 
a result, the surface radiates energy to space in the long-wave spectral 
region (4 to 50 microns). However, at these wavelengths, the earth's atmos-
phere is quite resistant to the loss of heat. The atmosphere contains gases 
that absorb in the infrared, particularly near the peak of surface emission, 
near 10 microns. The atmosphere intercepts a part of this long-wave surface 
emission, and, absorbing it, reemits it in all directions. Some is emitted 
downward. Rather than escaping to space, this heat is trapped in the lower 
atmosphere, whose temperature must rise as a result. Given a rise in tempera-
ture in the lower atmosphere, downward atmospheric emission to the surface 
must increase, leading to increased surface temperatures. 2 
By thus retarding the planet's radiative cooling processes, the presence 
of these infrared active gases in the atmosphere warms the planet. The sur-
face of the planet is roughly 33 degrees Celsius warmer than it would be were 
the atmosphere transparent to escaping long-wave radiation. 3 Water vapor, 
carbon dioxide, and ozone are the most important of these infrared active 
gases. 4 
Climates change when the planetary energy balance is noticeably altered. 
At the regional level, climate change can, up to some limiting condition, be 
broadly related to a change in mean global surface temperature. Caught 
between tropical and subtropical climates at the equator and glacial climates 
in the high latitudes, climate tends to move toward either a more glacial or a 
warmer, more tropical state upon a change in planetary temperature. With 
increased surface heating, the climate will warm. Ice cover will increasingly 
recede. Glacial climates associated with ice cover will likewise recede, to 
be replaced by more moderate climates. By contrast, given a global cooling, 
the climate will move toward a broad expansion of glacial climates and toward 
a colder overall climate. 5 
Of.the many causes of naturally occurring climatic change, few are of 
interest on time-scales of less than hundreds of thousands to millions of 
years. The two types of change that might be of interest are the change ex-
perienced on time-scales of several hundred years and the oscillation between 
glacial and interglacial conditions. 
At present, the climate of the planet is fixed in a cool glacial-
interglacial mode. Due to glaciation at both poles, the planet is quite 
reflec·tive of incoming solar radiation and, receiving less radiation, is 
rather cool. At relatively low planetary temperatures, the climate oscillates 
between a glacial and an interglacial state. Responding to slight changes in 
the amount of solar radiation received in the high latitudes, continental ice 
sheets advance and retreat in response to changes in orbital parameters. 
Downward variation in the amount of incident summer insolation in the high 
latitudes acts to reduce the rate of summer snow melt, leading to the accumu-
lation of snow and ice cover. Over long periods of time, the earth's orbit 
and tilt change fairly systematically. The amount of summer solar radiation 
received in high latitudes is quite sensitive to these changes. The increased 
expanse of the ice sheets acts to depress surface temperatures. In its inter-
glacial state, mean global temperature is depressed as much as 4 to 5 degrees 
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Celsius by the permanent ice fields and pack ice. 6 The effect of snow and ice 
accumulation during the ice ages of the last million years has been to depress 
the mean global surface temperature an additional 4 degrees Celsius. 
It has been concluded that the climate's periodic oscillation between 
glacial and interglacial conditions has resulted from such a sequence of 
events. 7 The onset of the next glaciation can be expected within several 
thousand years, and as such, movement back into a glacial age can be under-
stood to constitute the very long-term climatic future of the planet. 
By contrast, over periods of anywhere from decades to hundreds of years, 
the climate is remarkably stable. Some typical rates of change in surface 
temperature are shown in Table 1. Since very pronounced changes in climate 
occur only over long periods, typically thousands to hundreds of thousands of 
years, such changes are unnoticeable on the time-scales typical of a human 
life. 
Table 1 
NATURAL CLIMATIC FLUCTUATION REPRESENTED AS THE SUM 
OF CYCLICAL CHANGES 
Characteristic 
Period 
(in yrs.) 
100,000 
20,000 
2,500 
200 
100 
Fluctuation in 
Surface Temperature 
(in degrees C.) 
6 
3 
2 
0.5 
0.5 
Maximum Rate of 
Temperature Change 
(in degrees C./yr.) 
± 0.00025 
± 0.00045 
± 0.00075 
± 0.0075 
± 0.015 
Source: Interdepartmental Committee for Atmospheric Sciences, Report of the 
Ad Hoc Panel on the Present Interglacial, ICAS 18b-FY75 (Washington, D.C.: 
National Science Foundation, Federal Council for Science and Technology, 
1974). 
The last five significant changes in mean global temperature are noted in 
Table 2. None of these involved a departure of more than 1.5 degrees Celsius 
from the present value. The time period was reasonably short, from hundreds 
to a few thousand years. The warming in the Altithermal was probably related 
to orbital influences. Longer-term solar influences may have been involved in 
the others.* But most of these ciimate effects have not been satisfactorily 
*Over long periods, the flux of radiation at the top of the atmosphere 
varies. 8 It has been suggested that such a solar influence operates on time-
scales of about 180 years and, on those time-scales, might translate to a 
climate influence of as much as 0.7 degrees Celsius. 9 
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explained. At most, one can say that, over periods of hundred of years, one 
finds a natural variation in mean global surface temperature of 1 to 1.5 
degrees Celsius around the present value. This change is not insignificant. 
At the regional level, warming or cooling can be expressed in the form of 
changes in the boundaries separating different climates. Roughly speaking, 
the scale of this displacement is on the order of hundreds of kilometers (km) 
per degree Celsius change in temperature. 10 
Table 2 
CLIMATE CHANGE, 8,000 YBP TO PRESENT 
Period 
Pre-Boreal, 7,500 YBP 
Altithermal, 5,000 YBPa 
Roman, 2,000 YBP 
Early Medieval, 800 YBPb 
Little Ice Age, 500 to 200 YBPc 
Note: YBP = years before present. 
Change from Present 
(in degrees Celsius) 
-0.5 
+l 
+0.5 
+? 
-0.5 to 1 
(a) See T. Webb III and T. Wigley, "What Past Climates Can Indicate 
About a Warmer World," in Projecting the Climatic Consequences of 
Increasing Carbon Dioxide, M. MacCracken and F. Luther, eds., 
DOE/ER-0237 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Energy, 1985). 
(b) See L. Williams and T. Wigley, "A Comparison of Evidence for Late 
Holocene Summer Temperature Variations in the Northern Hemisphere," 
Quaternary Research 20 (1983): 286. 
(c) See I. Smith and W. Budd, "The Derivation of Past Climate Changes 
From Observed Changes of Glaciers," in Sea Level, Ice and Climatic 
Change, I. Allison, ed., publication 131 (Wallingford, U.K.: 
International Association of Hydrological Sciences, 1981) 
FUTURE CLIMATE CHANGE 
Among the influences on climate that are important on time-scales of 
decades to a few hundred years, only one, an increasing greenhouse effect, is 
likely to significantly affect future climate. Orbital factors are unlikely 
to affect global climate on these time-scales. As noted above, the modeling 
suggests that, although it is inevitable on time-scales of many thousands of 
years, the onset of a cooler period due to a change in the eccentricity of the 
planet's orbit is at least a millennium into the future. 11 On time-scales of 
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10 to 100 years1 the solar influence is limited to a few tenths to half a 
degree Celsius. 2 
The same is in large part true of volcanic aerosols. Once injected as 
sulfate aerosols into the stratosphere, such aerosols act to increase the 
opacity of the atmosphere to incoming solar radiation, cooling the planet. A 
particularly explosive event can reduce the mean global temperature by as much 
as 2 degrees Celsius. 13 But, in fact, due to their short residence times (two 
to four years), the effect of volcanic aerosols is usually more limited. The 
full response depends on other parts of the climate system (e.g., the oceans) 
with much longer response or relaxation times. As a result, the full response 
is rarely experienced. An extended period of intense, concentrated explosive 
volcanism could be climatically important, but extended periods of explosive 
volcanism are rare, occurring once every 1,000 to 100,000 years over periods 
as long as a decade, and once every 10,000 to 1 million years for periods as 
long as one hundred years. 14 Overall, the record suggests a background 
influence from explosive volcanism of perhaps -0.2 to -0.5 degrees Celsius 15 
which a future influence would need to exceed to result in a noticeable cool-
ing from the present. 
Other possible non-greenhouse influences are shown in Table 3. By and 
large, they are minor. Energy production releases heat to the atmosphere. 
Deforestation changes surface reflectivity and favors a cooling. Generally, 
industrially-produced tropospheric aerosols absorb short-wave radiation 
reflected by the planetary surface and radiate long-wave radiation to the 
surface, warming it. Were they to increase, which is the usual scenario, they 
would slightly warm the planet. 16 
By contrast, changed atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide are 
expected to raise the mean global surface temperature by 2 to 8 degrees 
Celsius. Through combustion activities, the economies of the world release 
carbon dioxide to the atmosphere. Over long periods, combustion can result in 
the accumulation of significant amounts of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. 
The fossil fuels are the principal culprits in release of carbon dioxide to 
the atmosphere. Carbon dioxide is released to the atmosphere through the 
combustion of any of the fossil fuels. The fossil fuels, however, form one of 
the fundamental bases for industrial civilization. The global energy system 
is at least 90 percent dependent on the fossil fuels and is wedded to them for 
at least the next three or four decades. As a result_, significant amounts of 
carbon dioxide could accumulate in the atmosphere as a result of industrial 
activities. 
Based on what we know about industrialization and economic growth in the 
modern world, we think that long-term releases of carbon dioxide can be pre-
dicted. Estimates for these go as high as 1,000 parts per million (ppmv), 17 
or an amount sufficient to raise mean global surface temperature by 4 to 8 
degrees Celsius. The most believable estimates of the future atmospheric 
accumulation of carbon dioxide suggest a rise on the order of 2.5 to 4 degrees 
Celsius.* · 
*For an annual rate of increase in fossil fuel use of 1.5 percent per year 
sustained over the next century, an airborne fraction of 0.6 to 0.65, a non-
fossil carbon release of 50 to 150 ppmv, and a delay in the response of the 
atmosphere of fifteen to forty-five years. 
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Table 3 
POTENTIAL INFLUENCES ON CLIMATE, 1985-2100 
Climate Influences 
Volcanic aerosolsa 
Surface heat emissionb 
Deforestationc 
Tropospheric aerosolsd 
Stratospheric ozone depletione 
Effect 
(in degrees Celsius) 
(+) 0.1 - 0.2 
(-) 0.1 - 0.2 
slight warming 
(±) 0.1 - 0.2 
(a) No increase in the introduction of volcanic aerosols should be 
expected. 
(b) See W. Kellogg, Effects of Human Activities on Global Climate, WMO 
486 (Geneva: World Meteorological Organization, 1977). 
(c) See R. Dickinson, "Effects of Deforestation on Climate," in Blowing 
in the Wind: Deforestation and Long-Range Implications, V. Sutlive, 
N. Altshuler, and M. Zamora, eds., Studies in Third World Societies 
(Williamsburg, Vir.: College of William and Mary, Department of 
Anthropology, 1981). 
(d) See W. Kellogg, "Aerosols and Climate," in Interactions of Energy 
and Climate, W. Bach, J. Pankrath, and J. Williams, eds. (Dor-
drecht, Netherlands: D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1980). 
(e) See V. Ramanathan et al., "Climate-Chemical Interactions and 
Effects of Changing Atmospheric Trace Gases," Reviews of Geophysics 
25 (1987): 1,441. 
In addition, atmospheric levels of other infrared active gases are also 
expected to increase as a result of human activities. The most important of 
these include methane, nitrous oxide, and the chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs). It 
is believed that increased atmospheric levels of these gases will add an addi-
tional 2 to 3 degrees Celsius to the surface warming. With this additional 
increase, the possible average global surface warming is in excess of 4 to 7 
degrees Celsius, or roughly three to five times the typical one-hundred year 
variation in surface temperature (see Table 3). 
An Intensified Greenhouse Effect 
The mechanism of an intensified greenhouse effect is exactly the same as 
that which gives us the present background greenhouse effect. As an infrared 
active gas, carbon dioxide absorbs in many of the same wavelengths that the 
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surface of the earth emits heat to space. Absorbing this heat, it warms the 
surrounding atmosphere and increases the atmosphere's emission of heat to the 
surface, thereby warming it. Any increase in the number of molecules of 
atmospheric carbon dioxide will increase the amount of atmospheric absorption 
and, through a further increased downward emission of heat from the atmosphere 
to the surface, further warm the surface. 
The greenhouse effect results from the particular ways in which the 
carbon dioxide molecule and other molecules interact with radiation in the 
atmosphere. Upon absorbing energy, the molecules become excited and begin to 
vibrate, spin, and bend in a waggling motion. This vibrational energy is 
radiated both upward and downward. The downward component c·ontributes to net 
surface warming. 
The intensity of a surface warming from an increased concentration of any 
infrared active gas depends on the strength of its absorption bands. Impor-
tant absorbers have absorption bands near the spectral region of peak emission 
of long-wave radiation from the surface, about 10 microns. The wavelength of 
carbon dioxide's absortion bands is near the spectral region of peak emission 
of long-wave radiation from the.surface, making it a powerful absorber. Its 
strongest absorption bands (fundamental, isotopic, and hot bands) are found in 
the 15 micron spectral region, with weaker (hot) bands centering at 10 
microns, two bands centering at 7.6 microns, and other weak bands in the 12 to 
18 micron spectral region. 18 
A number of absorption bands are located in the spectral region from 8.5 
to 12.5 microns, known as the "atmospheric window." The atmosphere contains 
almost no important absorbers in this region, making it largely transparent in 
this spectral region. Once added to the atmosphere, infrared active gases 
absorbing at these wavelengths are often very powerful absorbers and, even in 
very small concentrations, can influence the heat balance of the planet. In 
this sijectral region, temperature increases almost linearly with concentra-
tion.1 
By contrast, the main absorption bands at 15 microns are in an optically 
thick spectral region. Due to the level of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, 
the center of the band is saturated. As a result, absorption in this region 
occurs largely in the wings of the 15 micron band. Temperature is related 
logarithmically, rather than linearly, to concentration in this band. Temper-
ature increases with increasing concentration, but at a decreasing rate. Of 
absorption in the many carbon dioxide bands, absorption in the bands centering 
at 15 microns is by far the most important. It accounts for roughly 80 
percent of the increased absorption and surface warming associated with a 
doubling to a quadrupling of the ~resent atmospheric level of carbon dioxide, 
dominating long-wave absorption. 20 Given this fact, the surface temperature 
response to increased atmospheric levels of carbon dioxide as a whole is 
logarithmic, each successive doubl.ing of concentration yielding the same 
increase in surface temperature. 
' No limiting temperature is foreseen in the case of increased atmospheric 
levels of carbon dioxide, since, over the types of increase in concentration 
that might be realized over the next few centuries, the absorption bands 
located in the spectral region from 8.5 to 12.5 microns will probably not 
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saturate. 21 These will contribute to the surface·warming even at very high 
atmospheric levels of carbon dioxide. 
Other Gases 
The other gases are assumed to act on the climate in essentially the same 
way as carbon dioxide. For the most part, they have residence times longer 
than a year and are well mixed in the atmosphere. All have infrared absorp-
tion bands in the 4 to 15 micron region (see Table 4). Some of the more 
important of these include: methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (NzO), and the 
principal chlorofluorocarbons (CFC-11, CFC-12). Others include: carbon 
tetrafluoride (CF4), carbon tetrachloride (CCl4), acetylene (CzHz), methyl 
chloroform (CH3Ccl3), methylene chloride (CH2cl2), tropospheric ozone (03), 
and the chlorofluorocarbons of lesser importance, CFC-113, CFC-22, and CFC-
116.22 
The effect of the other gases is most often treated as an amplification 
of the projected carbon dioxide-induced warming, and the future aggregate 
effect of these gases is described in terms of a sensitivity parameter that 
amplifies the carbon dioxide warming by some constant factor. This is neces-
sary for several reasons, not the least of which is the fact that, although 
future rates of increase in the atmospheric levels of these gases are poorly 
known, their number is sufficiently large that a constant factor increase can 
be assumed to capture the general magnitude of their effect on surface temper-
atures. In addition, the use of a sensitivity parameter can capture somewhat 
the effect of an increasing number of gases being added to the list of poten-
tial important future infrared absorbers. 23 Given a very long time horizon, a 
significant expansion is possible. 
Climate Sensitivity 
The radiative effects of increasing atmospheric levels of the infrared 
active greenhouse gases are related to a change in surface temperature through 
a climate sensitivity estimate. The sensitivity of surface temperature to 
increased concentrations of carbon dioxide is estimated for a doubling of 
concentration. The response of surface temperatures is made up of two dis-
tinct processes: the direct radiative effects of an increased atmospheric 
level of carbon dioxide and the subsequent response of water vapor, ice 
sheets, and other aspects of climate to this radiative forcing. Given a 
surface warming due to the effects of an increased atmospheric level of carbon 
dioxide, additional water vapor will be introduced into the atmosphere and, 
since water vapor is a greenhouse gas, it will, in increased concentrations 
(for a doubling, a 15 to 30 percent increase24), increase the resistance of 
the atmosphere to the loss of heat and warm the troposphere and surface. 25 
Seasonal snow and ice cover will decline with an intensifying greenhouse 
effect, leading to a reduction in the planet's reflectivity and an increase in 
the amount of short-wave radiation received at the surface. 26 This will warm 
the surface. Cloud cover changes may add to or subtract from the warming. An 
increase of dense, low-lying clouds will tend to damp out some of the surface 
warming, whereas an increase in high, thin clouds will amplify it. 
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Table 4 
GREENHOUSE GASES: ABSORPTION BANDS, CONCENTRATIONS, AND RATES OF INCREASE 
Present Approx. Approx. 
Band Present Rate of Period 1850 
Center Concen- Increase of Concen-
Compound (microns) trationa (%/yr) Riseb tration 
CO2 15 345 ppmv 0.4c 1880-1985 270 ppmv 
03 9.6 20-100 ppmv 1 d 1850-1985 (-) 25% 
N2o 7.8,17,4.5 306 ppbv 0.2-0.4e 1870-1985 285 ppbv 
CH4 7.7 1.70 ppmv 1f 1600-1985 850 ppbv 
CFC-11 9. 2, 11. 8 220 pptv 5g 1950-1985 
CFC-12 9.1,8.7,10.9 375 pptv 5g 1940-1985 
CCl4 13 130 pptv lg 1915-1985 
CF4 7.8 70 pptv 3h 1880-1985 
CFC-22 12.4,7.6,9 90 pptv 10-14i 1960-1985 
CFC-113 8.5,11,12 45 pptv 12-15j 1965-1985 
CH3CC13 14.2,9.2 130 pptv 6g 1955-1985 
CH2c12 7.9,13.4 30 pptv 5k 1945-1985 
co 120 ppbv 1-21 1850-1985 (-) 15-55%m 
NOx n 30-100 pptv ? ? ? 
(a) Values for nitrous oxide, CFC-11, CFC-12, CFC-113, CFC-22, methane, methyl 
chloroform, and carbon tetrachloride are 1985 values; see the data from R. 
Prinn et al., presented in L. Ember et al., "Tending the Global Commons," 
Chemical and Engineering News 64 (1986): 16, and World Meteorological 
Organization, Atmospheric Ozone 1985. Assessment of Our Understanding of 
the Processes Controlling its Present Distribution and Change, WMO Global 
Ozone Research and Monitoring Project Report no. 16 (Geneva: WMO, 1986). 
The rest are 1980 values taken from V. Ramanathan et al., "Trace Gas 
Trends and Their Potential Role in Climate Change," Journal of Geophysical 
Research 90 (1985): 5,547. 
(b) See D. Wuebbles, M. MacCracken, and F. Luther, A Proposed Reference Set of 
Scenarios For Radiatively Active Atmospheric Constituents, DOE/NBB-0066 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Energy, 1984). 
(c) See R. Gammon, E. Sundquist, and P. Fraser, "History of Carbon Dioxide in 
the Atmosphere," in Atmospheric Carbon Dioxide and the Global Carbon 
Cycle, J. Trabalka ed., DOE/ER-0239 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of 
Energy, 1985). 
(d) See J. Logan, "Tropospheric Ozone: Seasonal Behavior, Trends, and Anthro-
pogenic Influence," Journal of Geophysical Research 90 (1985): 10,463; and 
G. Tiao et al., "A Statistical Trend Analysis of Ozonesonde Data," Journal 
of Geophysical Research 91 (1986): 13,121. 
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(e) See M. Khalil and R. Rasmussen, "Increase and Seasonal Cycles of Nitrous 
Oxide in the Earth's Atmosphere," Tellus 35B (1983): 161. 
(f) See D. Blake and F. Rowland, "World-wide Increase in Tropospheric Methane, 
Journal of Atmospheric Chemistry 4 (1986): 43. 
(g) See Ember et al. in note (a) above. 
(h) See P. Fabian et al., 11 CF4 and C2F6 in the Atmosphere," Journal of Geo-
physical Research 92 (1987): 9,831. 
(i) See R.A. Rasmussen and M.A. Khalil, "Atmospheric Fluorocarbons and Methyl 
Chloroform at the South Pole," Antarctic Journal of the United States: 
1982 Review (1982): 203. 
(j) See D.R. Blake, Testimony Before the U.S. Senate Committee on Energy and 
Natural Resources, November 9, 1987. 
(k) See E. Bauer, "A Catalogue of Changing Influences on Stratospheric Ozone," 
Journal of Geophysical Research 84 (1979): 6,929. 
(1) See M. Khalil and R. Rasmussen, "Global Trends of Carbon Monoxide," Eos 68 
(1987): 1,213 (abstract). 
(m) See A.M. Thompson and R.J. Cicerone, "Possible Perturbations to Atmos-
pheric CO, CH4 , and OH," Journal of Geophysical Research 91 (1986): 
10,853. 
(n) N02 has absorption bands at 8.7 and 7.4 microns. 
The direct radiative effects of a doubling are one of the better-known 
parameters in the carbon dioxide-climate problem. 27 They are estimated at 
about 4 watts per square meter in increased downward radiation from the atmos-
phere. This translates roughly to an increase in mean global temperature of 
about 1.2 degrees Celsius. 
By contrast, the feedback responses of the climate system are only 
approximately known. Hence, there is a good deal of divergent opinion as to· 
the specific contribution of these responses to climate sensitivity. The most 
advanced climate models generate sensitivities to doubled atmospheric levels 
of carbon dioxide that fall into a range of 2 to 4.2 degrees Celsius. 28 
Since the direct radiative effect is estimated at about 1 degree Celsius, the 
feedback response from water vapor, ice cover changes, and changes in cloud 
cover contributes 1 to 3 degrees Celsius to the warming. The most advanced of 
this class of climate models calculates sensitivities at the high end of that 
range, 3.5 to 4.2 degrees Celsius. 29 In the case of the higher sensitivity, 
the water vapor feedback dominates the calculation, accounting for more than 
half of the net warming. The direct radiative effects of carbon dioxide 
account for about one-fourth of the surface warming (see Table 5). Of the 
remainder, the ice-albedo effect accounts for about 10 percent. A change in 
cloud distribution and height adds about one-fifth. 
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Table 5 
COMPONENTS OF WARMING FROM DOUBLING OF 
CARBON DIOXIDE, GISS MODEL 
Components Degrees Celsius 
Direct radiative effect 
Positive feedbacks 
Water vapor feedback 
Ice-albedo feedback 
Cloud feedback 
Negative feedbacks 
Lapse rate adjustment 
1.2 
2.7 
0.4 
0.9 
(-) 1.2 
Source: J. Hansen et al., "Climate Sensitivity: Analysis of Feed-
back Mechanisms," in Climate Processes and Climate Sensitivity, J. 
Hansen and T. Takahashi, eds. (Washington, D.C.: American Geo-
physical Union, 1984). 
The strength of these advanced three dimensional models lies in the fact 
that, unlike earlier climate models, they generate sensitivities based on the 
sum of the calculated regional responses of water vapor, snow and ice cover, 
and other aspects of the climate to the direct radiative effects of increased 
levels of carbon dioxide, and do not depend on externally prescribed values. 
This is evident, for instance, in the case of the lapse rate response, one of 
the most important feedback responses of the climate system. The lapse rate 
is the rate at which temperature changes with altitude, and it is important in 
determining the partitioning of heating within the surface-atmosphere system. 
Given a fixed amount of total heating in the atmosphere-surface system, if the 
atmosphere warms more than the surface, the surface must coo1. 30 This is a 
negative lapse rate feedback. A negative response is expected to prevail 
globally (see Table 5), but since the response in higher latitudes is expected 
to be positive, it is tempered by some responses at the regional level. These 
must be individually calculated. 
As a result of the increasing sophistication of climate modeling, the 
range of possible values for climate sensitivity can be assumed to lie within 
the 2 to 4.2 degree Celsius range, and more likely than not toward the higher 
end of that range. The effects of warming on cloud cover constitute the one 
major caveat. Average global surface temperature is sensitive to changes in 
cloud cover. For instance, in order to halve the sensitivity of the climate 
at 35 degrees north latitude to a doubling of the atmospheric level of carbon 
dioxide, low lying clouds need to increase by only 1.5 percent or the abun-
dance of high clouds to decline by 2.5 percent. 31 It is possible that the net 
effect of changes in cloud cover could enhance, limit, or have no effect on 
climate sensitivity. 
A 50 percent reduction in climate sensitivity as a result of the play of 
the cloud parameter is taken as the upper limit to a potential negative cloud 
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feedback. Working from the climate model results of the latest generation of 
general circulation models (GCMs), this results in a lower limit to the warm-
ing of 1.8 to 2.1 degrees Celsius from a doubling of the atmospheric level of 
carbon dioxide. 32 
Compared to the sensitivities that result from simpler models (see Table 
6), the estimates suggested by the GCM results are quite sensitive to an 
increase in the atmospheric level of carbon dioxide. The simpler models, how-
ever, cannot be taken as particularly good indicators of climate sensitivity. 
At best, these models can be taken to indicate the broad magnitude of the 
climate response. The model results depend on a large number of externally 
prescribed values, and this opens the way for many different estimates of what 
globally averaged values might look like for any one climate response. 33 
Given this situation, and the fact that, since they employ many simplifying 
assumptions, the models cannot account for non-radiative convective climate 
processes (e.g., dynamic and thermodynamic processes), the models are not 
sufficiently developed to help one narrowly ascertain climate sensitivity. 
For such purposes, the results of the GCMs are to be preferred. 
Table 6 
ESTIMATED CLIMATE SENSITIVITY FOR DIFFERENT MODEL TYPES 
Model Type 
Radiative convective models 
Energy balance models 
General circulation models 
Latest GCMs 
Note: for a doubling of carbon dioxide. 
Sensitivity 
(in degrees Celsius) 
1.2 - 3.2 
0.8 - 3.5 
2.0 - 4.2 
3.5 - 4.2 
Sources: M. Schlesinger and J. Mitchell, "Model Projections of the 
Equilibrium Climatic Response to Increased Carbon Dioxide," in 
Projecting the Climatic Effects of Increasing Carbon Dioxide, M. 
MacCracken and F. Luther, eds., DOE/ER-0237 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Department of Energy, 1985); M. Schlesinger, "Climate Model Simulations 
of COrinduced Climatic Change," Advances in Geophysics 26 (1984): 141; 
M. Budyko, K. Ya Vinnikov, and N. Yefiinova, "The Dependence of the Air -
Temperature and Precipitation on Carbon Dioxide Concentration in the 
Atmosphere," Meteorology and Hydrology 4 (1982): 5; and W. Clark et al., 
"The Carbon Dioxide Question: A Perspective for 1982," in Carbon 
Dioxide Review: 1982, W. Clark, ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1982). 
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Sensitivity Parameter for the Other Greenhouse Gases 
A first order estimate of the change in m~an global surface temperature 
resulting from the other gases is often estimated against a doubling of 
methane and tropospheric ozone·concentrations, a 25 percent increase in the 
atmospheric level of nitrous oxide, and an increase in levels of the chloro-
fluorocarbons and chlorocarbons each to 1 part per billion (ppbv).* Based on 
the results of one-dimensional energy balance or radiative-convective models, 
such a pattern of increase would yield an increase in mean global surface 
temperature of about 1.5 degrees Celsius. Incorporating the effects of other 
gases increases this. The estimates are based on a model with a sensitivity 
(1.8 degrees Celsius) at the lower end of the accepted range. If adjusted, 
this estimate would be on the order of 1.8 to 3 degrees Celsius. However, 
given the uncertainties in the projected rate of build-up of the other gases, 
these estimates are more properly given as a sensitivity parameter, as dis-
cussed earlier. Much recent work suggests that this sensitivity parameter 
would double the estimated carbon dioxide-induce baseline warming expected in 
the next century. 39 If the present rates of increase were to be utilized to 
define this sensitivity parameter, the baseline warming would be increased by 
an additional 50 percent. 40 
Past Greenhouse Additions to the Atmosphere 
About 140 to 170 billion metric tons (gigatons, or GT) of carbon were 
added to the atmosphere between 1850 and 1985. Because only a part of the 
annually emitted carbon dioxide remains in the atmosphere, the total amount of 
carbon that was emitted to the atmosphere over this period was much larger. 
About 173 GT were released as a result of fossil fuel combustion. 41 Anywhere 
from 90 to 360 GT were released as a result of forest clearing and other land-
use changes in the middle latitudes and the tropics. 42 As a result of human 
activities, the size of the biosphere has been reduced by about 40 percent, 
although this happened over a period of many centuries. 43 The atmospheric· 
concentration of carbon dioxide has increased about 25 percent since 1850, 
rising from the preindustri~l level of 265 to 280 to the present 345 ppmv. 
The4ztmospheric level of methane has been increasing since the sixteenth 
century. The present level is approximately double the preindustrial level 
*Given the expected usages of the chlorofluorocarbons, constant production 
rates might constitute a lower limit on future emissions rates for CFC-11 and 
CFC-lj4 At constant 1977 production rates, concentrations will increase to 2 
ppbv. Based on the projected rates of increase in fossil fuel usage (or 
possibly on rates of agricultural fertilizer application), nitrous oxide is 
expected to increase in concentration by 25 to 50 percent. 35 The atmospheric 
level of methane scales largely wi~h population increase. 36 Based on the ex-
pected rate of population growth, this might be expected to increase 40 to 
100 percent over the next forty-five years. Other temperature-sensitive 
releases of methane would double the present atmospheric level. 37 Concentra-
tions of the chlorocarbons are increasing at annual rates of 3 to 6 percent. 
The tropospheric level of ozone is thought likely to increase by 50 percent 
within forty years.38 
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of 825 ppbv and has increased about 135 to 145 percent since the beginning of 
the global agricultural expansion in the early seventeenth century. The rate 
of increase in the level of methane in the atmosphere has progressively in-
creased, from around 0.1 percent per year in 1800 to about 0.2 percent per 
year in 1886 to 0.6 percent per year in 1900. 45 Modeling exercises indicate 
that the tropospheric ozone level may have increased about 10 percent since 
1945. 46 If so, the preindustrial level would have been about 20 to 60 ppbv. 
There were no preindustrial levels of most of the rest of the infrared 
active gases. The preindustrial level of nitrous oxide was probably about 295 
ppbv, suggesting a cumulative input of 13 million tons of nitrous oxide to the 
atmosphere. With no preindustrial levels (and long lifetimes), the input of 
the other gases would about equal their atmosphere mass, or 3.8 and 5.7 mil-
lion metric tons of CFC-11 and CFC-12, respectively, and 0.7, 0.09, and 3.7 
million metric tons of CFC-22, carbon tetrafluoride, and carbon tetrachloride, 
respectively. 47 At present, about 785 thousand metric tons total of CFC-11 
and CFC-12 are produced annually. Annual global production of carbon tetra-
fluoride and methyl chloroform is estimated at 1,030 and 545 thousand metric 
tons, respectively. 48 
Present Rates of Increase 
The atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide is increasing at a annual 
rate of about 0.4 percent. The present annual net addition of carbon to the 
atmosphere is about 3.5 GT, resulting in an annual increase in the atmospheric 
level of carbon dioxide of about 1.5 ppmv per year. The atmospheric concen-
tration of methane is increasing by about 1 percent per year49 and at that 
rate would double in seventy years. Concentrations of CFC-11 and CFC-12 are 
increasing about 5 percent per year, although the rate of increase is declin-
ing. With the exception of nitrous oxide, the atmospheric concentrations of 
the remainder of the gases are increasing at rates of anywhere from 1 to 15 
percent per year (see Table 4) .. The atmospheric concentration of nitrous 
oxide is increasing about 0.2 to 0.4 percent per year. 50 
Carbon Dioxide Si~nal? 
The climate has grown about 0.5 degrees Celsius warmer from 1850 to 
1985. 51 This is often taken as evidence of the onset of an intensifying 
greenhouse effect. Other evidence assembled thus far includes: a sustained 
middle latitude warming evident in patterns of glacier retreat; 52 a rising sea 
level; 53 evidence that temperatures in recent years have been among the warm-
est in the last thousand years; changes in diurnial temperatures similar to 
those that might be expected with an intensifying greenhouse effect; 54 and 
indications of a long-term Arctic warming taken from temperature profiles of 
Alaskan soils. 55 Evidence of a stratospheric cooling, a consequence of an 
intensifying greenhouse effect, is also available. 56 
In a narrow technical sense, the relationship between past releases of 
carbon dioxide and the historic rise in mean global surface temperature has 
not been confirmed by an unambiguous signal from nature. 57 The warming trend 
has yet to emerge outside the range of natural temperature variability, and 
-18-
until it does it will not be possible to say for certain that it is not the 
product of random climatic fluctuation. 
This situation is not unexpected. The response of the climate system to 
an external perturbation, like a change in the atmospheric carbon dioxide 
concentration, is not immediate. In some cases, years are required for the 
system to fully respond to a change. The most important brake on the climate 
system is found in the mass of the earth's oceans, which have a large heat 
capacity and can delay the effects of a change in the atmospheric level of 
carbon dioxide from two to five decades or longer. 58 As a result, whereas the 
mean global temperature would have been perhaps 0.8 to 1.5 degrees Celsius 
higher than in 1985 had the response of the climate system been immediate, in 
fact, it has warmed only about 0.5 degrees Celsius. (This effect will con-
tinue to act in the future and will delay any future change for like periods 
of time.) In any case, the full equilibrium warming from past greenhouse 
emissions is in some cases simply not large enough to constitute an unambig-
uous signal, even were its full effects not to be delayed by the heat capacity 
of the oceans. A 0.8 degree Celsius warming remains within or close to the 
range of natural variability, making detection difficult. 
As a result of these factors, most scientists suggest that firm confirma-
tion of the signal is at least a decade or a decade and a half in the future. 
If non-greenhouse factors that influence climate over the short-term can be 
satisfactorily accounted for, it might be possible to separate out the effect 
of increased ambient carbon dioxide and maneuver around these problems. 59 
Future Levels of Climatic Change 
Given some knowledge of the basic parameters involved in climate change, 
estimates of the magnitude and rate of future climate change can be offered. 
Values for the most important parameters used to estimate change at the global 
level are given in Table 7. Based on these values, it is evident that, as a 
result of human activities, global climate will soon warm. 
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Table 7 
PARA.METERS GOVERNING ANTHROPOGENIC CLIMATIC CHANGE, PRESENT-2O7O 
Parameter 
co2 levela 
Other greenhouse gases 
Climate sensitivity to a 
doubling of CO2 
Ocean thermal delay 
Global warming, 2070b 
Likely Value 
670 ppmv 
150% of CO2 
3.5-4.2 degrees C 
40 years 
4-5 degrees C 
Note: assumes that no preventive action is taken. 
Possible Value 
530-830 ppmv 
50-300% of CO2 
2-4.5 degrees C 
20-60 years 
2-6 degrees C 
(a) Based on the apparent airborne fraction (0.58), adjusted upward to account 
for decreasing oceanic uptake of carbon dioxide. Estimates are solely for 
the fossil fuel source. 
(b) Calculated to account for the carbon dioxide released from the biosphere 
and other sources (SO ppmv). 
CLIMATIC CHANGE: THE GEOGRAPHICAL COMPONENT 
Temperature 
Global warming will be disproportionately experienced in the high polar 
regions, mostly due to interactions of increased temperatures on the one hand 
and the water vapor content of polar atmospheres and snow and ice cover on the 
other. 60 Polar temperatures are expected to rise about three times more than 
the temperature of the globe as a whole (see Figure 1). 
Abundant empirical evidence exists to substantiate this polar response to 
a global warming. For instance, the response to the slight (0.5 degree Cel-
sius) warming experienced between 1880 and 1940 was most pronounced in sub-
Arctic regions, where temperatures rose as much as 5 degrees Celsius. 61 
Evidence is also available from warmer periods of the more distant past. 62 
A polar warming will affect the cryosphere. There are large ice sheets 
on the island of Greenland and on Antarctica and in the Arctic basin there is 
a floating sheet of pack ice. Most of the northernmost lands are frozen. In 
middle latitudes there exist cirque and small mountain glaciers. The latter 
would melt upon a small warming. 63 Glacier termini retreat on the order of 1 
km per degree Celsius increase in temperature. 64 
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Figure 1 
ANNUAL SURFACE TEMPERATURE CHANGE FOR INCREASED CARBON DIOXIDE 
(in degrees Celsius) 
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Adapted from S. Manabe and R. Stouffer, "Sensitivity of a Global Climate Model 
to an Increase of co2 Concentration in the Atmosphere," Journal of Geophysical 
Research 85, CIO (1980): 5,529. 
A polar warming resulting from a 4 or 5 degree Celsius increase in mean 
global surface temperature will probably melt the Arctic ice pack65 and ini-
tiate long-term thawing of the continental permafrost. The modeling efforts 
disagree about the nature of the Arctic pack ice's disappearance. Some sug-
gest summer melting and winter reappearance and others a year-round absence of 
ice cover. The temperature rise required to melt the Arctic pack ice is also 
disputed. One needs to go back to the late Tertiary, 3 to 15 million years 
before present, to find a period in which the Arctic basin was clear of ice. 
The mean surface temperature of the planet was probably 4 or 5 degrees Celsius 
higher than now. 66 Some modelers have been able to clear the basin of ice 
with a global warming of 2.5 degrees Celsius. 67 A 5 degree Celsius polar 
warming is estimated to result in a 500 km retreat of summer ice margins, 
leaving the diameter of the ice sheet a mere 1,500 km. 68 The geographical 
extent of the ice pack appears to have declined about 10 percent during the 
1880 to 1940 warming. 69 
A good deal of discussion has focused on the West Antarctic Ice sheet, 
which is grounded on rock lying below sea level. This ice sheet is expected 
to remain in place throughout the rtext 200 years, although it is likely to 
eventually collapse in response to a warming. 70 Global sea levels would rise 
5 to 8 meters were this to occur. 
More likely is melting at the ice sheet's margins. This would raise sea 
levels . Thermal expansion of the upper layers of the ocean would also raise 
sea levels . Sea level would rise about 60 centimeters (cm) with a 1 degree 
warming of the entire ocean. 71 In the next century, sea level is expected to 
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rise 1.5 to 2 meters (see Table 8). 72 From 1880 to 1940, it rose at a rate of 
about 15 cm per century. 73 
Finally, the warming experienced in the equatorial regions is expected to 
be about half the global average, while that of the middle latitudes would be 
about the same as the average global change. 74 
Table 8 
CONTRIBUTION TO RISING SEA LEVEL, 1985-2100 
(In.meters) 
Mountain glaciers and small Arctic ice capsa 
Permafrostb 
Greenlandc 
Antarcticad 
Thermal expansione 
Total 
0.25 
0.02 
0.25-0.61 
0.24-0.5 
0. 72 
1.48-2 .1 
Note: assumes a global surface warming of 4 to 7 degrees Celsius. 
(a) See M. Meier, "Contribution of Small Glaciers to Global Sea Level," 
Science 226 (1984): 1,418. 
(b) See R. Barry, "Snow Cover, Sea Ice and Permafrost," in Glaciers, Ice 
Sheets, and Sea Level: Effects of a CO2-Induced Climatic Change, Com-
mittee on Glaciology, National Research Council, ed., DOE/ER/60235-1 
(Washington, D.C.: Department of Energy, 1985). 
(c) See R. Bindschadler, "Contribution of the Greenland Ice Cap to Changing 
Sea Level: Present and Future," in Committee on Glaciology, National 
Research Council, note (b) above. 
(d) See R. Thomas, "Responses of the Polar Ice Sheets to Climatic Warming," in 
Committee on Glaciology, National Research Council, note (b) above; and C. 
Lingle, "A Model of a Polar Ice Stream and Future Sea-Level Rise Due to a 
Possible Drastic Retreat of the West Antarctic Ice Sheet," in Committee on 
Glaciology, National Research Council, in note (b) above. 
(e) See J. Hoffman, D. Keyes, and J. Titus, Projecting Future Sea Level Rise: 
Methodology, Estimates to the Year 2100 and Research Needs, EPA 230-09-007 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 1983). 
Moisture 
General patterns of precipitation change are suggested by the global 
climate models. 75 The global hydrological cycle should become more active. 
Increased surface heating should lead to a rise in the rate of evaporation, 
and to a concomitant rise in the rate of precipitation (see Figure 2). The 
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models suggest about a 7 to 12 percent increase in global hydrological 
activity. 
Figure 2 
GLOBAL WATER BALANCE CHANGE FOR INCREASED CARBON DIOXIDE 
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Adapted from S. Manabe and R. Stouffer, "Sensitivity of a Global Climate Model 
to an Increase of co2 Concentration in the Atmosphere," Journal of Geophysical 
Research 85, CIO (1980): 5,549. 
However, whereas the net increase in evaporation is spread evenly through 
the year and across latitudes, the net increase in precipitation has a marked 
latitudinal and seasonal character. Precipitation increases substantially in 
the high latitudes. Precipitation, however, remains about the same or changes 
only slightly in the middle latitudes. As a result, spring and summer soil 
moisture declines markedly in the middle latitudes (see Figure 3). Since 
seasonal precipitation in continental interiors is often dependent upon the 
availability of surface moisture, summer precipitation often declines in the 
model results. 76 Significant drying is often evident in the model results for 
the subtro"Qical region of the northern hemisphere (10 to. 30 degrees north 
latitude). 77 · 
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Figure 3 
SOIL MOISTURE CHANGE FOR INCREASED CARBON DIOXIDE 
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Reprinted by permission from S. Manabe, R. Wetherald, and R. Stouffer, "Summer 
Dryness Due to an Increase of Atmospheric CO2 Concentration," Climatic Change 
3 (1981): 372. Copyright© 1981 by D. Reidel Publishing Co. 
In addition, changes in the general circulation of the atmosphere are 
possible. The meteorological equator separates the atmospheric circulations 
of the northern and southern hemispheres. It varies with the respective 
intensities of these hemispheric circulations. The intensity of each 
hemispheric circulation varies with the size of the temperature gradient or 
difference between the poles and the equator. This gradient should, on aver-
age, decline in the northern hemisphere with a melting of the Arctic basin 
ice. This might result in a displacement of the meteorological equator about 
five degrees north from its present location at about five degrees north 
latitude. 78 
The positioning of different climatic regimes is broadly controlled by 
the structure of the circulation of the atmosphere, i.e., by the arrangement 
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of different atmospheric circulations and circulation cells from the equator 
to the poles. A displacement of the northern hemispheric circulation five 
degrees in latitude would result in a concomitant displacement of these 
circulations, perhaps as much as 550 km. 79 If correct, this would bring 
intensely dry anticyclonic influence into the middle latitudes, deflecting 
northward the present circulatory features of middle latitude climates and 
leading to an intense drying.* 
Changes in surface moisture depend on changes in precipitation, and at 
the regional level these cannot often be predicted with any confidence at 
present. Hence, despite th~ plausibility of the above reasoning, there are at 
best a few continental areas and broad latitudinal regions where we can confi-
dently characterize future trends. The continental interior of North America 
constitutes one area of confidence. Drying is likely here. 81 Drying is also 
likely in the continental areas in the middle latitudes. Although, with the 
exception of the situation in the North American sector, one cannot confident-
ly offer moisture projections at the regional level, the evidence nonetheless 
indicates a general drying in a broad latitude band, either in the lower 
middle latitudes or in the middle latitudes from thirty to thirty-eight 
degrees north latitude. 82 The drying shows a clear poleward progression with 
further warming, 83 and so would eventually come to dominate most parts of the 
middle latitudes. 
Elsewhere the situation is more ambiguous. The Mediterranean region of 
the European sector may be an exception. Here the evidence suggests a drying 
analogous to that of the North American interior. In most other regions, the 
evidence is contradictory.** One can say, however, that there is little 
reason to be optimistic about the situation in the most populous region of the 
world, the subtropics and tropics from ten to thirty degrees north latitude, 
where a generalized drying is suggested. 
Ecological Impacts 
Global warming would have a significant effect on natural ecosystems. 
The region of Arctic permafrost and tundra can be expected to retreat poleward 
about 100 to 200 km per degree Celsius increase in mean global temperature. 84 
*A displacement of the main circulatory features would also be expected to 
result from the projected changes in seasonal and permanent ice cover. The 
dominant feature of the middle latitude circulation is the main depression 
track. It typically lies at the edge of seasonal snow and ice cover, or the 
region of greatest surface temperature contrast. It moves north and south 
With the seasonal progression of snow and ice. As snow and ice cover are 
premanently melted back toward the poles, this depression or storm track will 
fol:ow, p~5haps 500 km or more, or,. as the modeling suggests, five degrees in 
latitude. Precipitation in the middle latitudes is dependent on the main 
storm track. Were this storm track to be displaced toward the poles, precip-
itation in the middle latitudes--at least in summer--would decline. 
**For instance, in a belt from zero to twenty degrees south latitude, one 
finds wetter climates, much wetter climates, drier climates, and intensely 
arid climates, depending on the model or analogue that one uses. 
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The same is true of sub-Arctic and temperate tree lines. 8S During past cli-
mate changes, tree lines migrated at maximum rates of a few km per decade. 86 
The rate of migration is constrained by the dispersal rates of seeds and tree 
life. From Table 7, the rate at which tree lines would have to migrate would 
be something on the order of SO to 200 km per decade, or well beyond the rates 
that forest systems can maintain. This suggests the possibility of a general-
ized impoverishment of these ecosystems throughout the middle latitudes. 
Animals would also be affected. Many animals can migrate at rates sub-
stantially in excess of the rates of forest migration. But to the degree that 
due to a rapidly changing cl,imate the stability of ecosystems is substantially 
lessened, the animals that depend on a diverse ecology would undergo consider-
able stress. Human influences would compound this. The migration of species 
would be possible only if it were to go unhindered by the obstructions that 
humankind, since industrialization, has built to the movements of species. 
The ranges of many species are confined to narrow regions surrounded by in-
tense human uses. Species confined to such reserves would probably be unable 
to migrate. 87 
In the high Arctic, the survival of animals that now inhabit the tundra 
would be questionable. During past warm periods, animals have tended to 
migrate northward. 88 If the warming was to be so intense as to lead not 
simply to the displacement of tree lines but to the complete or near complete 
disappearance of the present vegetation of the high latitudes, many polar 
species would simply disappear. Any global warming that was to return the 
planet to conditions like those that prevailed during the late or middle 
Tertiary (e.g., an average global warming of 4 to 6 degrees Celsius) would 
almost certainly result in such a change. 
Implications for Climates of the United States 
, With a global warming of 4 to S degrees Celsius, the climate of the 
United States would probably be warmer and drier. Surface temperatures that 
now prevail in El Paso would shift to Missouri, while those of Kansas City 
would prevail in southern Minnesota. 89 Soil moisture would be reduced. Evi-
dence taken from a wide variety of models, analogues, and other approaches is 
presented in Table 9. It is strongly suggestive of a trend to a much drier 
climate. 
Prospective changes in surface winds are not well understood. The Arctic 
Basin has been modeled to act as a summer heat sink upon the complete summer 
disappearance of the floating ice, leading to increased fluxes of sensible 
heat from about forty degrees north latitude toward the pole, 90 and probably 
increased zonal circulation and increased surface wind. High·zonal index 
historically has been related to drought episodes, 91 and could increase the 
frequency of drought throughout much of the central and western United States, 
although this could have been predicted simply on the basis of a change to a 
generally drier climate. 92 
The water balance would be affected by a global warming. Due to changes 
in the timing of seasons, snow melt would take place about a month sooner than 
at present. Evaporation would also be higher, and precipitation might be 
reduced in summer. Strearnflow would also decline93 (see Table 10). 
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Table 9 
MOISTURE CHANGES IN THE MIDDLE OF THE CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES 
Summer Soil 
Type of Evidence Moisture 
Climate Models 
GDFL 1986 Drier 
GDFL 1981 Drier 
NCAR 1984 Largely drier 
NCAR 1983 Largely driera 
GISS 1984 Drier 
BMO 1987 Drier 
BMO 1984 Wetterb 
Reconstructions 
Butzer 1980c Drier 
Flohn 1980d Drier 
Suggested b~ Warm 
Decades and Years 
Jaeger 1983 Drier 
Wigley 1979 Drier 
Rind 1985 Largely drier 
Paulutikoff 1984 
Case A, B Drier 
Case C Mixed 
(a) No change in the southern Great Plains. 
(b) Drier in the northern Great Plains. 
(c) Altithermal reconstruction. 
(d) Late Tertiary reconstruction. 
Sources: 
Temperature Rise as 
a Percent of the 
Mean Global Rise 
150-200 
120-150 
below 60 
100 
100-200 
50-100 
100-250 
160-333 
GDFL 1986: S. Manabe and R. Wetherald, "Reduction in Summer Soil Wetness 
Induced by an Increase in Atmospheric Carbon Dioxide," Science 232 (1986): 626. 
GDFL 1981: S. Manabe, R. Wetherald, and R. Stouffer, "Summer Dryness Due to 
an Increase of Atmospheric co2 Conc.entration," Climatic Change 3 (1981): 347. 
NC~ 1984: W. Washington and G. Kiehl, "Seasonal Cycle Experiment on the 
Climate Sensitivity Due to a Doubling of co2 With an Atmospheric General 
Circulation Model Coupled to a Simple Mixed-Layed Ocean Model," Journal of 
Geophysical Research 89 (1984): 9,475. 
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NCAR 1983: W. Washington and G. Meehl, "General Circulation Model Experiments 
on the Climatic Effects Due to a Doubling and Quadrupling of Carbon Dioxide 
Concentration," Journal of Geophysical Research 88 (1983): 6,600. 
BMO 1987: C. Wilson and J. Mitchell, "A Doubled Co2 Climate Sensivitity 
Experiment with a Global Climate Model Including a Simple Ocean Model," 
Journal of Geophysical Research 92 (1987):. 13,315. 
BMO 1984: J. Mitchell and G. Lupton, "A 4 x CO2 Integration with Prescribed 
Changes in Sea Surface Temperature," Progress in Biometeorology 3 (1984): 353. 
GISS 1984: J. Hansen, et al., "Climate Sensitivity: Analysis of Feedback 
Mechanisms," in J. Hansen and T. Takahashi eds., Climate Processes and Climate 
Sensitivity (Washington, D.C.: American Geophysical Union, 1984). 
D. Rind and S. Lebedeff, Potential Climatic Impacts of Increasing Atmospheric 
co2 With Emphasis on Water Availability and Hydrology in the United States, 
EPA 230-04-84-006 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 
1984). 
K. Butzer, "Adaptation to Global Environmental Change," Professional 
Geographer 32 (1980): 269. 
H. Flohn, Possible Climatic Consequences of a Man-Made Global Warming, RR-80-
30 (Laxenburg, Austria: International Institute for Applied Analysis, 1980). 
J. Jaeger and W. Kellogg, "Anomalies in Temperature and Rainfall During Warm 
Arctic Seasons," Climatic Change 5 (1983): 39. 
T. Wigley, P. Jones, and P. Kelly, "Scenarios for a Warm, High-CO2 World," 
Nature 283 (1979): 17. 
J. Palutikoff, T. Wigley, and J. Lough, Seasonal Climate Scenarios for Europe 
and North America in a High-CO2 Warmer World, DOE/EV/10098-5 (Washington, 
D.C.: U.S. Department of Energy, 1984). 
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Table 10 
COMPARISON OF WATER REQUIREMENTS AND SUPPLIES 
IN SEVEN RIVER BASINS 
Present Climate Warmer and Drier Climatea 
Ratio of Percent Ratio of 
Requirement Change in Requirement 
Water Region · to Supply Supply to Supply 
Missouri 0.43 -63.9 1.18 
Arkansas/White/Red 0.18 -53.8 0.39 
Texas Gulf 0.35 -49.8 0.70 
Rio Grande 0.91 -75.7 3. 72 
Upper Colorado 0.99 -39.6 1.65 
Lower Colorado 1.19 -56.5 2.68 
California 0.41 -43.9 0.74 
Seven regions together 0.43 -53 0.90 
(a) With a regional warming of 2 degrees Celsius and a 10 percent decline in 
precipitation. 
Source: R. Revelle and P. Waggoner, "Effects of a Carbon Dioxide-Induced 
Climatic Change on Water Supplies in the Western United States," in Changing 
Climate, Carbon Dioxide Assessment Board, National Research Council (Washing-
ton, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1983). 
. Finally, the number of storms along the southern and eastern coasts might 
increase. More hurricanes would develop as tropical oceans warm and the sur-
face area of waters about 77 Fahrenheit--the temperature needed for the forma-
tion of storms--expands northward. Their intensity would also increase. 94 
EXAMPLE IMPACTS IN THE UNITED STATES 
Agriculture 
The sensitivity of American agriculture to climate is apparent through: 
the distribution of yields across climate regions; 95 the limiting climatic 
conditions at the boundaries of crop ·regions; 96 production in climatically 
marginal producing areas; 97 the geographical pattern of interannual yield 
variability; 98 and the use of fallowing systems. 99 The grain-producing region 
of the U.S. is already too warm and slightly too dry during the critical 
periods of the growing season.lOO For instance, for soybeans, the present 
conditions are too warm in July and August and precipitation is too low in 
July for optimal production (see Figure 4). 
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Figure 4 
INFLUENCE OF CLIMATE FACTORS ON SOYBEAN YIELDS 
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Reprinted from L. Thompson, "Weather and Technology in the Production of-
Soybeans in the Central United States," Agronomy Journal 62 (1970): 232, by 
permission of American Society of Agronomy, Inc. 
Regression analyses and plant physiological models suggest that with a 
global warming yields of the major agricultural crops would decline about 5 
percent per degree Celsius increase in temperature. 101 The response to 
precipitation decline tends to be on the order of about -2 to -10 percent. 102 
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Farmers will respond to these effects and attempt to limit the worst 
effects through the application of technology. This will be most problematic 
at the western and southern margins of the present agricultural belts. Short 
of a major revolution in crop breeding, these marginal areas must go out of 
production or revert to less valuable crops: corn to wheat at the western 
margin of the corn belt (see Figure 5); wheat to sorghum at the western and 
southern margin of the wheat belt. 103 Adaptation of American agriculture to a 
warming will also be limited by: the present and future demands on western 
surface waters (see Table 10); ground water depletion; the costs of new 
irrigation ($400 to 600 per acre104); the effects of increased wind erosion of 
soils (wind erosion varies inversely with soil moisture, and should increase 
as it warms105 ); increased losses to insects; 106 and the absence of suitable 
soils and topography in the more northerly states. 
Figure 5 
SHIFT IN THE CORN BELT FOR A 3 DEGREE CELSIUS WARMING AND A 
10 PERCENT REDUCTION IN SUMMER RAINFALL 
• Oryland corn, warmer climate 
• Irrigated corn, warmer climate 
- Boundary of present corn belt 
Adapted from T. Blasing and A. Solomon, Response of the North American Corn 
Belt to Climate Warming, TR006, Washington, D.C.: United States Department of 
Energy , Office of Energy Research, August 1983. 
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It is impossible to know whether the farmer will be able to limit im-
pacts. It depends on the effect of a warming and drying on the economics of 
the farm. Surface water transfers, if financed by the farmer, would affect 
the economics of production and life on the farm. The relocation of agricul-
tural regions would involve heavy capital costs, particularly if production is 
relocated into regions lacking the required infrastructure: schools, roads, 
soils, and so on.IO] If the farmer was to be forced to absorb these costs, he 
would be significantly affected. Higher production costs would affect the 
ability of the farmer to respond. So, while the system may "adapt," we do not 
really know what that means in any practical sense. It is likely that adapta-
tion will be costly and difficult. 
Coastal Impacts 
A sea level rise of 1.5 to 2 meters would inundate many areas along the 
Atlantic and Gulf coasts. 108 Some cities like Charleston, South Carolina would 
lose up to one-quarter of their present land area. 109 Impacts that are likely 
to result include the destruction of buildings, roads, and other structures 
and the increased costs to localities of maintaining present infrastructures. 
Increased salt water intrusion into groundwater supplies would result and 
degrade water quality. An increase in sea level also would flood many coastal 
beaches. A 0.3 meter rise in sea level would erode most sandy beaches along 
the U.S. Atlantic and Gulf coasts 30 meters inland.llO Barrier islands would 
migrate landward or would break-up. Increased sea levels would also increase 
storm surge and the flooding associated with storms. 111 The annual economic 
costs associated with storm damage in Galveston are estimated to quintuple 
with a sea level rise of several meters. 112 
Rising sea level would destroy habitat critical to the reproductive 
cycles of many migratory birds and marine and fur-bearing animals. It is 
estimated that about 50 to 80 percent of the existing coastal marches would be 
inundated by rising sea level. 113 Higher sea levels would also result in 
higher salinities in U.S. estuaries. With only a 13 cm rise in sea level, 
salinity levels would migrate 2 to 4 km up the Delaware River. 114 
Mitigation of impacts through the construction of dikes, sea walls, 
levees, and other physical structures is thought to be economically justified 
only at locations of substantial value, like population centers, industrial 
centers, and sites of historical interest. 115 Such measures are thought to 
involve large and heretofore unprecedented costs. 116 
Increased Electrical Demand 
Increased ambient temperatures would affect energy utilization in the 
United States. Heating degree days would decline. Heating degree days 
decline about 10 percent for each 1 degree Celsius increase in temperature, 117 
or, for a 5 degree Celsius warming, as much as 50 percent. Heating accounts 
for about 15 percent of total U.S. energy use. So total U.S. energy use might 
decline 8 to 10 percent. 
The number of cooling degree days would also rise, thereby increasing 
peak summer electrical demand. Based on historical evidence taken from the 
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Upper Midwest, peak demand rises about 10 percent for each 2.5 degree Celsius 
rise in temperature. 118 The expanded demand for electricity would arise only 
during the warmest months, so that the net increase in energy consumption 
would be limited. However, given the prevailing trends in the capital costs 
associated with the construction of large thermal power plants, a 20 percent 
increase in electrical generating capacity would represent a formidable 
expansion in capacity. 
SOURCES, SINKS AND POLICY RESPONSES 
Carbon dioxide and the other greenhouse gases are released to the atmos-
phere as a result of human activities. Fossil fuel combustion is by far the 
biggest culprit, but population pressure and land-use changes are factors. 
Any form of intervention would need to target fossil fuel combustion and these 
other influences. 
Carbon Dioxide 
Carbon dioxide results from the oxidation of carbon from the biosphere 
and fossil fuels. Once emitted, 40 to 70 percent is retained in the atmos-
phere and the remainder is absorbed into the oceans. Annually about 5.5 GT of 
carbon are emitted as carbon dioxide as a result of the combustion of fossil 
fuels. 119 Between 0.6 and 2.6 GT per year are released as a result of defor-
estation.120 The conversion of limestone to lime in cement-making may emit 
another 0.1 GT of carbon to the atmosphere. 
Each 3.5 GT of carbon dioxide added to the atmosphere increases the 
reservoir of atmospheric carbon by about 0.5 percent. The atmosphere contains 
about 700 GT of carbon (see Figure 6). About 550 to 650 GT and 1,500 to 2,000 
GT of carbon are held in the terrestrial biota and in soils, respectively. 
The oceans contain about 39,000 GT of carbon. Greater than 10 million GT are 
held as carbonates in limestone and dolomites. Fossil fuel deposits contain 
5 ,000 to 10,000 GT of recoverable carbon. 
Long-term releases of carbon dioxide from tropical deforestation are 
limited by the size of the remaining tropical forests. The total amount of 
carbon that might be added to the atmosphere from this source is limited to a 
maximum 125 GT of carbon, or equivalent to a net addition of about 70 ppmv o~ 
:arbon dioxide to the atmosphere. Revelle and Munk suggest a likely future 
lnput1of about 40 ppmv. 121 Other estimates range from about 30 ppmv up-
ward. 22 A 40 ppmv increase would raise the mean global surface temperature 
by 0.3 to 0.6 degrees Celsius. 
Some of this warming will be countered by the effect of changes in the 
reflectivity of the planet as whole ~ropical areas are denuded of vegetative 
cover. A coolin~ of about 0.1 degrees Celsius or so is likely to result from 
deforestation. 12 But, presumably, increased vegetative growth in higher 
latitudes will compensate for this. Increased growth in higher latitudes 
would result in the net removal of carbon dioxide from the atmosphere. This 
removal might amount to some 50 to 100 GT of carbon, or the equivalent of 15 
to 25 ppmv. 124 On the other hand,.plant respiration would release carbon 
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dioxide to the atmosphere. The respiration rate controls the rate of decay 
plant organic matter. It increases with increasing temperature. Soils 
respire about 20 to 30 percent more per degree Celsius increase in tempera-
ture. Soils might release something like 100 GT of carbon in the next 
century, or the equivalent of 25 ppmv of carbon dioxide. 125 Other minor 
sources of carbon dioxide emissions like ocean outgassing, the decay of 
methane, and cement-making would add to this. (Over the next ninet2 years, 
these might add 30 to 60 ppmv of carbon dioxide to the atmosphere. 1 6) With 
the net contribution from deforestation and forest growth, this suggests a 
biospheric/other source contribution of about 50 to 100 ppmv. 
Figure 6 
EXCHANGEABLE CARBON RESERVOIRS AND FLUXES 
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Source: Carbon Dioxide Effects Research and Assessment Program, U.S. Depart-
ment of Energy, Summary of the Carbon Dioxide Effects Research and Assessment 
Program, 002/1 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Energy, 1980). 
Future increases in atmospheric carbon dioxide resulting from fossil fuel 
combustion are difficult to estimate. The resource base is essentially. 
unlimited in the time horizon of interest. Recoverable resources of fossil 
carbon are large enough to increase atmospheric levels of carbon dioxide to 
four to five times the present level, with an upper limit of five to eight 
times the present level. 127 To date, only about 150 GT, or 3 percent or less 
of the total reserve of recoverable carbon, has been consumed. Most of what 
remains is in the form of coal, oil shale, and tar sands. 
About 370 to 520 GT of carbon are buried beneath the ground as oil and 
natural gas. 128 Most of this is likely to be combusted within the next 
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seventy-five years. This would increase the atmospheric concentration of 
carbon dioxide to about 420 ppmv, or about 150 percent of the preindustrial 
level and, in conjunction with coal consumption at constant 1980 levels, raise 
the level of carbon dioxide to 460 ppmv by 2060. There are about 3,500 to 
4,000 GT of carbon in global coal resources. 129 Assuming the complete combus-
tion of all oil and natural gas, a vigorous coal policy (initial growth rates 
of 4.5 percent per year, declining to 2 percent per year) would raise the 
atmospheric level of carbon dioxide to about 800 ppmv by the year 2075 (see 
Figure 7).130 
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Figure 7 
ATMOSPHERIC CARBON DIOXIDE CONCENTRATION FOR A 
VIGOROUS GLOBAL COAL USE EXPANSION 
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;ource: H. Perry and H. Landsberg, "Projected World Energy Consumption," in 
(nerg? and Climate, Geophysical Research Board, National Academy of Sciences 
Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Sciences, 1977). 
Fossil fuel consumption grew abo.ut 4. 5 percent per year in the period 
from 1945 to 1972. Global fossil fuel combustion has increased about 1.86 
percent per year since 1973, 131 a rate of increase which if continued would 
double the preindustrial level of carbon dioxide by 2055. Most analysts 
Project that consumption will increase between 1.5 and 2 percent per year. 132 
Future rates of increase in combustion depend on economic factors that 
relate energy use to material production in society. They also depend on the 
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scale of production in society (and therefore on population), and on the type 
and the efficiency of production. Given a large population engaged in low 
efficiency, energy-intensive industrial activities, large inputs of carbon to 
the atmosphere are inevitable. 
Not a great deal can be said about releases of carbon to the atmosphere 
as a result of the long-term play of economic forces and the presence of large 
global populations. The energy-economy models are ambiguous. Although nearly 
all accede to the proposition that high rates of population and industrial 
growth may make high carbon dioxide levels inevitable, there is a good deal of 
disagreement as to the exact level of carbon dioxide accumulation that would 
in fact result. This level is variously estimated as high as 1,000 ppmv and 
as low as 500 ppmv. Population growth and industrialization are processes 
that, without much argument, can be considered largely beyond the influence of 
policy intervention. The minimum carbon dioxide accumulation consequent to 
the play of these factors constitutes a lower bound on what policy inter-
vention can achieve. 
Coal is the critical fuel. Depending on how it is combusted, per British 
Thermal Unit (BTU), coal releases about two or three times as much carbon 
dioxide as natural gas. 133 Large future releases of carbon dioxide can result 
only from coal and oil shale consumption. An ambitious coal exploitation 
policy at rates of increase in combustion analogous to those of oil this last 
100 years (4.5 percent per year) would, even in absence of carbon emission 
from any other source, double the amount of carbon dioxide presently in the 
atmosphere by about 2060. 
Future Levels of Carbon Dioxide 
An exact accounting of the total increase in the atmospheric level of 
carbon dioxide that is likely over the next 100 years, assuming that something 
can be said about trends in emissions, depends on the particular response of 
the oceans. The oceans constitute the principal sink for emitted carbon 
dioxide that does not remain in the atmosphere. Most carbon dioxide is taken 
up by the oceans chemically as a result of a set of reactions with carbonate 
ion. Carbon dioxide is absorbed into the oceans as a result of changes in the 
partial pressure, or concentration, of atmospheric carbon dioxide. Like any 
large body of water, the oceans tend toward equilibrium with atmospheric car-
bon dioxide. As the atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide increases, 
the partial pressures of carbon dioxide in the ocean and atmosphere diverge, 
and carbon moves to the oceans, where it is dissolved. Once dissolved, carbon 
dioxide and sea water react to form carbonic acid, which then reacts with the 
most basic form of carbon dioxide in the ocean, carbonate ion, to form 
bicarbonate ion, which is incorporated into the shells of calcareous animals 
and removed downward to the deep oceans. 
By itself, the first of these two processes can remove little excess 
carbon dioxide from the atmosphere. The amount of dissolved oceanic carbon 
dioxide in direct exchange with the atmosphere is small: less than 0.6 percent 
of the inorganic carbon of the surface layer. To be effective, dissolved 
carbon dioxide must be continuously removed from the surface layer. The 
availability of carbonate ion controls the rate at which dissolved carbon 
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dioxide is removed from the surface layer. But, although the presence of 
carbonate ion makes it possible for the ocean's surface layer to absorb 
roughly eight times·the carbon it would otherwise absorb, carbonate ion is 
sufficiently scarce to facilitate the removal of only a part of the carbon 
dioxide added to the atmosphere-annually. Only 30 to 40 percent of this_ 
annual increment is removed to the oceans each year.* 
In the future, this rate of uptake must decline. 136 Carbonate ion is 
consumed in the reactions leading to the formation of bicarbonate. Once con-
sumed, carbonate ion is removed from the surface layer for decades. As the 
atmospheric level of carbon dioxide increases, and as bicarbonate increases in 
the surface layer, the reservoir of carbonate ions declines, and with it the 
rate of oceanic uptake of carbon dioxide. Based on the ocean models, it is 
suggested that by 2070 carbonate depletion will depress the amount of annually 
emitted carbon that is withdrawn into the oceans by perhaps 7 to 15 per-
cent.137 
Ocean circulation is driven by wintertime formation of cold, dense waters 
in the high latitudes, and its intensity may decline as the area of cold, high 
salinity water contracts. Parcels of water moving between the deep oceans and 
the surface layer bear carbonate ions, the product of calcium carbonate disso-
lution at depths below 5 km. It has been suggested that water in the high 
latitudes will warm and, being less dense, will increasingly work against the 
sinking action that presently sets this circulation into motion. Of particu-
lar concern is the recession of seasonal sea ice cover, which is the effective 
driving force for the formation of deep ocean waters. 
This change may affect the rate of oceanic absorption of emitted carbon 
d~oxide. Although this climatic effect is not well understood, the change 
will certainly be in the direction of decreased absorption. The consequences 
are suggested to be on the same.order as the effects of the depletion of car-
bonate ion (e.g., a 5 to 9 percent decline in oceanic absorption). 138 
In Table 11, estimated future atmospheric levels of carbon dioxide are 
presented for different rates of increase in emissions. Given about a doub-
ling of the present atmospheric concentration, an equilibrium level will, 
after hundreds of years, be established at about 450 ppmv. 139 
*This is the upper limit of the amount of carbon that the current ocean 
models can accommodate. 134 Given different estimates of the total emission ?f carbon to the atmosphere (5 to 7.5· GT per year) and of the observed annual 
increase (3.5 GT) in the atmosphere,. up to 60 percent of- emitted carbon might 
need to be taken up by the oceans. The missing sink (0 to 20 percent) is 
usually assumed to go back into the biosphere through increased biospheric 
growth stimulated by increased ambient carbon dioxide levels. Such enhanced 
growth is uncertain. 135 It is possible that presently unknown ocean pro-
cesses or substantial errors in the calculation of the amount of emitted car-
bon dioxide can account for this residual. 
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Table 11 
ATMOSPHERIC CARBON DIOXIDE CONCENTRATIONS FOR DIFFERENT RATES 
OF INCREASE OF EMISSIONS, 2030 and 2070 
Rates of Increase 
in Emissions 
(in percent per year) 
2.5 
2.0 
1.5 
1.0 
Atmospheric Carbon Dioxide Level 
(in ppmv) 
2030 2070 
425-484 664-872 
415-467 587-745 
408-454 527-648 
401-441 480-575 
Note: assuming a range of oceanic uptake of 30 to 60 percent. 
Methane, Tropospheric Ozone, and Carbon Monoxide 
The anthropogenic sources of the other greenhouse gases are not as well· 
understood. These gases result from two sources: direct release into the 
atmosphere and the photochemical production of these gases in the atmosphere 
as a result of the release to and interaction in the atmosphere of other 
photochemically active gases. In terms of sheer numbers, most of the other 
gases are released directly from the surface. The chemistry of the others is 
complex. 
A case in point is methane. Methane is directly released into the atmos-
phere upon the anaerobic decomposition of organic matter in waterlogged soils, 
swamps, landfills, marshes, and freshwater and marine sediments, and upon 
biomass burning and activities relating to the transport of natural gas and 
the mining of coal. 140 Once released to the atmosphere, it acts like carbon 
dioxide to warm the planet. After a five- to ten-year residence in the atmos-
phere, it is oxidized to carbon monoxide. The oxidation process, however, 
results in various chemical by-products that are important to the chemistry of 
the troposphere. Tropospheric ozone is formed photochemically as a result of 
the oxidation of methane. 141 So is carbon monoxide, which, although not 
radiatively active, is, like methane, quite photochemically active. Once 
present in the atmosphere, carbon monoxide interacts with the hydroxyl radical 
(OH) in the presence of nitric oxide (NOx) to photochemically produce ozone in 
situ in the troposphere. 142 
The chain of reactions leading to the formation of ozone in the tropos-
phere from the oxidation of methane is complex. Even more complex is the 
relationship of methane to carbon monoxide. Methane is oxidized to carbon 
monoxide through a set of reactions involving OH. 143 Its rather long lifetime 
in the atmosphere results from the limited pool of OH available for the 
process. If the pool were a good deal larger, the lifetime of methane might 
be half its present value. Conversely, were the pool much smaller, the life-
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time of methane would be longer and, given a constant source at the surface, 
the atmospheric concentration of methane would increase. Carbon monoxide 
emissions tend to make this pool smaller. Like methane, carbon monoxide is 
highly reactive with OH. Once present in the atmosphere, it is oxidized to 
carbon dioxide through a set of-reactions similar to those that reduce methane 
to carbon monoxide. Increasing emissions of.carbon monoxide tend, therefore, 
to shrink the pool of OH available for the removal of methane and to result in 
its increase in the atmosphere. 144 
Only about one-third of carbon monoxide emissions result from the oxi-
dation of methane. 145 Surface emissions resulting from combustion processes 
and biomass burning account for the majority of carbon monoxide emissions. 
Roughly, a doubling of carbon monoxide emissions from fossil fuel combustion 
would result in a 25 percent increase in the level of methane in the atmos-
phere; a four-fold increase in carbon monoxide emissions would result in a 75 
percent increase. 146 
In addition to methane, other greenhouse gases also are removed from the 
atmosphere through reaction with OH. Some of these include: methyl chloro-
form, methylene chloride, and methyl chloride. 147 Were surface methane or 
carbon monoxide emissions to significantly increase, the abundance of these 
might increase in the atmosphere. Ozone is removed from the troposphere 
through reactions with OH. So, in addition to affecting tropospheric ozone's 
photochemical rate of production, rising surface emissions of carbon monoxide 
or methane would also slow its rate of removal, leading to an increasing tro-
pospheric level of ozone. Given the size of the OH pool, a four-fold increase 
in emissions of carbon monoxide, nitric oxide, and methane from fossil fuel 
combustion would result in about a 50 percent increase in tropospheric ozone 
abundances.148 
Rates of increase of tropospheric ozone abundances, as well as the 
abundances of methane and other gases, are dependent on the rate of surface 
release of carbon monoxide, nitric oxide, and methane. 
Carbon Monoxide: Carbon monoxide is produced through incomplete com-
b~stion of organic matter or through the oxidation of methane. The primary 
biogenic sources of carbon monoxide appear to be the oceans, forest fires, 
photochemical oxidation of terpenes and isoprenes from plant sources, open 
burning of agricultural wastes, biomass burning, and the oxidation of 
methane. 149 Observations of the atmospheric distribution of carbon monoxide 
suggest an annual production of about.2.3 GT per year from these sources, and 
that oxidation of methane produces perhaps 30 percent of this. 150 About 0.5 
GT of carbon monoxide may be produced annually through the incomplete com-
bustion of fossil fuel. As a whole, emissions from combustion activities (20 
Percent), wood burning (2 percent), and land clearing (21 percent) account for 
about 40 percent of all carbon monoxide surface emissions. About half of all 
surface m~thane emissions are controlled by human activities. Thus about half 
of carbon monoxide emissions are anthropogenic in origin. 
. Of the combustion-related source, about one-half is associated with 
incomplete combustion in internal combustion engines. 151 Other industrial 
Processes account for about one-third of the total. The remainder results 
from incomplete combustion in central station generating facilities (14 
percent) and waste disposal (4 percent). 
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The background carbon monoxide level is about 0.11 ppmv. It appears to 
be increasing about 1 percent per year. 152 Assuming that surface emissions of 
carbon monoxide have been increasing since industrialization, OH concentra-
tions should have declined and· tropospheric ozone levels increased from 1880 
to 1985. Assuming a SO percent increase in carbon monoxide emissions, OH 
should have decreased by about 12 percent. 153 A 10 to 50 percent increase in 
tropospheric ozone has been suggested. 154 The tropospheric concentration of 
ozone appears to be increasing about 1 percent per year. It is roughly 20 
percent higher in the northern hemisphere-than in the southern, consistent 
with larger northern hemispheric carbon monoxide emissions sources. 155 OH 
levels might be 20 percent lower. 156 A doubling of the tropospheric concen-
tration of ozone is possible. 157 
Nitric Oxide: The rate of ozone and methane accumulation in the atmos-
phere is dependent on emissions of nitric oxide. Nitric oxide acts to 
catalyze the reactions leading to the in situ production of ozone. 158 -In-
creasing nitric oxide emissions also increase OH in the atmosphere and reduce 
methane abundances.* Fossil fuel combustion and biomass burning constitute 
the main anthropogenic sources of nitric oxide. 
Methane: About 80 to 85 percent of all atmospheric methane is of bio-
genic origin, whereas only about 15 to 20gercent is released during the 
production or combustion of fossil fuel. 16 About SO to 80 percent of the 
surface sources of methane are controlled by human activities. Cattle account 
for about one-sixth to one-third of the emissions. With biomass burning, rice 
paddies account for about 25 to 40 percent of emissions. 161 Thus, rice paddy 
agriculture, biomass burning, and enteric fermentation account for 40 to 70 
percent of terrestrial methane production. These sources scale with popula-
tion increase. Since 1940, the area employed in the cultivation of rice 
increased about 80 percent, about 1.6 percent per year. 162 About 90 percent 
of emitted methane is oxidized to carbon monoxide. The remainder is trans-
ported to the stratosphere. 
Present calculations suggest that roughly 30 percent of the observed 
increase has resulted from surface emissions of carbon monoxide and 70 percent 
from agricultural activities. 163 Assuming that this will continue to be true, 
methane concentrations will continue to increase due to an expanding global 
population--about 25 percent by 2000. 
The surface methane release is temperature dependent. Anaerobic respira-
tion increases with increasing temperature. This rate controls the rate of 
methane production from the deca* of plant organic matter. With warmer 
temperatures, it should rise. 164 * Upon a warming, methane will also be 
*For a four-fold increase in nitric oxide emissions, methane abundances 
decline 15 to 20 percent. But ozone abundances increase by about 25 percent 
and, since tropospheric ozone is a more efficient infrared absorber than 
methane, the net effect is toward a warming. 159 
**The resulting emission would partially offset the effects of higher temper-
atures on OH abundances. OH increases in concentration with temperature. 
Increased OH abundances would shorten the residence time of methane in the 
atmosphere and would reduce methane levels, but the temperature effect should 
still be positive, yielding a net increase in methane of about 1 ppmv, or an 
amount equal to about two-thirds of the present level. 
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released from coastal sediments. The amount of the release is thought to be 
large. The release could increase the present atmospheric level of methane by 
perhaps 66 to 133 percent. 165 These releases, in conjunction with a continua-
tion of the present rate of increase in surface emissions, imply something 
like a tripling of the present level of methane in the next century. 
Chlorocarbons, Fluorocarbons and Chlorofluorocarbons 
Compared to methane and ozone, the cycles of many of the chlorocarbons, 
fluorocarbons and CFCs are much less involved. Most are released through 
industrial activities. Once released to the atmosphere, some of these gases 
are removed from the troposphere through photochemical interactions with OH; 
these include methylene chloride, methyl chloroform, methyl chloride, CFC-22, 
and a few others. Others are transported to the stratosphere, where, after 
many decades, or in some cases millenia, they are destroyed through photoly-
sis.166* During transport to the high stratosphere, the chlorofluorocarbons 
Warm the top of the troposphere, or tropopause. It has been suggested that 
this would increase the amount of water vapor in the stratos~here, which is 
exceedingly dry, and further enhance the greenhouse effect. 109 Methane is 
thought to act similarly. 170 
CFC-11 and CFC-12 are used predominantly in spray cans (60 percent) and 
refrigeration (5 percent). They are also used as foam-blowing agents (35 
percent) and as solvents. 171 Other CFCs (22, 502, and 114) have been devel-
oped as substitutes for CFC-11 and CFC-12. Carbon tetrachloride is released 
in the production of the CFCs. Carbon tetrafluoride and CFC-116 are released 
during aluminum refining. Methylene chloride and methyl chloroform are used 
as solvents. 172 Spray can uses of the chlorofluorocarbons were banned in the 
1970s in the United States, Canada and Sweden. 
Although together they may be important, with the exception of CFC-11 and 
CFC-12, the climatic effect of each individual gas will be quite small, 
typically 0.1 degrees Celsius or less. 173 Hence, it will be difficult to 
control the releases of most of them. 
Nitrous Oxide 
Nitrous oxide is released from animal and human wastes, inland bodies of 
W~ter, and directly from the soil by denitrifying bacteria. It is also 
d~rectly released into the atmosphere as a result of fossil fuel combus-
tion. 74 A large amount of nitrogen is annually fixed in agricultural soils 
as nitrites. But the rate at which nitrous oxide is released from soils 
subsequent to anthropogenic fixation is uncertain; some suggest a 50 percent 
*Free chlorine released through photolysis of the CFCs interacts photo-
chemically with stratospheric ozone, depleting it. A global cooling or a 
global warming of 0.1 to 0.2 degrees Celsius could result from a 20 to 30 
Percent stratospheric ozone reduction. 167 The residence times for .CFC-11 and 
CFC-12 are 65 and 120 years, respectively, 168 and so this depletion would not 
be realized for 50 to 100 years. 
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release within ten years175 and others suggest that full denitrification will 
occur only over hundreds of years. 176 Studies suggest that about 2 percent of 
nitrogen is released from the soils one year after application. With a much 
delayed release, nitrous oxide levels would double only after many hundreds of 
years. 
At present, the data on the historic build-up of nitrous oxide in the 
atmosphere are consistent with either a pure fossil fuel source increasing 4 
percent per year or a pure fertilizer source increasing 6 percent per year. 
Based on those rates of increase, by 2025 the atmospheric concentration of 
nitrous oxide should increase by 16 to 32 percent to 353 to 403 ppbv. 177 The 
primary sink for nitrous oxide appears to be photodissociation and chemical 
interaction with molecular oxygen in the stratosphere. The residence time for 
nitrous oxide is estimated to be about 120 years. 
It has been suggested that nitrous oxide releases may increase with a 
warming. 178 Little work has been directed to this issue. 
The Other Gas Effect 
Table 12 shows a typical estimate for the projected changes in the atmos-
pheric levels of the other greenhouse gases. Annual rates of increase in 
concentrations range from a few.tenths of a ~ercent to 3 percent. Estimates 
from other sources are roughly comparable. 17 Despite uncertainties in the 
photochemical models, and in future technological and economic trends, there 
is general agreement that rates of increase like these (though not necessarily 
these specific rates) will prevail. The estimates given in Table 12 would 
result by 2030 in a warming of 1.8 to 2.2 degrees Celsius. 
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Table· 12 
CHANGES IN CONCENTRATIONS OF GREENHOUSE GASES, 1980-2030 
Rate of 
Percent Increase 
Chemical Compound Increase (%/year) 
CO2 30 0.6 
CH4 50-80 0.8-1.2 
N20 15-50 0.3-0.8 
CFC-11 170-450 2-3.4 
CFC-12 115-330 1.5-2.9 
co 10-120 0.2-1.6 
NO, N02 0-100 0-1.4 
03, tropospheric 45-50 0.7-0.8 
Source: G. MacDonald, Climate Change and Acid Rain, MP86W00010 
(McLean, Vir.: The Mitre Corporation, 1986). 
Policy Responses 
The greenhouse problem is essentially an energy and environmental policy 
problem requiring that society either make alterations in energy and indus-
trial policies to limit the impending warming or adapt to it. 
Of the other gases, it is probably possible to limit somewhat the tropos-
pheric build-up of ozone through emissions controls on carbon monoxide and 
nitric oxide released from the energy sector. Controls can also be imposed on 
:eleases of CFC-11 and CFC-12. The degree of control that might be realized 
is probably on the order of 0.5 to 2 degrees Celsius. 180 
A gradual transition to a non-carbon energy system appears to be the only 
feasible means by which to limit the atmospheric buildup of carbon dioxide. A 
~ransition to a new energy source implies few large economic costs as long as 
it is conducted over a sufficiently long period and change in the use of fuels 
and the construction of facilities fits the typical turnover time of capital. 
Some non-carbon replacement fuels already are cost competitive or nearly cost 
competitive with fossil sources. This is also true in the case of energy 
conservation resulting from improvements in energy efficiency. 181 It might 
also be feasible to replace the energy produced through the combustion of 
fossil fuels through an expansion of the existing civilian nuclear energy 
programs. 
The transition from one dominant ener~2 system to another probably re-. 
quires about fifty to seventy-five years. 1 This results from the very long 
lifetimes of many fossil fuel facilities and from constraints arising from the 
material and economic requirements of large-scale, rapid expansion of non-
fossil energy supplies. As a result, it will probably be difficult to limit 
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atmospheric levels of carbon dioxide to less than 500 ppmv, or 1.85 times the 
preindustrial level, even in the event that a long-term transition to a non-
. b · · · d · d. 1 183 fossil energy system was to e initiate imme iate y. 
An increase in the atmospheric level of carbon dioxide to 500 ppmv would 
result in an average global warming of 2 to 3.5 degrees Celsius. Assuming a 
fifty to seventy-five year market penetration time for new energy sources, we 
can calculate the effect of delays in the implementation of policies designed 
to effect a transition to a non-fossil energy system. A 2 to 5 degrees 
Celsius warming would result were action to be delayed to the year 2020, and a 
2.5 to 6 degrees Celsus warming would result from a delay of fifty years. 184 
To this one would have to add the effect of the other greenhouse gases. 
The potential for preventive action through reforestation, or through the 
removal of carbon dioxide from power plant stacks and deposition in the 
oceans, is limited. Reforestation on a scale that might result in a signifi-
cant withdrawal of carbon from the atmosphere (and incorporation in the bio-
sphere) would involve enormous expanses of land.* The future demand for land 
to grow food to feed a growing global population renders such a response 
infeasible. 185 Stack removal of carbon dioxide and its subsequent sequestra-
tion in the deep ocean, although theoretically possible, is limited by cost 
considerations, the effects of scrubbing on the efficiency of electricity 
production, and the limited pool of emissions that might be controlled through 
stack scrubbing. 186 Only about 25 percent of all global carbon dioxide 
emissions are emitted from power plant stacks and therefore are subject to 
control. These considerations render such a response infeasible over the 
long-term. 
A number of adaptive postures are also evident. Enhanced irrigation 
capacity would be an important adaptive mechanism for U.S. agriculture. Water 
management would be important. Efforts to reduce the present rates of ground 
water depletion, soil erosion, and desertification would help conserve 
valuable resources for future use. 
Other frequently cited adaptive mechanisms include: the development of 
more drought- and heat-resistant cultivars and more effective pesticides; 
changes in the inland water transport system to accommodate streamflow reduc-
tions; improved coastal planning; continued improvements in the efficiency of 
cooling devices to offset increased summer peak electrical demand; and the 
diversification of national economic activity in situations where present 
activities are found to be climate sensitive. In addition, one might 
consider: improved mechanisms of drought assistance; an enlarged global food 
reserve; and international mechanisms through which to equally allocate the 
burden and benefits of a warming. 
Some potential adaptive mechanisms could be delayed until impacts are 
actually experienced. However, a number of aoaptive mechanisms require a 
substantial lead time for planning and construction. This is true for any 
*For instance, to remove about 125 ppmv of carbon dioxide from the atmos-
phere, it would be necessary to reforest a land area the size of the remain-
ing forested area in the tropics. 
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system of large-scale inter-basin water transfer. The initial steps toward 
such systems would have to be taken fairly soon if they are to be of timely 
use. Any technological interventions that have lengthly lead times would be 
constrainted. 
No rigorous analysis of the adaptive response has yet been conducted. 
With a few exceptions, 187 its nature and preconditions have not been inves-
tigated, nor has its feasibility undergone close scrutiny. Typically, it is 
assumed that, due to constraints on the ability of society to limit fossil 
fuel use, the preventive response is unworkable and that society's only 
recourse is to an adaptive posture. This is premature. Due to the lack of 
rigorous attention paid to the adaptive response, it is possible that the 
reasoning could run in the opposite direction: that, due to physical con-
straints on the ability of society to adapt to a global warming, a much slower 
rate of warming than is projected is a prerequisite of any attempt by society 
to adapt to a changing climate. To slow the rate, a preventive response would 
be needed. 
In absence of a rigorous analysis of the adaptive response, it will not 
be possible to say which of the two principal responses open to society--
prevention or adaptation--is the more desirable. This requires that more 
attention be paid to the adaptive response than has heretofore been the case. 
~n absence of a renewed commitment of society to its preservationist values, 
its decisions depend on this analysis. 
CONCLUSION 
As a result of the combustion of fossil fuels, carbon dioxide is being 
released to the atmosphere. Other gases like nitrous oxide, methane, and the 
:hlorofluorocarbons are being released as a result of changes in land use and 
industrial practices. At projected rates of expansion in the activities 
leading to the release of the greenhouse gases, by 2070, mean global surface 
temperature will rise 4 to 5 degrees Celsius. A wide variety of impacts, many 
of them negative, can be expected. 
Climate has undegone changes in the past. However, most past changes 
have been slow and gradual, and have allowed natural and human systems to 
adapt. The projected changes will be unprecedented in their rapidity. 
There are no technical fixes, no easy answers to the greenhouse-climate 
change problem. Any serious effort to limit emissions would entail a 
thoroughgoing transformation of the global economy. 
The effects of climate change will be most pronounced on unmanaged 
natural systems. Entire plant and animal species will be lost as the climate 
changes. It is our responsibility, having set into motion the processes 
leading to climate change, to limit these losses to the absolute minimum. 
-45-
NOTES 
1. S. Schneider and W. Kellogg, "The Chemical Basis for Climate Change," in 
Chemistry of the Lower Atmosphere, S. Rasool, ed., (New York: Plenum 
Press, 1973). 
2. F. Luther, and R. Ellingson, "Carbon Dioxide and the Radiation Budget," 
in Projecting the Climatic Effects of Increasing Carbon Dioxide, M. 
MacCracken and F. Luther, eds., DOE/ER-0237 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Department of Energy, 1985). 
3. J. Hansen et al., "Climate Sensitivity to Increasing Greenhouse Gases," 
in The Greenhouse Effect and Sea Level Rise: A Challenge for This Gen-
eration, M. Barth and J. Titus, eds. (New York: Van Nostrand, 1984.) 
4. 
5. 
R. Dickinson, "Modeling Climate Changes Due to Carbon Dioxide Increases," 
in Carbon Dioxide Review: 1982, W. Clark, ed., (New York: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1982). 
H. Lamb, "The Role of Atmosphere and Oceans in Relation to Climatic 
Changes and the Growth of Ice-Sheets on Land," in Problems in Paleo-
climatology, A. Nairn, ed. (London: Interscience Publishers, 1963); S. 
Manabe and D. Hahn, "Simulation of the Tropical Climate of an Ice Age," 
Journal of Geophysical Research 82 (1977): 3,889. For another ice age 
simulation see S. Manabe and A. Broccoli, "The Influence of Continental 
Ice Sheets on the Climate of an Ice Age," Journal of Geophysical Research 
90 (1985): 2,167. 
6. E. Barron and W. Washington, "The Role of Geographical Variables in 
Explaining Paleoclimates: Results From Cretaceous Climate Model Sensi-
tivity Studies," Journal of Geophysical Research 89 (1984): 1,267; and W. 
Sellers, "A Global Climatic Model Based on the Energy Balance of the 
Earth-Atmosphere System," Journal of Applied Meteorology 8 (1969): 392. 
7. J. Hays, J. Imbrie, and N. Shackleton, "Variations in the Earth's Orbit: 
8. 
Pacemaker of the Ice Ages," Science 194 (1976): 1,121. 
J. Eddy, R. Gilliland, and D. Hoyt, "Changes in the Solar Constant and 
Climatic Effects," Nature 300 (1982): 689. 
9. W. Broecker, "Climatic Change: Are We on the Brink of a Pronounced Global 
Warming?", Science 188 (1975): 460. 
10. E. Dorf, "Climatic Changes of the Past and Present," American Scientist 
48 (1960): 341; and J.C. Bernabo and T. Webb III, "Changing Patterns in 
the Holocene Pollen Record of Northeastern North America: A Mapped 
Summary," Quaternary Research 8 (1977): 64; see particularly the spruce 
and hemlock declines. See also the corn belt movement with temperature 
in J. Newman, "Climate Change Impacts on the Growing Season of the North 
American Corn Belt," International Journal of Biometeorology 7 (1980): 
128. For the change in the positioning of middle latitude forests 
between the late Eocene and early Miocene (a cooling of 4 to 8 degrees 
-46-
1 
1 
1 
1, 
1~ 
16 
17 
18 
19 
h 
3.1 
h 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18, 
19, 
Celsius), see J. Olson, "Cenozoic Fluctuations in Biotic Parts of the 
Global Carbon Cycle," in The Carbon Cycle and Atmospheric CO2: Natural 
Variations Archaen to Present, E. Sundquist and W. Broecker, eds. (Wash-
ington, D.C.: American Geophysical Union, 1985), and W. Emanuel, H. 
Shugart, and M. Stevenson, "Climatic Change and the Broad-scale Distri-
bution of Terrestrial Ecosystem Complexes," Climatic Change 7 (1985): 29. 
W. Kellogg, Effects of Human Activities on Global Climate, WMO 486 
(Geneva: World Meteorological Organization, 1977). 
R. Gilliland, "Solar, Volcanic, and co2 Forcing of Recent Climatic 
Changes," Climatic Change 4 (1982): 111. It is believed that over long 
periods, the flux of radiation at the top of the atmosphere can vary as 
much as 0.5 percent. Roughly, an increase of 0.1 percent in this flux 
would increase mean global surface temperature about 0.1 degrees Celsius. 
See Eddy, Gilliland, and Hoyt, note 8 above. For the solar influence 
over the past one-hundred years, see.J. Hansen et al., "Climate Impact of 
Increasing Atmospheric Carbon Dioxide," Science 213 (1981): 957. 
See Hansen et al. in note 12 above. 
J. Pollack et al., "Volcanic Explosions and Climatic Change: A 
Theoretical Assessment," Journal of Geophysical Research 81 (1976): 
1,071. 
See Gilliland in note 12 above; and J. Hansen et al. in note 12 above; 
Hansen et al. gives an estimate of about 0.1 degree Celsius. Also, see 
B. Taylor et al., "Volcanic Eruptions and Long-Term Temperature Records: 
An Empirical Search For Cause and Effect," Quarterly Journal of the Royal 
Meteorological Society 106 (1980): 175; C.-D. Schonwiese, "Climatic 
Variability Within the Modern Instrumentally-based Period," in Carbon 
Dioxide: Current Views and Developments in Energy/Climate Research, W. 
Bach et al., eds. (Dordrecht, Netherlands: D. Reidel Publishing Co., 
1983); and A. Robock, "The 'Little Ice Age': Northern Hemisphere Average 
Observations and Model Calculations," Science 206 (1979): 1,402; the 
estimate of 0.5 degrees Celsius for the volcanic influence excludes the 
climatic influence of the Tambora explosion, which was unprecedented in 
recent millennia in the amount of aerosol matter introduced into the 
atmosphere, and in climatic influence. 
W. Kellogg, "Aerosols and Climate," in Interactions of Energy and Cli-
mate, W. Bach, J. Pankrath and J. Williams, eds. (Dordrecht, Netherlands: 
D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1980). 
For instance, see S. Seidel and D. Keyes, Can We Delay a Greenhouse Warm-
ing? (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 1983). 
See note 2 above. 
T. Augustsson and V. Ramanathan, "A Radiative-Convective Model Study of 
the COrClimate Problem," Journal of the Atmospheric Sciences 34 (1977): 
448. 
-47-
20. Ibid. 
21. Ibid. 
22. V. Ramanathan et al., "Trace Gas Trends and Their Potential Role in Cli-
mate Change," Journal of Geophysical Research 90 (1985): 5,547. 
23. For instance, see the list of possible infrared active gases not yet 
accounted for in the other gas sensitivity calculation in Ramanathan et 
al., note 22 above; J. Chamberlain et al., "Climate Effects of Minor 
Atmospheric Constituents," in Clark, note 4 above; World Meteorological 
Organization Global Ozone Research and Monitoring Program, Report of the 
Meeting of Experts on Potential Climatic Effects of Ozone and Other Minor 
Trace Gases, report 14 (Geneva: World Meteorological Organization, 
1982); and in R. Dickinson and R. Cicerone, "The Future Global Warming 
from Atmospheric Trace Gases," Nature 319 (1986): 109. Some of these 
include: CFC-13, CFC-21, CFC-113, CFC-114, CFC-115, CFC 116, CFC-123, 
CFC-134a, CFC-132b, CFC-142b, Halon-1301, Halon-1211, acetylene, 
ethylene, ethane, propane, pentane, benzene, peroxyacetyl nitrate, 
hydrogen cyanide, dinitrogen pentoxide, nitrogen dioxide, nitric oxide, 
ammonia, nitric acid, methyl bromide, methyl fluoride, methyl iodide, 
sulfur dioxide, carbonyl sulfide, carbon disulfide, sulfur hexafluoride, 
formaldehyde, methanol, cynagen, formic acid, methyl pentanes, and 
hydrogen chloride. If each of these gases, and others not listed, were 
in the future to contribute as little as 0.02 degrees Celsius to the 
warming, the total could amount to as much as 0.5 degrees Celsius. 
24. J. Hansen et al., "Climate Sensitivity: Analysis of Feedback Mech-
anisms," in Climate Processes and Climate Sensitivity, J. Hansen and T. 
Takahashi, eds. (Washington, D.C.: American Geophysical Union, 1984). 
25. S. Manabe and R. Wetherald, "On the Distribution of Climate Change 
Resulting from an Increase in CO2 Content of the Atmosphere," Journal of 
the Atmospheric Sciences 37 (1980): 99. 
26. W. -C. Wang and P. Stone, "Effect of Ice-Albedo Feedback on Global Sensi-
tivity in a One-Dimensional Radiative-Convective Climate Model," Journal 
of the Atmospheric Sciences 37 (1980): 545. 
27. See note 4 above. 
28. S. Manabe and R. Stouffer, "Sensitivity of a Global Climate Model to an 
Increase of CO2 Concentration," Journal of Geophysical Research 85 
3 
3 
3E 
(1980): 5,529; J. Mitchell andG. Lupton, "A4XC02 Integration-With 39 
Prescribed Changes in Sea Surface Temperatures," Progress in Biometeor-
ology 3 (1984): 353; W. Washington and G. Meehl, "Seasonal Cycle 40 
Experiment on the Climate Sensitivity Due to a Doubling of co2 With an 
Atmospheric General Circulation Model Coupled to a Simple Mixed-Layer 
Ocean Model," Journal of Geophysical Research 89 (1984): 9,475; R. 4l. 
Wetherald and S. Manabe, "Influence of Seasonal Variability Upon the 
Sensitivity of a Model Climate," Journal of Geophysical Research 86 
(1981): 1,194; and S. Manabe and R. Wetherald, "Reduction in Summer Soil 
Wetness Induced by an Increase in Atmospheric Carbon Dioxide," Science 
232 (1986): 626. 
-48-
f 
1 
i1 
29. 
30. 
31. 
32. 
33. 
34. 
35. 
36. 
37. 
38. 
39. 
40. 
41. 
M. Schlesinger and J. Mitchell, "Model Projections of the Equilibrium 
Climatic Response to Increased Carbon Dioxide," in MacCracken and Luther, 
note 2 above. 
M. Schlesinger, "Analysis of Results from Energy Balance and Radiative-
Convection Models," note 2 above, appendix A. 
R. Reck, "Carbon Dioxide and Climate: Comparison of One-Dimensional and 
Three-Dimensional Models," in Environmental and Climatic Impact of Coal 
Utilization, J. Singh and A. Deepak, eds. (New York: Academic Press, 
1980). 
See note 29 above. A 50 percent reduction in climate sensitivity is 
taken from R. Somerville and L. Remer, "Cloud Optical Thickness Feedbacks 
in the co2 Climate Problem," Journal of Geophysical Research 89 (1984): 
9,668. 
As an example of this, due to their structure, the models rely upon what 
are acknowledged to be simplistic and potentially unrealistic descrip-
tions of some climate feedbacks (e.g., water vapor, lapse rate). See 
Schlesinger, note 30 above. 
D. Ehhalt, "The Effects of Chlorofluoromethanes on Climate," in Bach, 
Pankrath, and Williams, note 16 above. 
R. Weiss, "The Temporal and Spatial Distribution of Tropospheric Nitrous 
Oxide," Journal of Geophysical Research 86 (1981): 7,185. 
M. Khalil and R. Rasmussen, "Causes of Increasing Atmospheric Methane: 
Depletion of Hydroxyl Radicals and the Rise of Emissions," Atmospheric 
Environment 19 (1985): 397. 
S. Hameed and R. Gess, "Impact of a Global Warming on Biospheric Sources 
of Methane and Its Climatic Consequences," Tellus 35 (1983): 1. 
S. Liu et al., "On the Origin of Tropospheric Ozone," Journal of Geo-
physical Research 85 (1980): 7;546. For present rate of increase, see J. 
Logan, "Tropospheric Ozone: Seasonal Behavior, Trends, and Anthropogenic 
Influence," Journal of Geophysical Research 90 (1985): 10,463; J. Angell 
and J. Korshover, "Global Variation in Total Ozone and Layer Mean Ozone: 
An Update Through 1981," Journal of Climate and Applied Meteorology 22 
(1983): 1,611; and G. Tiao, et al., "A Statistical Trend Analysis of 
Ozonesonde Data," Journal of Geophysical Research 91 (1986): 13,121. 
See Chamberlain et al. in note 23 above, and note 22 above. 
See P. Ciborowski and D. Abrahamson, "The Greenhouse Problem: 
of Uncertainty," this volume. 
The Role 
R. Rotty and C. Masters, "Carbon Dioxide from Fossil Fuel Combustion: 
T:ends, Resources, and Technological Implications," in Atmospheric Carbon 
Dioxide and the Global Carbon Cycle, J. Trabalka, ed., DOE/ER-0239 (Wash-
ington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Energy, 1985). 
-49-
42. R. Houghton et al., "Carbon Dioxide Exchange Between the Atmosphere and 
Terrestrial Ecosystems," in Trabalka, note 41 above. 
43. J. Olson, H. Pfuderer, and Y. Chan, Changes in the Global Carbon Cycle 
and the Biosphere, ORNL/EIS-109 (Oak Ridge, Tenn.: Oak Ridge National 
Laboratory, 1978). 
44. Concentrations about doubled over this period. See R. Rasmussen and M. 
Khalil, "Atmospheric Methane in the Recent and Ancient Atmospheres: 
Concentrations, Trends, and Interhemispheric Gradient," Journal of 
Geophysical Research 89 (1984): 11,559; H. Craig and C. Chou, "Methane: 
The Record in Polar Ice Cores," Geophysical Research Letters 9 (1982): 
1,221; and G. Pearman et al., "Evidence of Changing Concentrations of 
Atmospheric co2 , N2o and CH4 From Air Bubbles in Antarctic Ice," Nature 
320 (1986): 248. 
45. See Rasmussen and Khalil in note 44 above; and Craig and Chou in note 44 
above. 
46. See Liu et al. in note 38 above. 
47. Chamberlain et al. in note 23 above. 
48. A. Miller and I. Mintzer, The Sky is the Limit: Strategies for Pro-
tecting the Ozone Layer, research report 3 (Washington, D.C.: World 
Resources Institute, 1986). 
49. D. Blake and F. Rowland, "World-wide Increase in Tropospheric Methane," 
Journal of Atmospheric Chemistry 4 (1986): 43. For a long-term 1.7 
percent per year increase, see B. Stauffer et al., "Increase of Atmos-
pheric Methane Recorded in Antarctic Ice Core," Science 229 (1985): 
1,386. For a 1 percent per year increase from 1950 to 1980, and an 
average 0.5 percent per year increase from 1900 to 1980, see Craig and 
Chou in note 44 above, p. 477. For an increase that fits to an average 
0.7 percent per year increase from 1900 to 1980, see Pearman et al. in 
note 44 above. 
50. See note 35 above. 
51. P. Jones, T. Wigley, and P. Kelly, "Variations in Surface Air Tempera-
tures: Part 1. Northern Hemisphere, 1881-1980," Monthly Weather Review 
110 (1982): 59. 
52. J. Oerlemans, "Glaciers as Indicators of a Carbon Dioxide Warming," 
Nature 320 (1986): 607. 
53. T. Barnett, "The Estimation of 'Global' Sea Level Change: A Problem of 
Uniqueness," Journal of Geophysical Research 89 (1984): 7,980. 
54. T. Karl, G. Kukla, and J. Gavin, "Decreasing Diurnial Temperature Range 
in the United States and Canada from 1941 Through 1980," Journal of 
Climate and Applied Meteorology 23 (1984): 1,489. 
-50-
5 
5: 
6( 
61 
63. 
55. 
56. 
57. 
58. 
59. 
60. 
62. 
63. 
64. 
A. Lachenbruch and B.V. Marshall, "Changing Climate: Geothermal Evidence 
from Permafrost in the Alaskan Arctic,"_ Science 234 (1986): 689. 
G. Oehlert, "Trends in Atmospheric Temperature Profiles," Journal of Geo-
physical Research 91 (1986): 11,845; and K .. Labitzke et al., "Long-Term 
Temperature Trends in the Stratosphere: Possible Influence of Anthro-
pogenic Gases," Geophysical Research Letters 13 (1986): 52. 
See Carbon Dioxide Assessment Committee, National Research Council, 
Changing Climate (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1983). For 
the detection of a marginally significant signal, see T. Barnett, "De-
tection of Changes in the Global Troposphere Temperature Field Induced by 
Greenhouse Gases," Journal of Geophysical Research 91 (1986): 6,659. 
See note 24 above. 
W. Kellogg and R. Bojkov, eds., Report of the JSC/CAS Meeting of Experts 
on Detection of Possible Climate Change (Geneva: World Meteorological 
Organization, 1982). 
S. Manabe, "Carbon Dioxide and Climatic Change," in Advances in Geo-
physics, vol. 25, Theory of Climate, B. Saltzman, ed. (New York: 
Academic Press, 1983). 
P. Kelly et al., "Variations in Surface Air Temperatures: Part 2: 
Arctic Regions, 1881-1980," Monthly Weather Review 110 (1982): 71. 
Disproportionate polar warming also has been noted in the temperature 
records of two warmer epochs, the Altithermal and the early medieval, 
Average sub-Arctic temperatures are known to have been at least 5 degrees 
Celsius warmer than now about 5,500 years before the present, although 
the mean global temperature was 1 degree Celsius above the present value. 
See J. Ritchie and F. K. Hare, "Late-Quaternary Vegetation and Climate 
Near the Arctic Tree Line of Northwestern North America," Quaternary 
Research 1 (1971): 331. The Arctic front, defined by the southernmost 
extension of the Arctic air mass, appears to have been displaced at least 
350 km northward during the Altithermal. See H. Lamb, Climate: Present, 
Past and Future, vol. 2, (London: Methuen and Co., 1977). For evidence 
of a generalized latitudinal dependence of temperature in reconstructions 
of the Eem Interglacial, see B. Frenzel, "The Pleistocene Vegetation of 
Northern Eurasia," Science 161 (1968): 637. 
World Climate Programme, An Assessment of the Role of CO2 on Climate 
Variations and Their Impact (Geneva: World Meteorological Organization, 
1981); and R. Barry, "The Cryosphere and Climatic Change," in Detecting 
the Climatic Effects of Increasing Carbon Dioxide, M. MacCracken and F. 
Luther, eds., DOE/ER-0235 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Energy, 
1985). 
Estimates for a 4.5 degree Celsius mean global warming suggest a melting 
of mountain glaciers and small Arctic island ice caps equivalent to 26 cm 
of sea level rise, or about 50 to 100 percent of all the ice in these 
systems. See M. Meier, "Contribution of Small Glaciers to Global Sea 
Level," Science 226 (1984): 1,418. 
-51-
65. H. Flohn, Major Climatic Events Associated With A Prolonged CO2-Induced 
Warming ORAU/IEA-81-8 (M) (Oak Ridge, Tenn.: Oak Ridge Associated Uni-
versities, Institute for Energy Analysis, 1981). For the last time the 
Arctic was ice-free, the late Tertiary; with mean global temperature 
perhaps 4 degrees Celsius above the present, see N. Shackleton et al., 
"Oxygen Isotope Calibration of the Onset of Ice-Rafting and History of 
Glaciation in the North Atlantic Region," Nature 307 (1984): 620. For a 
divergent opinion on an ice-free Arctic, see A. Semtner, "On Modelling 
the Seasonal Thermodynamic Cycle of Sea Ice in Studies of Climatic 
Change," Climatic Change 6 (1984): 27. 
66. See Shackleton et al. in note 65 above. 
67. C. Parkinson and W. Kellogg, "Arctic Sea Ice Decay Simulated for a COz-
Induced Temperature Rise," Climatic Change 2 (1980): 149. 
68. See Barry in note 63 above. 
69. H. Lamb, Climate: Present, Past and Future, vol 1. (London: Methuen and 
Co., 1972). 
8 
70. C. Bentley, "The West Antarctic Ice Sheet: Diagnosis and Prognosis," -in 8: 
Carbon Dioxide, Science and Consensus, CONF-820970 (Washington, D.C.: 
U.S. Department of Energy, 1983). 
71. J. Hollin and R. Barry, "Empirical and Theoretical Evidence Concerning 
the Response of the Earth's Ice and Snow Cover to a Global Temperature 84 
Increase," Environment International 2 (1979): 437. 
72. For a similar estimate, see J. Hoffmann, D. Keyes, and J. Titus, Project-
ing Future Sea Level Rise: Methodology, Estimates to the Year 2100, and 
Research Needs, EPA 230-09-007 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Environmental 8S 
Protection Agency, 1983); also R. Thomas, "Future Sea Level Rise and Its 
Early Detection by Satellite Remote Sensing," in Effects of Changes in 
Stratospheric Ozone and Global Climate, vol. 4, Sea Level Rise, J. Titus, 
ed. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 1986). 
73. See note 71 above. 
74. See note 24 above; Manabe and Stouffer in note 28 above; and Manabe and 
Wetherald in note -28 above. 
75. See, for instance, S. Manabe, R. Wetherald, and R. Stouffer, "Summer Dry-
ness Due to an Increase of Atmospheric Carbon Dioxide Concentration," 
Climatic Change 3 (1981): 347. 
76. For instance, see the seasonal response in the European sector in C. 
Wilson and J. Mitchell, "Simulated Climate and COz-Induced Climate Change 
Over Western Europe," Climatic Change 10 (1987): 11; and D. Rind and S. 
Lebedeff, Potential Climatic Impacts of Increasing Atmospheric co2 with 
Emphasis on Water Availability and Hydrology in the United States, EPA 
87 
88 
89 
230-04-84-006 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 9Q 
1984). 
-52-
t-
d 
:s 
lS, 
d 
,ry-
mge 
5. 
th 
A. 
y, 
77. See Geophysical Fluid Dynamics Laboratory (GDFL) 1986, Goddard Institute 
for Space Studies (GISS) 1984, and National Center for Atmospheric 
Research (NCAR) 1984 latitude distribution of soil moisture change in 
Schlesinger and Mitchell in note 29 above; and see Mitchel.! and Lupton in 
note 28 above. 
78
- H. Flohn, "Climate Change and an Ice-Free Arctic Ocean," in Clark, note 4 
above. 
79 
· Ibid. 
BO. See note 75 above. 
81. 
82. 
83. 
84. 
as. 
86. 
87. 
aa. 
89. 
90., 
W. Kellogg, "Precipitation Trends on a Warmer Earth," Interpretation of 
Climate and Photochemical Models, Ozone and Temperature Measurements, R. 
Reck and J. Hummel, eds. (New York: American Institute of Physics, 
1982). 
For the former and the latter cases, respectively, see NCAR 1984, and 
GDFL (and GISS) latitudinally averaged soil moisture simulations in 
Schlesinger and Mitchell, note 29 above. 
D. Rind, "The Dynamics of Warm and Cold Climates," Journal of the Atmos-
pheric Sciences 43 (1986): 3; and S. Manabe and K. Bryan Jr., 11 co2-
Induced Change in a Coupled Ocean-Atmosphere Model and Its Paleoclimatic 
Implications," Journal of Geophysical Research 90 (1985): 11,689. 
See World Climate Programme in note 63 above. This region appears to 
have been displaced several hundred km northward during the Altithermal 
and the previous interglacial during which mean global temperature was 
about 1 degree Celsius warmer than now. See Lamb in note 62 above. 
See note 10 above. The tree line advanced about 300 km into Keewatin 
during the Altithermal, and in Siberia was located on the Arctic shore. 
See Frenzel in note 62 above. Based on the slight warming from 900 to 
1200 A.D., the tree line response appears to be about 100 km per degree 
Celsius warming. See C. Sorenson et al., "Paleosols and the Forest 
Border in Keewatin, N.W.T.," Quaternary Research 1 (1971): 468. 
P. Moore, "Tree Boundaries on the Move," Nature 326 (1987): 545. 
R. Peters and J. Darling, "The Greenhouse Effect and Nature Reserves," 
Bioscience 35 (1985): 707. 
Ibid. 
Present average annual temperatures at El Paso, Kansas City and Minne-
apolis, respectively, are 63, 54, and 44 degrees Fahrenheit. A 4 degree 
Celsius mean global warming would result in average annual increases in 
the United States of about 4 to 6 degrees Celsius or 7 to 11 degrees 
Fahrenheit. 
See Manabe and Stouffer in note 28 above. 
-53-
91. R. Bryson and W. Wendland, "Tentative Climatic Patterns for Some Late 
Glacial and Post-glacial Episodes in Central North America," in Life, 
Land and Water, J. Mayer-Oakes, ed. (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba, 
1967). 
92. See Rind and Lebedeff in note 76 above. Year to year, precipitation 
statistics are fairly noisy, but they do, nonetheless, tend to settle 
down into patterns around some central tendency. As the climate changes, 
it will affect not only the central tendency, but also the distribution 
of values around the central tendency. Lower the central tendency and 
you lower the value for the average minimum and increase the frequency of 
drought. 
93. W. Langbein, et al., Annual Run-off in the United States, U.S. Geological 
Survey circular 52 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Interior, 
1949). For possible mitigating effects, see T. Wigley and P. Jones, "In-
fluences of Precipitation Changes and Direct CO2 Effects on Streamflow, 11 
Nature 314 (1985): 149. 
94. K. Emanuel, "The Dependence of Hurricane Intensity on Climate," Nature 
326 (1987): 483. 
95. State-wide averaged corn yields decline about 20 percent as one 
gresses westward from Illinois into the Great Plains, and about 
percent as one moves south into Appalachia and the southeastern 
Wheat yields decline about 50 percent from Illinois to Montana. 
Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Statistics (Washington, 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975-84). 
pro-
30 to 50 
states. 
See U.S. 
D.C.: 
96. The western boundary of the corn belt is defined by the requirement of a 
minimum of 20 inches of annual rainfall. See R. Neild and N. Richman, 
"Agroclimates Normal for Maize," Agricultural Meteorology 24 (1981): 83. 
The southern boundary is defined by maximum daily temperatures; the 
southern states are too warm for optimal cultivation. See R. Neild, 
"Temperature and Rainfall Influences on the Phenology and Yield of Grain 
Sorghum and Maize: A Comparison," Agricultural Meteorology 27 (1982): 
79. Great Plains wheat production is generally limited by moisture 
conditions at its western boundary and at its southern boundary by high 
growing season temperatures. 
97. For instance, for corn, yields in Columbia, Missouri; Lincoln, Nebraska; 
and Manhattan, Kansas are about 90, 70, and 75 percent of the corn belt 
average, respectively. See J. Benci et al., "Effects of Hypothetical 
Climatic Changes on Production and Yield of Corn," in Impacts of Climatic 
Change on the Biosphere, Climatic Impact Assessment Program, monograph 5 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Transportation, 1975). 
98. For corn, annual average yield variability increases east to west and 
north to south. For instance, Missouri corn production has an 88 percent 
probability of yield reductions of 20 percent at least 10 percent of the 
time; the same value for eastern production (Ohio and Illinois) and more 
northerly production (Iowa) is 30 and 59 percent, respectively. See F. 
Huff and J. Neill, "Effects of Natural Climatic Fluctuations on the 
-54-
9 
l 
l( 
lo 
lo: 
lOL 
los 
99, 
f 
100. 
l 
101. 
a 
.n 
102. 
L; 103, 
::ic 
5 
104. 
ent 
rie 
re 10s. 
Temporal and Spatial Variation in Crop Yields," Journal of Applied 
Meteorology 21 (1982): 540. For wheat,_ annual yield variability in-
creases in climatically marginal areas. The percentage of acreage not 
harvested increases from 10 percent in eastern Nebraska and Kansas to 30 
and 40 percent, respectively, in western Kansas and eastern Colorado. 
See P. Michaels, "Price, Weather, and 'Acreage Abandonment' in Western 
Great Plains Wheat Culture," Journal of Climate and Applied Meteorology 
22 (1983): 1,296. 
Annual production of wheat and other small grains declines east to west 
as soil moisture conditions demand inc~easing use of fallowing systems. 
See L. Thompson, "Weather and Technology in the Production of Corn in the 
U.S. Corn Belt," Agronomy Journal 61 (1969): 453; L. Thompson, "Weather 
and Technology in the Production of Soybeans in the Central United 
States," Agronomy Journal 62 (1970): 232; and L. Thompson, "Weather and 
Technology in the Production of Wheat in the United States," Journal of 
Soil and Water Conservation 24 (1969): 219. Wheat and other small grains 
are sensitive to above average temperatures in May and June and to 
reduced rainfall after seeding. 
R. Warrick, R. Gifford, with M. Parry, "CO2 , Climatic Change and Agri-
culture," in The Greenhouse Effect, Climatic Changes and Ecosystems, B. 
Bolin et al., eds. (Chichester, U.K.: John Wiley and Sons, 1986). Other 
studies suggest that yields would decline on the order of 10 to 20 
percent for each 2 degrees Celsius warming. See R. Shaw, "Climate Change 
and the Future of American Agriculture," in The Future of American Agri-
culture as a Strategic Resource, S. Batie and R. Healy, eds. (Washington, 
D.c.: Conservation Foundation, 1980); W. Terjung et al.,· "Yield 
Responses of Crops to Changes in Environment and Management Practices: 
Model Sensitivity Analysis. I. Maize," International Journal of Bio-
meteorology 28 (1984): 261; the Benci, Thompson, and Leeper models in 
Benci et al. in note 97 above; and S. Ramirez, C. Sakamoto and R. Jensen, 
"Wheat," in Climatic Impact Assessment Program in note 97 above (see both 
the Ramirez, Sakamoto, and Jensen, and the North Dakota State University 
models). -
See Shaw in note 101 above; Terjung et al. in note 101 above; the 
Thompson and Leeper models in Benci et al. iri note 97 above; and Ramirez 
et al. in note 101 above. 
W. Decker, V. Jones, and R. Achutuni, "The Impact of CO2-Induced Climate 
Change on U.S. Agriculture," in Characterization of Information Require-
me~ts for Studies of co2 Effects: Water Resources, Agriculture, Fish-
;ries, Forests and Human Health, M. White, e"d., DOE/ER-0236 (Washington, 
.C.: U.S. Department of Energy, 1985). 
W.B._ Sundquist, K. Menz, and C. Neumeyer, A Technology Assessment of 
~omm:rcial Corn Production in the United States, Agricultural Experiment 
tation bulletin 546-1982 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1982). 
~i-Skidrnore, "The Wind Erosion Problem," in CRS Handbook of Soils, 
lgl.mate and Agriculture, V. Kilmer, ed. (Boca Raton, Fla.: CRS Press, 82). 
-55-
106. D. Pimentel, "Increased co2 Effects on the Environment and in Turn on 
Agriculture and Forestry," in Workshop on Environmental and Societal 
Consequences of a Possible CO2-Induced Climate Change, Carbon Dioxide 
Effects Research and Assessment Program, CONF-7904143 (Washington, D.C.: 
U.S. Department of Energy, 1980). 
107. J. Niedercorn, "The Capital Costs of Climatically Induced Shifts in Agri-
cultural Production: The Example of the American Corn Belt," in The 
Urban Costs of Climatic Modification, T. Ferrar, ed. (New York: John 
Wiley and Sons, 1976). 
108. J. Titus, et al., Sea Level Rise Overview Paper (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency, 1983). 
109. S. Leatherman, "Coastal Geomorphic Responses to Sea Level Rise: Galveston 
Bay, Texas," in Barth and Titus, note 3 above. 
110. See Hoffmann, Seidel, and Keyes in note 72 above. 
111. R. Sorensen, R. Weisman, and G. Lennon, "Methods for Controlling the 
Increased Shore Erosion/Inundation, Storm Surge, and Salinity Intrusion 
Caused by a Postulated Sea Level Rise," paper prepared for ICF Inc. and 
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Bethlehem, Penn., 1983. 
112. M. Gibbs, "Economic Analysis of Sea Level Rise: Methods and Results," in 1 
Barth and Titus, note 3 above. 
113. J. Titus, "Rising Sea Levels: The Impact They Pose," EPA Journal 12 
(1986): 17. 
114. C. Hull and R. Tortoriello, "Sea Level Trend and Salinity in the Delaware 
1: 
1: 
Estuary," staff paper for the Delaware Basin Commission, West Trenton, 1~ 
N.J., 1979. 
115. Ibid. 
116. See note 111 above. 
117. G. McKay and T. Allsopp, "The Role of Climate in Affecting Energy Demand/ 
Supply," in Bach, Pankrath and Williams, note 16 above. 
12 
13 
118. E. Larson, D. Abrahamson, and P. Ciborowski, "Effects of Atmospheric Car- 13 
bon Dioxide on U.S. Peak Electrical Generating Capacity," IEEE Technology 
and Society Magazine, December 1984. 13: 
119. R. Rotty and G. Marland, "Fossil Fuel Combustion: Recent Amounts, 
Patterns, and Trends of co2 , 11 in The Changing Carbon Cycle: A Global 
Analysis, J. Trabalka and D. Reichle, eds. (New York: Springer-Verlag, 
1986). 13~ 
120. See note 42 above. 
-56-
on 
in 
:1.re 
nd/ 
:ar-
:ogy 
y 
:,I 
121. R. Revelle and W. Munk, "The Carbon Dioxide Cycle and the Biosphere," in 
Energy and Climate, Geophysics Research Board, National Research Council 
(Washington, D.C.: National Academy o( Sciences, 1977). 
122 • J. Trabalka et al., "Human Alterations of the Global Carbon Cycle and the 
Projected Future," in Trabalka, note 41 above; and G. Woodwell, "Biotic 
Effects on the Concentration of Atmospheric Carbon Dioxide: A Review and 
Projection," in Carbon Dioxide Assessment Committee, National Research 
Council, note 57 above. The net carbon input to the atmosphere is cal-
culated for an airborne fraction of 0.56. 
123
- R. Dickinson, "Effects of Deforestation on Climate," in Blowing in the 
Wind: Deforestation and Long Range Implications, V. Sutlive, N. Alt-
shuler and M. Zamora, eds., Studies in Third World Societies (Williams-
burg, Vir.: College of William and Mary, Department of Anthropology, 
1981). 
124
- G. Kohlmaier et al., "The Role of the Biosphere in the Carbon Cycle and 
Biota Models," in Bach et al. in note 15 above. For an estimate of about 
15 to 18 ppmv for a 4 degree Celsius warming stretched over eighty years, 
see P. Miller, "Carbon Balance in Northern Ecosystems and the Potential 
Effect of Carbon Dioxide-Induced Climate Change," in Global Dynamics of 
Biospheric Carbon, S. BroWl,1, ed., CONF-8108131 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Department of Energy, 1982). 
125
- See Kohlmaier et al, note 124 above. 
126. See C"b i orowski and Abrahamson, note 40 above, Table 9. 
127
• R. Rotty and G 1 d 1 1 
. Mar an, "Constraints on Fossi Fue Use," in Bach, 
Pankrath and Williams, note 16 above. 
128
. Ibid. 
129
· See note 41 above. 
130. 
Ideal depletion curves for oil and natural gas are taken from H'. Perry 
and H. Landsberg, "Projected World Energy Consumption," in Geophysics 
Research Board, National Research Council, note 121 above. 2 GT is 
assumed as the initial carbon input into the atmosphere from coal 
combustion. 
131. See 
note 119 above. 
132. 
133. 
;or a range of estimates, see A. Perry, "Carbon Dioxide Production 
11cenarios," in Clark, note 4 above. Also see the estimates cited in: H.-
T. Rogner, "Long-Term Energy Projections and Novel Energy Systems," in 
rabalka and Reichle, note 119, above. 
!· Albanese and M. Steinberg, Environmental Control Technology for 
Dtmospheric Carbon Dioxide, DOE/EV-0079 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
epartment of Energy, 1980). 
-57-
134. See Trabalka et al. in note 122 above. 
135. Ibid. 
136. C.F. Baes, Jr., "The Role of the Oceans in the Carbon Cycle," in Bach et 
al. in note 15 above. 
137. See the model results presented in Trabalka et al. in note 122 above, 
Table 10.6; and Seidel and Keyes in note 17 above. 
138. This assumes a 50 percent reduction in the area of cold surface waters. 
For the relation of the airborne fraction to the area of cold surface 
water, see T. Takahashi and A. Azevedo, "The Oceans as a COz Reservoir," 
in Reck and Hummel, note 81 above. 
139. C.F. Baes, Jr. and G. Killough, "Chemical and Biological Processes in 
CO2-Ocean Models," in Trabalka and Reichle, note 119 above. 
140. D. Ehhalt, "On the Rise: Methane in the Global Atmosphere," Environment 
27 (1985): 6. 
141. See Liu et al. in note 38 above. 
142. J. Fishman, S. Solomon, and P. Crutzen, "Observational and Theoretical 
Evidence in Support of a Significant In-situ Photochemical Source of 
Tropospheric Ozone," Tellus 31 (1979): 432. 
143. S. Wofsy, "Interactions of CH4 and CO in the Earth's Atmosphere," Annual 
Reviews of Earth and Planetary Science 4 (1976): 441. 
144. W. Chameides, S. Liu, and R. Cicerone, "Possible Variations in Atmos-
pheric Methane," Journal of Geophysical Research 82 (1977): 1,795. 
145. J. Logan et al., "Tropospheric Chemistry: A Global Perspective," Journal 
l 
1 
1 
1 
16 
of Geophysical Research 86 (1981): 7,210. 16: 
146. See note 144 above. 
147. See .note 22 above. 
148. S. Hameed, R. Gess and J. Hogan, "Response of the Global Climate to 
Changes in Atmospheric Chemical Composition Due to Fossil Fuel Burning," 
Journal of Geophysical Research 85 (1980): 7,537. 
149. See note 145 above. 
150. Ibid. 
151. Ibid. 
152. M. Khalil and R. Rasmussen, "Global Trends of Carbon Monoxide," Eos 68, 
no. 44 (1987): 1,213. 
-58-
t 
il 
:1.al 
II 
,, 
153. See note 22 above. 
154. 
155_ 
156. 
157. 
158. 
159. 
160. 
161. 
162. 
163_ 
164. 
165_ 
N. Sze, "Anthropogenic CO Emissions: Implications for the Atmospheric 
CO- OH-CH4 Cycle," Science 195 (1977): 673; J. Logan et al., "Atmospheric 
Chemistry: Response to Human Influence," Philosophical Transactions of 
the Royal Society of London 290 (1978): 187; and S. Hameed, J. Pinto, and 
R. Stewart, "Sensitivity of the Predicted CO-OH-CH4 Perturbation to 
Tropospheric NOx Concentrations," Journal of Geophysical Research 84 
(1979): 763. 
See note 142 above. 
See note 36 above. 
See Logan et al. in note 154 above. 
See Hameed, Pinto, and Stewart in note 154 above. 
See note 148 above. 
P. Crutzen, "The Role of the Tropics in Atmospheric Chemistry," in Geo-
physiology of Amazonia, R. Dickinson, ed. (New York: John Wiley and 
Sons, 1986); and see note 140 above. 
M. Khalil and R. Rasmussen, "Sources, Sinks, and Seasonal Cycles of 
Atmospheric Methane," Journal of Geophysical Research 88 (1983): 5,131; 
and W. Seiler, "Contribution of Biological Processes to the Global Budget 
of CH4 in the Atmosphere," in Current Perspectives in Hicrobial Ecology, 
M. Klug and C. Reddy, eds. (Washington, D.C.: American Society for 
Microbiology, 1984). 
A. Holzapfel-Pschorn and W. Seiler, "Methane Emission During a Cultiva-
Rice Paddy," Journal of Geophysical Research tion Period From an Italian 91 (1986): 11,803. 
See note 36 above. 
See note 37 above. 
!· Revelle, "Methane Hydrates in Continental Slope Sediments and Increas-
ing Atmospheric Carbon Dioxide," in Carbon Dioxide Assessment Committee, 
National Research Council, note 57 above. 
166. See note 22 above. 
167. 
V. Ramanathan and R. Dickinson, "The Role of· Stratospheric Ozone in the 
Zonal and Seasonal Radiative Energy Balance of the Earth-Troposphere 
System," Journal of the Atmospheric Sciences 36 (1979): 1,084; and note 
22 above. 
168. 
B See note 22 above·, and note 35 above. 
' 
-59-
169. R. Dickinson, S. Liu, and T. Donahue, "Effect of Chlorofluoromethane 
Infrared Radiation on Zonal Atmospheric Temperatures," Journal of the 
Atmospheric Sciences 35 (1978): 2,142. 
170. W.-C. Wang, D. Wuebbles, and W. Washington, "Potential Climatic Effects 
of Perturbations Other Than Carbon Dioxide," in MacCracken and Luther, 
note 2 above. 
171. See note 48 above. 
172. See note 22 above. 
173. Ibid. 
174. See note 35 above. 
175. M. McElroy, S. Wofsy and Y. Yung, "The Nitrogen Cycle: Perturbations Due 
to Man and Their Impact on Atmospheric N20 and 03," Philosophical 
Transactions of the Royal Society of London 277 (1977): 159. 
176. S. Liu,· R. Cicerone, and T. Donahue, "Sources and Sinks of Atmospheric 
N20 and the Possible Ozone Reduction Due to Industrial Fixed Nitrogen 
Fertilizers," Tellus 29 (1977): 251. 
177. See note 35 above. 
178. See note 170 above. 
179. See recent estimates for these gases, presented in Ciborowski and 
Abrahamson, note 40 above. Also see note 22 above. 
180. Carbon monoxide and NOx emissions account for about two-thirds of the 
projected increase in tropospheric ozone abundances. If control of these 
gases was to be proportional to the control of the long-term accumulation 
of carbon dioxide that realistically might be realized (e.g., 450 to 600 
ppmv, as opposed to uncontrolled levels of 500 to 900 ppmv), then the 
warming that might be averted through emissions control would be 0.3 to 
0.4 degrees Celsius. A doubling of the tropospheric ozone level is 
assumed in the uncontrolled case. For the path of carbon dioxide in the 
uncontrolled case, see J. Edmonds et al., Uncertainty in Future Global 
Energy Use and Fossil Fuel CO2 Emissions 1975 to 2075, DOE/NBB-0081 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Energy, 1986); R. Rotty, "Electri-
fication: A Prescription for the Ills of Atmospheric CO2," Nuclear , 
Science and Engineering, 90 (1985): 467; and Rogner in note 132 above. 
With a reduction in the emissions of CFC-11 and CFC-12 of 25 percent, 
long-term steady state levels of these two constituents together would be 
about 2.7 ppbv, as opposed to perhaps 6 ppbv in the uncontrolled case. 
CFC levels of 2.7 ppbv would result in a warming of 0.4 to 0.8 degrees 
Celsius; CFC levels of 6 ppbv would result in a warming of 0.9 to 1.8 
degrees Celsius. For CFC-12 levels with a 25 percent emissions reduc-
tion, see J. Hoffman, "The Importance of Knowing Sooner," in Titus in 
note 72 above, vol. 1, Overview. 
-60-
e 
e 
n 
>e 
181. M. Ross and R. Williams, Our Energy: Regaining Control (New York: 
McGraw Hill Book Company, 1981). 
182. C. Marchetti, The Dynamics of Energy Systems 
tution Model, AR-78-lB (Laxenburg, Austria: 
Applied Systems Analysis, 1978). 
and the Logistic Substi-
International Institute for 
183. A. Perry et al., "Energy Supply and Demand Implications of CO2," Energy 
Journal 7 (1982): 991. 
184. The three calculations assume atmospheric concentrations of 500 to 550, 
600 to 700, and 700 to 800, respectively. The first of these assumes 
that preventive action is taken within ten to fifteen years. The esti-
mates assume initial rates of annual growth in fossil fuel combustion of 
1.5 to 2 percent. Atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations for each 
delay are taken from Perry et al., note 183. 
185. F. Dyson and G. Marland, "Technical Fixes for the Climatic Effects of 
CO2," in Workshop on the Global Effects of Carbon Dioxide from Fossil 
Fuels, W. Elliott and L. Machta, eds., CONF-770385 (Washington, D.C.: 
U.S. Department of Energy, 1979). 
186. M. Steinberg, H. Cheng and F. Horn, A Systems Study for the Removal, 
Recovery and Disposal of Carbon Dioxide From Fossil Fuel Power Plants in 
the U.S., DOE/CH/0016-2 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Energy, 
1984). 
187
. See Ciborowski and Abrahamson, note 40 above. 
-61-

SECTION 2: THE PREVENTIVE STRATEGY 
-63-
cc 
Of 
fe 
tj 
in 
tj 
tr 
gl 
et 
tr 
SE 
\,I} 
g1 
of 
C] 
St 
re 
tl 
tj 
tj 
mt 
Se 
of 
re 
tl, 
dl.l 
bo 
co 
tl, 
tu 
INTRODUCTION TO SECTION 2 
Strategic responses to the greenhouse problem--prevention, adaptation, 
continued study, and compensation--are identified and defined in Section 1. 
Of these, the preventive response has received the most attention, with the 
feasibility of the preventive response attracting special attention. Preven-
~ive responses are preemptive in nature, seeking to prevent the problem of 
i~pending climate change, or at least to limit such changes, through altera-
tions in those policies that result in the emission of industrial gases to. 
the atmosphere. They would result in reduced emissions of the. greenhouse 
gases or their removal from the atmosphere. Some analysts have also 
envisioned intentional anthropogenic alteration of the optical properties of 
the atmosphere or of other features of the heat balance as a means of off-
setting a greenhouse warming. 
A few studies have considered the effectiveness of a large-scale inter-
~ational effort to inject sulfate aerosols into the stratosphere to offset an 
intensified greenhouse effect. In general, this is not thought to be a 
feasible solution to the climate change problem, given potential adverse 
environmental consequences that are associated with it (i.e., intensified 
acid deposition, effects of the pattern of injection on surface meteoro-
logical conditions). The withdrawal of greenhouse constituents from the 
atmosphere has been found not to be feasible due to the energy requirements 
of such a removal. It has been found necessary to concentrate on emissions 
control, which limits preventive control to nondiffuse, highly centralized or 
:egulated sources, like fossil fuel power plants or the energy sector of the 
industrialized societies. 
This implies, among other things, that carbon dioxide is the only gas 
whose control would be at all meaningful. Emissions of most of the other 
greenhouse gases (OGGs) probably cannot be controlled. Of the various means 
of controlling carbon dioxide emissions, purely technical fixes can be ex-
cluded from consideration. The removal of carbon dioxide from the effluent 
streams of coal-fired power plants can be excluded due to the costs of 
r~moval and, more importantly, to the small percentage of future emissions 
t_at might be affected by such removal (on the order of 25 percent). Preven-
:~vetaction, if it is to come about, must involve restrictions on the combus-
ion of coal and other carbon-based energy sources, and these restrictions 
must extend to all energy sectors rather than simply to the electrical 
sector. 
This process of narrowing the viable preventive responses to the group 
of responses involving carbon dioxide and energy policy brings the preventive 
~~sponse into focus. This narrowing fqcuses much of the preventive effort on 
de control of carbon dioxide, which implies first that much of the warming 
hue to OGGs must be considered inevitable and second that the control of car-on d. · ioxide must be much more thorough than would be the case were the OGGs 
cthontro:lable or were carbon dioxide the sole greenhouse constituent acting on 
e climate . 
. The narrowing also focuses the discussion on energy and on the oppor-
tunity for or constraints to a transition to a non-carbon based energy 
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system. There are grounds to believe that various economic and political 
factors may inhibit the rate of such a transition and, therefore, the degree 
to which the accumulation of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere can be limited. 
Over the long-term, the feasibility of a transition to a non-carbon energy 
system is not in dispute. Few doubt that such a transition will be realized 
long before all, or even one-third to one-half, of the global coal, tar 
sands, and oil shale resources are consumed. (Full combustion would probably 
be accompanied by an aggregate warming in the range of 6 to 10 degrees Cel-
sius.) Rather, the rate of transition over the next half century or so is at 
issue, along with the feasibility of limiting global commitments to coal, tar 
sands, and oil shale. 
The discussion thus far has been structured around the demands of these 
constraints as they constrict the purely technical potential for non-carbon 
or low-carbon energy futures. Vastly improved energy efficiency is usually 
the central component of low-carbon futures. Were it to be immediately 
exploited, improved end-use efficiency, it is estimated, would be sufficient 
to limit the annual energy use from 1985 to 2050 to present levels and limit 
the cumulative carbon combustion over that period to something like one-
twentieth of the total coal and shale oil carbon in the crustal reserves. By 
contrast, the most conservative, albeit probably the most defensible, des-
cription of the constraints to the transition--one that calculates the degree 
of constraint from those rates of introduction of new energy sources that 
seem reasonable and that could be maintained for a long period of time--
pushes the total carbon consumption to something like one-tenth of total 
carbon deposits. Higher values would result from a slightly more liberal 
interpretation of these constraints. 
Particular constraints that are discussed in the literature include 
those arising from the capital costs of a long-term transition and those 
implicit in the tendency of industrial society to drift to ever higher rates 
of ·energy consumption. The premature retirement of existing fossil fuel 
facilities would involve large capital costs. Capital would be needed to 
develop and expand new energy industries (e.g., to construct new factories to 
produce energy production and consumption technology and to construct fac-
tories to produce those factories) and to research and develop new energy 
sources. Finally there would be costs to society's production capacity if 
less industrially useful energy technologies were to be employed. A sig-
nificant part of the economy of the industrialized world is organized around 
fossil fuel production, and energy production generally, and this tends to 
bias the economic and political system toward a continuation of these 
activities. Institutions will seek to continue doing the· things they do 
well. Considerable opposition could be expected from the owners of coal'and 
oil reserves, and these interests would find powerful arguments against pre-
vention in the general structure of the international economy, which favors 
the noncompliance of minor energy consuming nations in cooperative preventive 
action. 
Much of the discussion of constraints to the preventive response has 
been directed to cost or is political in nature, focusing on those arguments 
that might be exploited by interests which, for one reason or another, stand 
opposed to emissions control. However, purely technical considerations also 
come into play. The feasibility of prevention depends upon one's perception 
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of what might constitute a meaningful level of limitation and on the degree 
to which society's self-professed ability to limit the atmospheric accumula-
tion of carbon dioxide is consistent with such a level of limitation. The 
latter depends on the response of the climate. If the sensitivity of the 
climate is quite high (e.g., a sensitivity of 4 or 5 degrees Celsius), it 
would be a very difficult matter indeed to limit the warming to a relatively 
small value, were that the goal. 
Hoffman and Seidel offer an overview of some of these issues. They 
highlight the effect of possible higher climate sensitivities to the green-
house gases and the practical difficulties of limiting emissions. As the 
authors note, recent modeling efforts suggest that the sensitivity of mean 
global temperature to a doubling of the atmospheric concentration of carbon 
dioxide could easily be double what it was thought to be early in the 1980s. 
Rather than a warming of 2 degrees Celsius, a doubling of atmospheric carbon 
dioxide concentrations could result in a warming of 4 degrees Celsius, and 
this would double the difficulty of limiting the magnitude of future warming. 
The authors conclude that the investment, psychological or financial, of 
current generations in fossil fuel industries extends beyond production tech-
nology to consumption technology, infrastructure, the present structure of 
energy costs, and the general pattern of capital investment, and that these 
constitute a barrier to a rapid transition to non-carbon energy sources. 
P:eventive responses that center on carbon dioxide are likely to create a 
situation in global energy markets that encourages individual nations, each 
2:acting in its own interests, to cheat and exploit any price advantages that 
might result from the preventive actions of others. It is possible that 
short-term preventive actions may so lower the market price of fossil fuels 
as to make irresistible the temptation for the world as a whole to "cheat" 
sp?radically. Control of the other gases is unlikely. Finally, Hoffman and 
~eidel argue that the lack of certainty about future impacts will generate at 
east some opposition to preventive action, and that this, with the other 
constraints, severely limits the prospects for a preventive response over the 
n:xt forty years. The transition to a new emissions regime will take a con-
:iderable amount of time. Policies directed to prevention can be effective, 
ut only in the sense that they can limit the magnitude of future warming, 
not eliminate the prospect altogether. 
h Williams et al. investigate the potential for preventive action based on 
en anced energy end-use efficiency and on the use of so-called "soft energy" 
~~~r:es. Final energy use and the total atmospheric accumulation of carbon 
xide are calculated for the year 2020. The estimates are based on 
accepted United Nations population estimates and are calculated to provide 
~~~~gh energy in the developing world to raise the basic living conditions to 
s. d s Western standards. Estimated Wes.tern per capita energy use falls con-
ti erably but is still thought sufficient in light of efficiency improvements 
1~8;llow a 100 percent increase in the consumption of goods and services over 
levels. The energy supply scenarios take into account global environ-
:en~al stresses like deforestation and nuclear proliferation, which often 
erive from the large-scale production of commercial energy. Particular 
energy supply strategies are suggested that can minimize the disruption 
caused by energy use. 
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Total global energy use in the year 2020 is about 11 terawatts in the 
Williams et al. scenario, or about the same as at present. The corresponding 
atmospheric carbon dioxide concentration would be about 388 parts per million 
(ppmv), or only a slight increase above the present concentration (345 ppmv). 
Carbon emissions in 2020 would be about the same as at present (5.5 giga-
tons). At equilibrium, an increase to 388 ppmv would be insignificant cli-
matically, amounting to an increase in mean global temperature of about 0.5 
degrees Celsius. 
These authors limit their analysis to energy efficiency improvements 
that could derive from technologies that are already commercially available 
or now in the prototype stage. However, as the authors note, this analysis 
ought to be considered as a statement of what could ideally be achieved with 
the introduction of these more efficient energy technologies and sources and 
with full saturation in the targeted economic sectors. Obviously, the intro-
duction of the most efficient technologies will take considerable time. The 
authors also do not consider the economic coherence of their scenario. 
Nonetheless, Williams et al. do provide a reasonably consistent technical 
scenario, which if only partly realized would go a long way toward limiting 
the projected atmospheric buildup of carbon dioxide. 
Laurmann assesses the effect of the long time periods needed for energy 
system transitions. Market penetration is the principal concept around which 
the author develops his analysis. The concept of market penetration is taken 
from Marchetti and establishes the rate of absorption of any given technology 
into commercial markets. The introduction of new energy technologies or 
sources into energy markets has historically been slow, with fifty to 
seventy-five years required for any one source to secure a 50 percent market 
share. Laurmann applies this empirically-derived estimate of market pene-
tration time to the future atmospheric accumulation of carbon dioxide, 
investigating the degree to which this constant forms a barrier to any 
attempt, over the next decade or so, to significantly limit the buildup of 
carbon dioxide. Any value for such an accumulation under a doubling of the 
preindustrial atmospheric carbon dioxide concentration, or its temperature-
change equivalent (a 3 degree Celsius increase), is taken to indicate that 
action is plausible. This value is easily exceeded in the case of the higher 
market penetration time but comes in just under it in the case of a fifty-
year market penetration time. 
Laurmann's analysis suggests that market penetration times constitute a 
significant barrier to a preventive response. However, as is true of the 
work of Hoffman and Seidel, such a conclusion depends on the level of climate 
change against which success or failure is estimated. Relatively low bench 
marks are often selected for use in evaluations as a matter of convention, 
but they have never withstood rigorous review. Laurmann's calculations 
account for the effect of the other gases, which he takes to be equal in 
effect to 80 percent of the effect of increased atmospheric levels of carbon 
dioxide. 
Firor draws on the literature and on as-yet-unpublished work of his 
colleagues to summarize the role of the greenhouse gases other than carbon 
dioxide. He considers primarily methane, nitrous oxide, the chlorofluoro-
carbons (CFC-11, CFC-12), ozone, and stratospheric water vapor. The present 
-68-
rates of growth in the atmospheric concentrations of these gases are present-
ed. Firor concludes that the effect of these other gases may equal or exceed 
the effect of carbon dioxide in the next fifty years, and, by considering the 
range of estimates, suggests that, were all other greenhouse gases consid-
ered, the total effect could be between 50 and 300 percent of the effect of 
carbon dioxide. An estimated OGG warming on the order of 100 percent of the 
effect of carbon dioxide implies a significant upward revision. 
As Firor notes, the policy discussion depends critically on numbers and 
on the scale of estimated changes. Any significant upward revision of the 
estimated change in planetary warming changes the terms of the policy debate. 
Recognition of the effect of the OGGs dramatically changes the physical 
science foundation of the problem and may necessitate a parallel shift in the 
Policy discussion. 
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LIMITS TO PREVENTING A GLOBAL WARMING 
John Hoffman and Stephen Seidel 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Washington, D.C. 
INTRODUCTION 
The global warming expected to result from increased atmospheric 
concentrations of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases has led some 
People to call for immediate actions to prevent climatic change. 1 The 
greenhouse gases, according to this school of thought, should be treated in 
the same manner as other pollutants: to the extent that public health or 
Welfare may be at risk, limits should be placed on future emissions of these 
gases. 
Concern over the implications of a greenhouse warming takes many forms. 
Some feel that a climate change of any magnitude places an unfair burden on 
future generations. 2 Others are concerned with potentially negative impacts 
0 n agriculture3 or with the inability of the developing world to adjust their 
fragile economic systems to changing environmental conditions. Still others 
Worry about the risks to coastal lands from the rise in sea level that is 
likely to accompany any significant warming. 4 
The worth of preventive strategies is far from universally accepted. 
Some agriculturalists have argued that more atmospheric carbon dioxide, on 
balance, will be beneficial to society. They note its salutary influence on 
Photosynthesis, which they suggest will more than compensate for its effect 
0 n the climate. 5 
This paper ·does not address the desirability of policies to delay, 
~imit, or prevent climate change; we have intentionally sidestepped this 
lssue. Rather, we shall evaluate the likely effectiveness of such policies. 
Our findings may discomfort some; it appears that not even the most stringent 
of the set of feasible preventive policies can prevent significant global 
Warming during the next forty years. Policies aimed at prevention can work, 
but their effectiveness seems to be limited to reductions in the magnitude of 
Warming in the twenty-first century. 
UNREALIZED WARMING: A PHYSICAL LIMIT TO PREVENTION 
Since 1860, atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide have risen 
approximately 25 percent. Atmospheric concentrations of other greenhouse 
~ases, including chlorofluorocarbons, methane, and nitrous oxide, have also 
increased, in some cases by larger percentages. While past increases in 
greenhouse gases probably have had some warming effect on the earth, not all 
the warming from past increases in the atmospheric concentrations of the 
greenhouse gases should have been felt yet. A bank of unrealized warming 
exists. 6 
This unrealized warming results from the way increased concentrations of 
greenhouse gases elevate air temperatures. The additional energy trapped by 
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the added greenhouse gases heats the surface of the planet, which warms both p 
the air and the surface of the ocean. Heat is transported downward into the p 
ocean, creating an imbalance between the air surface temperature and the d 
ocean surface temperature that then is reduced by a flux of heat from the air a 
into the water. In this way, the transport of heat into the ocean delays the 
warming of the atmosphere. The more heat is transported to the deeper layers 
of the oceans, the longer the time lag. Eventually, however, the top layers f 
of the oceans are warmed to the point at which they come into thermal 1, 
equilibrium with the air, and at that time the temperature of the system c, 
stops increasing. c, 
sl 
Because of the thermal lag, one cannot use the equilibrium response due r1 
to doubled atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide, estimated as 1.5 to ~: 
4.5 degrees Celsius by the National Academy of Sciences, 7 to predict the t, 
transitional temperature of the earth over time. Since at least half of the dE 
infrared absorbing gases now in the atmosphere have been emitted in the last rE 
two decades, a large percentage of the ultimate surface air temperature rise 
from past emissions cannot yet have been realized. Consequently, global 
temperatures can be expected to increase even if concentrations of greenhouse fc 
gases do not rise above current levels. In fact, since emissions of ~c 
greenhouse gases are growing, the ·gap between current temperature and cc 
equilibrium temperature must also be growing. 8 The size of the gap would be Si 
especially large if recent studies at the Goddard Institute for Space he 
Studies9 and the National Center for Atmospheric Research10 have correctly 
estimated the equilibrium warming from doubled atmospheric concentrations of 
carbon dioxide (4 degrees Celsius per doubled atmospheric carbon dioxide). le 
av;, 
The good news is that oceanic heat absorption has buffered us from the ill! 
global warming. The bad news, however, is that we are committing ourselves th 
to global warming without necessarily being aware of the magnitude of that ex 
commitment. Wa 
fu 
fo 
ECONOMIC CONSTRAINTS TO LIMITING GLOBAL WARMING di, 
be, 
Discussion of an immediate and successful termination to the emission of ~01 
greenhouse gases is purely rhetorical. Termination is not a serious policy 
option. Emissions of all known greenhouse gases (e.g., carbon dioxide, 
methane, chlorofluorocarbons, and nitrous oxide) are actually increasing, and UsE 
in the absence of strong governmental intervention to curtail their growth sh< 
they can be expected to increase appreciably for the forseeable future. thE 
Since emission of the greenhouse gases into the atmosphere is a natural con- die 
sequence of many important economic processes, termination cannot be ene 
contemplated without first considering its effects on the economy. This Poi 
paper will review the economic pressures that exist to increase, rather than the 
to decrease, the various greenhouse gas emissions. ad\ 
Carbon Dioxide 
Carbon dioxide emissions result primarily from the burning of fossil 
fuel but also from cement manufacturing and possibly from deforestation. 
Fossil fuels have become the dominant source of energy because of their 
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Price, convenience, and physical characteristics. Almost 90 percent of 
primary commercial energy now comes from fossil fuels. 11 Past decisions have 
dedicated tremendous amounts of capital to the production, transportation, 
r and consumption of various fossil fuels. 
·s 
D 
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In the absence of directed policies, the speed of any transition from 
fossil fuels would depend on the free market decisions of energy users over 
long periods of time. Consumers make energy decisions based on the relative 
costs of fossil as against non-fossil energy and on the availability of 
capital for new energy sources. Also important are consumers' abilities to 
shift from fossil fuels without lowering the value of investments and the 
relative attractiveness of energy alternatives for the work that consumers 
Wish to perform. Hence, any substantial transition from fossil fuels will 
take time, given the current costs, infrastructure, technology, and market 
demands. Estimates of past transitions suggest that a fifty-year period is 
required for one dominant energy source to replace another. 12 
Large fixed investments in existing energy systems constitute one reason 
1se for the length of this lag. Moreover, efforts to reduce fossil fuel use 
Would promote lower fossil fuel prices, making non-fossil energy options 
Comparatively less attractive. The recent world oil glut illustrates this 
,e Situation: lower oil prices clearly increase the market for larger cars and 
help sustain the demand for fossil fuel. 
,f International economic competition is another important factor in the 
length of this lag, since it limits a nation's ability to unilaterally shift 
away from fossil fuels. A shift to a more expensive non-fossil alternative 
a implies a clear cost disadvantage, and nations that attempt it could find 
s themselves at an economic disadvantage in relation to those that do not. For 
example, the Environmental Protection Agency study, Can We Delay A Greenhouse 
Warming? 13 estimates that even a 15 percent reduction in U.S. domestic fossil 
fuel consumption, induced by taxation on all fossil fuels (set at 100 percent 
for shale oil and adjusted proportionally for all other fuels based on carbon 
dioxide emissions), would leave worldwide consumption almost unchanged, 
because prices elsewhere would decrease. Global carbon dioxide emissions 
, of Would be reduced by only 3 percent. 
y 
and 
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Actions to achieve substantial improvements in the efficiency of energy 
Use offer another means by which to reduce fossil fuel use. Numerous studies 
show that opportunities for increased energy end-use efficiency are at least 
theoretically sufficient to substantially influence energy demand and carbon 
dioxide emissions. 14 Using mathematical models, proponents of improved 
energy end-use efficiency have shown that various end uses (i.e., trans-
P0rtation and heating) can be satisfied _less expensively through conservation 
than through the development of new sources of energy. Least-cost proponents 
advance these studies as a basis for energy efficiency programs, which they 
suggest represent a feasible alternative to the continued or accelerating 
combustion of fossil fuels. 
Unfortunately, these studies are probably much too optimistic. While 
clearly mapping a set of market opportunities, they tend to ignore real 
market obstacles to the sale and acceptance of energy efficiency improve-
ments. Technological uncertainties, transition costs, and institutional 
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inertia constitute serious obstacles to rapid and sustained improvements in 
energy efficiency. Experience shows. that investments that look good on paper 
often do not sell well. For example, according to many studies, energy 
conservation in existing housing constitutes a very profitable investment. 
But in the marketplace such conservation investments have not fared as well 
as one would expect from the studies. Reasons for this shortfall include 
consumer skepticism and a lack of financing. Lack of incentive may also be 
important, since some potential consumers may be renters. Also important may 
be the real consumer transaction costs, which are often ignored in the 
studies but which can constitute a large percentage of the real costs. For 
example, the transaction costs associated with the installation of new 
furnaces or with insulation can be quite high. The consumer must find a 
competent, trustworthy vendor for the desired service .. The consumer has to 
take time off work to wait for the contractors. Finally, legal remedies for 
incorrectly completed work, if such remedies exist, can be expensive and 
time-consuming. In the real world, obstacles like these have led far fewer 
homeowners to pursue conservation measures than energy efficiency models 
predict. 15 
Worse yet, conservation measures also tend to be underutilized in new 
homes, where they should be easiest to install. Perhaps developers find 
potential home buyers more sensitive to the visible aspects of the home, to 
the size of the up-front costs, or to mortgage costs than to energy costs. 
Or perhaps in some cases the developers do not know how to fully exploit this 
aspect of consumer preference. Whatever the cause, the facts are clear. 
Houses are being built which, although they are more efficient.than the 
houses built in the past, still fall far short of achieving full energy 
savings. Apparently, even ten years after the first oil crisis, the market 
still has not responded as the authors of the least-cost studies would have 
hoped. 
None of these facts justify failure to implement conservation measures. 
Nor do they justify failure to support programs that promote enhanced energy 
end-use efficiency. They do illustrate, however, that time is required for 
any technology, even a superior one, to penetrate a market. 
In summary, options may exist for reducing carbon dioxide emissions. 
However, a large body of evidence suggests that quick, easy, or inexpensive 
curtailment of the growth of fossil fuel use is unlikely.· Efforts to move 
away from proven technologies will be difficult .and time-consuming, if they 
are made at all. Finally, the demand for fossil energy is likely to grow as 
the developing world grows economically. Overall, glopal,policies appear to 
have a limited capacity to reduce emissions, even drastic global taxes on 
fossil fuels (for example, taxes set at 300 percent) are probably only 
sufficient to reduce emissions by one-third in 2025. 16 
Chlorofluorocarbons 
Chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) are used as aerosol propellants throughout 
the world except in the United States and several other countries that have 
banned their use in spray cans. Chlorofluorocarbons are also used as 
refrigerants in heat pumps, refrigerators, and air conditioners; as solvents 
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on almost all printed circuit boards and in some dry cleaning applications; 
as foam-blowing agents; and in a variety of other industrial processes and 
Products. Chlorofluorocarbons tend to be nontoxic, highly useful substances. 
For many purposes, they are far superior to their closest substitutes. 
Chlorofluorocarbons also are potent greenhouse gases. Increases in 
atmospheric concentrations of these gases are estimated to have contributed 
to the global warming experienced during the period between 1970 and 1980. 
Their effect is thought to have been equal to about 40 percent of the warming 
experienced during this period from increased atmospheric carbon dioxide 
concentrations. 17 
Emissions of the chlorofluorocarbons from developed countries are driven 
Primarily by demand in mature industries, a situation in which replacement 
demand and population growth are driving factors. Rand has predicted a 5 
Percent growth rate for the chlorofluorocarbons in the United States for CFC 
11 and 12. 18 CFC 113 has been an important exception to the characterization 
?f markets as mature in the developed wo~ld. The use of CFC 113, a solvent 
ln the electronics industry, has increased much more rapidly than the use of 
the other chlorofluorocarbons. -The increase in the use of CFC 113 
demonstrates the rapid growth that can be associated with new markets. In 
the developing world, many products that utilize chlorofluorocarbons are in 
the early stages of market penetration, making a rapid increase in the use of 
CFc 11 and 12 likely in those areas. 
Although a variety of possibilities exists for reducing the use of the 
Chlorofluorocarbons, in many cases the nearest substitute is much more 
expensive or is itself a potential environmental problem (e.g., a toxic 
substance). Nevertheless, over the long run it may be possible to find 
economically and environmentally acceptable substitutes for many current uses 
~f chlorofluorocarbons. 19 The most promising avenue for reducing chloro-
luorocarbon emission involves prohibiting their use in nonessential aerosols 
throughout the world. Since other aerosol_ propellants are actually less 
expensive than chlorofluorocarbons, this large emissions source constitutes 
an excellent control target. 
d Chlorofluorocarbons, like many of the long-lived greenhouse gases, 
femonstrate the problems that would be encountered in an effort to curtail 
Uture greenhouse warming. A worldwide freeze on the growth of 
~~lorofluorocarbon emissions would still allow concentrations to rise 
· l~efold, at which point concentrations would stabilize. And current 
emissions could be sustained over time only with increasingly stringent 
controls far beyond those on spray can aerosol uses. 
C Atmospheric methane appears to be increasing at 1 percent annually: 20 
~:n~iderable uncertainty surrounds the cause of ths increase. Emissions from 
t rious sources such as swamps, forests, rice paddies, natural gas 
iransmission, and livestock have not been well quantified. Moreover, the 
rncrease of atmospheric carbon monoxide concentrations may be reducing the 
a~te at which methane is scrubbed from the troposphere, thereby increasing 
mospheric methane concentrations. 21 
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Two aspects of methane release are of interest. It is a strong green-
house gas and it reacts in the stratosphere to produce water vapor, which at 
high altitudes is also a potent greenhouse gas. 22 This latter effect has not 
been calculated or included in the estimates of future global warming made by 
the Environmental Protection Agency or other groups. However, it could add 
significantly to total projected temperature change. 
Future atmospheric concentrations of methane are difficult to estimate. 
Rice is a basic foodstuff in much of the world. As the global population 
expands, the production of rice is likely to grow. It is unclear whether 
changes in cropping patterns or other biological factors can decrease the 
methane emissions from rice paddies. Methane emissions will also be 
difficult to control to the extent that leakage from natural gas pipelines 
constitutes a significant source of methane release. This is especially true 
in the case of the Soviet Union, which has inferior pipeline technology. 
Although further increases in the number of livestock are unlikely to keep c 
pace with population expansion, some further growth is likely. A possibility 
exists that biotechnology can reduce methanogenesis in livestock; at this c 
time, this is all that can be said. Similarly, as the earth warms, t 
previously negligible sources of methane, such as tundra or methane hydrates, 
could develop into more important sources of methane. Finally, the magnitude 
of future carbon monoxide emissions is unclear. Increases are possible if a l 
synthetic fuels industry develops; reductions are possible if clean auto-
mobile technologies penetrate most of the world markets. 
e 
In light of these considerations, the degree of future warming i 
associated with increased methane concentrations is unclear. Although P 
various measures may provide real opportunities to limit methane emissions, c 
.there also exist the possibilities that little can be done or that 1 
atmospheric methane concentrations will grow faster than the past rate of b 
growth. P 
Nitrous Oxide 
a1 
c: 
Cc 
s: 
Atmospheric concentrations of nitrous oxide are increasing at about 0.25 ~, 
percent per year, apparently as a result of some combination of coal tl 
combustion emissions and agricultural practices. 23 If the former dominate, c] 
reductions in fossil fuel use or alterations in the way in which we burn hj 
fuels could reduce the growth in the atmospheric concentrations of this gas. re 
If agricultural sources predominate, the possibilities for emissions- ~a 
reductions appear more limited. Furthermore, the possibility exists that Un 
rising carbon dioxide concentrations could change the nutrient balance of o~ 
soils and plants, thereby increasing terrestrial nitrous oxide production. ~a 
In general, an inadequate amount of research is now focused on the sources 
and sinks of nitrous oxide and the ways in which these may change as the 
earth warms. Efforts to limit further increases in atmospheric nitrous oxide ~i 
concentrations obviously require more understanding of these sources and e~ 
sinks. Rei 
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Tropospheric Ozone and Other Less Important Greenhouse Gases 
At altitudes of 6 to 10 kilometers (km), tropospheric ozone is a strong 
greenhouse gas. Some atmospheric chemists believe that nitrogen oxide 
emissions (NOx) from airplanes may increase the ozone abundance at those 
altitudes. 24 Airplane emissions are likely to increase with rising civilian 
and military use and with improved fuel efficiency and hotter jet engines. 
If nitrogen oxide emissions do in fact increase the ozone amounts at 
altitudes of 6 to 10 km, a strong greenhouse effect would depend on the time 
required for alterations in jet engines, and the amount of time involved in 
such a technological change would not be negligible. A reduced rate of 
increase in air miles and safety considerations might make such steps 
Undesirable. Again, few studies have addressed these issues. 
Concentrations of the other greenhouse gases, such as carbon tetra-
chloride and methylchloroform, have been observed to be increasing in the 
atmosphere. In aggregrate, the contribution of the minor trace gases to 
future global warming may become significant. Generally, it will be 
difficult to reduce emissions of these gases, since their substitutes often 
take the form of gases which may themselves have a greenhouse effect. 
LIMITS RESULTING FROM A LACK OF KNOWLEDGE AND CONSENSUS 
Our discussion has focused so far on the physical, technical, and 
economic constraints to preventing global warming. An additional constraint 
involves the lack of certainty and consensus about the desirability of 
Preventive actions. The existing knowledge does not yet provide a convincing 
c~se for the desirability of limiting future global warming. Few nations are 
~lkely to take unilateral action. Furthermore, even if some nations do 
ecome more concerned, the variation in the magnitude of the changes 
Predicted by the climate models is quite large, and this is likely to inhibit 
action. Such models produce a wide range of estimates regarding regional 
climate changes, which most directly determine the economic and environmental 
c?nsequences of increasing greenhouse gas concentrations. The climate models 
simply do not provide accurate representations of ocean circulation and the 
~ays the enhanced radiative forcing caused by greenhouse gases will alter 
th
~t circulation. Nor do they include dynamic representations of the way 
~limatically driven changes in vegetation and soils would alter the 
Ydrological cycle. Consequently, models cannot produce forecasts that are 
reliable at the regional scale. Individual nations can only guess at the 
Value of limiting future warmings without such forecasts. To some, such 
Uncertainty might seem to justify action, but to many, including those who 
0
~ resources that would be affected by. actions to curtail a greenhouse 
~arming, such uncertainty will produce opposition to actions to limit change. 
. Finally, if a consensus to limit global warming is to be developed, it 
~lll be critical to consider the needs of the developing world, where the 
:mission of greenhouse gases into the atmosphere is just beginning. 
d:Presentatives of these nations have indicated that they will be open to 
lscussions of the "luxuries" of the environmental concerns of rich nations 
only if they get a share of the economic pie. It will take time to develop 
an approach that everyone considers fair. The momentum for global warming is 
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significant and ensures that a significant change will take place in the 
corning decades. 
THE NEED TO EXPEDITE RESEARCH 
The above arguments underscore the likelihood of unavoidable and 
potentially significant climate changes through the middle of the next 
century. Preventive actions, if taken now, can successfully limit further 
warming, but only with time. 
Given the likelihood of significant climate change, the development of 
reliable regional climate scenarios and the evaluation of their potential 
effects should be our highest priorities. Such forecasts will not become 
available without a vastly expanded program of research. In fact, unless our 
priorities are changed, the rate of climate change over the next two decades 
is likely to exceed the rate at which scientific uncertainties are 
eliminated. Because of our current ignorance, it is impossible to state the 
implications of this situation. · 
Note: The authors wrote this paper in their private capacity. The views 
expressed herein do not represent the views of the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency or the U.S. Government. 
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INTRODUCTION 
At the present rate of use, the world's remaining recoverable oil re-
sources amount to less than a one hundred-year supply. Two-thirds of these 
:esources are located in Middle Eastern/North African (ME/NAf) countries and 
in countries with centrally planned economies. The amount left in the rest 
of the world is about a forty-year supply at the present rate of oil con-
s';1111Ption there. 1 These numbers indicate the ephemeral nature of the present 
011 glut and highlight the need to begin a global transition from oil. 
The rural populations of the developing world, which constitute half of ~~~ World's population, are also caught up in an energy crisis, even though 
Plays only a minor role in their lives. Here people are largely de-
iendent for energy on biomass--mainly fuelwood used for cooking. However, a 
Uelwood crisis has arisen, since in many areas increased fuelwood demand 
associated with population growth presently exceeds the rate of fuelwood 
1eg:neration through photosynthesis. It has been estimated by the Food and 
gricultural Organization (FAQ) that about 100 million human beings now 
;uffer "acute scarcity" of fuelwood and about 1 billion suffer a "deficit. 112 
Uelwood gathering involves many hours of drudgery each day, particularly by 
Women and children, and the ecological effects of excessive fuelwood use, 
Particularly deforestation and its effects, amplify this human toil. 
. Energy availability is a major global problem. But energy availability 
~s onl? one of several important global problems that must be addressed if 
~ank1.nd is to achieve a sustainable world society. Others include: , the 
~ obal economic crisis, North-South tensions, widespread poverty in develop-~~g countries, population growth, food scarcity, humanity's role in changing 
e global climate, deforestation and desertification, the risk of nuclear 
War, and nuclear weapons proliferation. 
The point of departure of the present analysis is the recognition that an f 
1 ° these other problems are strongly linked to energy and that pursuing 
so Utions to the energy problem without considering these linkages may aggra-
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vate these problems. Our analysis seeks to identify a long-term global 
energy strategy which supports, or at least does not conflict with, solutions 
of these other global problems. More generally, we seek to articulate the 
dimensions of a long-run energy strategy that is compatible with considera-
tions of equity, economic efficiency, environmental soundness, long-term 
human welfare, self-reliance, and peace--the key features of a sustainable 
world society. 
THE ROLE OF ENERGY POLICY IN SOLVING OTHER GLOBAL PROBLEMS 
To begin the analysis, we identify important links of the above-
mentioned problems to energy and in each case consider the potential 
contributions of energy planning to the resolution of these problems. 
The Economic Crisis 
The last decade has been a period of rampant inflation, major global 
recessions, widespread unemployment, and soaring real interest rates. In 
addition, recent years have seen the development of an international debt 
crisis, which could lead to collapse of the global financial system were 
hard-pressed debtors of the developing world to fail to discharge their 
debts. 
Costly energy has been a major contributing factor to these develop-
ments. On average, low- and middle-income developing countries spent, 
respectively, 61 percent and 37 percent of their export earnings on oil 
imports in 1981. 3 Also, energy from new sources is generally far more costly 
than energy now being used. In the United States, the percent of all new 
plant and equipment expenditures accounted for by capital expenditures on 
energy supply rose from 25 percent to nearly 40 percent between 1972 and 
1982, with essentially no net increase in domestic energy production in this 
period. In developing countries, investments committed to energy supply 
expansion increased during the 1970s, on average, from 1 to 2 percent to 2 to 
3 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), requiring in 1982 some $25 billion 
in foreign exchange--over one-third the foreign exchange required for all 
kinds of investments. 4 This has made capital scarcer for other economic 
activities. 
If less costly ways could be found to meet energy needs, energy planning 
could help to ease the economic crisis. If the focus of energy planning were 
to be shifted from supply expansion to the identification of the least costly 
ways of providing energy services (for space conditioning, lighting, mechan-
ical work, mobility, etc.), large reductions in life-cycle ener~y costs could 
be achieved with investments in energy efficiency improvements. Realizing 
such opportunities can improve economic efficiency and also promote lower 
world oil prices by restraining world oil demand and sparing the world the 
burden of tight world market conditions (see Figure 1). To the extent that 
costly new energy sources are not needed, it can also lead to lower prices 
for other energy forms. 
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Figure 1 
ORGANIZATION OF PETROLEUM EXPORTING COUNTRIES (OPEC) PRICING BEHAVIOR* 
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*The percentage of real price change from the previous year is plotted with 
Percent of OPEC production capacity used. The percentage of capacity util-
ization is equal to the crude oil production divided by the maximum sustain-
able production for that year. Source: Energy Information Administration, 
U.s. Department of Energy, Annual Energy Outlook 1983 with Projections to 
1995, report DOE/EIA-0383(83) (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 
1983). 
tl2_rth-South Tensions 
Poor countries of the South account for three-fourths of the world's 
Population but per capita incomes in the South are, on average, only one-
tenth as large as those in the rich countries of the North. This income 
disparity is a crucial factor responsible for the general tensions between 
~
0 rth and South, as well as for the crisis characterizing the world economy. 
~ssociated problems such as deteriorating commodity prices, northern pro-
tectionist barriers against the emerging manufacturing industries of the 
South, and the vulnerability of southern debtors to rising interest rates 
have put developing countries at a disadvantage in the global marketplace. 
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North-South tensions can be eased by working toward the eradication of 
income disparities by means of policies that foster development in developing 
countries, including policies that would help make affordable the energy 
needed to meet development goals. 
Poverty in Developing Countries 
Not only are North-South disparities large, but within developing 
countries there are enormous disparities between the elites, which typically 
account for 10 percent of the population and 30 to 50 percent of all income, 
and the rest of the population, which lives in abject poverty. The tradi-
tional approach to the problem of widespread poverty has been to maximize 
economic growth and to hope that the benefits of growth would "trickle down" 
to the poor, and this approach has failed. A policy that targets the satis-
faction of basic human needs for food, shelter, sanitary services, health 
care, education, and meaningful employment is more promising. Energy 
services are required to satisfy these needs. They must be provided as part 
of the larger development effort. 
Population Growth 
Since for the poor, economic pressures tend to favor large families, the 
population explosion is closely linked to the problem of poverty. 6 Thus, ef· 
forts to solve the population problem would be assisted by efforts to satisfy 
the basic human needs of the poor. 
Food Scarcity 
Whatever success is achieved in slowing population growth, the problem 
of feeding an expanding global population will remain a major global chal-
lenge for decades. Modernization of agriculture and the associated increased 
energy inputs are key to meeting food production targets. The FAO estimates 
that food production in developing countries must double by the year 2000, 
for which extra energy equivalent to 2.8 million barrels of oil per day would 
be required. 7 As this is less than the amount of oil saved by the United 
States between 1978 and 1982, it is clear that the challenge has less to do 
with the quantity of energy required than it does with ensuring that supplies 
can be directed to agricultural needs. 
Global Climatic Change 
In a matter of decades, humanity could induce major changes in the 
global climate as a result of the buildup in the atmosphere of carbon dioxide 
and the resulting greenhouse effect. The problem is closely related to 
energy use, since increased atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide 
result from the combustion of fossil fuels. Already in 1979, the atmospheric 
carbon dioxide level was 1.15 times the preindustrial level, or 334 parts pet 
million (ppmv). Climatologists believe an increase in mean global temper-
ature of 3 degrees Celsius (± 1.5 degrees Celsius), with perhaps a two- to 
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There appear to be no feasible technical fixes to the carbon dioxide 
Problem. 9 The magnitude of the prospective climatic chane can best be 
limited through reduced dependence on fossil fuels . 
~forestation and Desertification 
Between 1952 and 1972, some 30 million hectares of the world's forests 
Were lost per year, 10 while cropland and rangeland losses to desertification 
averaged 6 million hectares per year. 11 Deforestation arises from the per-
manent clearing of forest land for agriculture, from fuelwood gathering, and 
from other overuse of the forest resource; desertification comes in large 
Part with the overuse of marginal lands for agricultural purposes, especially 
the grazing of livestock. These trends need to be reversed for both environ-
m:ntal and economic reasons. Fuelwood resources could be used renewably, 
With the level of demand maintained below the regeneration rate, through more 
efficient use of biomass and better forest management. If agricultural 
troduction, including the grazing of livestock, was shifted from marginal to 
et~er lands through the use of modern energy-intensive, yield-increasing 
~:ic~ltural techniques, the trend toward desertification could be eased. 
h is_is a hopeful prospect since only one-third of all cropland is under 
eavily mechanized production. 12 
The R· k ~ is of Nuclear War 
p That conflict in the Middle East can draw in and entangle the super-
l~;;rs and threaten nuclear war is indicated by the experience of October 
and• when the Soviet Union threatened to intervene in the Arab-Israeli war, 
fo the1~nited States, in response, raised the alert status of its nuclear 
tirces. The creation of the U.S. Rapid Deployment Force to assure con-
We~~ed access of the industrialized market economies to Persian Gulf oil, as 
ti _as the presence of mobile Soviet forces in the region, indicate the con-
Thnuing potential for U.S.-Soviet conflict arising from Middle East turmoil. 
de: Potential for superpower conflict can be reduced through reduced depen-
ce of the industrialized market economies on Persian Gulf oil. 
~Ucl 
~ar Weapons Proliferation 
In 1964 h h nuc1 , t e U.S., t e U.S.S.R., France, and Great Britain were the only 
acqu:ar weapons states in the world. Since then, China and India have 
Will ired nuclear weapons; several other countries either have gained or soon 
decadPossess the capability to produce nuclear weapons. In the coming 
nucleeS, many more countries could join the nuclear club, particularly if 
ar power comes to be a major energy resource. 
An· · from th i ndissoluble link between nuclear weapons and nuclear power arises 
e fact that plutonium, a material usable in nuclear weapons, is pro-
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duced in substantial quantities in nuclear power reactors. There is no 
technical fix for eliminating this link short of avoiding dependence on the 
troublesome technologies involved. 
The risk of proliferation by governments is far greater with nuclear 
technologies requiring plutonium recycle than that associated with the 
present generation of once-through fuel cycles. In the latter case, the 
acquisition of nuclear weapons would require construction of dedicated facil-
ities for weapons production. This route to nuclear weaponry is deterred 
both by the difficulties encountered in a governing bureaucracy in achieving 
consensus as to the desirability of acquiring nuclear weapons and the risk of 
getting caught and being punished by members of the international community. 
In contrast, with the plutonium recycle technologies a country acquires 
nearly all the technology and materials needed to make nuclear weapons 
quickly (e.g., in a time of international crisis) without ever having to make 
an explicit decision to acquire such weapons. This route to nuclear weapons, 
which has come to be called "latent proliferation, 1114 involves low risk to 
the would-be proliferator and is exceedingly difficult to control institu-
tionally. 
By avoiding nuclear fuel cycles that involve the reprocessing of spent 
reactor fuel and the recycle of recovered plutonium, the risks of prolifera-
tion can be greatly reduced. Such fuel cycles must be avoided in all 
countries, not just in those feared to be proliferation prone; any scheme 
that would allow plutonium recycle for some countries but not for others 
would be discriminatory and would ultimately prove to be unstable. 15 
The incentive to reprocess spent fuel and recycle plutonium will remain 
low as long as uranium prices do not rise too much. If nuclear power 
develops slowly enough, and especially if nuclear power is regarded as an 
energy technology of last resort, such a rise in the price of uranium could 
be avoided. 
Technological constraints on the scopes and characters of nuclear power 
programs by themselves could not halt the horizontal proliferation of nuclear 
_weapons capability to many countries. As long as there is vertical prolif-
eration by the superpowers, other countries will want nuclear weapons as 
well. The only way to avoid a world in which nuclear weapons are much more 
widely proliferated is to couple the avoidance of dangerous nuclear power 
technologies with superpower efforts to move away from weapons of mass 
destruction. 16 -
THE TREATMENT OF THESE PROBLEMS IN OTHER ENERGY ANALYSES 
Traditionally, analysts who have dealt with the long-term global energy 
problem have not sought to identify energy strategies compatible with the 
solutions of other global problems. Although some recent analyses have 
explored the long-term effects of particular energy supply constraints, 17 the 
energy problem has usually been viewed as a narrow engineering challenge 
centered on the provision of new energy supplies in ways energy suppliers 
know best, in quantities sufficient to meet future energy needs, as estimated 
on the basis of crude historical correlations between levels of energy use 
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and human welfare. Projections of future energy requirements made in recent 
global energy studies by the World Energy Conference (WEC) and the Inter-
national Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), 18 are based on this 
"supply approach," as is evident in their projected energy requirements for 
2020, some two- to three-fold higher than those for 1980. These studies 
Present a view of the global energy future that involves heavy reliance on 
coal and nuclear power, an emphasis which takes advantage of the abundance of 
coal and nuclear fuels. But in a world where these projections would be 
realized, other problems would be exacerbated. For instance, the WEC and 
llASA projections imply doubled atmospheric levels of carbon dioxide in the 
latter half of the next century. The nuclear power projections in these 
studies imply a serious nuclear weapons proliferation risk; for example, the 
llASA nuclear projections imply that by 2020 there would be some 1.8 to 3.0 
million kilograms (kg) of plutonium recovered from spent fuel and circulated 
each year in global commerce; for comparison, some 5 to 10 kg are required to 
make a nuclear weapon. 
These analyses also fail to give adequate attention to the unique prob-
lems of the developing countries. For example, while the centralized energy 
technologies emphasized in conventional energy planning may be applicable to 
certain urban situations in the developing countries, the energy problems of 
t?e rural areas of the developing countries demand quite different strate-
g:es. More decentralized solutions, involving energy supplies suitable for 
~ldely dispersed industries, are needed for rural areas as the cities are 
lncreasingly unable to accommodate the large numbers of people now migrating 
to urban areas . 
lttE END-USE APPROACH TO THE GLOBAL ENERGY PROBLEM 
In an ongoing global energy project, an attempt is being made to develop 
~blong-term energy strategy that is both technically and economically feas-
~hle and consistent with the achievement of a sustainable world society. 19 
e present paper explores global aspects of this energy strategy. 
We have found that to identify such an energy strategy, it is necessary 
~o Shift the focus of analysis from supply to demand and to give attention 
~nstead to energy services. This "end-use approach" helps one to better 
f~derstand the role of energy in society: for example, it can be used to 
hlnd out the extent to which the energy services needed to satisfy basic 
m'lllnan needs are being met20 and the implications for energy service require-
uents of ongoing structural changes in the economy. 21 Moreover, improved 
0nderstanding of the details of energy use ~an facilitate the discovery of 
JP0 rtunities for cost-saving improvements in end-use technologies. 22 
of rough the end-use approach it is possible to identify the least costly mix 
1 energy supplies and energy efficiency improvements for providing any given 
eve1 of energy services. 
t· We have also found that, if the opportunities for energy demand reduc-
pton ~re exploited, substantial flexibility is gained in energy supply 
deannlng. The flexibility arises because at a lower overall level of energy 
lemand the number of energy supply options is greater; in contrast, at demand 
Vels as high as in the long-term WEC and IIASA projections, all energy 
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supply options must.be pushed to the limits. 
allow one the flexibility to choose an energy 
externalities posed by overdependence on oil, 
or by nonrenewable use of biomass. 
Lower levels of energy demand 
supply mix that mitigates the 
fossil fuels, and nuclear po~e! 
A comprehensive global end-use energy demand/supply perspective should 
be developed as an evolutionary process, from the bottom up. The analysis 
could begin with country studies that examine present energy use and supply 
and possible future patterns of demand for energy services, taking into 
account such factors as climate, demography, the mix of economic activities, 
social aspirations, etc. Then opportunities for alternative end-use tech-
nologies and energy supplies could be described, leading to the formulation 
of long-term national energy strategies that are consistent with long-term 
social goals. Individual country strategies could then be aggregated into 
regional strategies, which in turn could be aggregated into a global 
strategy. 
Since detailed end-use country studies and strategies have been de-
veloped for only a few countries, it is not yet possible to put together a 
global energy strategy according to such an idealized prescription. Never· 
theless, it is feasible to formulate a preliminary global energy perspective 
by extrapolating to the global situation what is known for a few countries, f 
A BASE CASE ENERGY DEMAND/SUPPLY SCENARIO o 
The base case global energy demand/supply scenario that will now be ·c 
described demonstrates that there are energy futures compatible with econom~ 
aspirations and responsive to concerns about a broad range of energy-relate 
global problems. Although this scenario lies far outside the range of out· 
comes forecast in conventional global energy studies, it is both technical11 
and economically feasible. 
Our scenario should not be viewed as a forecast. Rather it is one 
plausible future illustrating the feasibility of a global energy future d 
compatible with the achievement of a sustainable world society. It is base 
on a set of plausible assumptions illustrating what can be accomplished wi th 
energy demand and supply technologies which are already proven or in an 0 
advanced state of development. If such an energy future can be identified 0 
the basis of the restrictive assumption that we employ below, there are 
probably many more energy futures that are also compatible with the achieve· 
ment of a sustainable world. With this analysis, we hope to provide a more 
informed basis for energy planning by articulating important but largely 
unfamiliar choices for the energy future and by showing that the future of 
energy demand/supply is more a matter of choice than of prediction. 
On the demand side, we extrapolate from the results of our analyses fo! 
Sweden and the United States to all industrialized countries23 and from the, 
results of our analysis for a hypothetical developing country to all deve1°~ 
ing countries. On the supply side, we attempt to show how these needs migh 
be provided for in ways that avoid or mitigate the energy supply-related 
global problems described above. 
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t We focus on the year 2020. This date is sufficiently far in the future 
h~ allow the implementation of programs aimed at the satisfaction of basic 
in~~ ~eeds in developing countries, and to achieve considerable improvement 
wo 1 ving standards beyond the satisfaction of basic human needs. There 
enu d also be ample time by then for the widespread adoption of efficient 
si~:gy end-use technologies. By 2020, the world should be well into a tran-
indion to the post-petroleum era, and were conventional energy strategies 
Pto~:d to ~e pursued, at that time the carbon dioxide and the nuclear weapons 
suff:f:ration problems would reach critical proportions. Yet the date is 
Pl iciently close to have an important bearing on present long-range energy anning. 
mix Our analysis is but a first step in an effort to determine how a supply 
mighcompatible with our global goals at the projected energy demand levels 
Witht b: put together. Since the energy demand/supply balances associated 
nee thi~ exercise are highly aggregated at the global level, our analysis 
abi~~sarily neglects regional variations in energy demand and supply avail-
avai~ty_a~d sheds little light on problems associated with the geographical 
stud·ability of particular energy resources. Detailed country and regional 
ies are needed to provide the basis for such analysis. 
one-f~uture Per Capita Energy Demand in Industrialized Countries: With only 
toda ~rth of the world's population, the industrialized countries account 
subs~ 0 : two-thirds of world energy use. Fortunately, it is feasible to 
trial~ntially reduce the energy intensity of economic activity in the indus-
tran :Z:d world. One important factor bearing on future energy demand is the 
by g:ition_in the industrialized world to a post-industrial era characterized 
econ °~th in activities that are inherentl2 less energy intensive than 
cost~=~c ac~ivities of the industrial era. 4 In addition, there are-many 
base fective opportunities for the more efficient use of energy. 25 Our 
thesec~se energy demand scenario for the industrialized world illustrating 
count _actors is extrapolated from results we have obtained for two 
ties, the United States and Sweden. 26 
ener First , our findings for Sweden, which is generally looked to as a model 
thatg?-conserving society. While per capita GDP in Sweden is comparable to 
fifth in the United States, 27 final energy use per capita is only about three-
analys_as large, averaging 5.4 kilowatts (kW) per. capita in 1975. Yet our 
sis for Sweden reveals major opportunities for energy savings. 
impro!: Understand these opportunities, we investigated the impact of 
of co d energy-using technology on the demand for energy at various levels 
nsum • · impro Ption of goods and services. Two different levels of technological 
to bevement were considered: best available technology (that which is judged 
assume:c~nomical today) and advanced technology (for which some success is 
effici in ongoing research and development efforts to improve energy 
the b ency and for which expected costs are in the range of interest). Using 
teduce:t available technology per capita final energy use in Sweden would be 
the ce to about 3.5 kW (4.2 kW) for a 50 percent (100 percent) increase in 
onsumption of goods and services; using advanced technology, -which may 
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be more appropriate when looking as far ahead as 2020, per capita consumption 
would be reduced to 2.7 kW (3.3 kW) for the same increase in the consumption 
of goods and services. 
Our United States country study is also based on the wide use of cost-
effective energy end-use technologies. For the U.S. case, projections were 
made to the year 2020, by which time we showed that it would be feasible to 
reduce per capita final energy use to 4.3 kW (4.6 kW) from 9.0 kW in 1980, 
associated with a 50 percent (100 percent) increase in the per capita con-
sumption of goods and services. 
In light of these results for S~eden and the United States, and the 
broad applicability of the technologies involved in these analyses, it is 
reasonable to expect that on average a 50 percent average reduction in per 
capita final energy use could be achieved through energy efficiency improve-
ments in industrialized countries, reducing per capita final energy use in 
these countries by half, from 4.9 kW in 1980 to 2.5 kW by 2020. 
A level of 2.5 kW per capita is comparable to what could be realized in 
Sweden with advanced technology and a 50 percent increase in the per capita 
consumption of goods and services relative to 1975.* Since in 1975 per 
capita GDP in Sweden was some 75 percent higher than the average for all 
industrialized countries, 28 an energy demand level of 2.5 kW could be 
associated with an increase in the average per capita GDP considerably 
greater than 50 percent. 
Although this level of future per capita energy demand is radically 
different from that envisaged in previous global energy studies, this energy. 
demand scenario, on the basis of what has emerged from the U.S. and Sweden 
case studies, would appear to be both technically feasible and economical--
i.e., no more, and perhaps less, costly than the amount of energy supply 
expansion required to provide an equivalent level of energy services with 
conventional end-use technologies. 
While this scenario appears to be feasible, it is unlikely to be 
realized without public policies that facilitate the exploitation of 
opportunities for energy efficiency improvement. The needed measures 
include, among other things, elimination of subsidies for energy supply 
expansion, transformation of energy utilities from fuel and power suppliers 
to energy service suppliers, and marginal cost pricing for energy. 29 
The extent to which the opportunities for energy efficiency improve-
ments, which have been identified largely in Organization for Economic 
*The reduction in per capita energy demand could vary from country to country 
and could be quite small for low-income industrialized countries without much 
affecting the overall average level of future energy demand in industrialized 
countries. For instance, if per capita energy use were to remain fixed at 
the 1980 level (2.25 kW) for the six countries with the lowest per capita 
energy use, the average level of energy use for all industrialized countries 
would rise only slightly, to 2.58 kW. 
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in Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, would be seized upon and pur-
sued in Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) countries is uncertain. 
To date, these countries have made little headway in improving energy end-use 
efficiency (see Figure 2). This constitutes a major uncertainty in this 
scenario. 
Figure 2 
TRENDS IN ENERGY USE, GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCTION, AND OIL IMPORTS, 1973-1984* 
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CMEA = Council for Mutual Economic Assistance countries 
OECD = Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development countries 
GDP = Gross domestic production 
*Trends are given as a factor of 1973 levels. 
Future Per Capita Energy Demand in Developing Countries: At present, 
per capita energy use in developing countries averages about 0.9 kW, of which 
some 0.4 kW is non-commercial energy. Most non-commercial energy use is 
accounted for by the two-thirds of the population who live in rural areas, 
-91-
for the most part isolated from market economies. The challenge for energy 
planning in developing countries is to assure the availability of energy 
services to satisfy the basic human needs of the poor, to meet the energy 
service requirements of a growing population, and to promote a general 
improvement of the standard of living in an environmentally sound and 
sustainable way. 
How much energy will be needed in developing countries to meet these 
goals? Since per capita final energy use in developing countries presently 
averages only 0.9 kW, less than one-fifth of that in industrialized coun-
tries, one would think that substantially increased energy use would be 
required to meet development goals. However, since energy is used very 
inefficiently at present, this is not necessarily so. 
Most commercial energy use is accounted for by a modern sector, which 
supports mainly the 10 percent or so of the population who live like citizens 
of industrialized countries, often using energy even less efficiently than 
citizens of the North. Most energy efficiency improvements identified for 
the industrialized countries are relevant to the modern sector of developing 
economies. 
Energy efficiency improvements are also relevant for the traditional 
sector, where energy use is dominated by fuelwood and other bioenergy fuels 
used for cooking. Per capita energy use for cooking in rural areas is 
several times as large as that in industrialized countries--in fact it is 
comparable to per capita energy use for automobiles in Western Europe. 
To give an indication of what might be achieved with energy efficiency 
improvements in the long-term, we have developed an energy budget for a 
hypothetical country with a mix of energy-using activities similar to that in 
the mid-1970s for Western Europe (excluding space heating, which is not 
needed in most·developing countries), with the activity levels matched to 
energy intensities corresponding in energy performance to best available 
technologies on the market today or to advanced technologies that could be 
commercialized over a period of about a decade. Remarkably, total final 
energy use per capita for this scenario is estimated at about 1 kW, or only 
slightly more than at present. 30 · 
How is it possible to achieve such a large improvement in the living 
standard with so little an increase in energy use? Part of the explanation 
lies in the potential for increasing the efficiency of energy use simply by 
switching from traditional, inefficiently used, non-commercial fuels to 
modern energy carriers. The significance of the shift to modern energy 
carriers is vivid for cooking. The majority of the population in developing 
countries now uses biomass for cooking at a per capita rate of 1/2 to 1 ton 
of fuelwood per year--equivalent to an average energy use rate of 250 to 500 
watts. However, the rate of energy use for cooking would fall to some 50 
watts (the average in Brazilian and Indian houses using liquefied petroleum 
gas [LPG)) if a switch were made to high-quality gaseous fuels like LPG or 
biogas. Gas stoves are so much more efficient and controllable than tradi-
tional wood stoves. The importance of modern energy carriers is evident from 
the fact that in 1975 per capita GDP in the WE/JANZ region (Western Europe, 
Japan, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Israel) was ten times that of 
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developing countries, even though per capita final energy use for purposes 
other than space heating was only 2.3 kW, about two and one-half times the 
final energy use level in developing countries today. 
In addition to the savings associated with the shift to modern energy 
carriers, considerable further savings can be gained through the adoption of 
end-use technologies that are more efficient than those now in wide use. For 
a Wide range of such technologies, it would be less costly to provide a given 
level of energy services with the more energy efficient end-use technology 
than with conventional end-use technologies and more energy su~plies. This 
has been shown for industrialized countries31 and for Brazil. 3 
The following are indicative of the technologies that are available: 
recently developed gas stoves that are 70 percent efficient (and less 
Pollutin~j than conventional stoves, which have efficiencies around 50 
Percent; new compact fluorescent light bulbs that are compatible with 
ordinary incandescent sockets and use one-fourth as much electricity as 
incandescents; and the most efficient refrigerator-freezer available in 1985, 
a 301-liter Japanese unit that requires just 406 kilowatt-hours (kWh) per 
Year, about one-fourth of the electricity required by the average 
refrigerator-freezer in use in the United States. 
While most of the technologies assumed for this 1-kW scenario are 
commercially available today, a few are still in an advanced state of devel-
opment. For example, the energy performance for steel making is assumed to 
be the average for the Swedish Plasmasmelt and Elred processes. With these 
steel-making technologies, only half as much energy is required to produce a 
ton of steel, as compared with the average Swedish technology in use in 
1976_34 
The WE/JANZ activity levels in this 1-kW scenario should not necessarily 
be taken as targets for developing countries. In the first place, because 
technology is continually changing and the utility derived from a given 
amount of material, like that from energy, is constantly increasing, it would 
be foolish to target for the future of developing countries levels of mater-
ials consumption achieved in the past in industrialized countries. Higher 
energy costs usually translate into higher costs for basic materials. The 
rising costs of basic materials in recent years have fostered a wave of 
innovation in industrialized countries, leading to the introduction of 
lighter-weight products, more durable goods, the substitution of less costly 
materials in product manufacture, and less wasteful practices in the use of 
non-durable goods--trends that are expected to continue. 35 This implies that 
in the future rates of materials consumption (e.g., per capita consumption 
rates for steel, paper, and ammonia) considerably lower than those assumed 
for the 1-kW scenario would be adequate to provide the level of amenities 
common in the 1970s in the WE/JANZ region. 
Moreover, instead of adopting copycat development strategies, long-term 
development goals should reflect the resource constraints, the comparative 
advantages, and the unique social needs of developing regions. An alterna-
tive to the pattern of development followed in Western Europe might emphasize 
instead decentralized industry and local self-reliance, and thus might in-
volve less energy-intensive activities than a pattern of development that 
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emphasizes urbanization and the attendant need for long-distance transport, 
packaging, and storage of foodstuffs and industrial goods. 36 With a strong 
emphasis on energy efficiency improvement, such an alternative development 
path could probably be supported with less energy than 1 kW per capita 
consumption. 
Even though the activity levels of our 1-kW scenario should not be 
blindly pursued by developing countries, the 1-kW analysis shows clearly that 
living standards in developing countries ranging from those of the present up 
to those of the WE/JANZ region could be realized without increasing per 
capita energy use. On the basis of such considerations, we assume an average 
level of per capita energy use of 1 kW for developing countries in 2020--a 
level which, with emphasis on energy efficiency improvement and modern energy 
carriers, would be adequate both to ensure that basic human needs are satis-
fied and to allow for considerable further improvements in living standards. 
Of course, all this should not obscure the difficulties likely to be 
encountered in the pursuit of development goals. As in the case of devel-
opment generally, large amounts of capital would be required to introduce 
widespread use of modern energy carriers and efficient end-use technology. 
Nevertheless, this analysis suggests that there should be no fundamental 
energy constraint to development, as our energy supply analysis will show 
more clearly. 
The Demographic Context: In conventional energy demand projections, it 
is customary to treat population as a given, not affected by energy policy. 
However, the energy problem would be significantly easier to solve were the 
pressures of population growth to be eased. This can be seen in the differ-
ing energy requirements for the alternative United Nations (U.N.) population 
· projections for the year 2020. 37 Even though a relatively small range is 
projected(± 10 percent of the medium variant projection of 7.8 billion), 
total global ·population is so l~rge by 2020 that small relative changes can 
have significant impacts on the energy problem. For ex~mple, at the present 
level of per capita energy use, the difference between the high and low U.N. 
population variants corresponds to an extra energy supply in 2020 equivalent 
to nearly the present level of world oil production. 
We have stressed development strategies that satisfy basic human needs 
as a part of the overall effort needed to deal with the population problem. 
We shall assume for our base case scenario that efforts to satisfy basic 
human needs would be reflected in slower population growth than would other-
wise be the case. Since it is not possible at this time to quantify the 
impact of a basic human needs policy on population growth, we adopt the low 
U.N. population variant for our base case ~nergy demand scenario--1.24 and 
5.71 billion for industrialized and developing countries respectively in 
2020, up from 1.11 billion and 3. 32 billion in r980. 
Global Energy Demand: Assuming for industrialized countries a SO 
percent reduction in per capita final energy use between 1980 and 2020, and 
the low U.N. population variant for the year 2020, total final energy use by 
industrialized countries would be reduced from 5.5 terawatts (TW) in 1980 to 
3.1 TW in 2020. Assuming for developing countries a per capita final energy 
use level of 1.0 Win 2020, total final energy use there would increase from 
'2.9 TW in 1980 to 5.7 TW in 2020. 38 
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Global final energy demand, however, would be about the same in 2020 as 
in 1980, and the developing countries' share would increase from one-third to 
two-thirds of the totai. 39 Figure 3 shows the global energy demand level for 
2020 and the distribution of demand between developing and industrialized 
countries in terms of primary energy (which includes the energy conversion, 
transmission, and distribution losses for the assumed supply mix) for our 
base case scenario for the alternative WEC and IIASA scenarios, and for 
1980. This figure 0 shows that the major difference between our base case 
scenario and the energy scenarios presented in the 1982 WEC energy study and 
the 1981 IIASA energy study lies in the treatment of the industrialized coun-
tries. Primary demand for developing countries in our base case scenario is 
1.3 kW per capita, which is the same as the average value for the WEC high 
and low scenarios and only slightly less than the average of 1.5 kW for the 
average of the IIASA high and low scenarios. In light of the much greater 
emphasis given here to energy efficiency improvement, the 1.3 kW of primary 
energy in our base case scenario corresponds to a much higher living 
standard. 
While the level of global energy demand would not change much between 
1980 and 2020 in our base case scenario, we expect that there would be a 
marked shift to higher quality energy carriers. In particular, we assume a 
continuation of the ongoing electrification of the global energy economy, 
increasing electricity's share of final demand from 10 percent in 1980 to 18 
Percent in 2020. 40 This implies a doubling of electricity production between 
1980 and 2020. 
E..nergy Supply 
When energy demand is not too great, there is flexibility in the choice 
of energy supplies. We now explore the extent to which this flexibility can 
be exploited to help society to cope with the energy supply problems aggra-
vated by conventional energy strategies. Rather than speculate on the 
Possibility of radical alterations in the energy supply mix, we explore the 
Prospects for dealing with these problems through relatively minor shifts 
from the present situation. 
In this spirit, we assume that the total fossil fuel supply is the same 
in 2020 as in 1980, with remaining demand met largely by nuclear power, 
hydropower, and biomass. We then adjust the mix of coal, oil, and natural 
gas in the overali fossil fuel supply to reflect concerns about climatic 
change associated with the atmospheric buildup of carbon dioxide from the 
combustion of fossil fuels, global security, and the world oil price, as well 
as to account for the relative abundances of the remaining fossil fuels. We 
also adjust the mix of nuclear, hydro, and biomass energy supplies to reflect 
our concern about prolifer_ation, and land-use impacts and impacts on the 
environment. 
While the use of each individual fuel in 2020 differs little from the 
Present level in our base case scenario, it is radically different from what 
is envisaged for the year 2020 in conventional energy forecasts. Figure 4 
shows, for example, that in the WEC and IIASA scenarios fossil fuel use in 
2020 would be about double that for our base case scenario and nuclear energy 
Use would be four to seven times as large. 
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Figure 3 
ALTERNATIVE PROJECTIONS OF GLOBAL PRIMA.RY ENERGY USE (in terawatts) 
TO THE YEAR 2020, DISAGGREGATED BY CONSUMING REGION 
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WEC = World Energy Conference; source: J.R. Frisch, Energy 2000-2020 ... Where 
Are We Going? Regional Stresses (London: Conservation Commission of the 
World Energy Conference, 1982). 
IIASA = International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis; source: W. 
Haefele et al., Energy in a Finite World: A Global Systems Analysis 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1981). 
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Figure 4 
ALTERNATIVE PROJECTIONS OF GLOBAL PRIMARY ENERGY USE (in terawatts) 
TO THE YEAR 2020, DISAGGREGATED BY PRIMARY ENERGY SOURCE* 
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WEc - World Energy Conference; source: J.R. Frisch, Energy 2000-2020 ... Where 
Are We Going? Regional Stresses (London: Conservation Commission of the 
World Energy Conference, 1982). 
lIASA - International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis; source: W. 
Haefele et al., Energy in a Finite World: A Global Systems Analysis 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1981). 
*WEc and IIASA projections are averages of the high and low projections pre-
sented in those global energy studies. 
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Atmospheric Carbon Dioxide and the Burning of Fossil Fuels: The 
prospect that the atmospheric carbon dioxide level would double and create a 
major climatic change in the latter half of the next century has generated a 
rapidly growing literature on strategies for societal accommodation to the 
carbon dioxide/climate problem. For example, the 1983 U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency report on the carbon dioxide problem recommends accelera-
tion and expansion of research to improve our ability to adapt to a warmer 
climate. 41 
An end-use oriented energy strategy provides an alternative basis for 
responding through reduced dependence on fossil fuel use. However, in 
addition, the mix of fossil fuels is important, first, because the carbon 
dioxide emissions differ from one fossil fuel to another. Per unit of fossil 
fuel energy released, coal generates 1.2 times as much carbon dioxide as oil 
and 1.8 times as much as natural gas. 42 Also, the vastly greater remaining 
coal resources suggest that coal be given focused attention. Whereas con-
sumption of the remaining ultimately recoverable oil and gas resources (with 
no further use of coal) would lead to an atmospheric carbon dioxide level 
only 1.5 times the preindustrial level (440 ppmv), consumption of half the 
coal left in the ground would increase the carbon dioxide level to four times 
the preindustrial level. 43 Finally, in an energy-conserving world it may 
prove to be easier during the transition to the post-petroleum era to make do 
with less coal--a dirty, relatively difficult-to-use fuel--than either oil or 
natural gas, which are clean, easy to transport, and convenient to use. 
To relate future levels of fossil fuel use to constraints on the ulti-
mate level of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, we assume that: (1) half of 
the released carbon dioxide remains in the atmosphere; (2) all estimated 
ultimately recoverable oil and gas resources are eventually consumed, so that 
concerns about carbon dioxide are reflected as constraints on coal produc-
tion; and (3) coal production falls exponentially over time. The one free 
parameter, then, is the rate of exponential decline, which depends on the 
carbon dioxide ceiling level (see Figure 5). 44 If the ultimate ceiling were 
to be as low as 1.5 times the preindustrial level, coal would have to be 
phased out.very rapidly, falling to half the present level before the turn of 
the century. This is not a practical target. On the other hand, if the 
allowable level were 2.0 times the preindustrial level, then coal production 
could fall extremely slowly, to half the 1980 level only after 230 years. 
While major climatic changes are expected if the atmospheric carbon 
dioxide level doubles, it is impossible to say what an "acceptable" carbon 
dioxide ceiling should be. For the purposes of the present analysis, we 
arbitrarily select for the base case a ceiling of 1.7 times the preindustrial 
level (490 ppmv), which implies a fall in coal use to half its present level 
only after 100 years and a 20 percent decline in coal use between 1980 and 
2020. In our base case scenario, by 2020, the atmospheric carbon dioxide 
level would be about 1.3 times the preindustrial level (380 ppmv). The level 
of coal use would be only 20 to 40 percent as high in 2020 as in the WEC and 
IIASA scenarios (see Figure 6). In 2020, emissions of carbon dioxide from 
the burning of all fossil fuels would be only 40 to 60 percent as large as in 
the IIASA and WEC scenarios. 
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Figure 5 
CONSTRAINED ANNUAL GLOBAL COAL PRODUCTION (in terawatts) AS A 
FUNCT~ON OF THE ALLOWABLE ULTIMATE ATMOSPHERIC CARBON DIOXIDE LEVEL* 
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*Assuming that the carbon dioxide constraint is reflected entirely as a 
constraint on the use of coal. 
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Figure 6 
ALTERNATIVE PROJECTIONS OF GLOBAL COAL PRODUCTION (in terawatts) 
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WEC = World Energy Conference; source: J.R. Frisch, Energy 2000-2020 ... Where 
Are We Going? Regional Stresses (London: Conservation Commission of the 
World Energy Conference, 1982). 
IIASA = International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis; source: W. 
Haefele et al., Energy in a Finite World: A Global Systems Analysis 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1981). 
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Despite the slow rate of coal phase-out implicit in this scenario, 
control of atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations through restriction on 
coal use poses major economic and political challenges. The carbon dioxide 
ceiling we have assumed limits the usable coal resource to about one-fourth 
of the amount of coal available at prices less ·than one-half the world oil 
Price in 1982.45 Nevertheless, even with this constraint, coal would remain 
a major energy resource for a long time to come; the cumulative allowable 
Production is equivalent to a 150-year supply at the present rate of usage. 
The fact that almost 90 percent of the coal left in the ground is con-
centrated in just three countries (the Soviet Union, the United States, and 
China) 46 makes the prospects for control brighter than would be the case were 
the resources to be distributed widely throughout the world. Because of the 
~neven distribution, agreement among just these countries could have a major 
impact on coal use. 
The World Oil Problem: Most global energy studies envisage high future 
oi'l demand in the time period of interest, along with a shift of the balance 
of oil market power back to the Persian Gulf. This is illustrated in Figure 
7, which shows that in the IIASA energy scenarios and in the WEC high 
scenario, the Middle East/North African (ME/NAf) region in 2020 would be 
required to produce oil at or near capacity levels--a situation similar to 
that in 1979, when world oil supplies were tight and the Iranian revolution 
triggered the second oil price shock. 47 
It appears to be possible to avoid such a tight oil supply situation for 
~he entire period out to 2020 by pursuing end-use energy strategies in con-
Junction with efforts to shift the mix of oil and gas use to favor natural 
gas. 
There is about as much natural gas as oil left in the world, but the gas 
resource is much greater in relation to current consumption. The amount of 
remaining gas judged ultimately recoverable at the global level is about a 
two hundred-year supply, 48 compared to a one hundred-year supply for oil; 49 
the remaining recoverable gas outside the ME/NAf region and outside of coun-
tries with centrally planned economies is about a one hundred-year supply, 
compared to 40 for oil at the current consumption rate. Thus, one strategy 
for dealing with the global oil problem would be to give more emphasis to 
gas, which can be readily substituted for oil not only in stationary appli-
cations but in mobile vehicles as well.so 
We assume that by 2020 gas and oil production rates become equal (see 
Figure 4), which together with our assumptions about overall fossil fuel use 
a~d coal use implies a 1.85-fold increase in gas use but a reduction in global 
011 use from 59 to 45 million barrels per day (MBD) between 1980 and 2020. 
At this lower level of world oil demand, there would probably be adequate oil 
supplies available outside the ME/NAf region at production costs lower than 
$30 per barrel (in 1982 dollars) to sustain dependence on the ME/NA£region at 
the 1983 world oil glut level of 15 MBD. 51 Such a scenario implies much 
greater global security and far lower oil prices than in the WEC and IIASA 
scenarios, and perhaps even stable oil prices for the entire period out to 
2020. As a result, oil would be a more dependable and affordable energy source 
and more available for essential development purposes in developing countries 
during the critical transition period to the post-petroleum era. 
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Figure 7 
ALTERNATIVE PROJECTIONS OF GLOBAL OIL PRODUCTION (in terawatts), 
DISAGGREGATED INTO THE MIDDLE EAST/NORTH AFRICAN (ME/NAF) 
REGION AND THE REST OF THE WORLD 
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WEC - World Energy Conference; source: J.R. Frisch, Energy 2000-2020 ... Where 
Are We Going? Regional Stresses (London: Conservation Commission of the 
World Energy Conference, 1982). 
IIASA - International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis; source: W. 
Haefele et al., Energy in a Finite World: A Global Systems Analysis 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1981). 
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Nuclear Weapons Proliferation and Nuclear Power: Regarding the nuclear 
power-nuclear weapons connection, it is widely believed that the "genie is 
out of the bottle," so that we must learn to live with the risks of a 
proliferated world. Indeed, the genie would be out of the bottle if the WEC 
or IIASA nuclear power projections were borne out. In the IIASA and WEC 
studies, nuclear power is projected to grow to levels ten to thirty times the 
1980 level by 2020 (see Figure 8). But these projections are not necessarily 
destiny. 
If nuclear power growth were sufficiently slow that the economic incen-
tive to recycle plutonium were to remain low everywhere (by avoiding uranium 
scarcity), the risks of latent proliferation by non-nuclear weapons states 
and of merging weapons and civilian nuclear power programs in weapons states 
would be reduced considerably. 
Since the economics of reprocessing and recycle are not now favorable 
and would be only marginally favorable at very high uranium prices, avoiding 
reprocessing and plutonium recycle, though politically challenging, is in 
principle much easier to accomplish today than was thought possible just a 
few years ago. 52 
Since even a ban on nuclear fuel reprocessing and plutonium recycle 
would not prevent proliferation through the clandestine recovery of plutonium 
from spent fuel--the risk of which increases with the extent of worldwide 
nuclear power development--it would seem desirable to go further and make 
nuclear power an energy technology of last resort, limited to those situa-
tions where alternatives are not available. 
We adopted this perspective in constructing the base case scenario, for 
which we assumed that installed nuclear generating capacity increases from 
the 1980 level of 120 gigawatt electricity (GW[e]) to some 460 ~GW[e]) 
(approximately the level generally expected for the year 2000) 5 and then 
levels off. This implies that beyond the turn of the century the only 
nuclear plants that would be built would be those that replace retired units. 
Roles for Renewable Resources: The global risks posed by dependence on 
oil, fossil fuels generally, and nuclear power can be lessened through 
greater dependence on renewable energy sources. However, the prospects of 
heavy reliance on renewable resources are far more speculative at the present 
time than the prospects for reduced dependence on .conventional energy sources 
through the use of much more efficient energy end-use technologies. More-
over, large-scale development of some renewable energy resources, if not done 
carefully, can also pose land-use conflicts or pose other problems. For exam-
ple, as we have pointed out, the present pattern of non-renewable biomass use 
for energy and other purposes is a major cause of deforestation. 
Nevertheless, renewahles can play an important role in the overall glo-
bal energy budget. Hydropower, wind and photovoltaic energy, and bioenergy 
in particular are among the more promising renewable energy sourc88es, which 
with careful planning can be significant energy sources. 
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Figure 8 
ALTERNATIVE PROJECTIONS OF PRIMARY ENERGY USE (in terawatts) 
ASSOCIATED WITH NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION 
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WEC = World Energy Conference; source: J.R. Frisch, Energy 2000-2020 ... Where 
Are We Going? Regional Stresses (London: Conservation Commission of the 
World Energy Conference, 1982). 
IIASA = International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis; source: W. 
Haefele et al., Energy in a Finite World: A Global Systems Analysis 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1981). 
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For our base case scenario, we assume that these sources meet energy re-
quirements in excess of what can be provided with conventional energy sources 
in light of the constraints we have assumed to limit the use of fossil and 
nuclear energy sources. 
We do not suggest that the level and/or mix of renewable resources we 
have chosen for 2020 (see Figure 4) is optimal. 54 Rather, we have chosen a 
level and a mix which we feel are plausible and which would not obviously be 
significantly constrained by potential land-use conflicts or other limita-
tions on the use of these resources. 
Hydropower: Among renewable power generation sources, hydropower is 
fully proven and is especially promising in developing countries, where only 
7 percent of economical reserves have been developed to date. Hydropower, 
which is often much less costly to develop than thermal power, provides the 
opportunity for many developing countries to become more self-reliant in 
energy. 
We assume for the base case scenario that the hydro share of total elec-
tricity increases from 20 percent in 1980 to 25 percent in 2020, by which 
time about 40 percent of the economic hydro potential (or 20 percent of the 
technically usable potential) would be developed. 55 This level of hydro 
development is sufficiently far from the technical limit of the resource that 
it need not involve sites that would be particulary disruptive ecologically. 
Moreover, the assumed pace of hydro expansion is sufficiently modest (2 
percent average annual growth) that expansion could be carefully integrated 
into the overall development process, thereby taking into account the range 
of social and ecological concerns that have been raised about hydro develop-
ment. 
Wind and Photovoltaics: Wind power is also a potentially important 
renewable power source. Large mass-produced wind machines appear to be 
petitive in windy areas with conventional sources of electric power. 56 
most promising wind regimes lie in industrialized countries, in several 
which commercial wind energy systems have been built. 
com-
The 
of 
While not yet commercially established, photovoltaic technology holds 
great promise, especially if recent innovations such as amorphous silicon 
solar cells are as successful as predicted. 57 
Owing to the commercial uncertainties surrounding photovoltaics, we make 
no separate estimate of the level of use of this technology but instead con-
sider wind and photovoltaic technologies together and assume that these 
sources together account for 5 percent of total electricity use in 2020. 
Fuel-Fired Thermal Power Plants: We assume that electricity require-
ments in excess of that which is provided by nuclear power, hydropower, wind, 
and photovoltaics will be provided by conventional central station fuel-fired 
thermal power plants or cogeneration plants. Assuming that 15 percent of the 
electrical demand could be met by cogeneration (a percentage which reflects 
our analysis of the industrial cogeneration potential in the United States), 
the amount of electricity required from fuel-fired central station thermal 
power plants should be about the same in 2020 as in 1980, despite a doubling 
of the overall use of electricity. 58 
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Biomass Energy Sources: Biomass is widely regarded as poor people's 
energy--an energy source unfit for a modern society. This perception makes 
it difficult for many people to take seriously any notions of significant 
bioenergy development. Yet bioenergy sources have many attractive aspects. 
Used directly, biomass is a fuel that is usually less costly than oil and is 
often competitive with coal. For the production of synthetic gaseous or 
liquid fuels, biomass is in many ways superior to coal: it has much less 
sulfur than coal, little ash, and, because of its looser molecular structure, 
it can be gasified at a lower temperature than coal. Grown on a renewable 
basis, biomass can be used as a chemical fuel, the production and use of 
which leads to no net increase in the atmospheric carbon dioxide level. 
Lastly, the production of modern gaseous and liquid energy carriers from 
biomass sources also promotes self-reliance among fossil fuel-poor but 
biomass-rich countries. 
For our base case scenario, we assume that half of all cogenerated elec-
tricity (e.g., cogeneration in the forest products and agricultural pro-
cessing industries) is based on biomass, requiring some 0.2 TW of primary 
biomass energy. 59 In addition, we assume that for direct use applications, 
some 1 TW (one-eighth of all direct fuel use) of solids, liquids, and gases 
would be required from biomass sources, 60 owing to our assumed constraint on 
the overall fossil fuel supply. Assuming that biomass feedstocks are con-
verted to useful solid, liquid, and gaseous energy carriers at an average 
conversion efficiency of 70 percent, some 1.4 TW of primary biomass energy 
would be required to make these fuels, bringing the total ~rimary biomass 
energy requirements for our base case scenario to 1.6 TW, 6 which is only 
slightly higher than the use of bioenergy sources in 1980 (see Figure 4). 
We assume here that attempts would be made to utilize bioenergy on a 
renewable basis, thereby countering deforestation trends associated with cur-
rent non-renewable uses of biomass. Toward this end, we focus attention on 
two biomass sources, the careful use of which could support efforts to 
reverse the ongoing process of deforestation: organic wastes and biomass 
grown for energy purposes. 
Global production of organic wastes (forest product industry wastes, 
crop residues, manure, and urban refuse), is enormous, amounting in 1980 to 
about 2.8 TW, or an amount some two-thirds as large as world oil production. 
Assuming that the production of organic wastes increases in proportion to 
population, it would reach 4.1 TW by 2020. 62 However, because of the 
competing uses for these wastes, 63 we assume in our base case scenario that 
only 0.8 TW (one-fifth of the total) is recovered for energy purposes. 
With this level of organic waste utilization, an equal amount of biomass 
would have to be grown for energy purposes. An annual production of some 1.4 
billion tons of dry biomass per year is required to provide 0.8 TW of biomass 
energy. Given the relatively low productivities of existing forests, we 
instead assume managed biomass production for energy use or for multiple 
purposes on biomass plantations or farms or woodlots. With managed biomass 
production productivities can be much higher than in natural forests. For 
the purposes of the present analysis, we assume that the mean recoverable 
biomass productivity from plantations is 10 dry tons per hectare per year. 
While- this is far less than what has been achieved under very favorable 
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circumstances, there is not enough good long-term data available upon which 
to indicate reliably much higher productivities. 64 Such a level of annual 
productivity implies a need in 2020 for some 140 million hectares, which is 
on the order of 4 percent of the world's forest area. Hence, in the case of 
energy plantations, as in the case of organic waste utilization, it is clear 
that the demands on the biomass system are rather modest and would not seem 
to be limited by any significant land use or other constraints. 
Overview of Energy Supply for the Base Case Scenario: The primary 
energy supply for the base case scenario is shown in Figure 4, along with the 
actual supply of 1980 and the supply requirements of the WEC and IIASA 
scenarios. We have made no attempt to assemble an energy supply mix that is 
optimal in an economic sense. Rather, the supply mix for our base case 
scenario is highly plausible and compatible with efforts to solve important 
global problems having strong links to energy. 
What is perhaps most striking in a comparision of the supply levels and 
mixes for our base case scenario and the WEC and IIASA scenarios is that, 
While our finding, that it appears to be both technically and economically 
feasible to find energy strategies compatible with and supportive of the 
solutions to other important global problems, is a ;'radical result," it is 
the WEC and IIASA energy supply scenarios which are radically different from 
the present situation and which, if pursued and realized, would require that 
society face and overcome formidable economic and institutional hurdles. Our 
base case scenario involves no major changes from the present situation--the 
overall level of fossil fuel use is unchanged, the renewable share is up only 
modestly (from 16 percent in 1980 to 19 percent in 2020), and no exotic 
energy sources would be required. In short, the energy supply problem would 
be quite manageable. 
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
Our analysis has shown that for the assumptions underlying our base case 
scenario, a plausible energy future can be described which is compatible with 
and supportive of the solutions of global problems other than energy. How 
dependent is this outcome on the various assumptions? To address this issue 
We present a sensitivity analysis, considering in turn biomass and then oil 
and gas as swing energy sources--meaning that the levels of these supplies 
are adjusted to bring energy supply and demand into-balance as variations are 
made in the scenario assumptions relating to population, per capita energy 
Use, the atmospheric level of carbon dioxide, and nuclear power. 
~iomass as the Swing Energy Source 
Biomass is a potentially important swing energy source because: it is a 
Widely available renewable energy source that can be readily utilized with 
technologies at hand or brought to commercialization quickly; its use on a 
renewable basis would not aggravate the global carbon dioxide problem; and 
the development of biomass resources for energy purposes would constitute an 
important part of a global afforestation effort. 
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Given the uncertainties surrounding the extent to which organic wastes 
can be used for energy purposes, we assume that organic waste use for energy 
in 2020 cannot exceed 1.0 TW, or one-fifth of the total organic waste gen-
eration rate. 65 We further assume that plantations and organic wastes 
contribute equally to the biomass supply until the organic waste use level 
reaches 1.0 TW and that all additional biomass is from plantations. 
A useful index for measuring the biomass production effort is the 
average rate at which new plantations (in million hectares per year) have to 
be brought into production to assure the availability of sufficient biomass 
in 2020 to meet the targeted biomass supply levels. We shall refer to this 
index as the plantation expansion rate (PER).* For our base case· scenario, 
this rate would be 4.6 million hectares per year, which is comEarable to the 
present PER for fuelwood plantations in developing countries. 6 
We now discuss in turn the sensitivity of the PER to changes in several 
dl . 1·** assumptions un er ying our ana ysis. 
Population: We have already noted that total energy supply requirements 
in 2020 are a sensitive function of population. With plantation energy as 
the swing energy source, the PER is even more sensitive to population (see 
Figure 9). 
The PER increases from less than 5 million to 14 million (22 million) 
hectares per year as the population increases from the low to the medium 
(high) U.N. variant for 2020, a calculation which underscores the importance 
of efforts to-slow population growth., 
The biomass effort clearly.becomes much more challenging at the higher 
population growth rates. But even the more ambitious bioenergy development 
efforts may be feasible or desirable, since even with the high population 
variant the required PER is still low in relation to the global deforestation 
rate. According to FAO statistics, the world's forest area decreased from 
4,400 million hectares in 1952 to 3,800 million hectares in 1972, or at an 
annual rate of 30 million hectares per year in this period. 67 Hence, a 
substantial reforestation effort may be needed to reverse the ongoing process 
of deforestation. 
At the higher PER values, competition between bioenergy and food pro-
duction becomes an issue. However, the best use of land may involve 
complementary rather than competitive strategies for bioenergy and food 
*The rotation period for plantations is assumed to be five years, so that 
biomass harvested in 2020 must be planted in the period from 1985 to 2015. 
**In all alternatives to the base case scenario, we assume that: (1) elec-
tricity accounts for 18 percent of final energy demand; (2) hydro (wind and 
photovoltaics) accounts for 25 percent (5 percent) of electricity production; 
(3) cogeneration accounts for 15 percent of electricity production, with a 
fifty-fifty mix of fossil fuels and biomass; (4) the nuclear electricity 
level is fixed at 0.3 TW unless specified otherwise; (5) the remainder of 
electricity production is by fossil fuels in central station plants. 
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Production. With this approach, agricultural production would be restricted 
to the better lands and agricultural productivity increased through enhanced 
inputs of energy (through tractors, fertilizers, irrigation, etc.), while 
biomass for energy purposes·would be grown on the more marginal lands. Tree 
farms with rotations of five to ten years or more would probably constitute a 
more sustainable use of marginal lands than would agricultural production. 
Per Capita Energy Use: Figure 9 illustrates the impacts on the PER of 
alternative per capita energy demand levels, specifically the impacts of 
alternative combinations (x,y), where 
x per capita energy use rate for developing countries and 
y per capita energy use rate for industrialized countries. 
For developing countries, we consider as an alternative to the base case 
a case involving a 50 percent increase in per capita final energy use between 
1980 and 2020 to 1.3 kW. This rate.of final energy use corresponds to a 
Primary energy use rate of about 1.7 kW, which is near the high end of the 
WEc and IIASA projections (1.1 to 1.6 kW and 1.2 to 1.9 kW, respectively) for 
2020. This alternative energy use rate implies only modest improvements in 
the efficiency of energy-using technologies in developing countries. 
For industrialized countries, we consider as alternatives to the base 
case levels of 3.3 kW and 4.9 kW per capita, representing considerably less 
ambitious conservation efforts than that which characterizes our base case 
scenario. The 3.3 kW case involves per capita final energy use in 2020 which 
is one-third less than in 1980 and is equal to the 1980 final energy use 
level for the WE/JANZ region. In the 4.9 kW case, energy efficiency would 
improve between 1980 and 2020 just enough to offset economic growth. An 
indication of the modesty of the associated conservation effort in this 
latter case is provided by a comparison with OECD economic and energy 
Performance between 1973 and 1984, a period in which real per capita GDP 
increased 18 percent while per capita prima~y energy use declined 6 percent. 
Figure 9 illustrates the impacts of alternative assumptions about per 
capita energy demand on the requirements for bioenergy development, assuming 
that biomass is the swing fuel. This figure shows that the (x,y) = (1.0 kW, 
3.3 kW) scenario would involve a PER comparable to the average rate of 
cropland expansion between 1950 and 1975, while the (1.3 kW, 2.5 kW), (1.3 
kW, 3.3 kW), and (1.0 kW, 4.9 kW) scenarios would require PER values in the 
range 20 million to 30 million hectares per year, some two to three times the 
average rate of cropland expansion and hence formidable undertakings. 
The Atmospheric Carbon Dioxide Level: The ultimate level of carbon 
dioxide buildup in the atmosphere could be varied by accelerating or slowing 
the rate of coal phase-out through the substitution of biomass for coal. 
Figure 9 shows how variations in the carbon dioxide ceiling in the range 1.5 
to 2.0 times the preindustrial level would affect biomass plantation require-
ments. This figure shows that the PER is relatively insensitive to the 
atmospheric carbon dioxide ceiling for ceilings in the range 1.6 to 2.0. To 
reduce the ceiling to 1.5, however, requires a PER more than triple that for 
the base case. The major impediment to realizing a 1.5 ceiling level, how-
ever, would probably be not so much its implications for biomass production 
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Figure 9 
THE RESULTS OF SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS* 
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terms of the required global energy production_rate in 2020 and in terms of 
the average plantation expansion rate in the period from 1985 to 2015 that is 
required to ensure that enough biomass is available for harvesting in 2020 to 
meet global bioenergy requirements. 
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as the prospect of major dislocations in the coal industry associated with 
rapid coal phase-out. In this case, coal use would have to decline about 4 
percent per year to a level by 2020 that is just one-fifth of that in 1980. 
We have assumed in this analysis that eventually all oil and gas sup-
plies would be consumed. But there are conceivable circumstances in which 
this assumption might be relaxed. For instance, one of the most promising 
energy supply technologi~s in the offing involves the use of amorphous 
silicon solar cells, perhaps laid out flat on simple support structures in 
desert areas, to produce hydrogen through electrolysis. Our preliminary 
analysis indicates that if present industry expectations regarding the costs 
of amorphous silicon solar cell panels were to be realized, it might be 
feasible to ~reduce hydrogen at costs competitive with the costs of oil and 
natural gas. 68 If this turns out to be feasible, substitution of hydrogen 
for all fossil fuels worldwide in the period from 2020 to 2050 would result 
in an ultimate atmospheric carbon dioxide concentration of only 1.4 times the 
preindustrial level, or 400 ppmv. 69 The required land area would be on the 
order of half the state of Texas, or about 2 percent of the world's warm 
deserts. 70 
Nuclear Power: We consider two alternative nuclear power levels consis-
tent with our philosophy that nuclear power should be an energy source of 
last resort: 0 TW and 0.5 TW, compared to 0.3 TW in the base case scenario. 
The former involves a complete phase-out of nuclear power, with no more 
nuclear plants built beyond those now under construction. Our high nuclear 
power scenario involves the same rate of nuclear power expansion in the 
period from 2000 to 2020 as in the period 1980 to 2000; in this scenario, new 
plants would be built between 2000 and 2020 at a rate of thirty plants of 1 
GW(e) average capacity per year, 71 with installed nuclear generating capacity 
reaching 770 GW(e) by the year 2020. 
It is noteworthy that these alternative scenarios do not have a signifi-
cant impact on the PER, which changes from 5 million hectares per year in the 
base case to 3 (10) million hectares if the nuclear power use rate changes 
from 0.3 TW to 0.5 (0.0) TW (see Figure 9). 
Overall, nuclear power would not have a major impact on the global 
energy picture unless it were widely used throughout the world at levels 
several times higher than the maximum assumed in thi~ analysis and under such 
circumstances that the risks of proliferation would be large as well. 
Oil and Natural Gas as the Swing Fuels When Energy Demand Is High 
In the above sensitivity analysis, we have shown that at high energy 
demand levels it would be a major challenge to provide the extra energy 
required with biomass sources alone. However, it is probably unnecessarily 
constraining to limit the marginal energy supply options to biomass. Iri 
particular, our base case levels of oil and gas production are lower than 
those projected in other global energy studies (see Figure 4) and may be 
lower than is necessary to keep the world oil price to reasonable levels or 
to insulate the rest of the world from overdependence on Middle Eastern oil 
and the disruption of oil supplies. 
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To examine this issue, we describe a high energy demand scenario in 
which the aggregate final energy demand is 1.0 kW per canita in developing 
countries and 4.9 kW per capita in industrial countries. 72 For the supply 
mix, we assume the same conditions as for the cases in which biomass is the 
swing fuel, except that: 
• The biomass supply is limited to 3 TW (twice the 1980 level), one-
third of which would come from organic wastes (one-fourth of all 
organic wastes) and two-thirds from plantations, corresponding to a 
PER of 12 million hectares per year between 1985 and 2015, approxi-
mately the rate of cropland expansion between 1950 and 1975. 
• The extra demand not met by biomass is met instead through increased 
oil and natural gas production, the levels of which are assumed to be 
equal by 2020. 
• Oil production outside the ME/NAf region is assumed to increase enough 
to limit the need for oil from the ME/NAf region to 15 MBD, the 1980 
glut level. 73 
Here are some of the highlights of this scenario: 
• Primary energy demand would increase from 10 TW in 1980 to 15 TW in 
2020, a level which is still only about two-thirds as large as in the 
WEC and IIASA scenarios (see Figure 4). 
• Electricity demand would grow at less than half the 5 percent per year 
average· growth rate of the 1970s. 74 
• While oil use would be about the same as in 1980, the assumed.expan-
sion in natural gas production implies an increase in the sum of oil 
and gas use from 6 TW in 1980 to 9 TW in 2020. 75 The corresponding 
levels in the WEC and IIASA scenarios are 9 and 10 TW, respectively 
(see Figure 4). 
• It may still be feasible under this scenario to maintain the world oil 
price at or near the present level through 2020, since the demand for 
non-ME/NAf oil would be comparable to the estimated remaining supnlies 
of non-ME/NAf oil with production costs less than $30 per barrel. 76 
• The ultimate level of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere would be the 
same as in the base case scenario, since only the rate of oil and gas 
consumption would be increased. Total fossil fuel emissions in 2020 
would still be only 60 percent as large as in the WEC and IIASA 
scenarios. 77 
• The level of nuclear power development would be the same as in the 
base case, so that the proliferation problem would not be exacerbated. 
• The level of hydropower development for 2020 would be only about half 
of the 1976 WEC estimate of economically exploitable hydro resources. 
It would seem from these numbers that most of our concerns relating to 
energy supply could be dealt with in the high demand scenario. Why, there-
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fore, should energy planners seek to attain the energy demand levels associa-
ted with base case scenario, which involves a much higher level of energy 
efficiency improvement, if roughly the same objectives could be realized at 
the higher demand level? There are two reasons to strive for the lower 
demand level. 
First, as we have repeatedly stressed, it is probably cheaper at today's 
energy prices to provide energy services with the higher efficiency end-use 
technologies that would characterize the base case scenario than with more 
energy supplies and less efficient end-use technologies. As a consequence, 
the base case scenario would probably be associated with a higher standard of 
living in 2020 than the high-demand scenario. 
In addition, it is desirable to seek a lower demand level to provide a 
significant margin for error in planning. As energy demand rises, the abil-
ity of society to plan around environmental problems declines. 
For the demand levels of the high demand scenario, relative stability in 
world oil prices through 2020 depends on two assumptions: (1) that natural 
gas production can be expanded two and one-half fold between 1980 and 2020 to 
a level comparable to that projected in the WEC and IIASA high scenarios; and 
(2) that low-cost oil resources outside the ME/NAf region are indeed as large 
as estimated in the IIASA study so that production outside the ME/NAf region 
Would be sufficient to keep dependence on ME/NAf oil to the 1983 oil glut 
levei. 78 
It may be feasible to realize the production goals asssumed above, but 
it would nonetheless be challenging and there would be little room for devia-
tion. It is very likely, for example, that if world oil demand were higher 
than the level assumed for this scenario, most of the extra demand would have 
to be met by ME/NAf producers. If world oil demand were just one-fourth 
higher than in the high demand scenario (corresponding to a mere 7 percent 
increase in world energy use), and if the extra demand had to be met with 
increased ME/NAf production, that region would have to produce at near 
capacity levels79 --a condition that would undoubtedly mean a much higher oil 
price and greatly reduced global security. 
Alternatively, the incremental energy demand could be met through coal 
and/or nuclear power expansion, but this would be at the expense of solutions 
to the atmospheric carbon dioxide and nuclear weapons proliferation problems. 
Of course, the commercial success of new technologies such as amorphous 
silicon solar cells might enable expanded energy demand without exacerbating 
these problems, but such technologies cannot be counted on at this time. 
CONCLUSION 
The present analysis shows that it appears to be technically and eco-
nomically feasible to: (1) meet basic human needs and considerably improve 
living standards in the developing world without increasing per capita energy 
use levels through a shift to modern energy carriers and more efficient use 
of energy in both the modern and traditional sectors; and (2) provide a 
continuing improvement in living standards in industrialized countries while· 
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reducing per capita energy use by half over the period between 1980 and 2020, 
a reduction that is possible as a consequence of the many opportunities for 
more efficient use of energy as well of ongoing structural changes in indus-
trialized economies. 
At the global level, these findings imply that ambitious economic goals 
can be realized in the period between 1980 and 2020 without increasing the 
overall level of primary energy requirements. However, a continuing shift to 
higher-quality energy carriers is required. For developing countries, this 
involves transition from the present situation--in which nearly half of pri-
mary energy requirements are provided by fuelwood, used largely for cooking--
to wide use of modern solid, liquid, and gaseous fuels. For developing and 
industrialized countries alike, this implies a much greater degree of elec-
trification of the world energy economy than at present. 
Our analysis shows that as long as global energy demand is not too 
large, there can be considerable flexibility in the choice of energy sup-
plies, the mix of which can be adjusted so as to evolve an energy strategy 
consistent with the solutions of other major global problems: dependence on 
Persian Gulf oil can be reduced, thereby reducing the upward pressure on 
world oil prices and improving global security; expansion of fossil fuel use 
can be avoided, thereby reducing the risks associated with the atmospheric 
buildup of carbon dioxide; and growth of nuclear power can be curbed, thereby 
reducing the risks of nuclear weapons proliferation. 
We have not shown that our scenario energy balances are consistent with 
what can be achieved on a regional or country basis; that exercise remains to 
be carried out. As we have repeatedly stressed, a comprehensive global 
perspective on the energy problem must result from the integration of per-
spectives for individual countries and regions. But our analysis does sug-
gest that there are no obvious global constraints to an energy future that is 
consistent with the solutions to other important global problems. Thus it 
provides a motivation for pursuing detailed country and regional analyses 
along similar lines. 
Our sensitivity analysis shows further that emphasis on energy effi-
ciency improvement constitutes a robust approach to the problems we have 
posed: the identification of an energy strategy consistent with the goals we 
have established would not require that energy demand levels reach precisely 
the levels of the base case scenario; a comfortable margin would exist for 
planning error. But our analysis has also shown "that there would be little 
room to maneuver were demand to increase to the level of our high demand 
scenario. Our analysis thus highlights the importance of pursuing an energy 
course in which total global energy use changes little over the next several 
decades, as the net result of adopting energy efficiency improvements that 
offset the expanded demand for energy services resulting from population and 
economic growth. 
This course would require new policies that would facilitate the devel-
opment of industries that deliver not energy but the services that energy 
provides. 80 These new industries would be made up in part of existing 
companies (e.g., some utilities) converted from being purveyors of energy 
supplies into being purveyors of energy services as well. And it would be 
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made up in part of entirely new industries that deal exclusively in the 
marketing and servicing of energy-efficient equipment for businesses and 
individual energy consumers (e.g., the energy management firms that are now 
emerging in the U.S. to serve commercial and industrial businesses). 
Bringing about a fundamental reordering of the energy problem--from 
preoccupation with supply expansion to concern for the economically efficient 
provision of energy services--would not be easy. But pursuing any alterna-
tive supply-oriented energy course would not be easier. The supply approach 
to the energy problem is foundering. The last several years have witnessed 
some of the most costly dry holes in the history of petroleum exploration. 
At the same time, the falling world oil price has stymied efforts to develop 
supply alternatives to oil; in the U.S. attempts to launch a synthetic fuels 
industry have collapsed. The very survival of the nuclear power industry is 
threatened in some parts of the world. In relation to such problems, the 
challenges encountered in the development of an effective energy service 
industry do not seem to be so formidable. 
If the end-use approach really catches on, it may actually prove to be 
easier to implement than is indicated by our analysis. Our analysis has been 
restricted to technologies that are either already commercialized or are in 
an advanced state of development, with fairly well-defined energy performance 
characteristics. We have made no attempt to guess whoily new end-use 
technologies or to identify technological limits for future improvements in 
energy efficiency. Yet it is clear that there is room for much more innova-
tion than that which we have described. The technologies on which we have 
focussed have energy performances that are still far from thermodynamic 
limits, and we are only now beginning to see the fruits of research and 
development efforts on end-use technologies that were initiated in the 
aftermath of the first oil crisis, the beginning of the era of high-cost 
energy . 
To sum up, the end-use strategy we have described, which emphasizes 
energy efficiency improvements in industrialized and developing countries 
alike, is not dependent on technological breakthroughs. It is economically 
feasible in the sense that investments in energy efficiency involve direct 
lifecycle costs per unit energy saved that are less than or equal to the per 
Unit costs of investments in additional energy supply. The present inade-
quate industrial infrastructure for energy services marketing constitutes the 
major impediment to an end-use energy strategy. 
It would seem to us that it is worth the challenge to society to see 
that the needed infrastructure is established, in light of the clear advan-
tage of this approach to energy, which facilitates the formulation of an 
energy strategy consistent with and supportive of the achievement of a 
sustainable world. 
Note: This paper is based on Energy for a Sustainable World, by J. Goldemberg 
et al. (New Delhi: Wiley Eastern, 1987). 
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1. 
Regiona 
NA 
USSR/EE 
WE/JANZ 
LA 
AF/SEA 
ME/NAf 
C/CPA 
Total 
NOTES 
Estimated Ultimately Recoverable Oil Resources 
and Oil Consumption 
Resources 
(TW-yrs)b 
39.7 
66.3 
22.7 
32.6 
30.0 
154.8 
18.1 
364.2 
1978 
Consumption 
(TW-yrs)c 
1. 28 
0.56 
1. 22 
0.23 
0.21 
0.11 
0.12 
3.73 
(a) NA= North America; USSR/EE= Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and 
Eastern Europe; WE/JANZ= Western Europe, Japan, Australia, New 
Zealand, South Africa, and Israel; LA= Latin America; AF/SEA= 
Africa, South Asia, and Southeast Asia; ME/NAf = Middle East and 
North Africa; C/CPA = China and other centrally planned Asian 
economies. 
(b) See: W. Haefele et al., Energy in a Finite World: A Global Systems 
Analysis (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1981), table 
2.6. 
(c) See: J.-R. Frisch, Energy 2000-2020 ... Where Are We Going? Regional 
Stresses (London: Conservation Commission of the World Energy 
Conference, 1982). 
2. Forestry Department, Food and Agricultural Organization, "A Global 
Reconnaissance Survey of the Fuelwood Supply/Requirement Situation," 
report to the Technical Panel on Fuelwood and Charcoal of the Preparatory 
Committee for the United Nations Conference on New and Renewable Energy, 
Rome, 1981. 
3. World Bank, World Bank Development Report 1984 (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1984). 
4. World Bank, The Energy Transition in Developing Countries (Washington, 
D.C.: World Bank, 1983). 
5. T. Johansson and R. Williams, "An End-Use Energy Strategy for 
Industrialized Countries," this volume. 
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6. See note 3 above. 
7. Food and Agricultural Organization, Agriculture: Toward 2000 (Rome: 
Food and Agricultural Organization, 1981). 
8. Carbon Dioxide Assessment Committee, National Research Council, Changing 
Climate (Washington D.C.: National Academy Press, 1983). 
9. W. Kellogg and R. Schware, Climate Change and Society: The Consequences 
of Increasing Atmospheric Carbon Dioxide (Boulder, Colo.: Westview 
Press, 1981). 
10. B. Bolin et al., The Global Carbon Cycle, Scope 13 (Chichester, U.K.: 
John Wiley and Sons, 1979). 
11. M. Biswas, "United Nations Conference on Desertification in Retrospect" 
Laxenberg, Austria: International Institute for Applied Systems 
Analysis, 1978. 
12. Personal communication, David Pimentel, Cornell University, 1985. 
13. B. Blechman and D. Hart, International Security 7 (1982): 132. 
14. H. Feiveson, "Proliferation Resistant Nuclear Fuel Cycles," Annual Review 
of Energy 3 (1978): 357. 
15. H. Feiveson and J. Goldemberg, "Denuclearisation," Economic and Political 
Weekly XV (1980): 1,546. 
16. Ibid. 
17. There have been several global energy studies that depart from the 
traditional supply orientation. One study (U. Columbo and 0. Bernardini, 
Low Growth Scenario and the Perspective for Western Europe, report of the 
Panel on Low Energy Growth, Commission for the European Communities, 
1979) exploring an energy supply-constrained global energy future for the 
year 2030 (16 terawatts [TW] of primary energy use), shares a number of 
features with the present one, including an emphasis on energy 
efficiency, although our analysis indicates a much greater potential for 
energy efficiency improvement. A 1983 study (D·. Rose, M. Miller and C. 
Agnew, Global Energy Futures and CO2-Induced Cl1mate Change, report MITEL 
83-015, Cambridge, Mass.: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1983) 
exploring alternative energy strategies for coping with the co2 problem, 
found that improved energy efficiency offers the single most important 
opportunity to ameliorate the co2 buildup and described several viable 
scenarios with demand levels in the neighborhood of 15 TW for the year 
2025. A 1981 study (A. Lovins et al., Energy Strategy for Low Cl~mate 
Risk, report for the German Federal Environmental Agency, Bonn, 1981) is 
perhaps the first global study to stress the importance of pursuing 
alernative energy strategies, including energy efficiency improvements, 
as a means of coping with the co2 problem. Its targeted global primary 
energy use level for the year 2030 is 5.2 TW. One of the main reasons 
this is so low is that the authors assume that per capita energy use in 
-117-
developing countries can be reduced to 0.25 kW (about one-fourth of the 
1980 level). We are skeptical that development needs can be satisfied 
with such a low level of energy use. 
18. For the WEC projections, see Frisch in note l(c) above; for the IIASA 
projections, see Haefele et al. in note l(b) above. 
19. J. Goldemberg et al., "An End-Use Oriented Global Energy Strategy," 
Annual Review of Energy 10 (1985): 613; see also J. Goldemberg et al., 
Energy for a Sustainable World (New Delhi: Wiley Eastern, 1987). 
20. J. Goldemberg et al., "Basic Needs and Much More with One Kilowatt Per 
Capita," Ambio 14 no. 4-5 (1985): 190. 
21. E. Larson, M. Ross, and R. Williams, "Beyond the Era of Materials," 
Scientific American 254 no. 6 (1986): 34. 
22. See note 5 above. 
23. See note 5 above. 
24. See note 21 above. 
25. See note 5 above. 
26. See note 5 above. 
27. In 1975, per capita GNP averaged $11,050 (1982 dollars) in Sweden and 
$6,250 in the WE/JANZ region; see Bureau of the Census, U.S. Department 
of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States 1984 (Washington, 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1984). The per capita GDP level for 
all industrialized countries in 1975 was about the same as that of the 
WE/JANZ region. 
28. Ibid. 
29. See note 19 above. 
30. See next page. 
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Table 1. 
FINAL ENERGY USE PER CAPITA FOR A HYPOTHETICAL DEVELOPING COUNTRY IN A YARH CLIMATE YITH AMENITIES 
(EXCEPT FOR SPACE HEATING) COMPARABLE TO THOSE IN THE YE/JANZ REGION IN THE 1970s BUT YITH CURRENTLY BEST 
AVAILABLE OR ADVANCED ENERGY END-USE TECHNOLOGIES 
_____________ ..,A~c,._t""i"'v'-'i"t=-'y'-'L"'e'-'v'-'e'-'l'-a------------~T..,ee.,c..,h,,n"-'o'-'l'-'o"-'g"-ly,._,__,p'-'e'-'r'"'f"'o"r"-'m"'a'"n"'c"'e_a ______ _,E"-'l"'e"'c'"t'-'r'"'i'-'c'-'i-'tc:,vc___---"F-"u"'e°"'l __ T.._o"'-"'tae....ls2. 
Resldential b 
Cooking 
Hot water 
4 persons/household (HH) 
Brazilian cooking levelc 
50 liters of hot water/capita/daye 
Refrigeration 
Llghts 
TV 
Clothes washer 
Subtotal 
1 315-liter refrigerator-freezer/HU 
New Jersey, U.S. level of lightingh 
1 color TV/HH, 4 hours/day 
1/HH, 1 cycle/day 
Conunercial 5.4 sq. meters floor space/capitaJ 
?ta 
nsportation 
Automobiles 
Intercity bus 
Passenger train 
Urban mass transit 
Air travel 
Truck freight 
Ran freight 
llater freight 
Subtotal 
0.19 autos/capita, 15,000 km/car/yrJ 
1850 passenger(p)-km/capitaJ 
3175 (p)-km/capitaJ,n 
520 (p)-km/capitaj,p 
345 (p)-km/capitaJ 
1495 ton(t)-km/capitaj 
814 (t)-km/capitaJ 
1/2 OECD Europe average, 1978t 
Manuf 
acturing 
Raw steel 
Cement 
Prlmary aluminum 
Paper, paperboard 
»ltrogen fertilizer 
Otheree 
Subtotal ff 
320 kg/capitav 
479 kg/capitax 
9.7 kg/capitax 
106 kg/capitaaa 
26 kg N/capitacc 
Swedish industrial mix with 1975 
W. European level of GDP/capita 
A grtculture Average for YE/JANZ region, 1975 
Average for WE/JANZ region, 1975 
Mint 
ng, construction 
Totals 
(a) Th 
e Values for the average activity levels and energy 
(b) 
(c) 
intensities identified for the WE/JANZ region in 1975 are 
from A. Khan and A. Holzl, Evolution of Future Demands Till 
_
203o in Different World Regions: An Assessment Hade for the 
Two IIASA Scenarios, IIASA report RR-82-14 (Laxenburg, 
Austria, 1982). 
Activity levels for the residential sector are estimates, 
owing to lack of data for the WE/JANZ region. 
An average of one 13-kg cannister of LPG per month for a 
family of five, corresponding to a per capita fuel 
consumption rate of 49 watts for an ordinary gas stove with 
a burner efficiency of about 50 percent. 
70% efficient gas stoved 
Heat pump water heater, 
coefficient of performance-2.sf 
Electrolux, 475 kYh/yearg 
Compact fluorescent bulbsh 
75-watt unit 
0.2 kYh/cyclei 
Performance of Harnosand Buildinf 
(all uses, except space heating) 
Cummins/NASA Lewis car, 
3.0 liter/100 kml 
3/4 energy intensity in 1975m 
3/4 energy intensity in 1975° 
3/4 energy intensity in 1975° 
1/2 U.S. energy intensitt in 1980q 
0.67 megajoules(HJ)/t-km 
Electric rail@ 0.18 HJ/t-kms 
60% of OECD energy intensityu 
Average, Plasmasmelt-Elred processes"' 
Swedish average in 1983Y 
Alcoa processz 
Average of 1977 Swedish desi§nsbb 
Ammonia derived from methane d 
Energy intensity for Swedish 
industry w/ 1975 level of goods 
and services and advanced tech-
nologygg 
3/4 of YE/JANZ energy intensityhh 
3/4 of WE/JANZ energy intensity 
29.0 
13.5 
3.8 
3.1 
Ll 
51 
22 
4.5 
2.0 
5 
12 
28 
6 
11 
11 
121 
4 
210 
34 
34 
107 
26 
32 
8 
21 
32 
_2Q 
276 
77 
54 
26 
24 
36 
212 
429 
41 
-22 
839 
85 
22 
288 
550 
45 
-22 
1049 
(g) The most energy-efficient two-door refrigerator-freezer 
available in Europe in 1982. 
(h) Assumes that five compact fluorescent light bulbs, which 
draw 18 watts but put out as much light as 75-watt 
incandescent bulbs, are used on average four hours a day. 
(i) Typical value for U.S. washing machines. 
(j) Average for the YE/JANZ region in 1975. 
(d) 
Low NOx·emitting units, with efficiency of 70 percent, 
developed by Thermoelectron Corporation for the Gas Research 
Institute. See note 33. 
(k) The most energy-efficient commercial building in Sweden in 
1981, the time it was built, using 0.13 gigajoules (CJ) of 
electricity per square meter of floor area for all purposes 
other than space heating. See Johansson and Williams, "An 
End-Use Energy Strategy for Industrialized Countries," this 
volume. 
(e) The U.S. average is about 100 liters per capita per day. 
(f) 
For water heated from 20 to 50 degrees Celsius. Assumes 
heat pump performance comparable to that of the most· 
efficient heat pump water heaters available in the United 
States in 1982. 
(1) The Cummins/NASA Lewis car is a design for a 1360 kg, four-
to five-passenger car in a Ford Tempo body, with a four-
cylinder, direct-injection, spark-assisted, multi-fuel 
capable, adiabatic diesel engine with turbo-compounding. 
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(m) The ave~age energy intensity of intercity buses was 0.60 
megajoules per passenger kilometer (MJ/p-km) in 1975. The 
assumed 25 percent reduction is based on the introduction of 
adiabatic diesel engines with turbo-compounding. 
(n) Ratio of seventy to thirty in the diesel/electric mix. 
(o) The average energy intensity of passenger trains of 0.60 
MJ/p-km for diesel units and 0.20 MJ/p-km for electric 
units, and of urban mass transit of 1.13 MJ/p-km for diesel 
buses and 0.41 MJ/p-km for electric mass transit in 1975. 
The assumed 25 percent reduction in energy intensity of both 
is based on a switch to adiabatic diesels with turbo-
compounding and the use of electric motor control 
technology. 
(p) Ratio of sixty to forty in the diesel/electric mix. 
(q) The average 1980 energy intensity for U.S. air travel was 
3.8 MJ/p-km. The assumed 50 percent reduction in energy 
intensity is based on improvements described in F. von 
Rippel, "U.S. Transportation Energy Demand," Center for 
Energy and Environmental Studies report 111, Princeton 
University, Princeton, N.J., 1981. 
(r) The assumed energy intensity is one-third less than the 
simple average today in Sweden for single-unit trucks (1.26 
MJ per ton-km) and combination trucks (0.76 MJ per ton-km), 
to take into account improvements via use of adiabatic 
diesels with turbo-compounding. 
(s) Average energy intensity for electric rail in Sweden, with 
an average load of 300 tons and an average load factor of 
about 40 percent. 
(t) The 119 kg of oil use per capita for water freight in 1978 
in OECD Europe is assumed to be reduced in half due to 
reduced use of oil, which accounted for 58 percent and 29 
percent of 1977 Western European import and export tonnage 
respectively. 
(u) A 40 percent reduction in fuel intensity is assumed, 
reflecting innovations such as the adiabatic diesel and 
turbo-compounding. 
(v) OECD European average, 1978. 
(w) Assumes a fifty-fifty mix of the Elred process (requiring 
10.7 GJ of fuel and 1.3 GJ of electricity per ton) and the 
Plasmasmelt process (requiring 4.6 GJ of fuel and 4.2 GJ of 
electricity per ton). See note 5 above. 
31. See note 5 above. 
(x) OECD European average, 1980. 
(y) Assumes an energy intensity of 3.56 GJ of fuel and 0.40 Gl 
of electricity per ton (the 1983 Swedish average). 
(z) Assumes an energy intensity of 84 GJ per ton of fuel <th' 
1978 U.S. average) and 36 GJ of electricity (the 
requirements for the Alcoa process now being developed)· 
See T. Beck, "Improvements in Energy Efficiency of 77 .z, 
Industrial Electrochemical Processes,• report ANL/OEPM· 
prepared for the Office of Electrochemical Project 
Management, Argonne National Laboratory, 1977. 
(aa) OECD European average, 1979. 
(bb) GJ of Assumes an energy intensity of 7 .3 GJ of fuel and 3.2 ,)· 
electricity per ton (the average for 1977 Swedish design 
See P. Steen et al., Energy: For What and How Huch? 
(Stockholm, Sweden: Liber Forlag, 1981) in Swedish. 
(cc) OECD European average, 1979-80. 
(dd) 
(ee) 
Assumes an energy intensity of 44 GJ of fuel per ton of 
nitrogen in ammonia (the value with steam reforming of 0 ,i 
natural gas in a new fertilizer plant). See D. Waitz~\oi 
al., "Fertilizer from Coal," paper prepared by the Divi' 
of Chemical Development, Tennessee Valley Authority, 
presented at the Faculty Institute on Coal Production 
Technology and Utilization, Oak Ridge Associated 
Universities, Oak Ridge, Tenn., 1978. 
•"' The difference between the manufacturing total and the t•I 
of the items calculated explicitly. Energy usage associS 
with "other" for the non-manufacturing sectors is 
negligible. 
ed b/ ( ff) The overall level of energy use for industry is obtain O 51 
multiplying the assumed industrial energy intensity bY ' 
times the Swedish per capita GDP in 1975; the -average 
Western European per capita GDP was 55 percent of the it/ 
Swedish value at that time. It is assumed that electt1\r1• 
accounts for 22 percent of final energy demand for ind0 ' 
the percentage for Sweden in 1975. 
(gg) See T. Johansson et al., "Sweden Beyond Oil: 
Use of Energy," Science 219 (1983): 355. 
(hh) The assumed reduction in energy intensity is based on 
innovations such as the use of advanced diesel engines-
32. H. Geller, "The Potential for Electricity Conservation in Brazil," 
Companhia Energetica de Sao Paulo, Sao Paulo, 1985. 
33. 
34. 
35. 
K. Shukla and J. Hurley, "Development of and Efficient, Low NOx Domestic 
Gas Range Cook Top," report prepared for Thermoelectron Corporation, 
Waltham, Mass., 1983. 
See note 5 above. 
See note 21 above. 
36. For example, see Colombo and Bernardini in note 17 above. 
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37. 
38. 
Industrial 
Developing 
World 
Alternative U.N. Global Population Projections 
· (in billions) 
1980 2020 
Low Medium 
countries 1.11 1.24 1.35 
countries 3.32 5.71 6.47 
4.43 6.95 7.82 
High 
1.44 
7.14 
8.58 
Source: United Nations, World Population Prospects as Assessed in 1980 
(New York: United Nations, 1981). 
The Main Energy Demand Features of Our Base Case Energy Scenario 
Populationa 
(billions) 
Final energy useb 
(TW) 
Fuels 
Electricity 
Total 
Per capita final 
energy use 
(kW) 
Indust. Countries 
1980 2020 
1.11 
4.77 
0.70 
5.47 
4.92 
1.24 
3.10 
2.5 
Devel. Countries 
1980 2020 
3.32 
2. 77 
0.13 
2.90 
0.87 
5. 71 
5. 71 
1.0 
(a) The 1980 U.N. low variant population projection. 
World 
1980 2020 
4.43 
7.54 
0.83 
8.37 
1. 89 
6.95 
7.23 
1.58c 
8.81 
1. 27 
(b) Defined as the total fuel (including bunkers) and electricity 
consumed by final consumers; excludes losses in the generation, 
transmission, and distribution of electricity, and the consumption of 
petroleum fuels by refineries. 
(c) The electrical fraction of global final energy demand is assumed to 
be 0.8 times that for the U.S. country study. See note 5 above. 
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39. See note 38 above. 
40. See note 38 above. 
41. S. Seidel and D. Keyes, Can We Delay a Greenhouse Warming? (Washington, 
D.C.: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 1983). 
42. Per TW-year of oil, natural gas, and coal consumption, respectively, 
0.63, 0.43, and 0.78 billion tons or gigatons (GT) of carbon are 
released. The carbon dioxide level in 1979 was 708.5 GT (334 ppmv). The 
preindustrial level is assumed to have been 615 GT (290 ppmv), and SO 
percent of emitted carbon dioxide is assumed to remain in the atmosphere. 
Ultimately recoverable resources are presently estimated at 365 TW-years 
for oil (see note 1 above) and 349 TW-years for natural gas (see note 48 
below), and if completely exploited would add carbon to the atmosphere as 
carbon dioxide in the amount 
0.5 X [0.63 X 365 + 0.43 X 349] = 190 GT 
or 0.31 times the preindustrial atmospheric level. If half of the world's 
geological coal resources (8,535 TW-years) were eventually used up, the 
amount of net carbon buildup in the atmosphere as carbon dioxide would be 
0.5 X 0.5 X 0.78 X 8,535 1,660 GT, 
or 2.7 times the preindustrial level. 
Geological Resources of Coal 
(in trillion tons coal equivalent [Ttce]) 
Ttce TW-Yearsa Percentage 
U.S.S.R. 4.41 4096 48 
U.S. 2.33 2164 25 
China 1.31 1217 14 
Other 1.14 1059 12 
Total 9.19 8535 100 
Source: World Energy Conference, World Energy Resources 1985-2000 
(Guildford, U.K.: IPC Science and Technology Press, 1978). 
(a) For a heating value of 29.3 GJ per metric ton coal equivalent. 
43. See note 42 above. 
-122-
44. 
4 
q 
e 
44. Coal production in a given year is assumed to be proportional to the 
remaining coal resources that might eventually be used without exceeding 
a specified ceiling on the atmospheric carbon dioxide level. For the 
above assumptions about oil and gas use (see note 42 above), the 
allowable coal production schedule as a function of various atmospheric 
carbon dioxide ceilings would be: 
Coal Production as a Function of Atmosphere co2 Ceilings 
co2 Level as a Total Production for Example Years 
Fraction of Pre- Production (in TW-years) 
industrial Level (in TW-yrs) 1978 2000 2020 2040 2100 
1.50 65.50 2.59 1.09 0.49 0.22 0.02 
1.60 223.20 2.59 2.01 1.59 1.26 0.63 
1. 70 380.91 2.59 2.23 1. 95 1. 70 1.13 
1.80 538.62 2.59 2.33 2.12 1. 92 1.44 
1. 90 696.33 2.59 2.39 2.22 2.06 1. 65 
2.00 854.04 2.59 2.42 2.28 2.15 1. 79 
45. In Haefele et al., note 1 above, it is estimated that global coal 
resources recoverable at a cost of up to $40 per ton (in 1982 dollars); 
[$25 per ton in 1975 dollars] amount to 560 TW-years (606 GT), with 1,019 
TW-years (1,105 GT) available in the cost range $40 to $80 per ton. Coal 
at $80 per ton is equivalent to oil at $17 per barrel, or one~half the 
world oil price in 1982. 
46. See note 42 above. 
47. 
Regional Distribution of World Oil Production, 
Base Case, WEC, and IIASA Scenarios 
(in million barrels per day) 
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 2020 
ME/NAf 
Rest 
Total 
25.9 22.4 19.0 16.3 14.9 
39.9 40.4 40.2 40.7 41.5 
65.8 62.8 59.2 57.0 56.4 
(a) Base case scenario. 
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Base 
Casea 
15 
30 
45 
WEC 
Low High 
19 
41 
60 
26 
56 
82 
IIASA 
Low High 
31 
47 
78 
34 
64 
98 
48. 
Region 
NA 
Estimated Ultimately Recoverable Natual Gas Resources 
and Natural Gas Consumption 
Resources, 1977a Consumption, 
(in TW-years) (in TW) 
60.5 0.74 
U.S.S.R./EE 96.4 0.47 
WE/JANZ 23.1 0.27 
LA 20.9 0.07 
Af/SEA 18.4 0.02 
ME/NAf 117.1 0.04 
C/CPA 12.5 0.01 
Total 348.9 1. 62 
(a) See-: Haefele et al. in note l(b) above, table 2. 7. 
(b) See: Frisch in note l(c) above. 
1978b 
49. See note 1 above. 
50. One possibility is to use compressed natural gas (CNG) directly as motor 
vehicle fuel. See J. West and L. Brown, Compressed Natural Gas, publica-
tion P14 (Aukland: New Zealand Energy Research and Development 
Committee, 1979). In Italy, some 270,000 vehicles were operated on CNG 
in 1980; New Zealand plans to convert 150,000 vehicles to CNG by 1985; 
both Canada and Australia are gearing up for major conversions. 
51. If world oil demand fell from 4.18 TW in 1980 to the base case scenario 
level of 3.21 TW in 2020, the required cumulative world oil production, 
from 1981 to 2020 w.ould be some 148 TW-years in this period. If in the 
period from 1983 to 2020 production in the ME/NAf region were maintained 
at the 1983 world "oil glut" level of 1.06 TW (15 million barrels per 
day), cumulative oil requirements from regions other than the ME/NAf 
region in this period would amount to 
148 - (1.36 x 3) - (1.06 x 37) - 104.7 TW-years. 
For comparison, world oil resources remaining outside the ME/NAf region 
and estimated to be ultimately recoverable at a price less than $26 per 
barrel (1982 dollars) amount to some 132 TW-years. See Haefele et al. in 
note l(b) above. 
52. D. Albright and H. Feiveson, "Plutonium Recycle and the Problem of 
Nuclear Proliferation," Center for Energy and Environmental Studies, 
report 206 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University, 1986). 
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5~ 
54 
· 53. 
Official Projections of Nuclear Electricity Production 
for Market Economies 
(in TW of continuous production) 
Region 1980a 2000 
U.S. 0.0315 0.080-0.082b 
Other OECD 0.0346 0.097-0.104b 
Other Market Economies 0.0016 0.018-0.027b 
U.S.S.R. 0.0071 0.065-0.124c 
Eastern Europe and Cuba 0.0027 0.026c 
Total 0.0774 0.286-0_'337d 
(a) See: The British Petroleum Company, BP Statistical Review of World 
Energy (London, 1982). 
(b) See: Office of Policy, Planning, and Analysis, Energy Projections to 
the Year 2010, technical report in support of the national energy 
plan, DOE/PE-0029/2 (Washington, D.C.: Department of Energy, 1983). 
(c) See: International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook (Paris: 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 1982). 
(d) Assuming a 65 percent average capacity factor, the corresponding 
global installed capacity in the year 2000 would be 440 to 518 GW(e). 
54 .. The total final demand for all fuels is 7.23 TW. (See note 38 above.) 
The demand for biomass fuels is the difference between this total and the 
final use of fossil fuels. The latter is calculated as follows. 
Assuming that three-fourths of central station power generation is based 
1 
_on coal converted at 40 percent conversion efficiency, coal used for 
direct purposes would be 
1.94 - 0. 75 X 2.5 x 0.66 = 0. 70 TW. 
Assuming that one-fourth of central station power generation is based on 
the use of natural gas in steam-injected gas turbines at SO percent 
conversion efficiency and that one-half of the fossil fuel-based cogen-
eration is natural gas fired, for which 1.5 units of extra fuel is needed 
to produce each unit of electricity, natural gas use for direct purposes 
would be 
3.21 - 0.25 X 2.0 X 0.66 - 0.5 X 1.5 X 0.13 = 2.78 TW. 
Assuming that one-half of fossil fuel-based cogeneration is based on oil, 
for which 1.5 units of extra fuel is needed to produce each unit of 
electricity, and that 10 percent of gross oil use is consumed in refining 
operations, oil use for direct purposes would be 
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3.21 - 0.5 X 1.5 X 0.13 - 0.1 X 3.21 = 2.79 TW. 
Thus direct fuel requirements from biomass would be 
7.23 - 0.70 - 2.78 - 2.79 = 0.96 TW 
Assuming average conversion losses of 30 perent in producing final energy 
carriers from biomass, the total amount of biomass required for direct 
fuels use would be 1.37 TW. Also, some 0.21 TW would be required to 
produce 0.14 TW of cogenerated electricity, assuming the same conversion 
efficiency as for cogenerated electricity production with fossil fuels. 
Global Electricity Supply Mix: Base Case 
(in TW) 
Hydro 
Wind and photovoltaics 
Co generation 
Biomass 
Fossil fuel 
Central station 
Nuclear 
Fossil fuel 
Total 
0.19 0.46a 
0.09b 
0.14c 
0.13c 
0.3oe 
0.66f 
1. 78g 
(a) Hydro is a_ssumed to make up 25 percent of the electricity supply 
(4,030 TW-hours per year [TWh/year]). This is two-fifths of the 
global economic hydro potential (9,700 TWh/year) and one-fifth of the 
global technical potential (19,400 TWh/year), as estimated in 1976 by 
the World Energy Conference. See E. Armstrong, "Hydraulic Re-
sources," in Renewable Energy Resources: The Full Reports to the 
Conservation Commission.of the World Energy Conference (Gilford, 
U.K.: IPC Sciences and Technology Press, 1978). The 1976 WEC 
estimates of the economic hydro potential are probably low in light 
of subsequent electricity price increases and better resources 
estimates (e.g., more recent estimates for Brazil and India that 
indicate economic potentials higher by some 75 percent than the 1976 
WEC estimates for these countries). 
(b) Wind and photovoltaics together are assumed to make up 5 percent of 
the electricity supply. Owing to the large uncertainties in the 
future of photovoltaic technology, the wind/photovoltaics mix is not 
disaggregated. In the event that photovoltaics technology is not 
commercialized, all of this electricity would be provided by wind. 
In Haefele et al., note l(b) above, it is estimated that the 
technical potential for wind power globally is 3 TW and that the 
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"realizable" potential is 1 TW. Thompson estimated a recoverable 
wind energy potential of 0.9 TW for the 16 percent of the North 
American land area where the wind energy density is in excess of 400 
watts per square meter, using Boeing Mod-2 windmills (2.5 megawatts 
each) spaced 1.5 kilometers (km) apart. See G. Thompson, "The 
Prospects for Wind and Wave Power in North America," Center for 
;y Energy and Environmental Studies report 11, Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University, 1981. 
(c) The cogeneration fraction of total electricity production is assumed 
to be 15 percent, the same as the percentage which we estimate could 
be provided in the U.S. in 2020 by the major steam-using industries. 
A fifty-fifty mix of biomass and fossil fuels is assumed for fuel 
input. 
(d) Includes a small amount of geothermal. 
(e) The nuclear electricity level assumed for 2020 is equal to the level 
officially forecast for the year 2000. See note 53 above. 
(f) Central station power generation based on fossil fossil fuels is 
assumed to be the residual. 
(g) Electricity demand (see note 38 above) is divided by 0.89 to account 
for transportation and distribution losses. 
Global Primary Energy Supply Mix: Base Case 
(in TW) 
Nuclear power 
Hydrod 
~ind and photovoltaicd 
Fossil fuelse 
Coal 
Oil 
Natural gas 
Subtotal 
Biomass 
Organic wastes 
Plantations 
Subtotal 
Total 
0.22a 
0.19 
2.44 
4.18 
1. 74 
8.36 
10.30 
0,75b,c 
0.46c 
0.09c 
1.94 
3.21 
3.21 
8.36f 
11.20 
(a) Assumes that 2.8 units of fuel are required to produce 1 unit of 
electricity in thermal power plants in 1980. 
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(b) Assumes that 2.5 units of fuel are required to produce 1 unit of 
electricity in nuclear and coal-fired thermal power plants in 2020. 
(c) See base case global electricity supply mix above. 
(d) Assumes the primary energy consumption associated with hydro, wind, 
and photovoltaic electricity production to be the energy value of the 
output of these systems. 
(e) Assumes that on average 1.5 units of fuel are required to produce 1 
unit of cogenerated electricity. 
(f) Total fossil fuel consumption is assumed to be the same as in 1980. 
(g) Assumes that half of the biomass is provided by organic wastes and 
half by managed biomass production. The level of organic waste use 
for energy purposes corresponds to about one-fifth of the estimated 
organic waste production in 2020. See note 62 below. 
(h) Bioenergy data for less developed countries are from D. Hall, G. 
Barnard, and P. Moss, Biomass for Energy in the Developing World 
(Oxford, U.K.: Pergamon Press, 1982). United States bioenergy 
consumption by the paper and pulp industry, 1.1 exajoules (EJ) in 
1980, are from American Paper Institute, Statistics of Paper, 
Paperboard, and Woodpulp (New York: American Paper Institute, 1981). 
Data for U.S. wood consumption for household fuel, 0.87 EJ, are from 
Energy Information Administration, Housing Characteristics, 1980, a 
report contributing to the Residential Energy Consumption Survey, 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Energy, 1982). Data for non-
commercial energy use in other industrialized market economies are 
from International Energy Agency, Energy Balances of OECD Countries, 
1976-1980 (Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development, 1982). Data for fuelwood consumption for Eastern Europe 
and the Soviet Union are from United Nations, 1979 Yearbook of World 
Energy Statistics (New York: United Nations, 1981). 
55. For the assumed global electricity supply mix for our base case scenario, 
see note 54 above. 
56. National Swedish Board for Energy Source Development, "Wind Energy in the 
Swedish Power System: the First Phase of an Investigation on Wind Power 
Integration in the Swedish Power System," NE 1982:12, Stockholm, 1982. 
57. E. Demeo and R. Taylor, "Solar Photovoltaic Power Systems: An Electric 
Utility R&D Perspective," Science 220 (1984): 245. 
58. See note 55 above. 
59. For the assumed global primary energy supply mix for our base case 
scenario, see note 54 above; 
60. See notes 38 and 39 above. 
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61 
62 
he 
61. See note 59 above. 
62. Global Organic Waste Production 
(in TW) 
1980 
Forest product industry wastes 
United Statesa 0.11 
Rest of worldb 0.27 
Crop residues 
Industrialized countriesc 0.51 
Developing countriesc 0.60 
Manure 
Industrialized countriesc 0.38 
Developing countriesc 0.73 
Urban refuse 
United Statesd 0.046 
Other industrialized countriese 0.090 
Developing countriesf 0.034 
Total 2. 77 
2020 
0.14 
0.44 
0.57 
1.04 
0.42 
1.26 
0.060 
0.096 
0.058 
4.084 
(a) U.S. 1979 roundwood production was 1.53 cubic meters (CM) per capita. 
See United Nations, 1979-1980 Statistical Yearbook (New York: United 
Nations, 1981). Residue production per unit of roundwood production 
was 0.406, 0.377, and 0.203 from manufacturing residues, logging 
residues, and stand improvement cuttings, respectively. See Office 
of Technology Assessment, Energy from Biological Processes. Vol. 2. 
Technical and Environmental Analysis (Washington, D.C.: Office of 
Technology Assessment, 1980). These same values are assumed to hold 
for 1980 (2020), when the U.S. population was (is expected to be) 228 
million (296 million). At 10 GJ/CM, total residue production in 1980 
(2020) was (would be) 3.42 EJ (4.53 EJ). 
(b) It is assumed that residue production in the rest of the world is 
like that in the European Economic Community (EEC), where the ratio 
of residues to roundwood production is 0.32. See W. Paly and P. 
Chartier, Energy from Biomass in Europe (London: Applied Science 
Publishers, 1980). Roundwood production outside the U.S. in 1979 was 
0.65 CM per capita. See United Nations, in note (a) above. Residue 
production would be 8.61 EJ (13.83 EJ) for a population in 1980 · 
(2020) of 4.14 billion (6.65 billion). 
(c) It is assumed that per capita production rates are the same as in 
1975. See T. Taylor, R. Taylor, and S. Weiss, "Worldwide Data 
Related to Potentials for Widescale Use of Renewable Energy," Center 
for Energy and Environmental Studies report 132, Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University, 1982. 
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(d) It is assumed that the present rate of U.S. urban refuse generation 
(1.63 kg per capita per day, with an average heating value of 10.7 MJ 
per kg) persists. 
(e) It is assumed that the present rate of EEC refuse generation (1.0 kg 
per capita per day, with an average heating value of 8.8 MJ per kg) 
applies on average to all industrialized countries outside the United 
States in both 1980 and 2020. See U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency, "Refuse-Fired Energy Systems in Europe: An Evaluation of 
Design Practices," executive summary, publication SW 771, Office of 
Water and Waste Management, Washington D.C.: Environmental 
Protection Agency, 1979. 
(f) It is assumed that one-tenth of the population (the urban elite) 
generates urban refuse at the European rate. 
63. While in principle a high level of crop residue recovery might be 
achieved by harvesting techniques that recover residues simultaneously 
with the primary products, only part of these wastes would be available 
for energy purposes. In developing countries, crop residues are often 
used as fodder for livestock. And some residues will have to be left 
behind to provide nutrients·and to maintain soil quality. However, to 
the extent that crop residues and manure are utilized for biogas 
production, it may often be feasible to return the nutrient-rich residuum 
from the biodigesters to the soil for such purposes. In the case of 
forest residues, it may be necessary to restrict removals to the larger 
pieces, leaving behind the leaves or needles and twigs, in which the 
nutrients tend to be concentrated. 
64. Various studies indicate bioenergy productivities on managed plantations 
ranging from about 7 dry tonnes per hectare per year (mesquite, saltbush, 
kochia) in arid regions to 10-15 tons (willow, poplar) in Sweden to 40-60 
tons (eucalyptus., leucaena) in Brazil or India. However, these estimates 
are often based on unusually good experience for limited plots with 
especially favorable growing conditions. For energy planning purposes, 
more long-term experience on large plantations is needed before making 
projections based on high productivities. Foresters and ecologists with 
whom we discussed these issues did not feel that an average productivity 
of 10 tons per hectare per year was excessive for large-scale production 
on managed plantations or energy farms. 
65. See notes 59 and 62 above. 
66. In 1980, the amount of reforestation in seventy-six developing countries 
(excluding China) amounted to 1.15 million hectares. See Food and 
Agriculture Organization/Economic Commission for Europe, Forest Resources 
1980 (Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization, 1985). Between 1950 and 
1979, 100 million hectares in China were replanted in forests, but only 
28 million hectares of replanted area yielded surviving forests. Over 
the ten-year period from 1972 to 1981, the rate of planting averaged 4.7 
million hectares per year. In many areas, the survival rate has 
increased recently to 50 percent or more. The official Chinese policy is 
to increase forest area at an annual rate of 3.5 million hectares per 
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year, from 122 million hectares in 1981 to 192 million hectares in 2000. 
See B. Zhu, "Afforestation and Energy for China," draft report prepared 
at the Center for Energy and Environmental Studies, Princeton University, 
Princeton, N.J., 1984. 
67. See note 10 above. 
68. Goldemberg et al., Energy for a Sustainable World, in note 19, appendix 
A. 
69. In the base case fossil fuel use scenario (see note 59 above), the total 
carbon added to the atmosphere as carbon dioxide and which remains there 
as a result of fuel combustion in the period from 1980 to 2020 would be 
101.2 GT, with 46.6 GT from oil combustion, 21.3 GT from natural gas 
combustion, and 33.3 GT from coal combustion for the carbon release 
assumptions presented in note 42. 
Oil: 0.5 x 0.5 x (4.18 + 3.21) x 40 yrs x 0.63 
Natural gas: 0.5 x 0.5 x (1.74 + 3.21) x 40 yrs x 
46.6 GT 
0.43 21.3 GT 
Coal: 0.5 x 2.44 x [l - exp(-40 x 0.0068))/0.0068 x 0.78 = 33.3 GT 
If fossil fuel use were then to decline linearly to zero from 2020 to 
2050, the cumulative carbon dioxide buildup in this period would be 
0.5 X 0.5 X 30 X [3.21 X (0.63 + 0.43) + 1.94 X 0.78] = 36.9 GT 
and the ultimate level of carbon in the atmosphere (as carbon dioxide) 
would be 847 GT (399 ppmv), ·or 1.38 times the preindustrial level: 
708.5 + 101.2 + 36.9 = 847 GT (399 ppmv). 
70. To estimate the solar collector area required to provide hydrogen through 
electrolysis from amorphous silicon solar cells at the 2020 base case 
level of fossil fuel consumption (8.4 TW), we assume: (1) an average 
insolation rate of 200 watts per square meter for sunny (desert) areas; 
(2) an average efficiency of amorphous silicon solar cells of 15 percent, 
a practical target value for tandem, multi-layered cells, according to a 
1984 Electrical Power Review Institute review (see note 57 above); and 
(3) an average efficiency for electrolysis of 80 percent. Under these 
conditions, the collector area required would be some 0.350 million 
square kilometers, or an area half the size of the state of Texas (0.691 
million square kilometers), or 2 percent of the area of warm deserts of 
the world (17.8 million square kilometers). 
71. Assuming that: (1) nuclear power plants last thirty years; (2) the 
installed capacity is O GW in 1970, 120 GW in 1980, and 460 GW in 2000; 
and (3) the rate of construction is constant from 1970 to 1980 and from 
1980 to 2000, then the rate of replacement construction in the period 
from 2000 to 2020 would be 
1/20 X [120 + (460-120)/20 X 10] 14.5 GW per year. 
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Likewise, the rate of net additions in the period from 2000 to 2020 would 
be 
[770 - 460]/20 = 15.5 GW per year. 
Main Energy Demand Features High Energy Demand Scenario 
Industrialized Developing 
Countries Countries World 
1980 2020 1980 2020 1980 2020 
Populationa 
(in billions) 1.11 1.24 3.32 5. 71 4.43 6.95 
Final energy use 
(in TW) 
Fuels 4. 77 2. 77 7.54 9.67 
Electricity 0.70 0.13 0.83 2.12b 
Total 5.47 6.08 2.90 5. 71 8.37 11. 79 
Per capita final· 
energy use 
(in kW) 4.92 4.9_c 0.87 1.oc 1. 89 1. 70 
(a) The U.N. low variant population projection. 
(b) Assumes that electricity accounts for 18 percent of final energy use 
in 2020. 
(c) Assumes that per capita·energy use in industrialized (developing) 
countries in 2020 is about the same as in 1980, or 4.9 kW (1.0 kW). 
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74. 
The Distribution of World Oil Production 
(in MBD) 
Production, Recent Years Projections 
ME/NAf 
Rest 
Total 
1979 
25.9 
39.9 
65.8 
1980 
22.4 
40.4 
62.8 
1981 
19.0 
40.2 
59.2 
(a) Our base case scenario. 
(b) Our high demand scenario. 
1982 
16.3 
40.7 
57.0 
(c) Average of low ~nd high scenarios. 
1983 
14.9 
41. 5 
56.4 
BCa 
15 
30 
45 
2020 
HDb WECc 
15 22.5 
48 48.5 
63 71.0 
Global Electricity Supply Mix, High Demand Scenario 
(in average TW produced at p.ower plants) 
Hydro 
Wind and photovoltaics 
Co generation 
Biomass 
Fossil fuel 
Central station 
Nuclear 
Fossil fuel 
Total 
1980 
0.19 
0.08 
0.66 
0.93f 
2020 
0.30d 
1.ooe 
2.38f 
IIASAc 
32.5 
55.5 
88.0 
(a) As in the base case, it is assumed that one-fourth of the electricity 
supply (5,300 TWh/year) is hydro. For comparison, the 1976 WEC 
estimate of the global economic potential is 9,700 TWh/year. 
(b) As in the base case, it is assumed that 5 percent of the tQtal 
electricity supply is wind and photovoltaics. 
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(c) As in the base case, it is assumed that the cogeneration fraction of 
total electricity production is 15 percent, with a fifty-fifty mix of 
biomass and fossil fuel inputs. 
(d) As in the base case, it is assumed that in 2020 nuclear electricity 
is produced at the level officially forecast for 2000. 
(e) Assumes that central station power generation based on fossil fuels 
is the residual. 
(f) Electricity production is equal to the electricity demand level (see 
note 72 above) divided by 0.89 to account for transportation and 
distribution losses. 
Global Primary Energy Supply Mix, High Demand Scenario 
(in TW) 
Nuclear power 
Hydro 
Wind and photovoltaic electricity 
Fossil Fuels 
Coal 
Oil 
Natural gas 
Subtotal 
Biomass 
Organic wastes 
Plantations 
Subtotal 
Total 
(a) See note 74 above. 
1980 
0.22 
0.19 
2.44 
4.18 
1. 74 
8.36 
10.3 
2020 
1. 95 
4.46b 
4.46b 
10.87 
15.34 
(b) Oil and gas production levels (assumed to be equal) are the residual. 
(c) Assumes that one-fourth.of the produced organic wastes can be 
recovered for energy purposes. 
(d) Assumes that the PER between 1985 and 2015 is limited to 12 million 
hectares per year; that the average plantation yield is 10 tons per 
year; and that wood has a heating value of 18 GJ per dry ton. Under 
these conditions, some 3.5 billion tons of wood would be harvested on 
350 million hectares in 2020. 
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76. If world oil demand increased from 4.18 TW in 1980 to the high demand 
scenario level of A.46 TW in 2020, the required cumulative world oil 
production from 1981 to 2020 would be some 173 TW-years in this period. 
If in the period from 1983 to 2020 production in the ME/NAf region were 
maintained at the 1983 world "oil glut" level of 1.06 TW (15 MBD), cumu-
lative oil requirements from regions other than the ME/NAf region in this 
period would amount to some 
173 - (1.36 x 3) - (1:06 x 37) = 130 TW-years. 
For comparison, it is estimated in Haefele et al., note l(b) above, that 
the remaining non-ME/NAf world oil resources that are ultimately recover-
able at a price less than $26 per barrel (1982 dollars) are some 132 TW-
years. 
77. Using the carbon dioxide production coefficients given in note 42 above, 
for alternative fossil fuels, and assuming that half of the released 
carbon dioxide stays in the atmosphere, we obtain the following net 
additions of carbon to the atmosphere in 2020: 
Base case scenario 
High demand scenario 
WEC scenarios (average of high and low) 
IIASA scenarios (average of high and low) 
78. See note 73 above. 
4.9 GT 
6.2 GT 
10.2 GT 
10.8 GT 
79. In Haefele et al., note l(b) above, it is estimated that the peak oil 
production capacity for the ME/NAf region in the period from 2020 to 2030 
will be some 34 million barrels per day (2.4 TW). 
80. See Goldemberg et al., Energy for a Sustainable World in note 19 above, 
chapter 5. 
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MARKET PENETRATION AS AN IMPEDIMENT TO REPLACEMENT OF FOSSIL FUELS 
IN THE CARBON DIOXIDE ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEM 
John A. Laurmann 
Gas Research Institute, Chicago, Illinois 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1975, Marchetti extended the use of the logistic transition curve as 
a descriptor for the market growth of an emergent technology to the depiction 
of the replacement path for one of the world's primary energy sources by 
another. 1 He then used this empirically-based microeconomic property, once 
applied to the global scale, not only to describe past global energy transi-
tions but also to predict future transitions. This insight, when applied to 
the carbon dioxide/climate change issue, was seminal in transforming what was 
in essence a scientific curiosity into a significant environmental issue with 
important and pressing policy implications. 
Basing his results on careful and extensive analysis of the historical 
record, Marchetti concluded that the time for takeover of one form of the 
world's primary energy source by another was very long, and cited fifty years 
as a minimum time for an increase from a 1 percent to a 50 percent market 
share of the replacement technology. Moreover, he claimed that this estimate 
Was applicable to future shifts in energy use. Since, in the mid-70s, fifty 
years was the consensus estimate for the onset of a critical greenhouse 
warming from the projected increased use of fossil fuels, the application of 
Marchetti's findings implied that immediate steps to replace fossil by non-
fossil energy sources would be needed to avert environmental disaster. Absent 
this coincidence in timing of the environmental insult with the response time 
required to handle it, the carbon dioxide/climate change problem seemed to 
most to be far too distant and too uncertain to warrant concern--an attitude 
that is now returning with postponement of the timing of a significant carbon 
dioxide-induced climatic impact following the recent reductions in projected 
economic and energy growth rates. The pragmatic rationale for such a stance 
is clear: time- and growth-discounting, even at very low rates, reduce the 
present-day costs of catastrophically expensive future impacts, for instance 
those that occur fifty or one hundred years from now, to minor proportions. 
In contrast to an assessment based on technical considerations, stress 
alternatively could be placed on the intergenerational costs of this long-
range problem, posed as a moral question concerning the welfare of the yet 
unborn. Adherents of this second viewpoint attach little importance to 
discounting arguments, so their attitude would be little changed were the 
market penetration time impediment to the transition to a non-fossil economy 
to turn out to be illusory. As we shall discuss later, the latter possibility 
cannot be ruled out--an outcome of considerable importance to some analysts 
even if not to all viewers of this environmental problem. 
The latest reductions in projected energy growth rates considerably 
delay the most likely date for significant climatic impacts resulting from 
increasing atmospheric carbon dioxide levels compared with estimates made as 
recently as five years ago. The earlier projections were for continued long-
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term exponential growth, whereas current thinking suggests a reduced rate of 
growth of fossil fuel use later in the twenty-first century, as well as an 
overall diminution of average growth compared with earlier estimates. The 
present-day significance of the carbon dioxide problem is thereby reduced in a 
major way, even accepting the irreducibility of market penetration times. 
However, such a conclusion is not yet warranted for two reasons: firstly, 
uncertainty in the timing and magnitude of the carbon dioxide-induced warming 
is large and the possibility of much more severe or earlier impacts cannot be 
ignored; and secondly, projections of recently observed trends in the 
atmospheric concentrations of other trace greenhouse gases imply that the 
total heating effect of these gases plus carbon dioxide can impact climate 
within the fifty-year minimum market penetration time given by Marchetti. 
Even though it is now ten years since Marchetti first published his 
findings, little has been done to place this rather surprising and oft times 
controversial thesis on a surer theoretical footing. His claim for the 
irreducibility of the market penetration time for possible future energy 
transitions is the most worrisome feature of the situation. Unfortunately, 
although some characteristics of the socioeconomic systems of the world can be 
postulated as important determinants of admissible rates of introduction of 
new energy forms, not even semi-quantitative evaluation of their roles has 
been possible to date. Applicability of the thesis to the world's energy 
future still rests on the extrapolation of empirical evidence, with no causal 
description available to back it up, and we are in no better position for 
judging its relevancy to the carbon dioxide issue at this time than we were 
when Marchetti first raised it. The review given in this paper, therefore, 
can do little more than outline the consequences of Marchetti's model, 
assuming it to be valid, and discuss the underlying aspects of the energy 
system that need to be studied in order, in the future, to determine whether 
energy penetration lag is truly an impediment to a transition away from the 
use of fossil fuels. 
THE HISTORICAL EVIDENCE 
Market penetration time models as applied to new, and particularly to 
new technology-based, products have been under investigation for over twenty 
years. The best-known of these that incorporates the logistic penetration 
time function used by Marchetti is due to Fisher and Pry, 2 who chiefly 
concerned themselves with product replacement for a given end use taken over 
by a new technological line. -Original consideration of the subject was 
offered by Mansfield ten years earlier, 3 with applications to major U.S. 
industries, such as railroads, coal, and steel. Blackman amplified 
Mansfield's work with the introduction of the same analytic form as used by 
Fisher and Pry and Marchetti. 4 It is important to note that this logistic 
functional form 
F 1 
----------1 + exp - « (t - t 0 ) (1) 
originally was selected to describe the temporal transition of the market 
share, F, of the new technology from Oat t = - ~ to 1 at t =+~,because, as 
a simple analytic S-shaped curve, it happened to fit the data. There was no 
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claim for deeper significance than this. The empirical evidence for its match 
to numerous data is now extensive; Marchetti cites 300 tests he has made of 
the formalism. 5 
A rudimentary explanation for the reasonableness of Equation 1 can be 
adduced through the differential form of the equation, which as 
dF 
dt 
- ~ F (1-F) 
(2) 
states that the rate of growth of the fractional share of the new product is 
proportional both to its degree of penetration and to the residual market 
size. The above description applies to the case in which a single product, an 
energy source in our case, is supplanted by another. This is usually an 
oversimplification, and Marchetti modified the method so that it could be 
applied to a multicomponent system. 6 A more sophisticated rationale for this 
situation has been given by Auer, 7 but with no practical consequences for us. 
Marchetti's results for past world energy use transitions are shown in Figure 
1, using his multicomponent approach. The solid lines follow the historic 
data, and in this logarithmic plot, F/(1-F) versus time (t), follows a 
straight line when obeying the simple logistic form 
ln F/(1-F) = ~ (t-t0 ) (3) 
The market penetration time, or time constant, tp, for a given component 
Pair is defined somewhat arbitrarily as the time taken for the new technology 
share to grow from 1 percent to 50 percent of the total market. The emergent 
World markets for wood, coal and oil, tp had values between 90 and 100 years 
(see Figure 1). Marchetti's upper estimate for a penetration time of 100 
Years for a future energy source derives from this result. 
We might add parenthetically that the.market penetration time 
Was defined by Fisher and Pry as the time taken for market share to 
from 10 percent to 90 percent, but this turns out to be numerically 
to the 1 percent to 50 percent figure, assuming the logistic form. 
it can be shown that 
tp (1%-50%) 1.0457 tp (10%-90%) (4) 
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In fact, 
Figure 1 
PAST MARKET PENETRATION OF THE WORLD'S PRIMARY ENERGY SOURCES 
102 l::.==============:J:r:.===============r.===============:; o.99 
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Nuclear 
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1850 1900 1950 2000 
Year 
Adapted from C. Marchetti, "Primary Energy Substitution Model: On the 
Interaction Between Energy and Society," Chemical Economy and Engineering 
Review 7, (1975): 9. 
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The data available to Marchetti in 1975 on nuclear energy growth were 
too meager to enable an estimate of the time constant for nuclear energy to be 
made. The latest information on the growth of nuclear energy use is presented 
in Figure 2. Here, in addition to the reported annual nuclear power con-
sumption values through 1982, shown as dots, we have plotted logistic growth 
curves with thirty-, fifty-, and seventy-five-year time constants, as well as 
Marchetti's own projection of nuclear energy growth, 8 plus one of the latest 
projections, that of Edmonds and Reilly, for nuclear growth based on a 
detailed world energy/macroeconomic model. 9 The depiction in Figure 2 is 
notable in two regards. First, we see a major difference between the apparent 
logistic trend of nuclear energy growth (approximating the tp = 30 years 
value) and the Edmonds and Relly prjection. The latter, we should empha-
size, is typical of other current projections. The apparent discrepancy can 
be explained through the long planning and construction lead times: nuclear 
plants currently coming on line reflect plans made several (probably more than 
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ten) years ago, before the advent of reduced energy demand in the developed 
world and prior to the time of increasing public hostility to the installation 
of nuclear generating capacity. Presumably, in the future nuclear growth will 
fall below the logistic extrapolation. 
The second significant feature of the data is that they appear to 
contradict Marchetti's claim for a fifty- to one-hundred-year market pene-
tration time. However, there are reasons why the latter conclusion need not 
apply. Thus one may argue that early initial penetration could be extremely 
high if actively promoted and capitalized through national programs. Later 
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Figure 2 
PAST AND PROJECTED FUTURE WORLD NUCLEAR ENERGY PRODUCTION 
AS A FUNCTION OF TOTAL ENERGY USE* 
tp 30 yrs. 
1980 1990 2000 
Year 
I 
I 
Marchetti 
1979/Projection 
I 
I 
I 
,, 
, 
YEdmunds 
/ -Reilly 
/ (1983) 
I 
I 
// 
/ 
2010 2020 2030 
tp - the time for increase from 1 percent to 50 percent of market share 
*Logistic growth curves assume a 1 percent market share by 1975. 
Nuclear data are from Energy Information Agency, 1982 International Energy 
Annual Report, DOE-EIA-0219 (82) (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of 
Energy, Office of Energy, Markets and End Use, 1983). 
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on, when the new industry starts to compete with the old in a major way, 
penetration my slow. In addition, most of the growth of nuclear energy 
depicted in Figure 2 occurred in developed countries; the results should 
therefore not be considered as typical for world conditions, and Marchetti 
himself has pointed out that the time constants for primary ener5y penetration 
have historically been shorter for smaller geographical scales. 1 For 
example, he suggests that a time constant as short as thirty years would be 
applicable to Western Europe, with recent evidence for increased use of 
natural gas confirming this observation. By contrast, U.S. primary energy 
substitution, excluding nuclear, has been relatively slow, with time constants 
of the order of seventy to eighty years. Hence, Marchetti's empirical 
conclusions on the effects of scale and degree of socioeconomic development 
are important features of market penetration and imply that the changing pro-
portion of energy use between the developed and developing countries must be 
taken into account when trying to predict future energy penetration rates. 11 
APPLICATION OF THE LOGISTIC MARKET PENETRATION 
TIME FORMULATION TO THE CARBON DIOXIDE PROBLEM 
It is an easy exercise to apply the simple logistic replacement formula 
(Formula 1) to an assumed two-component primary global energy system--fossil 
and non-fossil--to determine the effect of alternative fossil/non-fossil 
energy futures on atmospheric carbon dioxide levels. Figures 3 through 6 show 
the results of such. an exercise, using a constant fractional retention model 
for the amount of carbon dioxide left in the atmosphere upon the combustion of 
fossil fuels. This fraction was taken as 56 percent, based on past observa-
tions, and is a reasonable approximation for atmospheric carbon dioxide levels 
at least as high as double the ~reindustrial value, provided the deforestation 
contribution is not too large. 12 If the latter situation holds, the long-term 
carbon dioxide level for a prescribed future energy use will fall below the 
values given in the figures. The results in Figures 3 through 6 are plotted 
for a variety of market penetration time constants, tp, and initiation times 
for the introduction of some non-fossil fuel, which we assume as a replacement 
for the world's currently fossil fuel- dominated energy production. The 
latter are identified by values for the time by which non-fossil energy has 
risen to occupy 1 percent of the market, referenced to a base date of 1975. 
These illustrative calculations demonstrate the conditions and assump-
tions concerning energy growth and market penetration time, under which 
characteristic atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations approach threatening 
levels. We assume that the carbon dioxide doubling state, indicated by the 
heavy horizontal lines, represents such a condition. For several reasons, 
these should not be taken as faithful projections of possible futures; they 
are presented to indicate those values of the parameters tp and t 0 that could 
give difficulty were a move to non-fossil energy use to be dictated. The 
simplification to a two-component system makes it impossible to properly 
represent the role of hydro power; it is currently a significant factor in 
overall supply, but it cannot rise enough to play a noticeable role in the 
abatement of carbon dioxide growth. We have, therefore, lumped hydro power in 
with the fossil component, as we have also done for current production of 
energy from biomass. It would be possible to refine the calculations to 
correctly incorporate such items, but this is hardly merited in view of our 
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effort to present only the overall nature of the difficulties encountered in 
the energy transition process. Excessive detail tends to suggest a degree of 
precision that is not warranted by the data. 
Figures 3 through 6 are also idealized in assuming continued fixed 
exponential growth of total energy use, ~. with values varying between 2 
percent and 5 percent per annum. Projections of energy use made prior to the 
energy crises of the 1970s typically assumed constant exponential rates, 
varying from the 5 percent at the beginning of the decade, to 3 percent 
towards its end. There have been a few very lone-term projections that have 
accounted for population stabilization, 13 such as the International Institute 
for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) projections. Most current studies pro-
ject decreasing rates of energy growth starting sometime early in the next 
century, as, for example, in the Edmonds and Reilly projection shown in Figure 
2. We feel, however, that broad conclusions regarding the importance of 
market penetration time lags should not be affected by omission or departures 
from exponentiality, at least when considering medium time scale phenomena 
that are contained within a fifty-year market penetration time. We consider 
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Figure 3 
GROWTH OF CO2 CONCENTRATION FOR LOGISTIC NON-FOSSIL 
REPLACEMENT OF FOSSIL FUELS* 
Y= 3.0% p.a. 
tp = SO yrs. 
CO2 Doubling 
0 (1975) 
-10 
0'--...1...,__.__1~98_0_._~-L-2~00-0---1-~-L-2~02_0____.____._.L..,....2~04-0---1-----'-.L..-2~06_0____.____._.L..-__._2_.080 
Date 
*Total energy growth is assumed to be exponential at an annual rate, ~. of 3 
percent. Market penetration time constant, tp, is fifty years; various non-
fossil entry dates, t 0 , for a 1 percent penetration (relative to 1965) are 
shown. 
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the latter a reasonable lower limit according to the historical data collected 
by Marchetti. Of greater significance is the very large uncertainty in the 
long-term energy projections; an aspect that will be discussed later in this 
paper. 
The curves in Figure 3 were calculated for an overall energy growth rate 
of 3 percent per annum, an acceptable figure in the late 1970s but an over-
estimate according to most of today's forecasts, which lie in the 2 percent 
per annum range. At the 3 percent per annum growth rate, assuming all of this 
was to result from accelerating fossil fuel combustion, atmospheric levels of 
carbon dioxide would double by about 2040, at which time global temperatures 
would have risen by about 2.5 degrees Celsius. 14 The latter figure is highly 
uncertain and is likely to be biased upward because of the delaying effect of 
the ocean's thermal inertia, which is not included in these equilibrium 
calculations of climate change. 
Figure 7 shows several projections of average global temperature in-
crease for a fixed 3 percent per annum exponential energy growth rate and .for 
an approximately 2 percent per annum rate projection made by Rotty in 1980. 15 
We have also indicated on the abscissa the revision in timing of the climate 
Figure 4 
ATMOSPHERIC CO2 INCREASE FOR A TOTAL EXPONENTIAL ENERGY 
USE GROWTH RATE OF 4 PERCENT PER ANNUM 
y = 4% p.a. 
tp = 50 yrs. 
-10 
o.__ ___ _._ __ __..__ __ ..__ _____ ~--~--~--------..__ ________ _ 
1980 2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 
Date 
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Figure 5 
ATMOSPHERIC co2 INCREASE FOR VARIOUS TOTAL EXPONENTIAL 
ENERGY GROWTH RATES (7)* 
1 % Penetration Date t0 = 1965 
Market Penetration Time 
___ tp = 75 yrs. 
- tp = 50yrs. 
CO2 Doubling 
I 
I 
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3% 
2% 
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*Non-fossil fuel's share was 1 percent of the market in 1965. 
change due to a twenty-year lag from ocean thermal inertia effects. Figure 7 
also introduces another important feature of the greenhouse warming, the 
effect of infrared-absorbing trace gases other than carbon dioxide. The solid 
lines in the figure show the effect of these additional greenhouse gases, 
which, if we accept Ramanathan's estimate of the effect of these other gases 
(OGGs), essentially eliminate the effect on global climate of a reduction in 
annual rate of increase in fossil fuel use from 3 percent to about 2 percent 
per annum. 16 Overall, the effect is a return to the mid-1970s' viewpoint on 
timing and criticality of the anticipated anthropogenically-produced climate 
changes. Ramanathan estimated an additional warming from the OGGs equal to 
about 80 percent of the warming expected from carbon dioxide alone, a value 
thought to be too low today. 17 An increase by 100 percent or even more is 
believed possible.** 
**But it would be difficult to account for the current absence of a clear 
climatic change signal if the supplement is too large. 18 An analysis of the 
implication of OGG growth has yet to be undertaken. · 
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In studying the significance of the non-fossil market penetration 
results presented in Figures 3 through 6, we thus believe that, so long as we 
take the carbon dioxide doubling levels shown on the figures as indicative of 
serious climatic impact and assume that present growth in the concentrations 
of the other greenhouse gas concentrations continues, it should be assumed 
that a 3 percent per annum energy growth rate is more representative of a 
likely future than is a lower rate. Alternatively, we could use the lower, 2 
percent, growth rate and take a lower carbon dioxide concentration as 
indicative of significant impact. Following the latter argument, the range of 
carbon dioxide levels that should be considered critical correspond to 
increases of between 50 percent and 100 percent above the preindustrial level, 
the upper limit allowing for no effect from the additional trace gases and the 
lower for both carbon dioxide and the OGGs. A critical level is defined as 
that which, in conjunction with the OGGs, would increase mean global 
temperature 2.5 degrees Celsius. 
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Figures 3 and 4 are plotted for a fifty-year market penetration time 
constant (about the lowest that could be accepted if the Marchetti proposition 
is believed), and for a variety of initiation dates, t 0 , for the introduction 
of non-fossil fuel energy sources. These indicate th~t a 3 percent rate of 
growth, with a fifty-year time constant, requires immediate movement away from 
fossil fuel use to avoid the carbon dioxide doubling state. However, energy 
growth at 2 percent per annum, retaining the fifty- year tp value, would delay 
the time for required action for several decades (see Figures 5 and 6). 
Increasing the market penetration time to seventy-five years reintroduces the 
difficulty (see Figure 6). These general conclusions apply to the climatic 
impacts of carbon dioxide emissions. The addition of the other greenhouse 
gases, whose effect is assumed to double the warming from carbon dioxide alone 
(so we consider the 0.5 level in Figures 3 through 6 as critical), changes the 
Picture. With a fifty-year penetration time, both for reduction of carbon 
dioxide and the other greenhouse gases, and a 2 percent per annum energy 
growth rate, Figures 5 and 6 indicate that we are today already too late to 
avoid a serious climatic effect unless this is achieved by replacing fossil_ 
fuels with nuclear energy, which already has a sizable market share (see 
Figure 2). This pessimistic conclusion is somewhat relieved if allowance is 
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made for the effect of ocean thermal inertia. A twenty-year delay from this 
effect would put us currently on about the t 0 - -10-year curves plotted in 
Figure 5, and then the SO percent carbon dioxide increase level would be 
asymptomatically avoided at a 2 percent per annum energy growth rate and a 
fifty-year penetration time. However, with tp - 50, as we can see from Figure 
6, the respite would be short, with action required in under twenty years were 
the 50 percent increase to be avoided. 
These conclusions assume that use of resources contributing to release 
of the OGGs can be reduced at the same rate as carbon dioxide from fossil 
fuels. Since it is currently believed, though by no means certain, that the 
additional trace gases come from non-energy sources, such a scenario requires 
multiple decisions from and in many different societal sectors. The problems 
of such a course of action have yet to be investigated. We only note here 
that, were the contribution of the OGGs to climate warming to be as large as 
the latest estimates indicate, reduction of atmospheric carbon dioxide 
emissions alone would do little to relieve the anticipated climatic change.* 
Before leaving the perspective on the market penetration time issue 
yielded by these calculations, we should point out two reservations. First, 
the reduction in temperature rise from ocean thermal inertia is not a 
permanent effect; eventually, assuming atmospheric carbon dioxide levels 
stabilize, the climate change will approach the steady state estimate. Hence, 
it is possible that the equilibrium climatic impacts will be merely delayed 
rather than avoided. Indeed, if Hansen et al. are right in their contention 
that very long (100·-year) lags are in order, 20 and provided that carbon 
dioxide deep ocean deposition rates are not markedly increased, then a major 
change in our view of the policy aspects of the carbon dioxide problem is 
required. The implications of this for decision-making and the market 
penetration time problem have not yet been studied. Second, we have assumed 
that an overall temperature rise corresponding to a doubling of atmospheric 
carbon dioxide levels should be avoided. However, the curves of carbon 
dioxide growth that are marginally close to this state are nearly horizontal, 
so that a fixed criterion based on avoiding the doubling condition yields 
unduly high sensitivity of conclusions to, for example, the precise value of 
t 0 • Such behavior is an artifact arising from imposit,ion of sharply defined 
critical criterion (i.e., carbon dioxide doubling), and it would be more 
appropriate to apply a more gradually imposed condition, such as arrived at 
through consideration of the increasing economic costs of growing climatic 
impacts. 21 A revision following upon these lines remains on the future 
research agenda. 
*The difficulty reported in the recent Environmental Protection Agency 
analysis in effecting a significant reduction in climatic change through a 
coal taxation policy is a direct reflection of this situation. 19 The EPA 
projections assumed that increase in the atmospheric concentrations of the 
OGGs would continue unabated. 
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OTHER APPROACHES TO THE TRANSITION PROBLEM 
The market penetration time concept was not only the first to be applied 
to the question of the replacement of fossil by non-fossil energy but remains 
the only quantified approach. Several other views of the transition problem 
have been presented, but none of these have been able to come to grips with 
the real impediments to a rapid shift away from fossil fuel use, should this 
become necessary. The usual approach has been to postulate one or more future 
energy scenarios, appropriately divided into fossil and non-fossil portions, 
and then ask in what way these would have to be changed to avoid exceeding a 
pre-selected level of atmospheric carbon dioxide. The resultant required 
rates of growth of non-fossil energy forms are then studied, and qualitative 
arguments made as to whether these would be easy or difficult to achieve. The 
first widely publicized report of this nature was made by the Council of 
Environmental Quality (CEQ), 22 which concluded that the carbon dioxide issue 
needed to be incorporated as an integral part of present energy policies in 
order to avoid serious climatic consequences from increasing carbon dioxide 
emissions. 
In Figure 8, we illustrate the approach used in such studies; it is 
taken from the extensive analysis by Perry et al. 23 In this projection, total 
energy use is assumed to remain unaffected as the ratio of fossil to non-
fossil energy use is adjusted to asymptotically avoid exceeding a pre-selected 
rise in the atmospheric carbon dioxide level. The two sets of fossil and non-
fossil primary energy consumption curves correspond to two values of maximum 
allowed atmospheric carbon dioxide concentration, with different action 
initiation times (AITs), which for comparative purposes can be approximately 
identified with the date t 0 defined in the preceding section. Also shown in 
the figure are the results obtained through the use of an optimization tech-
nique for the transition. Perry et al. performed an extensive study on the 
shape of the non-fossil and fossil energy use curves for the cases shown in 
this figure, as well as for many other scenarios. Particular features deemed 
important were: the shape of the tail of the fossil fuel curve (too prompt a 
fall was believed to be bad) and the magnitudes of the first and second deri-
Vates of the non-fossil energy use curves. The first derivate, EN, measures 
the rate of installation of new non-fossil energy power plants required to 
meet the imposed carbon dioxide ceiling, and a simple assessment of critical-
ity is provided here by comparison with power plant lifetime. If this is 
done, it is found that most transition scenarios do riot make for difficulty 
(unless action is initiated late, well past 2000). However, the second time 
derivate of non-fossil energy use, EN, can attain very large values, even with 
early AITs, as illustrated in Figures 9 and 10. This quantity represents the 
required rate of construction of new manufacturing plant that supply hardware 
to make the power plants; here the situation is more critical and requires 
further discussion. 
There are various ways of investigating whether the rates plotted in 
Figure 10 are excessive, and these are covered by Perry et al. One method is 
to assume a (construction) plant lifetime of twenty years and relate this to a 
steady state replacement rate after population stabilization with constant per 
capita energy use. For the base energy scenario used in the calculations (a 
high 4 percent per annum initial growth in coal use, asymptoting to an annual 
total energy use rate of 59 terawatt-years per year), this results in an EN 
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maximum value of 15 GW/yr2 , a value exceeded outright in Figure 10 for a 500 
parts per million (ppmv) carbon dioxide ceiling, and--if action initiation is 
delayed too long--also for the 600 ppmv ceiling. In Figure 10, an optimized 
solution is given by systematically adjusting the transition path so as to 
minimize the maximum value of EN. However, although it reduces EN maximum 
value by a half, the revised energy path does not eliminate the difficulty of 
transition. 24 
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FOSSIL AND NON-FOSSIL ENERGY CONSUMPTION SCENARIOS WITH 
LIMITED MAXIMUM ATMOSPHERIC CO2 LEVELS 
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The detailed consideration in Perry et al, as well as those in the 1981 
CEQ report, develop only qualitative arguments on the problems encountered in 
reducing, then eliminating, fossil fuel use. Clues are provided as to the 
nature of the potential difficulties, but it is all too easy to present 
arguments for or against conclusions that might be drawn, depending upon the 
predilections of the reviewer. Another class of methods that ostensibly would 
be able to treat the problem more quantitatively and with less chance of con-
troversy devolves on the use of energy/macroeconomic models used to depict 
economic interactions resulting from alternative energy-use futures. These 
typically are used to evaluate the economic impacts of various levels of 
carbon dioxide increase, and associate a shadow price with these, from which a 
taxation rate on fossil fuel use can be calculated so as to produce the 
desired reduction in carbon dioxide emissions and its climatic impact. 25 
Figure 9 
VALUES OF THE SECOND DERIVATE OF ANNUAL NON-FOSSIL ENERGY USE (En) 
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A variety of differing conclusions have been reached by these authors, though 
several agree that a taxation system is not an attractive or effective route. 
We shall not enter into their subject matter, since all the analyses omit the 
principal problem with which we are concerned, i.e., the constraints of the 
socioeconomic system that could prevent a rapid transition to non-fossil fuel 
use. If included at all in these modeling efforts, these constraints are 
incorporated exogenously and shed no light on the real problems or possibilit-
ies of the energy transition. Other economic models do incorporate some 
factors· that are important for our subject, such as capitalization constraints 
and firm profit maximization actions, though none apparently can be used to 
derive quantitative values of primary energy market penetration times or deal 
with Marchetti's claim for their irreducibility. 
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MAXIMUM VALUES OF EN AS A FUNCTION OF ACTION INITIATION TIME 
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THE VALIDITY AND POSSIBLE BASIS OF THE 
MARKET PENETRATION TIME CONSTANT 
The examples given above show that an irreducible market penetration 
time for primary energy sources as low as fifty years will pose a problem for 
society, were it to attempt to avoid serious climatic changes--unless the 
nuclear alternative is accepted. Yet, is fifty years in fact an irreducible 
value, and, if not, what economic costs are incurred in shortening it? 
Unfortunately, we are not in a position to answer these questions. We have 
suggestions as to the nature of the forces that are at work controlling the 
speed of transition, but we cannot state whether these imply absolute limits 
on the transition rate or whether they involve marginal additional economic 
costs that can be sustained with relative ease under internationally enforced 
action. The best we can do in the following is to present a listing of a 
variety of social and economic factors that might influence market penetration 
characteristics, though we cannot say that the itemization is complete or even 
if it includes the most important elements. 
Below we present a taxonomy of factors that could influence market pene-
tration times, divided into three major subdivisions--economic, institutional, 
and physical. We can further divide these into a number of features that may 
potentially constrain the rate of penetration. 
Economic 
• Premature replacement of otherwise usable capital equipment--power 
plants, secondary industry plants, infrastructure needed for the 
delivery of energy from its origin to the final user, and end-use 
technologies. 
• Lack of capital for financing new energy systems, including infra-
structure and secondary industries.* In contrast to the item above, 
which introduces merely an economic disincentive for use of new 
energy sources, this feature implies a more severe constraint 
through the potential sacrifice of non-energy-sector growth and a 
need to shift the national emphasis to the production of new energy 
sources. A limiting condition is reached when total assets of the 
nation become insufficient to raise the needed capital resources. 
• Imperfection of the markets, including the problems of market clear-
ing, specifically the absence of adequate trading mechanisms for the 
new energy product, and the market inefficiency of regulatory con-
trols (such as coal taxation), if these are envisaged. 
*The critical variable, EN, introduced by Perry et al., and discussed above, 
is the first such element to have been quantitatively brought into the energy 
transition problem. 
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Institutional 
• The commons problem. The international character of the carbon 
dioxide/climate change issue makes it particularly difficult, and 
time consuming, to achieve a consensus on the need for a worldwide 
replacement of fossil fuels. Given the heterogeneity of national 
constituencies, self interest many dictate many differing responses. 
Varying cultural attitudes can make for distinctly different ethical 
stances on the mitigation of the carbon dioxide threat. 
• The costs of fossil fuel reduction. It is likely that the move away 
from fossil fuel use would involve a reduction in the standard of 
living, or at least a slower-than-anticipated rate of increase. It 
will take more time to build the required political agreement to act 
under such circumstances. 
• Bureaucratic impediments. Even without these major impediments, 
most nations, whether democracies or dictatorships, have built in 
bureaucratic impediments to rapid major restructuring at the 
national level. A decision to abandon a primary energy source would 
constitute such a change. 
• Consumer acceptance. Of less significance to our problem, but a 
characteristic important for smaller-scale substitutions, is con-
sumer acce.ptance of a new product. In the literature, this is often 
cited as critical in the initial phase of introduction. If the non-
fossil energy were to be radically different in form or in end-use 
efficiency (a decentralized energy system in the United States might 
be such a case), consumer acceptance could be a relevant issue. 
Physical 
• Material constraints. The deployment of a new energy resource could 
impose excessive demands on materials and products in limited sup-
ply, in addition to the new primary energy resource itself. Most 
important in this regard, and less obvious, are possible shortages 
in secondary industries and in the supporting infrastructure. 
• Workforce constraints. These could occur in nearly every category--
unskilled, blue collar, skilled, and professional. In some 
instances these shortages may reflect a population deficit; more 
likely, they will require training or retraining. Professional 
training would be the most time-consuming. 
• Lack of information. The dissemination of "know-how," is poten-
tially a major retardant to implementation. The mechanism for 
information diffusion has been studied but is not yet well under-
stood; it clearly includes a social component which could have been 
included within the institutional category listed above. 
• Capital resource limitations. This descriptor could also have been 
put in the economic category, though for the most part it can be 
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ultimately associated with a material deficit. However, a shortage 
of financing capital could also reflect economic considerations of 
return on investment. To further blur the distinctions between our 
three main categories, we take note of the fact that, due to the 
very long-term nature of the carbon dioxide problem, conventional 
high economically-based discount rates serve as deterrents to its 
remediation. A socially determined discount rate may be lower, and, 
in this regard, arguments for present-day expenditures incurred to 
avoid far distant costs hinge on the ethics of intergenerationally 
suffered impacts, and, according to our taxonomy, capital resource 
limitation thus may be best listed in the institutional category. 
Assuming that we have identified the factors influencing the market 
penetration time phenomenon, we can envisage a research program that addresses 
them in sufficient detail to ultimately settle our principal question concern-
ing irreducibility of penetration times. Although we strongly advocate that 
this be undertaken, our needs are urgent and the research path to satisfy them 
is lengthy. A more expeditious route might be.found by identifying the 
Potentially most prominent mechanisms. For instance, the existing literature 
already makes it clear that the substitution process has distinctly different 
Phases. In the analyses of small-scale innovative new technology, the early 
Phase involves the pursuit of venture capital and customer acceptance. 
Straightforward economic competition in a fixed-size market is often thought 
to characterize the next phase. The last, near-saturation, phase is econom-
ically anomalous according to efficient market theory, with 100 percent share 
of the emergent technology rarely being obtained. Since the operant factors 
are of different origins in these three phases, a one-parameter logistic curve 
cannot allow for independent variations in them, and the simple model is 
clearly inadequate. Thus, in the case of replacement of global fossil fuel 
Use, one might anticipate the initial penetration phase to be lengthened due 
to the need for concerted intergovernmental actions,* but shortened by non-
market enforcement procedures, such as taxation, that penalizes older, com-
peting products. In the intermediate phase, maximum non-fossil energy growth 
Would presumably be determined by capital and resource constraints to a 
mandated transition or by economic competition. 
In the major growth period, the potential constraints on the rate of 
substitution are clearly a function of scale, and the literature supports the 
conclusion that the larger regions and economic entities involved in the 
replacement process have longer time constants. We have already quoted 
Marchetti's results on this characteristic for energy transitions on the 
global, as compared to the national, scale. Other investigations on small-
scale innovations support this general thesis. 26 However, there is an addi-
tional factor delimiting the range of possible energy substitution rates that 
has apparently been ignored to date and is also related to scale. No method 
for logically amending the logistic growth prescription has been devised to 
account for a changing underlying energy growth rate, and it is easy to see 
that a change in total energy growth could affect the penetration rate dif-
*A b num er of scholars have, indeed, already given up on the possibility of 
international accord and advocate a policy of adaptation to climate change. 
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ferently, depending upon which of the causative factors listed above are at 
work. For example, a limited capacity to extract a necessary material good 
could be a time-limiting factor at high demand rates, whereas a high energy 
use rate, and with it high economic growth, could help overcome the replace-
ment time limitations symptomatic of a low state of economic development and 
an associated shortage of needed technical skills. 
This last possibility brings up an aspect of the carbon dioxide problem 
that is of special interest, particularly since it runs contrary to conven-
tional thinking. Thus it is widely accepted that a deceleration of the rate 
of increase in world energy use, together with a reduction in the rate of 
annual increase in world gross national product (GNP), must ease the environ-
mental problems associated with fossil fuel carbon dioxide release. From most 
points of view, this is a difficult proposition with which to argue. However, 
a reduced growth in GNP implies a slower introduction of research results and 
technology improvement. The importance of technology development in overall 
economic growth and quality of life has been em~hasized in at least two recent 
research findings using energy/economy models. 27 Hamm has cited technological 
improvement as one of the prime parameters governing an optimal solution to 
the carbon dioxide problem. Unfortunately, this model, as well as other 
macroeconomic models, have to incorporate technology improvement as an exogen-
ous parameter, the value of which is at best an educated guess. Such models, 
therefore, cannot prescribe the rates of growth that would best achieve a 
solution to the carbon dioxide problem. However, they do lead to contro-
versial propositions, such as urging maximum short-term fossil energy growth. 
The latter, it is suggested, would encourage rapid economic expansion, and 
with it the timely improvement in carbon dioxide abatement methods or in 
advanced non-fossil energy, thereby limiting the rise of atmospheric carbon 
dioxide levels to acceptable levels at minimum cost. It is also worth noting 
that a reduction of energy cost through technological advance does not 
necessarily favor lower emissions of carbon dioxide. For example, if coal 
liquefaction and gasification cost were to be reduced, economic forces would 
encourage additional fossil fuel use growth. 
We have throughout this paper made reference to early work on market 
penetration that was concerned with smaller-scale single-product lines or with 
single secondary-market penetration, and the literature is extensive on this 
subject. As with Marchetti's extension to the world scale, the work has been 
largely empirical. Identification of causal mechanisms has not been followed 
through with quantitative models. An itemization of the important elements in 
such applications, similar in spirit to the listing we have given here, has 
been made by Ayres and Shapanda, 28 and a recent review covering the primary 
literature in the field has been published by Hurter and Rubenstein. 29 The 
1976 text by Linstone and Sahal states that the explanatory power of the 
Mansfield and Blackman work, which forms the foundation of the logistic sub-
stitution mode for new product introduction, is close to zero. 30 Neither a 
justification of the functional form employed, nor any quantifiable insights 
into the determinants of causal mechanisms, is provided by the technique. The 
few studies that introduce more detail have found use only in post hoc 
analysis. Their use for prediction beyond well-documented past experience is 
of doubtful value; Warren, in his review of the attempts made to apply market 
penetration time concepts to the prediction of the future of solar energy, 
notes, "Solar energy market penetration models are not science but number 
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mysticism;" and he places little faith in them as predictive tools. 31 A 
respectable theory of the diffusion of knowledge of a system or a process 
imbedded in the social system has been developed32 and used to generate 
logistic or similar S-shaped curves, 33 but this sociological component can be 
only one of a number at work in the market-substitution process. By itself, 
it is not usable as a forecaster of penetration times. 
Another source of information relevant to market penetration processes 
can be found in the literature dealing with behavior of the com~etitive, 
Profit-maximizing firm in its response to changing input costs. 4 This 
microeconomic theory treats on~ of the elements determining market share in a 
competitive mode, but does not seem to have been applied yet to an explicit 
calculation of the parameters in a logistic substitution model. Aggregation to 
the macro level is required to bring the approach to the level of our concern, 
and this in turn is bound to involve many features beyond the single firm 
profit-maximizing response with which the theory is concerned. Peterka has 
constructed a model that reproduces the logistic form by assuming the growth 
of the firm, once initially capitalized, to be limited by the revenue avail-
able from sales. 35 The logic of the model appears sound only if other 
financial resources are not available to promote growth, such as external 
sources of financing or governmental intervention--an unlikely situation for 
the primary energy market substitution future with which we are dealing. The 
Peterka formulation has, in fact, been incorporated through an exogenously 
Prescribed parameter into a widely used macroeconomic energy model, ETA-
MACRo,36 but including an adjustable parameter to allow for additional capital 
financing of the new energy form. 
A full economic description will have to include a model of the firm's 
behavior in the competitive environment, as described through the introduction 
of the new emergent energy technology into the energy markets of a macro model 
describing overall energy and economic growth. Models of the latter variety 
do exist, and features that mimic energy substitution delay have been intro-
duced. Among these is the Edmonds and Reilly model mentioned above. For 
macro energy/economy models, the two most prominent time-dependent features 
that relate to energy market penetration are increasing scarce resource costs, 
Which depend on the resource size and on its rate of depletion, and produc-
tivity enhancement through an assumed rate of technology improvement. In all 
cases, however, the resultant temporal lags are determined solely by exogenous 
choice of parameters and tell us little about real-life limitations to the 
replacement process. The IIASA energy study37 and the recent Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology (MIT) study by Rose et ai. 38 have considered sub-
sectors of the world's energy system in considerable detail, but we still have 
no means of incorporating their effects to predict market penetration time 
lags other than by arbitrary selection of parameter values. It is clear that 
help from macroeconomic/ energy modeling in the market penetration question is 
a long way off. Even so, such modeling might still serve a useful function by 
determining the sensitivity of the global-scale system to parameters represen-
tative of market penetration restraint effects once these can be identified in 
generic fashion. It should be remembered that it is likely that a limited 
ability of society to rapidly change from fossil to non-fossil energy use 
might arise in part from secondary constraining effects outside of the energy 
Production sector, a complication requiring the use of macro models more 
comprehensive than those that concentrate on energy sector performance. 39 
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None of the approaches discussed above can at present give us a mechan-
istic explanation of the long takeover times of primary energy forms. However, 
an offshoot of classical economic theory, recently expanded upon, may be able 
to do so. The so-called fifty-year-long-wave business cycle, 40 originally 
perceived as an empirically observed feature of depression and expansion in 
economic activity, has now been duplicated in models. Hence, it may be pos-
sible to relate the theory behind these simulations to conclusions regarding 
future possible energy transitions. 
Until recently, the majority of the work in this field was empirical, 
and admittedly on a statistically insecure base; explanations, although widely 
discussed, were qualitative and conjectural. The very existence of the long-
wave, in fact, still is in dispute. More complicated and extended statistical 
studies have sought other correlations, such as a connection between surges of 
innovative activity and economic growth, 41 though cause and effect can be 
argued here. Marchetti, in some later work on market penetration, has also 
noted the latter relationship as well as a correlation of ascendancy of the 
new energy forms with the Kondratieff wave itself. 42 
The modeling that has now produced a quantitative description of the 
long-term cycle, as well as shorter business cycles, stems from the Systems· 
Dynamics group at MIT, 43 and by now there have been several simulations that 
claim to have explained the phenomenon from basic non-equilibrium features of 
macroeconomics. 44 As with all business cycles, the long-wave is thought to 
arise from a fundamental linear instability of the economic system, but with 
non-linear saturation effects determining its periodicity in a form of limit 
cycle behavior. The dominant time constants are those relating to real capi-
tal depreciation rates (twenty to thirty years are conventional numbers) and 
to a capital to capital-output-rate ratio (typically three years). However, 
although these define the response times in a linear description, they do not 
directly determine the non-linear behavior. The initial expansion phase 
involves positive feedback, termed "self-ordering" in the theory, an initial 
perturbation of growth in demand of capital goods, that in turn dictates a 
larger capital goods production capacity. This amplification is assumed to be 
temporally affected by a lag in ability to respond to the increased demand, 
and a combination of the feedback with the lag is critical in extending the 
ascending portion of the cycle. A lag also results when overexpansion and 
saturation of production capacity, a non-linear feature, combine to limit 
growth and eventually produce a shift to a feedback-reinforced depression 
phase. 
In this model, the oscillations reflect the buildup and loss of total 
physical capital and involve labor mobility as well as capital accumulation; 
by contrast, short-term business cycles are controlled by employment and 
inventory dynamics. Hence, a considerable part of the socioeconomic system is 
affected during the long-wave cycle, and it is not unreasonable to assume that 
its large inertia is responsible for its large periodicity. 
The systems dynamics modeling approach, briefly summarized here, appears 
to provide a means for discussing the past-history of new forms of primary 
energy in relation to the long-wave phenomenon. If it could be included in 
this theory, market penetration would reflect a feature of the free market. 
It is not known how severe a restraint the element portrayed in the model 
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would be in an enforced shift of primary energy use, but preswnably it is 
researchable along the same lines of analysis used in the study of the free 
market situation. 
THE EFFECT OF UNCERTAINTY 
Large uncertainty, an important feature of the carbon dioxide/climate 
problem, makes assessment of this problem's present-day importance difficult 
and has resulted in widely differing opinions on the seriousness of the 
potential threat and its degree of urgency. Formal techniques exist for 
treating such a situation, based on a decision analytic approach, 45 provided 
probability distributions can be assigned to the uncertain variables. This 
~ubject matter goes beyond the scope of this paper, so, rather than enter into 
its application to market penetration time problems, we shall restrict our 
analysis to a less formalized discussion on the effect of uncertainty by 
presenting calculations for the cwnulative probability of a carbon dioxide 
doubling event as a function of time, using probabilitl estimates for future 
carbon dioxide emissions derived by Nordhaus and Yohe. 6 
Figure 11 is taken from Nordhaus and Yohe and presents the probabilities 
of attaining various atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations at a nwnber of 
Probability levels. These were obtained from Monte Carlo runs of an optimwn 
economic growth model, systematically varying the parameters of the model. 
Figure 12 transcribes these results into an evaluation of the probability of a 
carbon dioxide doubling condition by a given date. For a given market pene-
tration time constant, tp, each year in Figure 12 can be associated with a 
level of penetration of non-fossil energy, asswning the logistic form to 
apply, and using overall energy growth rates calculated by Nordhaus and Yohe 
~see Figure 14). Hence, we can calculate cwnulative probabilities for avoid-
ing a carbon dioxide doubling as a function of the entry date of non-fossil 
fuels. Figure 13 shows the results, choosing a range of market penetration 
time constants. We have also plotted in the figure cwnulative probability 
curves asswning the presence of other greenhouse warming gases at a concen-
tration that doubles the heating due to carbon dioxide alone. Note that in 
this case we are dealing with an effective doubling condition, i.e. one that 
results in a temperature rise equal to that produced by carbon dioxide in the 
absence of the other trace species. An increase in temperatures of 2.5 
degrees Celsius is the best guess for this rise, but this figure also has a 
large degree of uncertainty, so that it would be incorrect for us to 
reinterpret Figure 13 as cwnulative probabilities of avoiding a 2.5 degree 
~elsius rise. If this additional source of uncertainty were to be included, 
lt would result in a wider spread of the probability curves, and hence an even 
earlier date for any less that fifty-fifty chance of being able to avoid a 2~5 
degree Celsius temperature increase. 
Figure 14 gives dates for the carbon dioxide doubling condition super-
imposed on Nordhaus's total energy growth estimates. It also includes a 
corresponding curve for an effective doubling of carbon dioxide. Both these 
doubling-date curves were used to produce Figure 13. From Figure 13, we can 
;ssess the risk we take through a delay in the introduction of non-fossil 
Uels in the absence of the other greenhouse gases. It reveals a chance of 
one in five that a carbon dioxide doubling will be exceeded for a fifty-year 
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market penetration time and entry at a 1 percent market share in 1992. Entry 
can be delayed until 2010 if one is willing to take even bets on exceeding the 
doubling condition. If one can accept a high-risk situation with only a one 
in five chance of avoiding doubling, the 1 percent market share date can be 
postponed until after mid-twenty-first century. Inclusion of the other trace 
gases puts the first of these dates far back to 1955, and even the most 
probable estimate requires an entry date of 1973. The most optimistic, least 
risk-averse probability estimate, 20 percent, results in 1993 as the date at 
which 1 percent market penetration is required. 
We need to repeat here that we are assuming the other greenhouse gases 
would be removed at the same logistic rate as is carbon dioxide. As empha-
sized earlier, without removal of trace gases, elimination of the use of 
fossil fuels can do little to delay the onset of significant climatic warming. 
Figure 11 
PROBABILITY LEVELS FOR THE OCCURRENCE OF A GIVEN ATMOSPHERIC 
CO2 CONCENTRATION BY A CHOSEN DATE 
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Dioxide Emissions," in Changing Climate: Report of the Carbon Dioxide Assess-
ment Committee, National Research Council (Washington, D.C.: National Academy 
Press, 1983). 
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Figure 12 
CUMULATIVE PROBABILITY OF EXCEEDING ATMOSPHERIC CO2 DOUBLING FOR THE MOST 
PROBABLE FUTURE ENERGY GROWTH SCENARIO 
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PROBABILITY LEVELS FOR WORLD ENERGY GROWTH 
CO2 Doubling 
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Adapted from W. Nordhaus and G. Yohe, "Future Paths of Energy and Carbon 
Dioxide Emissions," in Changing Climate: Report of the Carbon Dioxide 
Assessment Committee, National Research Council (Washington, D.C.: National 
Academy Press, 1983). 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Estimated Effects of Market Penetration Time Constraints 
The latest projections for global energy demand are much lower than a 
decade ago. Average total energy growth estimates to the mid-twenty-first 
century approximate 2 percent per annum. Accepting such a figure, the 
following conclusions on the role of primary energy market penetration time 
can be drawn: 
• If the market penetration time constant for world energy, defined as 
the time taken for a new energy form to increase its market share 
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from 1 percent to 50 percent, is fifty years or less, there is no 
proximate need to consider a move away from the predominant use of 
fossil energy as long as the effects of the other greenhouse gases 
are ignored. 
• However, if current estimates of the energy growth rate and the cli-
matic effects of the OGGs are accepted, immediate actions to intro-
duce non-fossil fuels into the global energy sector are needed to 
avoid a significant climatic impact. The latter is defined as a 
mean global temperature rise of 2.5 degrees Celsius by mid-twenty-
first century--our present best estimate of the climatic effect of a 
doubling of atmospheric carbon dioxide levels. 
• If the market penetration time is seventy-five years or more, it is 
probably too late to avoid a 2.5 degree Celsius temperature rise, 
even in the absence of the OGGs, unless nuclear is the replacement 
energy for fossil fuels. 
Irreducibility of Market Penetration Times 
The only direct evidence for the irreducibility of market penetration 
time constants is based on an admittedly lengthy past history of the major 
shifts in the world's use of primary energy. No theoretical basis for the 
fifty-year minimum value can be abstracted from this history. Furthermore, 
extrapolation is suspect for a number of reasons, and prime among these are: 
• The radically different nature of future as against past forces driving energy system change. Past shifts were economically or 
technologically preferred, whereas future changes are at least 
presently seen by most as a shift from more to less desirable energy 
forms, given limited resource availability. 
• The marked past, and anticipated increased future, rate of technol-
ogy development, and hence the possibility of new or more efficient 
means for making the transition to non-fossil energy sources. 
• Preliminary evidence which indicates that the nuclear energy pene-
tration time constant is considerably less than the historically 
observed minimum of fifty years. If this entry phase property is 
also characteristic of later phases of nuclear energy growth, the 
market penetration time impediment to the avoidance of an anthropo-
genetically induced climate change may not exist. It is unknown 
whether this provisional conclusion can be extended to other 
advanced renewable energy sources. 
Belief in large inertial delays accompanying a wholesale shift away from. 
the use of fossil fuel forms of energy appears to be ascribable to: 
• The possibility that it could entail very large, overwhelmingly 
costly infrastructural and multi-sector revisions of socioeconomic 
systems. Primary evidence for the possibility of high cost is pro-
vided by the structure of total world developed assets, of which 
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• 
about 25 percent is accounted for by the world's investment in 
energy-related capital assets. 47 
Cooperation of diverse international cultures and economies, which 
is required for the enforcement of a mandated move away from the 
most immediately attractive energy alternatives. 
The Effect of Uncertainty 
High uncertainty attaches to projections of future world energy needs, 
and this implies a probability of significant climatically induced costs at 
earlier dates than given by the mean values. This situation has to impact 
considerations. For example, allowing for the uncertainty advances by fifteen 
years the date at which it is necessary to introduce non-fossil fuel energy 
sources into the global economy (as compared with the mean, best guessed date) 
in order to avoid significant climatic impact at the 20 percent probability 
level. Such a figure applies for the fifty-year market penetration time 
constant. Hence, at this probability level, it is already too late to avoid 
the critical 2.5 degree Celsius temperature rise, even in the absence of other 
greenhouse gases, except perhaps if nuclear energy is seen as the replacement 
energy. The difficulty would be further increased were allowances to be made 
for additional uncertainties arising from climate modeling and errors in esti-
mation of the costs of climatic changes. 
Resolution of the Unknowns 
Enough is understood about the possible factors controlling market pene-
tration to accommodate an analysis of their roles in past energy transitions 
and check them against fact. Once this is done, it should be possible to 
establish whether these same factors are also relevant to the future. The 
latter study, although unlikely to lead to quantifiable predictions, should 
establish whether there is a chance for the successful conduct of a more 
detailed analysis involving a micro-level description of present and possible 
future energy systems. 
Perhaps the single most important policy-related issue with regard to 
market penetration concerns the difference between free market behavior and 
enforced responses. It is necessary to be able to distinguish between imped-
iments to the transition that are imposed only by free-market cost considera-
tions and those that may be constrained by fundamental resource limitations. 
It would be expected that only the latter would be in effect were a compulsory 
shift away from fossil fuel use to be undertaken. A high priority research 
goal is, therefore, to determine, first, if this distinction is, in fact, 
real, and, second, if it is, what an ultimate resource limitation implies for 
a lower bound on the market penetration time constant. 
Final Remarks 
The meager evidence we have to date on the rapidity with which we can 
move into a non-fossil energy-based future suggests that market penetration 
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rate limitations can indeed prevent amelioration of carbon dioxide and other 
greenhouse gas-induced climatic impacts. This conclusion is based on past 
evidence; we do not know if it applies to the future. Preliminary data on 
nuclear energy use growth rates implies that, at least for this form of 
advanced energy, market penetration could be much faster than in the world's 
past primary energy transitions. 
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THE PROBLEM OF THE OTHER GASES 
John Firor 
National Center for Atmospheric Research, Boulder, Colorado 
INTRODUCTION 
This volume is not primarily designed to discuss technical problems. 
However, policy discussions depend on numbers. The projected global warming 
resulting from increased atmospheric levels of carbon dioxide ranges from 
hardly anything to worry about (if we assume low energy growth and adopt 
those climate models with the smallest sensitivities to increased atmospheric 
carbon dioxide) to a large warming and serious global problems (if we assume 
r~pid coal use and the largest model climate sensitivities). Much of the 
difficulty in reacting to the greenhouse problem sterns from the fact that 
this range of possible impacts on the global climate includes very small and 
quite large changes. · 
However, there are gases other than carbon dioxide that may contribute 
to the warming. If these gases increase the projected carbon dioxide warming 
b~ only a few percent, they can continue to be neglected in policy 
discussions about greenhouse warming. But if they significantly increase the 
Projected warming, then the likelihood of only a small effect occurring in 
the next century is decreased and the policy debate must necessarily shift. 
This paper, then, is a brief survey of our knowledge of the other 
a~mospheric greenhouse gases. There have been a number of previous careful 
discussions of this issue, and long lists of possible gases have been 
Prepared. Possible gases are those gases with suitable infrared properties 
:or which some reasonable speculation can be adduced regarding increased 
Uture atmospheric concentrations. The Oak Ridge National Laboratory's 
Carbon Dioxide Review: 1982, the World Meteorological Organization's Report 
~~ the Meeting of Experts on Potential Climatic Effects of Ozone and Other 
hinor Trace Gases, and the National Academy of Science's Changing Climate 
ave been reviewed in assembling this paper. In addition, colleagues were 
?0 nsulted about more recent work. This paper will not -repeat all the 
important points made in those publications; however, some effort will be 
made to indicate why the other gases need to be taken more seriously than 
they have been in the past. 
THE OTHER GREENHOUSE GASES 
. A large number of non-carbon dioxide, infrared-active gases are of 
~~terest from the perspective of the climate. Three factors are important 
ith regard to these gases: 
• Absorption bands. If the absorption bands of the other gases fall at 
wavelengths that are already well occupied by carbon dioxide or water 
vapor, these gases will have little effect on the overall greenhouse 
warming. However, if the bands are in "clear windows," they can 
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induce changes, although often minor, in the planetary energy 
balance. 
• Strength of the absorption bands. Stronger bands.can have larger 
effects. Since the other gases occur in much smaller concentrations 
and their absorptions are generally proportional to concentration, 
the other gases are frequently easier than carbon dioxide to include 
in calculations. 
• Rate of increase in atmospheric concentration. Fairly long series of 
measurements exist for some of these gases; for some, however, 
serious measurements have only recently begun. Some of the other 
gases are emitted as a result of industrial activity. Hence, 
estimating future rates of increase in the concentrations of these 
gases can be as difficult as estimating future world coal use or 
future trends in certain industrial processes--for instance, the rate 
of replacement of old products with new products having different 
emission characteristics. 
Another family of gases also needs to be considered. These substances 
are not themselves active in the infrared but react in the atmosphere to form 
greenhouse gases. Ozone results from such reactions, and when it is in the 
lower atmosphere it is a potent greenhouse gas. Even more convoluted chains 
of events may be important. Increases in carbon monoxide in the air, for 
example, consume some of the hydroxyl radical (OH) present, thereby lessening 
the action of hydroxyl in destroying methane, which is a greenhouse gas. 
Atmospheric methane concentrations tend to increase as a result. 
The range of substances that must be included in the studies is broad. 
It includes, at one extreme, the chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), which come only 
from well-known industrial sources, have long lifetimes in the atmosphere, 
and have atmospheric concentrations that are reasonably well monitored. At 
the other extreme is ozone, which is produced in the atmosphere by a complex 
set of reactions and has a relatively short lifetime in the air. Hence, a 
much denser monitoring net than now exists would be required to reliably 
ascertain the extent to which the average global ozone concentration in the 
lower atmosphere is changing. Stratospheric water vapor is an especially 
complex case. Water vapor, a strong greenhouse gas which increases in the 
atmosphere as the atmosphere warms, is, in the lower atmosphere, taken into 
account as a positive feedback in the carbon dioxide/climate calculations. 
However, the rate of flow of water to the stratosphere depends critically on 
the temperature of the tropopause in the tropics. If concentrations of the 
chlorofluorocarbons increase, they would not only warm the surface but also 
the tropical tropopause and so increase the amount of water in the 
stratosphere. This would further warm the surface. 
RATE OF PRESENT AND FUTURE ATMOSPHERIC INCREASE 
Table 1 lists five important trace atmospheric gases which have 
absorption bands in the carbon dioxide window and a direct greenhouse effect 
when they are present in the atmosphere. Estimates of the rapidity of 
increase in the concentration of each gas in the atmosphere, based on 
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measurements made in the last few years, are shown in the second column. 
Projections of those rates of increase in atmospheric concentrations that 
might be expected in the next fifty years, as gathered from many sources, are 
shown in the third column. The sources of two of these gases, CFC-11 and 
CFC-12, the chlorofluorcarbons, are well identified; estimating future 
releases of these two gases is simply a matter of guessing future industrial 
needs, future regulations, the state of the economy, and so on. For others, 
Which have complex and partially unknown sources, the exercise is more 
difficult. Present measured rates of increase can be used as indicators of 
the possible importance of each gas. However, all the sources of each gas 
Will need to be delineated and detailed estimates of future source strengths 
made before fully satisfactory projections of future concentrations can be 
made. 
For example, atmospheric methane is derived in part from the breakdown 
of organic material under anaerobic conditions, as happens in rice paddies. 
?ne might expect the area and intensity of the use of rice paddies to 
lncrease under the population pressures of the coming years and hence expect 
this particular source of methane also to increase. In addition, at some 
Point in the projected global warming of the next century, releases of 
continental slope sediment methane clathrates could occur, accelerating 
atmospheric methane increases. We use such discussions to reassure ourselves 
that the observed rates of increase of various gases are a reasonable 
approximation of future rates of increase. However, these discussions need 
to be made much more detailed and quantitative. 
Policy issues arise upon a reasonable probability that any of these 
gases might have a climatic impact. To estimate this probability, we need to 
know, in addition to the numbers in Table 1, the amount of global warming 
that each gas might result in so that the climatic impact of the other gases 
can be compared with that of increased atmospheric levels of carbon dioxide. 
For this purpose, we need longer-term projections of rates of increase, as 
Well as calculations of the greenhouse effectiveness for each gas. The World 
Meteorological Organization group estimated the total changes in atmospheric 
c?ncentrations of these gases for a one hundred-year future; for this 
discussion, a fifty-year time horizon m~ght be more convenient. The future 
surface temperature change due to increased atmospheric concentrations of the 
other gases is estimated in Table 2. Since there are wide uncertainty limits 
on some or all of.the rate estimates for the minor gases, a high and a low 
Value is shown. Changes in surface temperature are estimated with a climate 
ffi?del with a sensitivity to doubled atmospheric concentrations of carbon 
~lOXide of 1.5 to 3.0 degrees Celsius. The warming that could be produced by 
Q35 by this set of gases is appreciable. 
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Table 1 
RATES OF INCREASE OF TRACE ATMOSPHERIC GASES 
Gas 
Nitrous 
Methane 
CFC-11 
CFC-12 
Ozone 
(In Percent per Year) 
Present Rate Long-Term 
oxide 0.25 0.25 
0.75 0.25 
5.9 1 
4.8 1 
variable 0 
Table 2 
SURFACE TEMPERATURE CHANGE, 1985-2035 
(In Degrees Celsius) 
Projection 
to 0.9 
to 1.5 
to 5 
to 5 
to 1 
Gas Low Estimate High Estimate 
Ozone (tropospheric) 
Nitrous oxide 
Methane 
CFC-11 
CFC-12 
Water vapor (stratospheric) 
Total 
0.00 
0.04 
0.04 
0.03 
0.07 
0.36 
0.58 
0.20 
0.33 
0.24 
0.45 
2.16 
The projected warming due to other gases can be compared to the expected 
carbon dioxide-induced warming by 2035. The National Academy of Sciences' 
Carbon Dioxide Assessment Committee expects atmospheric carbon dioxide 
concentrations to double in the third quarter of the next century, producing 
a global warming of 1.5 to 3.0 degrees Celsius thereafter. In the year 2035, 
they expect atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations to be perhaps 420 to 
460 parts per million (ppmv), producing a warming that is similar to the 
totals shown in Table 2. 
A long list of additional gases also should be considered, including 
other chlorofluorocarbons, chlorocarbons, and fluorocarbons. For example, 
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atmospheric concentrations of methylene chloride are growing by about 5 
~ercent per year, while concentrations of methyl chloroform have been 
increasing 15 percent per year. Were these included, the projected warming 
due to other gases by 2035 would be greater than estimated above. 
SUMMAR_y 
Many reports have mentioned the problem of the other gases and make 
strong statements, such as, "The available studies strongly suggest that the 
combined climatic effects of potential future alterations in minor trace 
g~ses (including ozone) can be as large as those estimated due to a carbon 
~
10Xide increase" (World Meteorological Organization, 1982). But so far, it 
as not been common to combine the projected carbon dioxide effect and the 
effect of the other gases and discuss the resulting projected rate of climate 
~~ange. This reluctance probably arises from the lack of an extensive 
lterature on projected emissions of the other gases, such as would parallel 
the carbon dioxide literature. But since the early indications, as briefly 
re · viewed here, suggest that the greenhouse effect of the other gases may 
~qual or exceed the carbon dioxide effect in the next fifty years, it would 
ehoove the scientific community to address these details as vigorously as 
Possible in the coming months and years. And it would seem wise for those 
arranging policy discussions to include prominently among the scenarios a 
more rapid warming than that due to carbon dioxide alone. 
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SECTION 3: THE ADAPTIVE STRATEGY 
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INTRODUCTION TO SECTION 3 
Several responses in addition to the preventive response, are open to 
society. Society could opt not to act at all or to postpone any decision 
until some undefined time in the future, using the time to narrow the 
Scientific uncertainties. Society could also opt for the adaptive response, 
and rather than limit the scope of the impending changes in the climate, seek 
to adapt the natural environment and the society to the effects of a changing 
Climate. At present, the latter response is the one toward which most 
analysts, and many in the scientific establishment, are tending. 
Generally, the adaptive response focuses upon the ability to adapt 
society and human activities to a changing climate. The adaptive response 
assumes that impacts depend as much on the structure of society and its 
ability or inability to adapt (or maladapt) to climate change as they do on 
Climate change. Further, it assumes that not all climate changes have to 
~esult in unacceptable impacts, but rather that some climate changes may be 
eneficial and others may be sufficiently small that their effects may be 
~essened through compensating changes in the physical environment. The trick 
ls to exploit the beneficial changes and minimize the effects of the adverse 
ones, and, in cases where the climate changes may be unacceptable to present 
generations, to allow room for the play of evolution and natural change in 
expectations. Society's expectations seem to evolve with conditions; that Ylh. lch is unacceptable now may, under the pressure of an adverse future, be 
considered part of the natural course of things. 
Large-scale technological intervention into society and the physical 
e~~ironment constitutes the principle means by which adverse impacts, around 
Yl lch the case for adaptation is usually argued, can be minimized. Human 
act· · t lVtties can be altered through changed management practices and 
c~?hnologies. Presumably, such changes can ameliorate· the impact of adverse 
. lmate changes. In cases where local resources preclude technological 
lnt:rvention, large-scale, regionwide interventions into the physical 
environment through large public works could, it is believed, significantly 
~ugment the larger regional carrying capacity. Were this not to suffice, 
rarge-scale migration of agricultural and industrial production areas as a 
tesult of drought, rising sea level, or acute water scarcity might result. 
0 ; avoid disruption, these forced changes would be anticipated and patterns 
economic development rationalized according to the best fit of industrial 
activities and settlement patterns to changed climate regimes. 
b The notion of the long-term acceptability of climate change is governed 
Y the perception that society, and humanity generally, always adjusts to 
::verse conditions, no matter how disruptive they are. Society adjusted to 
ad: Worst of the plagues and cold of the late medievel period, and it will 
g Just to other climate change. Climate change will be understood by future 
a~nerations as a part of the natural world, and since there will be no 
h te:native to acceptance, society will simply shoulder the effects of a 
i~stile environment in the same way that it has always done, reconciling 
self to climate constraints and moving on from there. 
Overall then, adaptive responses center on the fit of society to local 
env· ' lronmental conditions and on the desire to optimize that fit. Society 
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exists in equilibrium with environmental conditions. Climate change will 
affect local environmental conditions, and, if sufficiently large, would 
upset this equilibrium. The adaptive response is directed toward the impacts 
leading to such disequilibrium. Society can be instrumentally adjusted to 
climate through directed present-day application of technology and management 
of change in society, or it will adjust through natural evolutionary 
processes. It is assumed that these adjustments can successfully buffer the 
worst effects of a changing climate or can at least work to create acceptance 
on the part of the affected populations. 
Of the various specific forms of adaptation that have been either 
explicitly advanced or obliquely or partially described, the most passive--
compensation and the long-term downward adjustment of expectations--have thus 
far evinced little appeal. Under the first approach, climate change is 
treated as essentially a distributional problem. Some generations and 
nations benefit from climate change and the activities leading to climate 
change, and some suffer; climate is allowed to change and work its effects, 
and the only intervention that is foreseen is to ensure an equitable 
distribution of both among nations, and possibly generations. But as many 
analysts have noted, this stands in direct contradiction to historic policies 
with regard to the distribution of wealth both internationally and domes-
tically. The lack of concern for future generations appears to constitute a 
constraint to the second of these passive strategies, which have yet to be 
explicitly championed, although they are implicit in the most pro-adaptation, 
anti-prevention analyses. 
Of the remaining adaptive responses, market adaptation and anticipatory 
or planned adaptation receive the most attention. These differ principally 
in the time of action relative to impacts. Society can choose to act only 
upon the actual experience of impacts, allowing market forces to adjust 
society to impacts as they occur. This is market adaptation. Or society can 
choose planned or anticipatory adaptation. This is essentially a proactive 
response, in which society anticipates impacts and seeks to ameliorate ~uture 
effects through the present-day application of technology and the present-day 
planned or directed management of change in society. 
Market adaptation is by far the least problematic of these two types of 
adaptation. The notion of efficiency, and, more specifically, of efficiency 
in the internal allocation of resources, is central to market adaptation. 
Under market adaptation, impacts are experienced in the context of the 
market. The climate changes. Production costs and the demand for goods and 
services change, rising and falling with the particular form that the climate 
change takes regionally. Localities respond according to their own resources 
and position in the national economy. Some adaptations make no economic 
sense, but others are successful. Some are futile. The market acts to 
allocate resources among them based on the considerations of cost and demand, 
relating adaptive expenditures to the market demand for goods, and., in the 
process of rewarding sensible adaptations and discouraging uneconomic 
adaptations, presumably maximizes social welfare. 
Aggregate societal adaptation is, under market adaptation, the sum·of 
countless local adaptations. Amelioration is realized to the degree to which 
the reliance upon markets realizes more economically efficient outcomes than 
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does reliance on administered systems. So long as reliance on market systems 
can significantly lift the background rate of growth, net impacts on society 
can be limited. 
Anticipatory adaptation is more problematical. Adaptation is understood 
to involve fairly radical adjustments in the physical environment, many with 
Particularly long time-scales for implementation. It is effected through 
long-range interventions in the biosphere and in water resources systems, 
society seeking to offset particular projected changes in the availability of 
moisture or any adverse changes in other climate parameters through targeted 
?0 mpensating changes in the terrestrial environment or, in cases where such 
:ntervention will not suffice, through long-range planning and state admin-
istration of industrial change in society. The time-scales of action are 
long, and action is isolated in time from the experience of climate change 
and its impacts. This is essentially targeted adaptation. 
As such, anticipatory adaptation is dependent on reliable projections 
about the climate. Because large present-day investments in future 
amelioration often demand a high degree of certainty about the measures' 
effectiveness, it is often necessary to have fairly precise information 
regarding local climate changes, their scale and sign, and their particular 
Placement in time. Large present-day investments will not be effected in the 
Presence of substantial uncertainty. Precise information with regard to 
cl· imate change at the local level is at least two to four decades away, and 
~robably further, and in the case of information about impacts and chains of 
impacts, such information is even further removed in time. 
An exampl~ of the need for precise information is evident in the case 
;f the payback periods of investments in future amelioration. The prospects 
~~: anticipatory adaptation depend on calculations of economic feasibility, 
lch, among other factors, are dependent on the length of the period of the 
Usefulness of the anticipatory adaptations. Most capital intensive 
:da~tations entail large expenses and require long periods of repayment, 
trPlcally thirty years or more, during which expenses are recouped through 
fe long-term benefits of action. But the length of the period of usefulness 
~ any one project depends on the pattern of climate change. Above all, the 
~tter must not manifest itself as a series of closely spaced discontinuous 
~hanges or as movement toward a climate state significantly different from 
at to which society is adapting. Being closely fitted to narrow ranges of 
conditions, anticipatory adaptations would find themselves quickly obsolete 
U~der such conditions. If closely enough spaced, climate changes can so 
s ~rten the period in which adaptations might be of benefit to society as to 
ma e large investments unworkable. 
~ If the pattern of climate change were to result in such a situation, it 
t~Uld severely restrict the prospects for planned adaptation. We do not know 
that changes at the regional or local level will be of this nature, but at 
the same time, we do not know that they will not. Not knowing whether, as 
c e ~lanet progressively warms, climate changes at the regional level will be 
mo~sis~ent in sign, neither the financial community nor the public decision-
pa er is at leisure to effect large investments in future amelioration. 
a~Ced With an uncertain future, the machinery of public decision will almost 
~ays opt for investments with certain, short-term returns. Due to the 
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uncertainties about the returns to society, costly adaptation is presently 
treated as, at best, impractical, something out of step with the realities of 
public finance. 
Based on informational considerations, the prospects for anticipatory 
adaptation seem rather thin. This is in direct contrast to market adapta-
tion, which is compromised by no such internal inconsistencies. This is the 
principal advantage of the market, and it sets the market response above the 
planned response. 
Beyond this difference; it is not clear how much can be said about the 
effectiveness or feasibility of the adaptive response. In part, this larger 
feasibility depends on the pace of climate change. Anticipatory adaptation 
assumes a fairly slow rate of change, if only because it demands some 
certainty that the conditions that society is restructuring itself to fit--
and here the time frame is probably twenty to fifty years--will somewhat 
approximate the present conditions. 
However, market responses are also limited to gradual changes in 
climate. The present, rather than the future, is dominant in the calculation 
of the market. The market takes its cues from existing conditions and short-
term trends. Operating at the margin, it moves in new directions only 
haltingly, through the sum of many hesitant, often uncertain, incremental 
steps stretched out over long periods of time. It rarely anticipates change. 
The market responds after the fact of change, often only after the passage of 
time reveals the change to be a permanent feature of the landscape. Its 
long-term decisions are the sum of decisions taken to meet present-day 
changes, and since investment decisions carry with them a twenty- to thirty-
year commitment to a certain type of economic base, it assumes a fairly slow 
rate of overall societal change. In a word, the response of the market is 
slow. It takes its leave from known conditions and generates long-term 
commitments to a future that is assumed to be largely like the present. 
Therefore, to best fit market adaptation, global climate change would 
need to be stretched over a fairly long period of time. No precise estimate 
of the optimum rate of change has been offered, but to ensure that the future 
somewhat approximates the conditions of the present, the rate of planetary 
warming probably could be no more than one or one and one-half degrees 
Celsius per half-century. The alternative involves a calculus that is 
unworkable: a change in the mix of industrial activities at a faster rate 
than the rate of capital turnover in the economy. 
Adaptation is usually marketed as a more feasible response than 
prevention. It is also frequently noted that, to the degree that some 
climate change is now inevitable, the adoption of an adaptive response is 
also inevitable. According to the analysis of Williams et al., a planetary 
warming of at least 0.4 to 1 degrees Celsius is now inevitable due only to 
carbon dioxide accumulation from fossil fuel consumption. Society will need 
to adapt to such a warming, regardless of the decisions it takes with respect 
to changes that might still be prevented. With regard to the former, the 
adaptive response, it is often noted, avoids the pitfalls encountered by the 
preventive response in the need for s9me type of unified international 
action. The adaptive response is a national response, a matter of fitting 
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national resources to specific regional conditions. In this, it is nicely 
fitted to a world of zealously sovereign states. 
But if it is true that adaptation is largely confined to fairly limited 
changes in climate, and then to market responses, then the very purpose of 
the adaptive response--to act as an alternative to the preventive response; 
to remove the constraints to mean global warmings that exceed 4 degrees 
Celsius--cannot be realized. Then adaptation is little more than the resolve 
to live through the changes, to "tough it out," regardless of the consequenc-
es. This is the dilemma of the adaptive response. 
In this section, Riebsarne considers broadly the natu.re of the adaptive 
re_~ponse. His comments are largely confined to anticipatory adaptation, or a 
best-fit response. Due to the challenge climate change presents to society, 
Purposeful, directed anticipatory action is presented as the most effective 
response and presumably the response of choice. It is not thought that easy 
laissez-faire adjustment should form the basis for societal action, if only 
due to failure that occasionally haunts society's efforts to adjust to slow 
change. The latter is often disregarded by society in its response to 
e~vironrnental change, and this can lead to an accumulation of impacts, some 
significant and negative, and to difficulty. A casual response to climate 
change would make this more likely. The bulk of the explicit argumentation 
centers on the fit of the adaptive response to the typical operation of 
society and to the political realities of action. 
Generally speaking, the operation of society is constrained by short 
ilanning-time horizons. It responds in a post-crisis mode, acting after the 
· act of change. A long litany of enduring environmental problems that have 
thus far eluded anticipatory solutions is testimony to this fact. This is 
;ften due to political realities. Vested political interests that benefit 
rom existing institutional arrangements and government programs often 
~epresent an insurmountable hurdle to large-scale change in governmental 
and-use and water-use policy. Resources often tend to flow toward regions 
of power rather than need. Sometimes incrementalism in the formulation of 
Policy frustrates the purposes of long-_range planning. Whatever the reason, 
~e political realities of action weigh heavily against anticipatory action. 
he realities require not only definite evidence of negative impact but often 
t e actual experience of the impacts itself; they demand a type of informa-
tion we do not possess, and that, Riebsarne notes, probably makes adaptation 
as problematic as the preventive response. 
The author catalogues a long list of constraints. The time horizon of 
: 0st _elected officials is short, verging upon momentary. Policymakers may 
_eavily discount the future and the importance of any impact that is distant 
~n time. Human beings are grounded in the present, and, lacking the ability 
~ escape the present, develop policy based on the assumption that the future. 
Wlll be much like the present. Many adaptations can involve significant 
cost , creating a conflict between present and future benefits. 
Most important, Riebsarne makes clear in his case studies that programs 
set up under the guise of long-term environmental protection are routinely 
~aptured by private interests and purposes, and their monies are diverted 
oward private present gain. To the degree that this is true, the oft-heard 
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appeal for long-range planning and the talk about the long-term benefits of 
action are no more than a disguise for self-seeking in the present. 
Taken together with the multifold uncertainties that surround anti-
cipatory adaptation, the political constraints act to limit the prospects for 
adaptation. With regard to the former, it is sufficient to note the ubiquity 
of our ignorance in the case of even the basic workings of most impacts and 
the sensitivity of society to those impacts. We cannot describe the factors 
that explain society's past and present sensitivity to climate. We have no 
well-accepted concepts that are useful in the description of societal 
vulnerability. Little understanding is available as to the ways most impacts 
work their effects on society, nor is there much understanding about the ways 
change affects the ability of society to cope with internal and external 
stress. Little is known, the author suggests, and clearly much less is known 
than would be needed to support an adaptive response. 
Crist and Reinartz consider the adaptive response operationally as they 
conduct a thought experiment on the nature and costs of adaptation to a 
drying in the Upper Midwest. Working from information available from 
Stockton and Boggess and others, the authors present a scenario for a change 
in available water resources assuming a mean global warming of several 
degrees Celsius. About a 50 percent drop in the available water supply is 
suggested. In the Red-Souris-Rainy river basin, the chosen study area, the 
effects of such a change in flow are largely concentrated in the summer, when 
demand is high and flow is lower, and are encountered in the context of a 
generalized increase in frequency of summer drought and low flow conditions. 
These climatic changes, the authors suggest, would have a noticeable 
effect on the local economy. In response to these, the authors present the 
rudiments of an adaptive strategy, based on traditional federal responses to 
changes in the availability of a resource. The emphasis is on the interbasin 
and intrabasin transfer of water, which, the authors note, are more costly 
than demand-oriented responses but are also more effective. Other supply-
oriented response mechanisms that the author recommend include: an expanded 
reservoir capacity; changes in the operating parameters of existing 
reservoirs; and the enhancement of supply facilities. Thirty years 
constitutes the historic lead time for such projects. The costs of such a 
program are estimated to fall in the $3 billion to $7 billion range. These 
estimates are uncertain, the authors conclude, but probably represent the 
broad magnitude of the costs associated with adaptation. 
As Crist and Reinartz note, this is a speculative exercise. Local 
conditions could develop in any number of directions other than those the 
authors consider. Better information is needed. In order to account for 
this need, the authors suggest a delay in any action until at least the year 
2000. 
Titus presents the case for adaptation, arguing that a significant 
global warming is inevitable regardless of preventive actions that may be 
taken, and that, given this situation, adaptation is the one inevitable 
element of policy. Society will need to adapt to the inevitable, and the 
most appropriate form for this might be anticipatory adaptation, which, if it 
does nothing else, will bring home to everyone the full, and perhaps 
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Unacceptable, implications of climate change. Without the latter, prevention 
Will not be considered viable. 
The author offers these observations while addressing the impacts of sea 
level rise and the necessity of beg~nning to plan for such a rise. At 
Charleston, the study site, the sea level should rise about 2 feet by 2030 
and 5 feet by 2075. This would inundate about 30 percent of the Charleston 
area by the latter date and induce economic losses equivalent to about 25 
Percent of the areas's projected economic activity. Anticipatory adaptation 
W?uld take the form of changes in land-use planning and of hard structures 
ltke bulkheads, sea walls, breakwaters, and levees, which could hold back 
rising ocean levels. The projected losses in economic activity would be 
a~proximately halved by such intervention. The author points out that this 
ktnd of response is the one toward which local officials are most inclined, 
and, since the impact will be experienced at the local level, this will be 
the long-term response to a changing climate. 
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SOCIAL ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE: RESEARCH AND POLICY ISSUES 
Uilliam Riebsame 
University of Colorado, Boulder, Colorado 
INTRODUCTION 
Schneider, in his 1980 editorial in Climatic Change, inquired as to 
~hether the ~olicy implications of the carbon dioxide/climate problem were 
evident yet. Schneider's editorial focused on options in energy development 
that might lessen carbon dioxide production. However, his inquiry can be 
restated in terms of adaptation to the greenhouse effect and the degree to 
~hich policies designed to facilitate such adaptation are evident. I believe 
that such implications are evident. The potential for carbon dioxide-induced 
climate change, although uncertain, suggests that we should at least review 
the range of possible responses and assess their strengths and weaknesses. 
This is not to call for immediate drastic action; indeed, it would be 
Premature to take draconian measures now to prepare for a future climate 
change. But the time is right to explore the broad structure of social 
responses, both preemptive and reactive, that might lessen the potential for 
adverse impacts from climate change. 
. This paper explores the likely societal impacts of carbon dioxide-
lnduced climate changes and the nature of possible.adaptation to such 
changes. It also examines the research and public policy questions that 
~ur:ound these two concerns. The paper is a broad discussion document, 
esigned to help define a wide spectrum of substantive issues surrounding 
a~aptation to carbon dioxide-induced climate change. In many instances, it 
a so applies to climate fluctuation from any cause, natural or anthropogenic. 
d . The outside limits on potential climate change are becoming better 
efined. However, our understanding is still quite limited with regard to 
~~e potential regional and local climate changes and the ways in which 
~fferent societies and their different livelihood systems might react to a 
~ anging climate. But we should strive to enlarge the b~dy of useful 
_nowledge about the possible impacts and adjustments to carbon dioxide-
lnduced climate change, even in the face of these uncertainties. We should 
not Wait until the final verdict is in or until the carbon dioxide signal is 
;~ident, since most research points to a marked climate change in the next 
lfty years or so, even if the details are unclear. In addition, insights 
gleaned while exploring carbon dioxide/climate impacts should increase our 
U~derstanding of the ways society copes with climate in general, with or 
~lthout the greenhouse effect. Hence, we should continue to pursue lines of 
research that broadly investigate society's adaptive capability. 
THE ADAPTATION PROBLEM 
Many analyses of the carbon dioxide/climate problem conclude that !?1icies to prevent the production of carbon dioxide or its climate effects 
lll not be successfully implemented. 2 Schelling concludes that we must 
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simply anticipate climatic change. 3 Scientific uncertainty, economic and 
social costs, political infeasibility, and outright denial of the problem by 
key decision-makers are some reasons given for the pessimism about preventive 
strategies. Others include the tendency of political systems to await crises 
before effecting real policy change. 4 Schneider suggests that policies 
designed to mitigate the impacts of ciimate change probably will be 
formulated in a post-crisis mode, leading one to envision a future in which 
society staggers from one climate-induced crisis to the next. 5 One also 
might note other slowly evolving, enduring environmental problems that have 
eluded anticipatory solutions. Examples of problems that have avoided 
solution despite increasing evidence that they will have serious future 
impacts include: soil erosion, acid precipitation, coastal erosion, and 
wildlife habitat loss. Glantz argues that such low-level, cumulative 
environmental problems are mismatched to the crisis management approach that 
characterizes policy formulation. 6 
The conventional wisdom that we will not avert a carbon dioxide-induced 
warming of some magnitude is rapidly becoming an article of faith in 
scientific and informed political circles. It also forms the basic premise 
of this paper. Hence, an adaptive strategy, which in its broadest sense 
incorporates a range of adaptive mechanisms, from systems redesign to simple 
acceptance of change in resource production, may be necessary to help society 
cope with carbon dioxide-induced climatic changes. But many of the hurdles 
that frustrate preventive policy also block adaptive policy. For instance, 
in order to be effective, some adaptive responses must be formulated well 
before recognized impacts occur and before the uncertainty over the effect of 
carbon dioxide is significantly lessened. And the costs, as well as the 
political infeasibility, of adaptive policies may rival those of preventive 
policies. Finally, adaptive policy will be formulated in the midst of 
continuing uncertainty about the nature of the interactions between climate 
and society and the·complex workings of the socioeconomic systems that 
transform natural and human resources into life-sustaining and life-enhancing 
goods. Hence, adaptive policy will be imperfect and will need continual 
review. 
The overarching policy problem, then, can be restated to include the 
necessity of sorting out those interactions between climate and society that 
will pose problems in the event of carbon dioxide-induced climate change and 
of prescribing responses that will lessen the negative impacts. The conjoint 
research problem is broader: to understand the full range of the relation-
ships between climate and society, thus providing a guide to the most 
pressing problems and the most efficient solutions. 
Overall, the discussion of adaptive policy is conditioned by a broader 
debate over the sign--the direction of the change, positive or negative--and 
the magnitude of potential impacts, a debate which illustrates some of the 
issues involved in the formulation of adaptive policy and which defines the 
nature and scope of the adaptive measures we should consider. 
Impacts: What Sign and Magnitude? 
A case for a minimal societal impact from anthropogenic climate changes 
is argued by those who feel that adaptation can be painless, even 
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unconscious. Proponents of this view have turned to past agricultural 
adjustments to argue the point. For example, Wittwer has written: 
Fortunately, the past century provides evidence that U.S. 
agriculture and its research establishment can cope with and 
even improve during climatic change. Over the past 100 years, 
for example, the High Plains became the wheat belt during a 
moist period, then the Dust Bowl during a dry period. Agri-
culture, through migration and technology, was able to adapt ... 
From 1915 to 1945, Indiana farmers experienced a +0.2 degree 
Celsius per year trend in temperatures and a total change in 
temperatures of +2 degrees Celsius during the past century. 
American agriculture already has demonstrated that it can adapt 
to a trend of +0.1 degrees Celsius per year, assuming no change 
in interannual fluctuations. 7 
In addition, he notes that "agriculture, through migration and tech-
nology, was able to adapt" to fluctuations like the 1930s Dust Bowl droughts. 
Waggoner suggests that the Okie migrations of the 1930s are examples of , 
farmers "saving themselves while abandoning the cropland to other uses. 118 
Waggoner further suggests that farmers will easily adapt to a changed 
Climate, making current alarms appear overly pessimistic in retrospect. 
These are, in some ways, powerful arguments, and the empirical approach 
taken should be applauded. However, the examples given are less compelling. 
The abandonment of Great Plains farms during the 1930s can be seen as a major 
human tragedy; in some areas up to 50 percent of the population emigrated 
during the 1930s. 9 This was a well-documented tragedy, born of the failure 
of a laissez-faire economy to deal with the production variability inherent 
to semi-arid zones and the failure to anticipate the instability of 
monoculture tenant farming.lo Indeed, the long-term adaptation of which 
Wittwer and Waggoner speak never actually occurred. Great Plains wheat 
acreage did decline with the 1930s drought, but it increased dramatically 
during the 1940s and rose to all-time highs after 1972, when increased grain 
Prices encouraged fence-to-fence planting. Thus, we have not effected a true 
a~ricultural adaptation in the Great Plains despite the soil bank, Payment in 
~lnd, and other conservation measures designed to keep marginal land out of 
lntensive crop production. 11 
It is also difficult to be as sanguine as those who argue for an easy 
adaptation to slow climate change if one hypothesizes that individual and 
Collective decision-makers respond to extreme climatic events rather than 
mean climatic conditions. There exists great climatological uncertainty 
surrounding the relationships between the mean and the variance around the 
mean in all climatic parameters. Mean values are partly an artifact of the 
extrapolative methods used and partly reflective of the way climatologists 
t:nd to express their science. But some analysts argue that extreme condi-
~lons, or change in the frequency of occurrence of critical conditions--for 
~nstance spring soil moisture, maximum summer temperatures, or minimum stream 
lows--are more important in impacting and eliciting adjustments in agri-
?Ultural, energy, and water systems. 12 It is possible that adjustment occurs 
ln a more disjoint, step-like fashion rather than through slow, cumulative 
adaptation that lags slightly behind the average climate trend. This implies 
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an ensemble of thresholds that modulate response, as illustrated in Table 1. 
Crises erupt as each threshold is exceeded by some extreme event. 
Climate Impacts 
Minor 
Severe 
Table 1 
CLIMATE IMPACTS AND RESPONSE THRESHOLDS 
Actions Threshold 
None 
- - - - Perception threshold 
Recognize, do nothing 
- - - - Minimal action threshold 
Adjust incrementally 
Penultimate threshold 
Change operations or location 
Modified from I. Burton, R. Kates, and G. White, The Environment as Hazard 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1978). 
On the other hand, the most concise argument that can be offered to 
suggest that carbon dioxide-induced climate change could be socially dis-
ruptive involves the magnitudes of the projected climate changes. Some 
projections indicate that the carbon dioxide-perturbed climate likely to 
evolve over the next fifty years resembles nothing experienced in the last 
thousand years or more. 13 This climate exceptionalism must surely, at least, 
pose a challenge to socioeconomic systems that·have evolved under a different 
set of climatic circumstances. 
The issues on which this debate centers involve the resiliency of 
socioeconomic systems in the face of climate change and the ability of the 
social support system and its managers to accommodate projected climate 
changes. The debate itself suggests that there is at least some possibility 
of a few significant negative impacts following upon climatic change. Yet, 
if carbon dioxide-induced climate change does indeed manifest itself as a 
series of crises, and if it will not be easily or unconsciously accommodated, 
how then do we characterize those climate impacts that might transcend the 
action thresholds in Table 1 and elicit a response? 
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THE NATURE OF POTENTIAL IMPACTS 
The literature on climate impacts is growing slowly. Considerable 
knowledge is available on biological and societal impacts and on the response 
to extreme weather and climate events. 14 Some knowledge is also is available 
on historical climate impacts and social response. 15 Unfortunately, research 
0 n the impacts of recent climate fluctuations consists mostly of idiosyn-
cratic case studies and is only slowly producing the knowledge needed to 
anticipate and perhaps mitigate the impacts of future climate fluctuations. 16 
Attempts to use existing studies as a guide to the potential impacts of 
future climate change stumble due to the lack of rigorous approaches in 
Previous research, especially the lack of comparable, empirical findings that 
have been validated across different cases and socioeconomic settings. 
Efforts are underway to resolve these problems. Kates et al. 17 have 
edited a volume of methodologies for climate impact assessment in an attempt 
to systematize and broaden climate-society research. Researchers at the 
~nternational Institute for Applied Systems Analysis are currently conducting 
impacts research based on climate-society analyses in marginal areas, where 
human activities, especially agriculture, are near the frontier of sustain-
able productivity and thus may be sensitive indicators of impacts. 18 A 
consortium of research centers* has recently initiated a climate impacts, 
Perception and adjustment experiment (CLIMPAX) to study the impacts and 
responses associated with regional climate fluctuations identified in the 
recent U.S. record. 19 Such efforts signal a break with the idiosyncratic 
methods characterizing existing climate-society research. 
~es of Impacts 
d· The research literature on climate impacts most relevant to carbon 
10Xide concerns is comprised of: discussions meant to sensitize scientists 
and policy-makers to the climate's vulnerability, 20 idiographic (but not 
n~:essarily weak) studies of specific impacts cases, 21 and a few analyses of 
~.
1mate-society interaction aimed at theoretical development or the accumula-
lon of useful lessons and ideas. 22 The work has elicited little reflective 
~ritique, although a few researchers have critically reviewed some of the 
ethods and approaches used in the field. 23 
th Impacts are the implicit and explicit focus of such research, although 
8 .e term has not been well defined. Impacts have been categorized rather 
0 1:Ply into biophysical versus socioeconomic, or first, second, ... , nth 
c~ er. _A simple classification of the potential negative impacts of climate 
cl~nge is proposed in Table 2. The most obvious negative impacts of a 
thlmate change are reductions in the flow of raw materials or decreases in 
f e stability of resource output. The change also may increase the demand 
u~r certain resources, as happens when colder temperatures increase energy 
coe or warmer conditions increase the need for water. This assumes, of 
Urse, that the impacted resource systems have, over time, achieved some 
----
; ~lark University, the University of Colorado, the Illinois State Water 
rvey, and the National Climate Data Center. 
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sort of operational equilibrium with the climate; this may not be an 
unreasonable expectation, given the huge effort made to match resource 
management to the environment (e.g., in the design of water-supply systems). 
Finally, a climate change might lead to a long-term decrease in the 
productivity or carrying capacity of a resource, especially if it is not 
accompanied by appropriate land~use change. A decreased or more variable 
flow of resources, in turn, translates into socioeconomic impacts on the 
price of goods, returns on investments, and operating costs. Climate change 
might also directly affect humans through impacts on health and comfort. 
Table 2 
NEGA~IVE IMPACTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 
Biophysical 
Decreased flow of resources (e.g., crop yields) 
More variable flow of resources (e.g., stream flow) 
Increased demand for resources (e.g., electricity) 
Loss of long-term productivity (e.g., soil erosion) 
Socioeconomic 
Increased cost of resources 
Added operating costs 
Decreased return on investment 
Required new capital 
Discomfort, health effects 
Measuring Impacts 
Although it is relatively easy to imagine the form negative impacts 
might take, actually measuring or estimating the magnitude of the impacts 
that might accompany a climate change, say in monetary terms, is quite 
difficult. But great pressure exists to turn nascent ideas and initial 
observations on climate impacts into quantitative statements about losses and 
their potential mitigation by various responses, especially since the 
calculation of costs and benefits has become a key ingredient of modern 
resources management and policy-making. 24 
Measuring Direct Impacts: A simple accounting of the losses and 
benefits associated with climate conditions would seem to be a reasonably 
straightforward process. In the United States, the Assessment and 
Information Services Center (AISC) of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration issues regular reports on the dollar value of weather and 
climate-induced losses or benefits. The values are distilled from reports in 
the news media, official estimates, and models that link atmospheric 
conditions to activities like agricultural production, energy use, and retail 
business sales. But empirical loss estimation has many weaknesses. There is 
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no science of loss estimation, and the AISC reports and other studies that 
include some account of direct climate impacts rely on a grab bag of methods, 
including direct observation; interviews with victims and public officials; 
and the canvassing of secondary sources (e.g., news media reports), insurance 
claims, and government reports. 25 Such impact assessments are of uneven 
reliability and may be misleading in terms of net losses or aggregate losses 
across regions. 
Reasoning From Extremes: Other researchers have tended to focus on loss 
estimation in extreme cases; arguing that impact estimates of relatively 
frequent, low-magnitude events are uncertain because the climate impact 
II • 
signal" is often lost amidst the typical "noise" of socioeconomic activity. 
Some researchers turn to extreme events which, presumably, result in 
unambiguous impacts that are easily disentangled from the other causes of 
socioeconomic variability. The Assessment of Research on Natural Hazards 
Project conducted in the early 1970s, for example, produced annual U.S. loss 
estimates for several climate hazards. 26 Among these were the impact of 
irost on agriculture, which were estimated to cause $1.1 billion in annual 
osses, and the cost of urban snowfall, which was about $100 million annual-
ly. These estimates included only direct effects, not the secondary effects 
generated as impacts rippled through socioeconomic systems. Burton, Kates 
~
nd White offered a similar list of rough estimates for selected climate 
azards in developed and developing countries (see Table 3). 27 More 
~ecently, Maunder and Ausubel compiled several estimates of direct annual 
Bosses due to weather and climate in various sectors of the U.S. economy. 28 
Ut such estimates are probably unreliable. The AISC estimates that even the 
~elatively benign year of 1982 resulted in $16.5 billion in agricultural 
osses, and only a 3 percent departure from normal heating and cooling 
requirements in 1983 resulted in an estimated $1.9 billion in additional 
energy use.29 
th Unfortunately, a database sufficient to provide reliable estimates of 
de aggregate impacts of extreme climate events does not yet exist. And we 
0 not know if one can generalize from the impacts of a series of extreme 
~Vents or climate anomalies to a permanent climate change. For example, we 
p~ ~at know if a contemporary, finite series of dry year~ on the U.S. Great 
ains would have the same impacts or elicit the same responses as would a 
Permanent change to drier conditions. 
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Table 3 
SELECTED ESTIMATES OF NATURAL HAZARD LOSSES 
Losses and Costs per 
Capita at Ris.k 
Annual (in~) 
Death Total 
Total Popula- Rate per Costs of Costs 
Popula- tion at Million Damages Loss Total as% 
Hazard Countr::C tion* Risk* at Risk Losses Reduction Cost of G.]f 
Drought Tanzania 13 12 40 0.70 0.80 1. 50 1.84 
Australia 13 1 0 24.00 19.00 43.00 0.10 
Floods Sri Lanka 13 3 5 13.40 1. 60 15.00 2.13 
United States 207 25 2 40.00 8.00 48.00 o.11 
Tropical 
cyclones Bangladesh 72 10 3,000 40.00 0.40 3.40 0.73 
United States 207 30 2 13.30 1.20 14.50 0.04 
*In millions. 
Source: I. Burton, R. Kates, and G. White, The Environment as Hazard (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1978). 
Economic Analyses 
Microeconomic analyses of climate impacts generally treat climate as a 
natural resource: a factor in the production of goods and services. 30 
Unfortunately, climate, as currently conceptualized, does not readily lend 
itself to classical economic analyses, especially those that yield cost 
estimates of climate changes. 31 Economic models based on market pricing 
mechanisms and industrial input and output were not designed to incorporate 
open access or common property resources like climate. Nor are such models 
amenable to the long-term extrapolation necessary to estimate the impacts of 
future climate changes. 
Yet one should be able to measure, value, and even manage climate in 
optimal ways that increase the net public or private benefit, if·, indeed, 
climate is a tangible good. Along these lines, d'Arge, attempting to assess 
the costs and benefits associated with anthropogenic climate change, used 
three approaches: 1) assessment of the costs incurred in order to maintain 
current production levels under a changed climate; 2) appraisal of the 
production opportunities foreclosed or enhanced by climate change; and 3) 
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assessment of the willingness among users of a given climate to pay in order 
to maintain or to change the climate. 32 Similar approaches have been applied 
to other natural resources, like forests and minerals. In addition, one 
might calculate climate-induced wage and price differentials at different 
locations, the value that climatic conditions add to or subtract from land, 
the impact of climate on crop prices and water supply costs, and even the 
health maintenance costs associated with different climates. 33 Often, 
however, economic researchers themselves note the extreme uncertainties in 
their calculations, which, as they also note, are often based on projections 
an~ methods ill-suited to climate impact assessment. 
THE NATURE OF CLIMATE SENSITIVITY 
Persistent problems encountered in economic analyses suggest that we 
should retreat to a more basic problem, that of identifying and comparing the 
climate sensitivities of various economic sectors. However, there exist no 
good, systematic surveys of the vulnerability of socioeconomic systems to 
climate impacts, although we possess anecdotal accounts of the relative or 
changing climate sensitivity of various human activities. 34 This is true in 
Part because we lack widely accepted concepts for describing social 
\Tulnerability or resiliency. In addition, we have not systematically 
monitored parameters of vulnerability as systems change. Finally, the 
~he?retical base for understanding systemic vulnerability has been pauperized 
dy inappropiate use of ecological concepts, especially where those concepts 
0 not allow for innovative human behavior. There is no easy way to hurdle 
these barriers. However, some researchers have attempted to make sense of 
~?ci:tal vulnerability to impacts. 35 A few general principles can be 
lstilled from this literature. 
fl· The tendency of activities or sectors to incur losses from climate 
Uctuation derives from the relative importance of climate as a input to 
economic and ecological systems. Many activities with a strong seasonal 
~Ycle are, de facto, sensitive to climate but not necessarily sensitive to 
wonregular climate fluctuations. This holds for agriculture, construction, 
s~ter transportation, recreation, etc. The seasonality rule does not hold as 
Wh:ongly for many business cycles, such as those observed in retail sales, 
ich are affected by nonclimate seasonalities like holidays. 36 
It is a well-accepted axiom of ecology that ecological parameters (e.g., 
throughputs outputs, storages, populations, energy cascades) are relatively 
~table wher~ system diversity is large. This diversity rule appears to hold 
ln most natural resource systems as well: systems of diverse composition are 
m~~s_vulnerable to disruption by environmental fluctuation. Cultivation of 
Othtlple crop varieties, reliance on several different sources of energy, and 
re :r_strategies which diversify holdings or activities all impart a certain 
avSllience to climatic fluctuation, although perhaps at the cost of reduced 
erage Yields or increased capital investments. 
f . 1 Systems with a wide margin between average operating conditions and 
f~l Ure parameters also tend to be more resilient in the face of climate 
reUctuations. Flood buffers, excess generating capacity, large food 
serves, and water storage capability are mechanisms through which such a 
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margin is maintained. But here again, the costs can be great, and the 
relative benefits of over-designing systems to perform even under rare 
conditions are difficult to assess and may lie largely in the unquantifiable 
realm of public confidence and safety. 
Finally, a system's vulnerability to disruption also derives from its 
management by humans, and management or political constraints might 
drastically affect its reliability in the face of climatic fluctuation. 37 
What are the Sensitive Sectors and Regions? 
Logic, experience, and conventional wisdom, at first glance, ease the 
process of differentiating a region's climate-sensitive activities from its 
more climate-immune sectors. Rain-fed agriculture; hydroelectric generation; 
the provision of domestic, industrial, and irrigation water; the demand for 
space heating and cooling; and certain manufacturing and recreational 
activities are climate-sensitive sectors that have received the greatest 
attention from climate impact assessors and society's risk managers. Less 
obvious are climate sensitivities in inland fish and game management, 
pollution control, forest fire control, natural rangeland grazing, waste 
disposal, urban design, public services, and human health. These areas have 
received much less research attention than agriculture, water resources, and 
energy use, which might be called the big three climate-sensitive sectors. 
Regional differences in climate vulnerabilities make analysis of 
sensitivity to climate fluctuation more difficult. Maunder has developed a 
complete set of region·a1 climate sensitivity indicators for New Zealand, 
several of which have been used·in policy formulation and implementation. 38 
Unfortunately, although rough outlines for assessing national climate 
sensitivities have been proposed, the development of climate sensitivity 
indicators is difficult, and the data-intensive, analytical task has not been 
seriously attempted for the United States. 39 An empirical description of 
U.S. climate sensitivities requires a reliable, consistent impacts data base, 
which does not exist. Maunder and Ausubel compiled a rough list of the 
sensitivity to weather and climate anomalies of various components of the 
U.S. gross national product (GNP) (see Table 4). 40 However; they consider 
anomalies lasting up to a season or two; different sensitivities might emerge 
with multiyear climate fluctuations. 
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Table 4 
ANNUAL LOSSES DUE TO ADVERSE WEATHER AND CLIMATE 
(In Millions of Dollars) 
~onomic Sector 
Agriculture 
Construction 
Manufacturing 
Nonair transportation 
Commercial aviation 
Communications 
Electric power use 
Fossil fuel use 
0thera 
Total 
(a) Governmental, retail, etc. 
Losses 
8,240.4 
998.0 
507.7 
96.3 
92.4 
77.4 
45.7 
5.1 
2,531.8 
12,594.8 
Pecent of Gross Revenue 
15.5 
1.0 
0.2 
0.3 
1.1 
0.3 
0.2 
0.1 
-1..Q 
!~~rce: W. Maunder and J. Ausubel, "Identifying Climate Sensitivity," in 
imate Assessment: Studies of the Interaction of Climate and Society, R. 
K1a9tes, J. Ausubel and M. Berberian, eds. (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 85). 
!ih_at are the Trends in Sensitivity? 
Argumentation exists on both sides of this issue. Bowden and his 
;olleagues postulate that in the long run societies tend to adapt to 
ec:irrent climate fluctuations in a way that lessens biophysical and 
socioeconomic impacts.41 This adaptation is achieved through altered social 
organization, infrastructural improvements in agriculture transportation, 
communication, and through development of more resilient technologies, like 
;:tPPlemental irrigation. Bowden et al. support this lessening hypothesis 
Gith case studies of recurrent droughts in the African Sahel and on the U.S. 
~~at Plains, but their analysis does not address the question of changing 
s nerability in the face of a permanently changed climate. However, a wide 
iet of other trends that could increase biophysical sensitivities to climate 
0mpacts act against the mechanisms of lessening. For example, soil erosion 
5Y:r time can reduce the drought resistance of crops produced on impoverished 
eoil, and decreased genetic diversity can increase the sensitivity of 
cosystems to climatic perturbation. 42 
cl· Alternatively, other scientists argue that societal vulnerability to 
itimate_fluctuation is growing. 43 Lamb argues that climate variability 
t sel: is increasing, concurrent with an increase in society's vulnerability 
eo climate disruption. This•view has been opposed by those who cite, for 
axa:ple! crop yield and food stock statistics showing no imminent crash, just 
c ronic food distribution problem. Unfortunately, we do not ful~y under-
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stand the past or present changes in societal climate sensitivity. We lack 
the baseline information that would provide clues to changes in the climate 
sensitivity of the various economic sectors. 
THE ADAPTIVE STRATEGY 
Adaptation, as broadly defined earlier, is the only policy alternative 
to prevention, but not all policies aimed at solving climate impact problems 
will be purely adaptive. Crisis decision-making or _incrementally adjusted 
policy may be socially maladaptive, given a major climate change. Adaptive 
policies, even if effective, will probably result in losses to some segments 
of society. Generally, we should strive to avoid economic injury to any 
party while seeking efficient solutions to our problems; no stakeholder 
should be handed a windfall loss because of adaptive policy decisions. 44 We 
might, then, in theory, apply a social welfare test to proposed adaptive 
policies, especially since any policy will surely favor some specific 
strategies above others and will probably entail unequally distributed costs. 
Randall offers two.concepts that are useful in the evaluation of the 
welfare efficiency of policy: (1) constant proportional shares, which 
demands that any improvement in one interest's utility be accompanied by 
proportional improvements in all other interests' utility, and (2) Pareto-
safety, which demands that improvement for one interest be accompanied by no 
finite loss to other interests, but which does allow relative economic 
loss. 45 · Pareto-safety seems to be a reasonable minimum base against which to 
compare carbon dioxide-adaptive policy alternatives. But we will find 
Pareto-safety a harsh ·task master, given the persistent tendency of 
macroeconomic policy to reduce utility for at least one interest. 
The distributive effects of policy may be a major problem in carbon 
dioxide-climate adaptation. Large-scale environmental problems seem, ipso 
facto, regionally divisive in the United States. For example, regional 
tensions surround the issue of federal land ownership and management, as is 
evident in the so-called Sagebrush Rebellion, 46 and federal resource policy 
often entails very different consequences for different parts of the country, 
resulting in economic and social deficit areas. 47 Thus, appropriate policy 
must be sensitive to regional differences in vulnerability and capability. 
Climate, like other open-access resources, will not bound by political 
frontiers, and only regionally based planning will adequately address the 
problems associated with climate impacts. It might be useful to draw from 
air-pollution policy concepts like airsheds or attainment areas, or to define 
logical climate impact mitigation units like those used in water development. 
Climate-sheds or strategic climate planning units might be defined on the 
basis of both physical characteristics and potentially affected human 
activities. State and regional policy affecting especially agriculture, 
water, and energy might be coordinated as background climate information 
aggregates and as specific carbon dioxide/climate projections improve. 
Possible.carbon dioxide/climate problems demand that we avoid the 
parochialism that has hindered integrative resource management, as has 
happened in, for instance, western water issues. 
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!:!.al.adaptive Policy 
It is possible that we will worsen environmental or social conditions 
through decisions taken in the heat of climate-induced crises. If a crisis 
~entality prevails, we might engage in decision-making processes whose 
impacts are worse than those of a do-nothing policy. For example, it is 
Possible that decreased crop yields may lead to efforts to intensify agri-
culture in situ through more intensive inputs of capital, energy, and 
materials. However, it is also possible that this may only worsen some 
U~timate system breakdown in terms of farm failure and land degradation, 
given continued environmental worsening. 
The Clark University Climate and Society Research Group explored this 
Possibility in their catastrophe hypothesis. 48 They argued that as societies 
adapt to recurrent climate fluctuations, they may become more vulnerable to 
Very rare extremes. Warrick and Bowden argued this point wfth regard to 
Great Plains drought and dryland small grains production, the continued 
drought vulnerability of which is exported to a large, often poor, segment of 
global society through increased mean yields, constant relative yield 
~ar~ability, and aggressively developed foreign markets. 49 Droughts, then, 
to inevitably lessen yields, and the increased prices they cause are often 
~o high for Third World markets. The people who have come to depend on 
c eap surplus grain then face food shortage. In terms of global food 
s~ability, a policy of foreign export of variable supplies may be a mal-
~-aptive adjustment to surplus production, especially in an era of carbon 
ioxide-induced climate change, which may shift the frequency of climate 
extremes, thus heightening the probability of catastrophe. 
~Nature of Adaptive Policy 
sh F?ur general types of adaptive strategies might be imagined. These are 
s ~vln in Table 5. They include a null policy, which might now be seen as the 
d~ e~t response given the scientific uncertainty surrounding the carbon 
suOXide/climate question. Research on social response to natural hazards 
amggests that the denial of a hazard, or no action if it is recoBnized, are 
~ ?ng the most frequent adjustments to an environmental threat. 5 Such a 
d~it:and-see policy appears to prevail at present with regard to the carbon 
beoxide issue. Also included is a best-fit strategy, which will ostensibly 
su our national adaptive strategy. The best-fit approach seeks to adjust 
knPPort systems to changed conditions and relies heavily on technical 
Po~~l:dge developed by the scientific community. Inadequate knowledge, 
ag :tical realities, and unanticipated complications, however, tend to act 
ainst full implementation of best-fit strategies. 
ind Least-regret strategies seek to minimize the potential for climate-
teluc:d catastrophe. These strategies are based on simple prudence, are 
altatively easily implemented, and may be less costly than the best-fit 
sh ernative. Least-regret policies designed to avoid total system collapse 
ma~Uld_accompany all best-fit proposals. Finally, strategies that seek to 
to ntain maximum flexibility in support systems have a large appeal now due 
Pr ~he scientific uncertainties surrounding the carbon dioxide/climate 
0 lem. However, because they rely on large operational buffers and over-
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engineering, they can be very expensive. Schneider's Genesis Strategy is an 
example of such a conservative approach: keep options open bS maintaining 
large reserves that buffer society from environmental shocks. 1 This reduces 
the chance of being forced into decision-making in extremis, when maladaptive 
choices are more likely to be made. 
Table 5 
GENERAL TYPES OF ADAPTIVE POLICY 
Do nothing; deny the problem (null policy) 
Attempt to find a best fit to the new climate 
Aim at a policy of "least-regret" 
Aim at a policy of maximum flexibility 
These strategies can be variously characterized. For instance, they can 
be described in terms of the degree to which they involve significant social 
intervention. Some strategies tend more toward maintenance of the status quo 
than others, seeking.to adjust support systems to the new climate while 
leaving them otherwise unchanged. Others tend to be more interventionary, 
utilizing the opportunity either to fine-tune support systems into a better 
fit with environmental and economic realities or to rethink and perhaps 
reshape socioeconomic policy. The former, considered in light of agri-
cultural adaptation to climatic change, might involve a northward shift of 
corn production but little alteration in agricultural support programs and 
policies. The latter might attach new programs to such a northward shift, 
for instance efforts to fix the most glaring market imperfections surrounding 
corn production or to centralize agricultural planning and thereby provide 
greater leverage in effecting adjustment. 
In addition, adaptive policies could be characterized according to the 
degree to which they seek to anticipate climate changes and alter the 
structure or operation of support systems in advance. 
Potential Adaptive Responses: The Substance of Policy 
A taxonomy of responses is presented in Table 6 in the form of various 
generic adaptations that might be made in any resource system--for instance, 
agricultural, energy supply, or transportation systems. The first four types 
of response, spatial, temporal, operational, and infrastructural, involve 
physical changes that would show up in the landscape or be evident in types 
or scheduling of human activities. The last category, institutional/ 
organizational, involves less obvious responses like those relating to the 
flow and use of political power, decision-making ladders, and group and 
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~ndividual interrelationships. The generic physical adaptations are listed 
in order of increasing economic and social costs, with temporal adjustments 
?robably the least disruptive and operational and locational changes probably 
involving the greatest costs. Relationships exist between these adaptations 
~nd the types of impacts shown in Table 2. The more obvious involve an 
increased variability of resource flows and increased flexibility in support 
systems, or an increase in extreme climatic events and a "hardening" of the 
systems. Such hardening might entail efforts to avoid system failures 
triggered by various climate thresholds--for example, the use of frost 
Protection devices for crops at the northern limit of their cultivation, or 
supplemental irrigation projects. Biased extension or contraction of the 
a~lowable operating parameters seems to be a probable response to a unidirec-
tional carbon dioxide-induced climate change and is probably cheaper than the 
SYmmetrical enlargement of operating ranges. Unfortunately, this might prove 
an inadequate response if a climate trend is accompanied by greater 
Variability. 
Temporal changes 
Infrastructural 
changes 
Operational changes 
Spatial changes 
Institutional/ 
organizational 
Table 6 
A TAXONOMY OF ADAPTIVE RESPONSES 
Seasonal shifts in activities 
Shifts in temporal spacing 
Hardening (e.g., coastal levees) 
Softening (subtract expensive capability/strength) 
Capacity (symmetric and asymmetric) 
Flexibility 
Asymmetric extension or contraction of limits 
Mix of operations 
Switch to new activities 
Location 
Concentration 
Linkages, nodes 
Decision-making structure 
Group relationships 
~raints to Policy Formulation 
to ~arrick and Riebsame identified two critical factors in social response 
Pol?11mate fluctuation: the information cascade and cognitive aspects of 
Pol~cy ~ormulation, and the various constraints and incentives to actual 
efflcy lmplementation. 52 Special attention has been given to the policy 
ects of decision-makers' cognitive limitations. 53 Important constraints 
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include: uncertainty; poor imageability of impacts; policy incrementalism; 
short planning horizons; poor grasp of statistics; and simple denial. 
The various political constraints to adaptive policy formulation and 
implementation have received less attention, but a sense of pessimism reigns. 
Mann notes that: 
There exists a profound skepticism of existing political and 
economic institutions and their capability of resolving major 
public problems, whether concerned with the environment or other 
issues. Government, it is argued, tends to regulate where it 
should not, and spends more than it should, thus constituting a 
dual burden on all of society. Politicians and bureaucrats are 
viewed as lacking the appropriate incentives for problem solving; 
indeed, their incentive structure is viewed as leading them in 
the direction of perpetuation and aggravation of social problems . 
... The constitutional and electoral systems with relatively brief 
terms of office and the necessity for incumbents to satisfy 
pressing and current public demands lend themselves to emphasis 
on meeting present demands with little concern for the future 
environment. 54 
Others have offered evidence for a broad lack of resolve among policy-
makers faced with cumulative~ long-term problems whose negative effects will 
accrue mostly in the future. 5 Unfortunately, we have no formalized methods 
of assessing the validity of such assertions, onlS rough guidelines for 
conducting general analyses of proposed policies. 6 
A lack of imagination may constitute the largest constraint to efforts 
to conceptualize new climate defensive and adaptive policies. Policy 
analysts, 57 vsychologists, 58 and natural and technological hazards 
researchers59 find the human ability to imagine new events and responses to 
be quite limited, or, as they describe it, boundedly rational. We tend to 
anchor our assessments of future possibilities on our perceptions of past 
events. Unfortunately, few past environmental changes are similar to the 
predicted carbon dioxide-induced climate change. Thus we may have trouble 
formulating even slightly novel adaptive strategies as climate change 
unfolds. However, various heuristic aids might help to expand the recognized 
range of possible adjustments. Several such aids seem appropriate: case 
studies of related problems; analogues; and scenarios. 
Policy Case Studies, Analogies and Scenarios 
The following case studies were chosen to illustrate some of the 
problems likely to be associated with a policy aimed at ameliorating the 
impact of carbon dioxide on the climate. 
National Water Management: Issues surrounding water supply, irrigation, 
flood control, and inland navigation may have been the most enduring constel-
lation of natural resource problems dealt with in the public policy arena. 
National water policy development has generally been aimed at a narrow best 
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fit between supply and potential demand, with scant recognition of market 
forces, ecological effects, systemic flexibility, or alternative management 
0Ptions such as non-structural adjustments. 6° For instance, flood control 
P?licy has traditionally been constrained to a narrow set of policy alterna-
tives, with communities enticed to choose from a narrow range of engineering 
\>larks, including dams, levees, and channelization, in lieu of non-structural 
responses to flood hazards, like flood-plain regulation or warning systems. 61 
This, however, has failed to reduce flood losses. 
. Similarly, the history of the federal flood insurance program also 
lllustrates an enduring crisis orientation. The program was initiated as a 
response to the 1965 floods a~sociated with Hurricane Betsy but was not given 
adequate support from Congress until after the 1972 floods of Hurricane 
Agnes. Hence, it took two major disasters to get the program underway, even 
though flood losses, especially those related to flood-plain encroachment, as 
~ncouraged by flood "control" projects, had been growing steadily since at 
east 1900. · 
f _Water development generally has not followed a program of prudent 
lexibility. Developers have continually defined water availability in terms 
of the regulated mean flow for some period of record in irrigation, 
;avigation, and domestic supply calculations. This approach fails to account 
or longer-term fluctuations and has caused water allocation problems--for 
example, overappropriation in the Colorado River basin. 62 Of course, 
operating margins are built into most systems, with a standard ratio of water 
~se to safe yield calculated into the design of most new projects. 
nf?rtunately, this safe yield is not always updated with growing demand; the 
ratio has dropped below values that are considered safe in many mid-Atlantic 
Urban water systems. 63 
Pl. Great Plains Small Grains Production: Policies designed to rescue Great 
h ains wheat, corn, and sorghum agriculture from persistent overproduction 
iave failed dismally. The 1983 Payment-in-Kind program, the latest 
rnstallment in a fifty-year effort to reduce crop acreages, foundered on the 
Ock~ of a short, sharp drought, a sense of unfairness stemming from the poor 
:ua~ity of in-kind grain, and various negative impacts of the program on the 
cgri:ultural services and supply sector. A lack of consistency and 
1°tntnitment in federal implementation and a failure to recognize the year-to-
re~r f~nancial needs of farm firms appear to be key weaknesses in acreage 
e Uction policy on the Plains. 64 
f The Great Plains Conservation Program (GPCP), for example, encouraged 
0 at'tners to permanently convert erosion-susceptible cropland to grazing land, 
fr other conservation use. 65 Unfortunately, 60 percent of the program's · 
runds have been used to increase agricultural water supplies rather than to 
eeseed or decommission marginal cropland. This has resulted in part from 
g;on?tnic pressures, since per-acre income continues to be lower for livestock 
·ona~ing and other noncrop uses. Perhaps most critically, the GPCP has relied 
co ?ng-term contracts with farmers, locking them into conservation 
colntnltments at a time (e.g. the 1970s) when interannual grain production 
Thntrols, an important determinant in production decisions, varied widely. 
ofus the policy's effectiveness has been reduced by the interactive effects 
Other policies. Finafly, the GPCP has actually encouraged more intensive 
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agriculture and, perhaps, the conversion of marginal land not to grass but to 
irrigation, in essence converting a wind erosion problem into a water 
erosion, supply, and salinization problem. The participants in the GPCP have 
increased irrigated acreage much faster than nonparticipants. In short, the 
program may actually have_been and still may be maladaptive. 
Soil Erosion: Agricultural soil loss as an environmental concern has 
many parallels to carbon dioxide-induced climate change: it is a slow, 
anthropogenic, cumulative problem that often operates below typical percep-
tual thresholds. In addition, its chief costs in intensely farmed parts of 
the United States will not become manifest until some future time, and it 
interacts with other environmental fluctuations, for instance climate change. 
Soil erosion is currently a serious problem on 296.6 million acres of 
nonfederal land. 66 About 23 percent of U.S. cropland is losing more than 5 
tons of soil per acre, the generally recognized threshold of damaging 
erosion, including 23 percent of corn-belt acreage and 40 percent of the 
cropland in the Southeast. Selective erosion of critical nutrients, as 
opposed to total top soil, is a less recognized but probably equally 
important problem. The U.S._Department of Agriculuture predicts that the 
continuation of 1977's erosion rates would decrease corn and soybean yields 
15 to 30 percent by 2030. 67 But there is little direct evidence for depres-
sed productivity due to soil erosion, the erosion signal in yields has not 
generally overcome the signal of intensive inputs of material and energy. 
Soil erosion presents a policy problem mismatched to traditional 
economic and resource management solutions. It has been suggested that soil 
mismanagement illustrates the degree to which our institutions and economy 
are.ill-adapted.to the existing environment. 68 Our inability to recognize 
slow, cumulative environmental trends, conflicting economic incentives and 
disincentives for conservative soil management, and continuing scientific 
uncertainty all conspire to block solutions to the soil loss problem. 
Current political and economic decision-making systems are inadequate to the 
task, since social mechanisms for the allocation of resources engender 
conflicts between short-term_economies and long-term realities. Hence, it 
may be necessary to deal with soil loss, the carbon dioxide/climate problem, 
and similar environmental problems, as ethical questions tied up in broader 
social issues such as the distribution of wealth, optimal food production and 
allocation systems, and even the size and structure of energy, transporta-
tion, and settlement systems. 69 
Colorado River Management: Rhodes et al. present a pertinent case study 
of Colorado River management with special emphasis on the floods in the 
spring of 1983. 70 They argue that the ·flooding resulted from two long-term 
management changes in the basin, and, of course, the remarkably wet 
conditions of 1982-83. Two reservoirs, Lake Powell and Lake Mead, are 
especially important in flood control in the basin. Lake Powell has been 
below full storage parameters for seventeen years. This provided an 
extraordinary flood buffer, allowing the reservoir to absorb even extremely 
high spring runoff without extra downstream releases. But the required 
minimum flood storage in Lake Mead, the next downstream reservoir; was not 
increased after Lake Powell's filling ended in 1982, with the result that the 
system's characteristics had changed but the overall operational parameters 
had not. In addition, marked flood-plain encroachment occurred during the 
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"flood-safe" Lake Powell filling period. Hence, stream flows that in earlier 
Years would have inflicted minimal damage caused serious loss in 1983. This 
encroachment was probably encouraged by perceptions that the river had been 
flood-proofed and was allowed by lax local zoning enforcement, over which the 
~ur~au of Reclamation, the agency with flood control responsibility in the 
asin, has little control. 
Rhodes et al. also argue that the seventeen-year "flood-proof" period 
~as, in essence, an anthropogenic environmental change involving less 
;ariable streamflows and a markedly reduced probability of damaging extremes. 
?ey conclude that "two decades are more than sufficient" to change percep-
tions of climate constraints; the encroachment was a logical appropriation of 
~PParently flood-proofed land and could have been avoided only by basin-wide 
and-use enforcement. 
th _The irony of recent Colorado River flooding is heightened by the hypo-
_esized carbon dioxide/climate impacts in the basin, which some suggest 
might include streamflow reductions of 20 percent or more. 71 However, the 
m;nagement and legal implications of such a carbon dioxide-induced reduction 
~h Colorado River discharge are not different from the problems arising from 
t e current supply/demand imbalance. Some observors argue that inflexibili-
ty, particularly with regard to the current allocative mechanisms, consti-
~tes the key constraint to rational basin management. 72 Obstacles to 
:h~nged management are embedded in institutional structures and the law, 
d t:h through the Colorado River Compact requires the upper basin states to 
ye iver a fixed quantity of water to the lower basin states even in drought 
bears. Climate change-induced shortages will surely intensify the demand for 
etter, perhaps market-oriented, allocative mechanisms. 
s Lessons From the Case Studies: The case studies cited here illustrate 
T~Veral common problems with long-term environmental management policy. 
ese can be distilled into five key weakness: 
(1) the policy does not do what it was designed to do; 
(2) the policy is improperly applied; 
(3) the policy is misused; 
(4) the policy interacts in negative and/or counter-intuitive ways with 
other policies; and 
(5) the policy is not flexible in the face of changing conditions. 
me A.nalogies: Society regularly, though often poorly, adjusts to environ-
Glntal changes that are similar to carbon dioxide-induced climate change. 
thantz and Ausubel created an analogue to the carbon dioxide/climate problem 
cu:;ough an analysis of the perception of, and response to, the ongoing, slow, 
notulative depletion of the Ogallala Aquifer in the U.S. Great Plains. They 
e that: 
Because studies of possible responses to the Ogallala depletion 
are more advanced, toey may shed light on responses to hypotheti-
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cal CO2-induced climate change. Portions of the congressionally 
mandated $6 million High Plains Study that analyzed the Ogallala 
depletion for its impacts on the national, regional, state, and 
local economies could provide useful first approximations of how 
farmers and other decision-makers might respond to a CO2-induced 
change in the regional water balance. 73 
The analogue approach is thus efficient, economical, and capable of 
making more concrete our first generation carbon dioxide/climate impact 
speculations. A first step in this approach might be the development of 
criteria for, and a list of, appropriate analogues. Case studies of climate 
policy analogues might be selected to mimic the carbon dioxide/climate 
problem, suggesting that they include at least these characteristics: 
• long-term, cumulative environment change 
• scientific uncertainty 
• intergenerational issues 
• political/economic complexity 
Knowledge of policy failures and successes in similar environmental 
problems should aid in the formulation of carbon dioxide/climate adaptive 
policy. Of the policy case studies presented earlier, the issues surrounding 
water management, soil erosion, and agricultural policy seem most related to 
carbon dioxide/climate policy problems. More careful reviews of these areas 
should give us a better idea of the constraints and incentives to successful 
policy with regard to carbon dioxide/climate change. 
Scenarios: Realistic, carefully constructed scenarios of climate 
impacts and adaptive strategies may be a useful tool in conceptualizing 
adaptive carbon dioxide policy. The carbon dioxide/climate problem, 
surrounded by uncertainty, and lacking current real-world manifestation, 
lends itself to scenario construction that is aimed at stretching our 
imagination of potential impacts and adaptations. Lave and Epple discuss 
three reasonable goals with regard to the use of scenarios: (1) changing 
mindsets; (2) formal modeling of impacts and adjustments; and (3) integrating 
disparate facts and hypotheses from different disciplines. 74 
The greatest immediate utility of scenarios with regard to the carbon 
dioxide/climate problem may reside in efforts to "stoke the imagination" and 
possibly change preceptions. However, the scenario is not a well-developed 
tool in environmental hazard analysis. There exist no generally accepted 
"rules of the game," and too many scenarios end up as unbelievable "future 
shock" nightmares. Hence, they may stir some public concern, but hold little 
credibility among political decision-makers. Lave argues that, at the least, 
scenarios must be based on "disciplined imagination," realistic assumptions, 
and informed judgment. A scenario that one is willing to present to politi-
cal decision-makers must be widely reviewed and fine-tuned in several itera-
tions among groups of experts. However, the point in the process at which 
review and revision becomes self-defeating, leading to bland, watered-down 
"scenarios-by-committee," cannot be specified in advance. Such an effect may 
have detracted from the value of the Climate to the Year 2000 studies. 75 
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lnmlementing Adaptive Policy 
An adaptive carbon dioxide/climate policy will not be self-executing. 
Federal mission agencies, for instance the Departments of Agriculture or ?0mmerce or the Environmental Protection Agency, will probably deal 
lndividually with subsets of the carbon dioxide/climate problem as they 
arise. It seems unlikely that a new agency will be created to deal 
~Pecifically with climate problems, although an interagency program, like the 
-~. National Climate Program, might emerge to coordinate the response. The 
e~lsting structures and political orientations of the responsible agencies 
~lll affect how well the country responds to carbon dioxide/climate impacts. 
6 . Mechanisms for Implementation: The strategic responses listed in Table 
might be effected incidentally as socioeconomic systems adjust to changing 
conditions. Experience, however, suggests that specific mechanisms will be 
~eeded to realize societal adaptation in most sectors. Table 7 lists four 
asic mechanisms for encouraging or coercing adaptation. 
ct· The relative efficacy of these mechanisms with regard to the carbon 
_loxide/climate problem remains speculative. They have been listed roughly 
ln order of increasing governmental intervention, and, presumably, increasing 
~?sts and problems encountered in implementation. Incentives for adaptation 
lll probably be used and be relatively cheap but will be only partially 
successful. Outright mandate, including court battles and enforcement, may f:~ the job done, but will be more costly and painful to society and is less 
1 ely to be implemented widely. 
Table 7 
MECHANISMS OF POLICY IMPLEMENTATION 
Incentives (e.g., tax breaks) 
Compensation (sharing between affected interests) 
.Aid (outright grants) 
Mandate (legal) 
Se . .'.the Key Implementation Constraint: A problem must be perceived as 
ifrious by the people who will be affected by it, as well as by its solution, 
ax·a solution is ever to be implemented. This is founded on some basic 
coloms about public sector decision-making: 1) any solution to a real, 
Po~Ple~ problem will adversely affect some individuals or groups;-and 2) 
th entially affected interests may be able to block policy implementation if 
fue~ are sufficiently unhappy with it. 76 Thus, the first and most 
canbamen~al constraint to the development and implementation of adaptive 
dir ?n dioxide policy is found in the rather vague public image of carbon 
PoOXlde-induced climate change. Climate itself is a vague public concept, 
chorly recognized even by people who regularly use climate resources; its 
ange may not readily be recognized as a serious threat. 
-209-
It will not be easy to maneuver around this constraint. However, a 
mixture of simple and more complex mechanisms for increasing believability 
are available. The simplest approach might involve compelling statements of 
the problem. The Environmental Protection Agency used this approach in press 
releases on its Can We Delay a Greenhouse Warming report. 77 It is important, 
however, to avoid overstatement or sensationalism. Alternatively, one might 
link the carbon dioxide problem to tangible impacts, for instance a doubling 
of food prices, mandatory growth controls in western cities, or increased 
coastal erosion. Another approach might involve the development of well-
articulated scenarios of what might happen were no adaptive policy action 
taken. Such scenarios must be understandable and realistic, and must speak 
to real-world problems that affect people's lives, for instance, farm 
foreclosures, food and energy, and water shortages. 
Serious problems are placed on the national political agenda once there 
is widespread agreement both that a serious situation exists and that 
significant negative impacts will occur if nothing is done to forestall them. 
However, interest group pressure, particularly from environmental groups, 
governmental agencies, and publics adversely impacted by an adaptation, forms 
the last, though still formidable, constraint to policy implementation. This 
need not prove an insurmountable obstacle as long as these interests can be 
convinced that the adaptive mechanisms in question are fair, workable, and 
efficacious, and, above all, that the mechanisms address a serious problem. 
BRIDGING THE CLIMATE-SOCIETY KNOWLEDGE GAP 
Research is steadily eliminating uncertainties surrounding the climate's 
response to increasing atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide. Unfor- · 
tunately, similar progress is not taking place with regard to the connection 
between climate and society. Three lines of research, proposed in this final 
section, may help bridge the climate-society knowledge gap relatively quickly 
and cheaply. The first involves various theoretical efforts in the human 
ecology of climate fluctuation. The others involve a broad-brush effort to 
canvass societal climate sensitivities, as well as efforts to develop a 
simple methodology for measuring the climate signal in human activities. 
Needed Theoretical Development 
The study of climate-society interaction falls under the aegis of the 
multidisciplinary field of human ecology. Our understanding of human-
environment relationships improved in the 1960s and 1970s with the develop-
ment of ideas about cultural adaptation, social systems, and, especially, the 
role of perception in modulating environmental behavior. The next step might 
involve the development of better methodologies for exploring the relation-
ship between social structure and the environment. 78 Behavioral studies have 
focused on the individual, progressing up the scale of aggregation by summing 
individual perceptions and behavior. But experience and intuition suggest 
that human aggregates interact with the environment in different ways than do 
individuals, and that institutional structure imparts constraints and 
incentives to adjustive behavior. 79 
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The nature of this theoretical work cannot be detailed in advance. 
U~wever, one possible focus would be particularly relevant to the carbon 
dioxide/climate problem: research on the interaction of social structure 
With slow, ~umulative environmental change. Human ecology, despite its 
attention to adjustment choice, takes a rather static view of human-environ-
ment relationships. 8O We have some broad ideas about how sociocultural 
change occurs, 81 but we have not managed to incorporate change per se into an 
explanatory framework of environmental interaction. We lack an understanding 
of how slow cumulative change affects society's ability to cope with internal 
~nd external stress. But we harbor a disturbing intuition that slow, 
~mperceptible change tends to sneak up on us until it threatens the 
Unctioning of society's support systems. 
Our ideas of societal adaptation to changing environmental conditions 
seem to be anchored by two extremes: either we adapt slowly, through 
;ountless incremental trial-and-error outcomes, or we adjust in a step-like 
ashion as crises erupt. The long history of animal and plant domestication 
Would appear to be an example of slow adaptation, and the causes of, and 
:esponses to, the recent oil shortages exemplify the latter type. Both 
~~cremental and momentous change appear to include sociotechnical adaptation, 
p ough the relative importance of each--the costs and benefits and the 
redictability or controllability of certain modes of change--rernain obscure. 
st Studies of the interaction of slow environmental change and social 
r ~uc~ure are desperately needed. We need to know why, for example, causal 
de ationships between overgrazing and range deterioration are so easily 
d:monstrated within the framework of range science, but so stubbornly 
al~avow:d by the ranching cornrnunity. 82 We need to know more about how people 
ln ktheir collectives view themselves as actors in environmental change. The 
0~c 0 ~ ~ttention to matters of slow social and environmental change limits 
thr ability to visualize the impacts of, and adaptations to, environmental 
mereats. If, as it appears, we tend to ignore slow change in the environ-
mi~~• then we will certainly not devise effective preemptive strategies to 
sp igate the impacts of carbon dioxide-induced climate change. ~ut this is 
to~culative, based on little validated empirical evidence of the causes and 
Wide of ?hange in interactions between humans and nature. Even the most 
~a ely cited models of change in social and resource systems, for instance 
thrx's historical materialism, are short on empirical validation. 83 Thus, 
fre P:0 blern does not derive solely from theoretical oversight, but sterns also 
om inattention to empirical methodology and case study. 
~tivity Analysis 
imp A two-pronged effort to identify sectoral climate sensitivities can 
shor~ve our decisions about what to look for in empirical data. First, we 
senU•d_c~nvass the methods used in previous research, seeking to identify 
ind~iti~ity indices. Especially important are indices that provide first-cut 
nee~cations of climate vulnerabilities and point to the non-climate data 
diste? to_develop a picture of the magnitude and seasonal and spatial 
sen :ibutions of climate sensitivities in the United States. Next, a rough 
ide:~~ivity analysis of the sectors listed in Table 8 should be conducted to 
ify the areas that are.most vulnerable to climate change. Some 
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approaches to such studies are suggested by Maunder and Ausubel, and they 
have produced a rough sensitivities list (see Table 9). 84 
Table 8 
PROVISIONAL LIST OF CLIMATE-SENSITIVE SECTORS 
Agriculture 
1. Small grains* 
2. Vegetable* 
3. Citrus 
4. Irrigated* 
5. Ranching* 
6. Poultry* 
7. International 
markets* 
Communications 
1 . Microwave 
2. Equipment 
maintenance 
Construction 
1. Major projects 
2. Housing 
Energy 
1. Electricity 
a. Thermal 
b. Hydro* 
2. Gas* 
3. Petroleum 
4. International 
markets 
Fisheries 
1. Ocean 
2. Inland 
Industrial and Commercial 
1. Industrial operations 
2. Retail sales 
Recreation and Tourism 
1. Resorts and tourism 
2. Winter sports* 
3. Hui;i.ting 
4. Special events 
Resource Management 
1. Fish and game 
2. Forestry and fire control 
3. Environmental quality 
Social Services 
1. Health* 
2. Rural and municipal 
services 
a. Snow removal* 
b. Low income 
c. Unemployment 
d. Education 
Transportation 
1. Highway 
2. Air 
3. Rail 
4. Oceanic shipping 
5. Inland barge 
Water Resources 
1. Supply* 
2. Quality* 
3. Flood control 
*Activities that might be especially sensitive to changes in precipitation 
and temperature. 
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Table 9 
SENSITIVITY OF GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT ELEMENTS 
TO WIDESPREAD ANOMALOUS WEATHER 
QNg__Elements 
l. Personal consumption expenditures 
a. Gasoline and oil 
b. Electricity 
Natural gas, fuel oil, coal 
c. Furniture and appliances 
d. Food at home 
Food away 
e. Apparel 
f. New and used cars 
g. Housing 
h. Transporation 
i. Other 
2
· Non-residential fixed investment 
3 
· Residential 
4
· ~hange in business inventories 
5 Net imports 
G. Government purchases 
a. Federal 
b. State and local 
Hot 
Summer 
++ 
? 
++ 
? 
? 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
Weather: Unusually 
Cold Dry Stormy/ 
Winter Summer Wet Snowy 
+ 
++ 
+ 
+ 
? 
? 
+ 
++ 
+ 
+ 
? 
? 
++ 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
++ 
++ 
? 
+ 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
? 
+ 
++ 
? 
? 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
Note: 
Double pluses and minuses indicate the greatest sensitivities. 
Mild 
++ 
++ 
++ 
+ 
++ 
++ 
++ 
? 
? 
++ 
~~;rce: W. Maunder and J. Ausubel, "Identifying Climate Sensitivity," in Climate 
J :ct Assessment: Studies of the Interaction of Climate and Society, R. Kates, 
· Usubel, and M. Berberian, eds. (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1985). 
teg A sensitivities assessment should help us prioritize our concerns with 
be ; rd to carbon dioxide/climate change. This prioritized concern might then 
instused With other approaches to help set a research and policy agenda. For 
of n an7e, we might wish to weight our priorities according to the proportion 
migh;tional or regional GNP contributed by each sensitive activity. This 
desi be a modest effort, probably involving "quick-and-dirty" approaches 
econgn:d to result in an ordered worry list, rather than sophisticated 
Usedomic_and statistical analysis. This list of sensitivities could then be 
Stud·to inform the development of appropriate impact and adjustment case. 
les, analogues and scenarios. 
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Appropriate Empiricism: Harvesting Natural Experiments 
Empirical evidence to guide theoretical development may be best gathered 
through field trials, in which one observes, reconstructs, and interprets the 
social response to actual climate fluctuations. But we must carefully design 
the research to collect the type of evidence that makes results from the 
experimental sciences so compelling. The following ideas stem from an 
emerging program called CLIMPAX, which was designed to harvest recent (1931 to 
present) "natural experiments" in parts of the country that experienced 
marked, persistent climate changes of ten- to twenty-year duration. 85 These 
experiments are designed to extract climate impact signals from the typical 
noise of socioeconomic time series through longitudinal and case-control 
analytical methods; the lack of any clear signal would allow us to conclude 
that fluctuations of the magnitudes and characteristics in question have no 
discernable effect on critical systems like agriculture, energy, and water 
resources. Studies of a range of climate fluctuations might allow us to 
determine thresholds of detectable impacts for different sectors in different 
climate settings. 
To identify a set of potential impact case studies, Karl and Riebsame86 
searched all coterminus U.S. climate divisions for marked, step-like changes 
in temperature and/or precipitation, comparing all possible adjacent non-over-
lapping ten- to twenty-year epochs. A few midcontinental cases exhibiting a 
change to warmer, drier conditions were selected from among the hundreds of 
areas assessed. For example, up to a 1 degree Celsius increase in spring 
(March through May) temperature and a 75 millimeter (approximately 25 percent) 
precipitation decrease was found in climate conditions of the south-central 
Great Plains between the epochs 1951-61 and 1962-72 (see Figure 1). A 
northern Great Plains case is shown in Figure 2. Parts of the Dakotas 
experienced a small, persistent increase in temperature with a 25 to 50 
millimeter (11 to 23 percent) decrease in summer precipitation between 1939-57 
and 1958-76. 
The next steps, then, involve collecting appropriate biophysical and 
socioeconomic data series for these cases, establishing longitudinal profiles 
(e.g., across the 1957-58 Dakota break in climate), perhaps with some sort of 
adaptational lag built in, and selecting case-control sites--nearby areas that 
did not experience the change or at least did so to a much lesser degree. 
Before and after and case-control comparisons should then allow one to 
identify a climate impacts signal, if it exists. 
Of course, an empirical approach cannot totally emulate a carbon dioxide-
induced climate change. Regionally constrained fluctuations will, 
theoretically, have different impacts than national-scale climate change. 
Additional analysis is needed to identify cases that might emulate carbon 
dioxide-forced changes in other climate characteristics, particularly 
variability. The criteria used by Karl and Riebsame do not mimic the current 
projections of carbon dioxide/climate change and should be reanalyzed for. 
fluctuations that look more like the projections. For example, areas should 
be chosen that have experienced relatively consistent trends toward·warmer, 
drier conditions for as long as possible. Such a case would be more 
meaningful if we could also find a nearby, and presumably geographically 
similar, area whose climate remained relatively constant during the same 
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Period. Case-control comparisons could then be attempted. The computational 
tout· ines are simple , and the necessary impacts data could probably be 
Collected relatively quickly, perhaps in one field season. 
d· Finally, we need a small set of cases that bracket the range of carbon 
10Xide/climate change predictions from the best to the worst cases. Some 
modest efforts along these lines could put our carbon dioxide/climate concerns 
~n much firmer ground and improve the likelihood that any policies formulated 
0 
adjust society to climate change will be truly adaptive. 
Figure 1 
CHANGE IN SPRINGTIME AVERAGE TEMPERATURE (in degrees Celsius) AND 
TOTAL PRECIPITATION (in millimeters) FROM 1951-61 TO 1962-72 
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of ~~-and Precipitation Fluctuations in the Contiguous United States," Journal 
lmate and Applied Meteorology 23 (1984): 960. 
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Figure 2 
CHANGE IN SUMMERTIME AVERAGE TEMPERATURE (in degrees Celsius) AND 
TOTAL PRECIPITATION (in millimeters) FROM 1939-57 to 1958-76 
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ature and Precipitation Fluctuations in the Contiguous United States," Journal 
of Climate and Applied Meteorology 23 (1984): 962. 
SUMMARY 
Adaptive public policy with regard to the carbon dioxide/climate problem 
may be as simple as a commitment to further monitor the situation and sponsor 
thought-provoking conferences . However, it might also involve greater d 
substance, as in the development of alternative tax or land-use laws designe 
to alter the types and locations of certain agricultural practices or change 
the capacities of regional energy and water systems. Recognizing the 
cognitive constraints that prevail in the solution of novel problems , we 
should at least explore the range of mechanisms that might be employed to 
improve our formulation of adaptive carbon dioxide/climate policy, while 
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simultaneously taking an introspective look at the policy process with regard 
to long-term environmental change. If the carbon dioxide/climate problem is 
real and becomes recognized as a serious public policy issue, then even absent 
a climate crisis, we may well evolve, for example, a farm policy that 
enc?urages adaptive flexibility in agricultural systems, an antediluvial 
~
017cy to minimize the negative effects of sea level rise, or even policies 
esigned to help society benefit from climate change. 
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A YATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT RESPONSE TO THE GREENHOUSE EFFECT 
IN THE RED RIVER BASIN 
Charles Crist and Daniel Reinartz 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, St. Paul, Minnesota 
INTRODUCTION 
Reconstructions of climatic history provide sufficient data to document 
the nonstationary nature of climate. Over long periods of time, climate 
changes significantly, varying, for instance, from glacial to nonglacial 
conditions over the last 15,000 years. Catastrophic climate changes are 
unlikely to occur in the future. However, significant variations in climate 
are expected to occur because of natural solar energy variations and human-
induced variations in the chemistry of the atmosphere. 
A direct link exists between climate change and the water levels of our 
lakes, streams, and prairie potholes. Hence, we must begin thinking now in 
terms of probabilistic futures. In fact, this is imperative given our 
current engineering and political processes. The planning, design, funding, 
and construction of water resource developments can take several decades, 
which means that the major water projects being conceived for today's needs 
will probably not be implem~nted until sometime in the twenty-first century. 
Therefore, where it can be shown that the present climate is anomalous 
compared to past conditions or probable future CQnditions, today's water 
resource manager must deal with_probabilistic future scenarios in planning. 
The relevance of future climate conditions to water resource planning is 
apparent in three reservoir projects that were constructed in the 195Os in 
the Red River of the North basin in northwestern Minnesota and eastern North 
Dakota. These reservoirs were planned in response to the 193Os drought, 
using limited historic records. Their primary purpose is water supply, and 
they have functioned well for that purpose. However, they have also more 
than recovered their initial economic investment cost in terms of flood 
control. This is due to the relatively wet period of the last thirty years. 
Currently, one of the reservoir projects ·has been recommended for modifica-
tion so that it will be more effective in flood control. Similarly, other 
projects are being planned now for flood control with little consideration 
given to the water shortages that existed in the 193Os. But water supply 
could be as much of a problem or concern in the next decade as flooding is 
now. 
The U.S. Corps of Engineers has had much experience in responding to 
short-term climate variations like floods, droughts, and hurricanes through 
emergency programs. However, its response to changed long-term climate 
conditions has been one of reaction rather than of anticipation. 
Although this approach has been effective and is likely to continue, the 
problems with existing projects in the Red River basin make it worthwhile to 
speculate on a water resource management response to a probable future 
climate scenario--one that is significantly different from that suggested by 
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statistical extrapolations from the immediate past. This paper is a thought 
exercise in one such probable climate scenario. It identifies a specific 
reaction and adjustment to the climate scenario used in the 1983 National 
Academy of Sciences report, "Effects of a Carbon Dioxide-Induced Climatic 
Change on Water Supplies in the Western United States. 111 
BASE CONDITION 
The National Academy of Sciences study predicts that atmospheric 
concentrations of carbon dioxide will double to 600 parts per million by the 
middle of the next century, resulting in an increase in mean global 
temperature. It assumes that this projected greenhouse effect would result 
in a 10 percent reduction in mean annual precipitation and a 2 degree Celsius 
increase in mean annual temperature. Although a different climate change may 
very well occur, this scenario appears probable based upon many studies to 
date. 2 
It is safe to assume that the overall impact of such a climate change 
will vary geographically, given the physiographic differences that exist 
within the United States. Some regions of the country will benefit and some 
will be adversely affected. However, all regions will have to readjust. To 
better analyze and properly define the magnitude and extent of the adjust-
ments, one water resource region was selected for attention in this paper. 
This region, the Red River basin, is an important agricultural region that is 
very much dependent on normal precipitation for crop production. Past 
reductions in precipitation have upset the hydrological balance, requiring 
adjustments in water resource management. A similar change is assumed for 
the future and is assumed to be likely to occur within a time frame that 
affects the planning of numerous large-scale water resource systems. 
BASIN DESCRIPTION 
Figure 1 shows the Red River basin. It is a roughly triangular area. 
The basin includes the eastern portion of North Dakota in the west and the 
northwestern edge of Minnesota in the east. The southern tip of the basin 
reaches as far as South Dakota along the North Dakota-Minnesota border. 
Sixteen counties in North Dakota and sixteen counties in Minnesota are 
included in the basin. Nineteen major sub-basins make up the approximately 
40,000 square miles of the basin's U.S. portion. The Red River of the North, 
which is formed by the confluence of the Bois de Sioux and Ottertail rivers 
at Wahpeton, North Dakota, and Breckenridge, Minnesota, bisects the valley. 
The basin eventually drains into Lake Winnipeg and the Hudson Bay in Canada. 
The topography of the region is diverse. In the east is an area of 
lakes, ridges, and hills. The central portion includes the very flat Red 
River Valley, and the western part is rolling drift prairie, dotted with 
prairie potholes. The annual precipitation varies from about 24 inches in 
the southeast to 17 inches in the northwest. About 75 percent of the 
precipitation falls between April and September. This is adequate for crop 
production in normal years. However, periods of drought are frequent, 
especially in the western part of the region. Potential evapotranspiration 
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losses generally exceed precipitation and average 30 inches. This region has 
a continental climate with a mean annual temperature of 40 degrees 
Fahrenheit. Extreme temperatures have been known to vary from -54 degrees 
Fahrenheit to 118 degrees Fahrenheit. 
The average runoff at the outlet of the U.S. portion of the basin at 
Emerson, Manitoba, is about 2,387,000 acre-feet or 1.1 inches. The monthly 
distribution of streamflow is highly variable. Maximum runoff generally 
occurs in April and May, due to snowmelt. August through March are low flow 
months, when little or no flow may be evident. 
Agriculture is the basic industry of the region.· The importance of the 
basin to domestic and foreign food production is well documented. The Red 
River basin produces three-fourths of the nation's sunflower harvest, one-
third of it's barley, one-fourth of its sugar beets, one~fifth of it's flax, 
and one-tenth of it's wheat, oats, and potatoes. The annual value of these 
products is currently about $4 billion. The population of the basin is 
approximately 570,000, according to the 1980 census. About 46 percent lives 
in urban areas, and 54 percent lives in rural. areas. The population should 
be over 600,000 by the year 2000, according to state projections. The only 
standard metropolitan statistical area is the Fargo-Moorhead urban area. 
Only one other community, Grank Forks, North Dakota, has a population greater 
than 25,000. 
The development opportunities of the basin are limited by a variety of 
water resource problems. Flooding has been a significant problem over the 
last thirty years, occurring primarily as a result of spring snowmelt often 
aggravated by rains. The worst flooding is in the central third of the 
region. In this area, the water can be spread out for miles on the flat 
landscape. Regional average annual flood damages to rural areas are almost 
twice those of urban areas. In addition, water supplies are not adequate to 
meet the needs in the basin. This problem became most evident during the 
1976 drought,.when many communities were forced to undertake voluntary 
conservation and rationing. Rural residents were compelled to haul water for 
domestic use and livestock. In conjunction with reduced crop yields, this 
greatly increased interest in irrigation. Finally, to a much lesser extent, 
the basin also has problems with water quality, erosion, fish and wildlife 
losses, and recreation. 
IMPACT OF POSTULATED EFFECT 
The ~ostulated climate change would affect water resource management in 
two ways. First; it would affect water supply through effects on lake 
levels, streamflow, and groundwater recharge. Second, it would affect the 
regional demand for water, including agricultural irrigation, municipal and 
industrial water requirements, livestock needs, and lawn watering; In the 
Red River basin, potential evapotranspiration losses generally exceed 
precipitation. Therefore, furt~er changes in these variables may have an 
important and even synergistic effect on runoff by increasing water 
requirements and reducing the supply. 
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Effect on Supply 
A carbon dioxide-induced climate change can have a significant effect on 
runoff in the Red River basin. This is largely because small changes in 
precipitation and temperature have a considerable amplification effect on 
runoff. For example, Nemec and Schaake, using the deterministic Sacramento 
soil moisture accounting model, superimposed a small climate change on two 
basins: one arid and one humid. 4 Both the dry basin in that study and the 
Red River basin receive approximately 21 inches of average annual precipi-
tation. The dry basin, the Pease River basin at Vernon, Texas, has a 
drainage area of 3,490 square miles, a mean annual precipitation of 21 
inches, and a mean annual runoff of 0.43 inches. They found that a 50 
percent reduction in annual runoff would result from a 10 percent decrease in 
precipitation and a 4 percent increase in potential evapotranspiration (an 
approximately 2 degree Celsius increase in temperature), a significant 
reduction caused by a relatively moderate change in precipitation and 
temperature. 
Langbein et al. developed an empirical relationship between average 
annual precipitation and average runoff as a function of weighted annual tem-
perature, as shown in Figure 2. 5 This relationship was based on representa-
tive data from twenty catchments throughout the contiguous United States. 
The curves show average runoff reductions for a given decrease in average 
annual precipitation or an increase in average annual temperature. These 
curves can be used to superimpose a carbon dioxide-induced change in these 
climate variables on almost any basin to get a generalized evaluation. 
Stockton and Boggess used this relationship to assess the effects in the 
Souris-Red-Rainy region. 6 Their work assumes a uniform distribution of 
climate changes throughout the year. They found that average annual runoff 
would decrease by 45 percent with a 10 percent decrease in precipitation and 
a 2 degree Celsius increase in temperature, which agrees well with Nemec and 
Schaake for a dry basin. Table 1 shows the impact on annual flows at 
selected stations on the Red River. The reductions are very significant. 
The projected flow at Emerson could be as much as 500,000 acre-feet less than 
what presently occurs at Grand Forks, North Dakota. 
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Figure 2 
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Table 1 
AVERAGE ANNUAL FLOWS IN THE RED RIVER BASIN 
UNDER PRESENT AND PROJECTED CONDITIONS 
(In Acre-Feet) 
Fargo, North Dakota 
Grand Forks, North Dakota 
Emerson, Manitoba 
Present Average 
Annual Discharge 
401,400 
1,845,000 
2,387,000 
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Scenario Average 
Annual Discharge 
220,800 
1,014,800 
1,312,800 
Reservoirs are useful for mitigating the effects of climate variability. 
Nemec and Schaake investigated the impact on the reservoir storage-yield 
relation for the same arid and humid basins discussed previously. 7 The 
storage-yield relation is the amount of water that can be reliably released 
for a given storage capacity. The simulated streamflow data from the deter-
ministic model were used as input to a large hypothetical reservoir. The 
reservoir was assumed to be full at the start of the period of record. 
Storage deficits were then observed. The hypothetical reservoir of concern, 
on the Pease River, would yield 10 percent of the mean annual flow with 90 
percent reliability and a storage capacity equal to 10 percent •Of the mean 
annual historic flow. This study shows that a 10 percent reduction in 
precipitation and a 4 percent increase in potential evapotranspiration would 
result in a 25 percent reduction in reservoir yield. 
In terms of water reserve, Stockton and Boggess, in their study of the 
Souris-Red-Rainy basin, found the ratio of total available storage to average 
annual flow for the present condition and for the scenario condition to be 
1.7 and 3.1 respectively. 8 Hence, it would take approximately 1.7 years to 
refill the reservoirs to their capacity today were they to be drained, and 
3.1 years to refill them to full capacity under a carbon dioxide-induced 
climate regime. 
The real impacts of any reduction in flow should be evaluated in 
comparison to required demand. Stockton and Boggess have determined this for 
the Souris-Red-Rainy basin (see Table 2). This table suggests that the 
supply would be more than that required for water supply needs in the basin. 
However, it must be noted that the basin would be affected by a climate 
change not so much through changes in the average conditions as through 
changes in the frequency of extreme conditions. Drought incidence and the 
duration and intensity of drought would increase. Furthermore, variations in 
the requirement-supply ratio do not necessarily reflect the most relevant 
impacts, which are experienced auring those times of the year when demand is 
high and supply is low. And it does not cons'ider sequential variations in 
streamflow and demand. This may be important, considering that 75 percent of 
the average annual precipitation occurs between April and September. 
In addition, the study by Nemec an4 Schaake further corroborates the 
serious impact of such a climate scenario on reservoirs in the Red River 
basin. Future projects would be required to compensate for this change and 
meet the projected increase in demand for the next planning period. 
Furthermore, the projected demand under the present climate would increase 
under the hypothesized climate due to increased evaporation and the need for 
additional agricultural irrigation. 
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Table 2 
COMPARISON OF REQUIREMENT-SUPPLY RATIOS FOR 
THE PRESENT CLIMATE AND FOR A WARMER, DRIER CLIMATE 
Climate 
Present 
Estimated mean annual supplya 
Estimated mean annual requirementb 
Warm/dry scenario 
Estimated mean annual supplyc 
Supply or Demand 
(in billion 
gallons per day) 
6.1 
0.47 
3.4 
Requirement-supply ratio, present: 0.07 
Requirement-supply ratio, warm/dry scenario: 0.14 
(a) Assumes zero groundwater overdraft. 
(b) Projection through the year 2000. 
(c) Assumes no increase in evaporation rate from the present cli-
matic state. 
Source:. C. Stockton and W. Boggess, Geohydrological Implicacions of 
Climace Change on Wacer Resource Developmenc (Fort Belvoir, Vir.: 
U.S. Army Coastal Engineers Research Center, 1979). 
Effect on Demand 
The overall impact of a warm, dry future would be significant in terms of 
water supplies, agricultural production, and corresponding water demands in 
the basin. The basin's water supply is used primarily for irrigation and 
municipal and industrial supply. Consumption in the Souris-Red-Rainy region 
is now about 120,000 acre-feet and is expected to increase to 500,000 acre-
feet by the year 2000, due mostly to irrigation. Irrigation use is expected 
to increase from the present 15 percent to 74 percent, with withdrawals of 
340,000 acre-feet in 1975 increasing to 600,000 acre-feet in the year 2000. 
Irrigated farmland now covers about 36,000 acres and is projected to expand to 
311,000 acres by the year 2000. 
The regional economy, however, could change depending on the magnitude 
and severity of the climate impact. For instance, impacts on agriculture 
would be widespread, although not all are undesirable. A longer growing 
season would be associated with the warmer temperatures and would favor a 
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northward shift of the leading edge of wheat, corn, and soybean production. 
Such a shift would be economically desirable, even though it would be at the 
expense of existing crops. Soils in the area are suitable for corn and 
soybeans, although, in the absence of irrigation, moisture stress would limit 
the northward shift. Irrigation demands for surface waters are projected to 
remain at SO percent of the permitted allocation, given constant climate 
conditions. However, a warm, dry future might conceivably double the present 
irrigation withdrawals were farmers to make full use of their permits to 
replace lost precipitation. And shifts in crop production to more water-
dependent crops, such as corn and soybeans, would further exacerbate this 
problem. 
A warm, dry future would exert the greatest water-related stress on the 
urban residents and businesses in the Red River basin, because most local 
potable water sources for the cities are already overexploited. Farmers would 
compound this problem were they to continue to tap deep aquifers for domestic 
supplies and double their present irrigation withdrawals with full use of 
existing permits. And the degree to which they would do so would depend on 
climate impacts elswhere. For instance, although the United States is 
improving its production of most agricultural products, Karl Butzer of the 
University of Chicago suggests that the net effect of decreased precipitation 
and increasing temperature would be decidedly negative, and that increased 
production in areas with improved climate conditions could not balance the 
losses in the high productivity zones. 9 The Red River Valley, then, would 
become even more important than it already is as a crop-producing region, with 
corresponding pressures on its water resources. 
Inter-regional demographic change represents one important unknown in the 
larger climate change problem. For instance, if the agricultural base of the 
area expands, then the agriculture-related businesses that provide the 
economic stimulus in the region will likewise grow. Total population figures, 
then, would exceed current projections, and water demands would increase, 
imposing additional strains on water resources and the supply systems. Demand 
could seriously overtax supplies under these conditions and require that 
federal, state, and local interests coordinate and plan on a scale not now 
exercised in order to avert major crises and conflicts regarding the 
allocation and use of limited water resources. This latter action is made 
likely by joint control of these waters with Canada, and by local interests, 
which are very conscious of possible water shortages and which already compete 
with one another for the available water. 
REACTION AND ADJUSTMENT 
The likelihood of climate change must be acknowledged by water resource 
managers and the public if a corresponding reaction and adjustment in water 
resource management is to occur and be implemented in a timely and logical 
manner. A wait-and-see attitude is not warranted, as is shown by the Red 
River of the North reservoir experience mentioned above. Hence, in order to 
effectively ameliorate the impact of the predicted climate change, water 
resource managers must guide the public in a phased implementation strategy, 
one that systematically addresses the problem by revealing rational priorities 
for action through time. Such a strategy would result in a program through 
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which society could achieve the most efficient water use by the most practical 
and available methods that are within economic reason. 
The steps involved in the development -of a strategy might include: 
Step 1 Identify the magnitude and severity of the water problem and 
establsh an overall water resource management goal or goals. 
Step 2 Inventory potential supply- and demand-oriented water 
resource measures. 
Step 3 Evaluate those measures by analyzing their cost effectiveness and 
the impacts of their implementation. 
Step 4 Identify actions to minimize any adverse impacts. 
Step 5 Design the specifics of a response and implementation 
program. 
Step 6 Prioritize and phase in an implementation strategy. 
These steps need to be accomplished within the context of the larger 
public forum. Private individuals and organizations with an interest and 
authority need to be involved. The components of the response program need to 
be supported by an analysis in which costs, benefits, impacts, and 
institutional.and legal implications are evaluated and the constraints to 
implementation identified. And, to be effective, the strategy must be an 
integral part of a regional effort involving federal, state, and local 
interests. The evaluation and development of a long-range program is a major 
portion of the strategy, although a separate element might be devoted to 
developing emergency actions to deal with floods and other short-term water 
crises not presently anticipated in the base condition. 
Each of· the strategy steps will be discussed; however, additional 
emphasis will be placed on steps 3, 4, and 5 in order to better define the 
types of response that are available, the magnitude of the economics and 
impacts, and the actions required to minimize those impacts. Finally, we 
provide general guidance as to the most effective Red River basin response. 
Step 1: Identify the Problem and Establish Goals 
Initial investigations should elaborate on current state, national, and 
international goals, particularly with regard to significant hydrological 
conditions, apparent water issues, the relative responsibilities of public and 
private water agencies, and the people to be involved. A reliable estimate of 
current and projected water inventories and demands would form an important 
basis for this effort. 
Step 2: Supply- and Demand-Oriented Measures 
Given the base condition in the Red River basin, a number of alternative 
measures could be components of a phased implementation strategy. An inven-
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tory of these measures is presented in Table 3. Attention is focused on an 
inventory of both the supply- and demand-oriented measures specific for the 
Red River basin. The list is certainly not all-inclusive; however, it does 
include the kinds of measures that might work in the Red River basin. 
Measures with the greatest potential for success are starred(*). 
Step 3: Evaluate Measures 
Impact evaluation involves the assessment of the economic, environmental, 
or social effects of particular measures, whether positive, as in the case of 
the economic benefits of additional water supply, or negative, as in the case 
of the environmental damage that might result from water transport. Precise 
estimates of the economic benefits of the measures identified in Table 3 are 
difficult to produce. This is because the effectiveness of each measure 
cannot be readily established and because changing interest rates, inflation, 
and strict regulations have resulted in rapidly increasing developmental 
costs. The lengthy period of time between the initial planning and the 
completion of a water project further complicates the estimate. For 
simplicity of discussion, the benefits of any measure will be assumed to be at 
least equal to its costs. Preliminary cost estimates for the supply-oriented 
measures are offered by category in Table 4. These estimates are very 
approximate. However, they are valid for discussion purposes, since they 
probably represent the overall magnitude of expense in 2030 associated with 
the identified measures. Demand-oriented measures are much less costly to 
develop; however, their overall beneficial impact is also less. 
The estimated costs of such measures are large. However, the resulting 
economic impacts from inaction may be worse. Future business and economic 
activities, employment, public services, and the entire economic base may be 
seriously affected. For instance, rural communities and local farming 
operations would suffer increased transportation costs, less competitively 
priced products, and foregone profits were agricultural processors to become 
unwilling to locate in the basin. 
Adaptive responses can adversely affect streamflows. Supply measures 
that utilize additional groundwater can.be expected to result in increased 
streamflow caused indirectly by municipal and irrigation return flows. 
Storage measures, on the other hand, may reduce streamflows due to evapora-
tion, seepage, and transmission losses. The overall impact of the above 
measures would be best determined on the basis of minimum in-stream flow 
requirement. 
The social impacts of the adaptive measures include those impacts 
directly attributable to the measures themselves. These include the displace-
ment of people, businesses, and farms; effects on life, health, and safety; 
and impacts on the quality of life. However, demographic impacts would also 
occur indirectly, as a result of economic change. The unavailability of water 
for irrigation would severely limit rural economic and demographic growth, as 
would the inability of small communities to exploit the economies of scale 
typical of those required for water facilities. Patterns of regional growth 
might be affected, depending on the location of available water facilities. 
Growth in urban areas probably would be limited by potential water shortages. 
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Table 3 
POSSIBLE MEASURES FOR ADAPTING TO CLIMATE CHANGE 
SUPPLY ORIENTED 
Surface Reservoirs . 
1. Estimate the response of the five existing 
major reservoirs and revise their operation 
and management to best accommodate demand.* 
2. Expand storage at Lake Ashtabula as a 
supplement.* 
3. Develop new reservoirs on the Pembina, Red 
Lake, Sheyenne, and Wild Rice rivers, basing 
the design of storage on the largest 
historical drought conditions. 
Groundwater Reservoirs 
1. Use groundwater reservoirs for emergencies 
only. 
2. Increase infiltration for groundwater 
recharge. 
3. Identify new sources. 
Interbasin and Intrabasin Transfers 
1. Operate the Garrison Diversion project 
for water supply needs in the Red River 
basin.* 
2. Develop an interbasin transfer system from 
Rainy Lake to the Red River basin.* 
3. Use pipelines to transfer water from beach 
ridges on the east and hills on the west to 
the areas of need in the Red River Valley.* 
4. Expand the rural water distribution system.* 
5. Develop a water supply source from Devils 
Lake.* 
Supply Facilities 
1. Construct more off-channel storage 
facilities (utilize oxbows areas wherever 
possible).* 
2. Enlarge existing supply facilities.* 
3. Decrease water losses along conveyance 
structures. 
Runoff Control 
1. Increase water yield through soil 
conservation measures. 
2. Improve snow retention in upland areas to 
increase infiltration and water storage. 
Evaporation Control 
1. Control evaporation through the timing 
and type of irrigation. 
2. Use evaporation suppressants for the major 
bodies of water. 
Other 
1. Develop a weather modification program 
such as cloud seeding. 
2. Protect prairie potholes, wetlands, and 
other natural areas from ·drainage. 
3. Reestablish the windbreak program. 
* Measures with the greatest potential for success. 
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DEMAND ORIENTED 
Use* 
1. Introduce rationing. 
2. Eliminate nonessential outdoor 
uses. 
Recycling* 
1. Implement conjunctive water use. 
Economic Incentives 
1. Use pricing mechanisms. 
2. Introduce metering. 
Technology* 
1. Improve crop varieties, 
fertilizers, and pesticides. 
2. Introduce more efficient 
equipment. 
3. Modify facilities. 
4. Adjust on-farm management. 
Education Program* 
1. Utilize newspaper articles and 
ads, bill inserts, and pamphlets. 
2. Develop flyers, posters, and 
displays. 
3. Implement customer assistance 
and school programs. 
l 
Table 4 
ESTIMATED COSTS OF SUPPLY-ORIENTED MEASURES 
Measure Estimated Cost Range 
Surface reservoirs 
Groundwater reservoirs 
Interbasin and intrabasin transfers 
Supply facilities 
Runoff control 
Evaporation control 
Other 
$1.0-1.5 
150-200 
2-5 
40-50 
5-10 
50-100 
10-25 
billion 
million 
billion 
million 
million 
million 
million 
Finally, increased groundwater withdrawals may cause the soil moisture 
zone to recede, causing plant and animal communities to suffer drought and 
leading to a breakup of ground cover. If significant, this could result in an 
increase in surface erosion from wind and runoff and in the loss of wildlife 
habitat. Silt and sediment loads in surface waters could also increase. On 
the other hand, wildlife would benefit from a more permanent source of water 
for habitat adjacent to storage facilities. Such surface waters would also 
provide nesting and feeding areas for waterfowl. 
Step 4. Minimizing Measures 
The adverse impacts of particular adaptive measures can be minimized 
through careful, measured development. Certain impact-minimizing measures 
might be considered to assure that the overall management program is most 
effective and has the greatest chance of success. These might include 
measures to: 
o Establish critical plateaus as early-warning indices. 
o Reevaluate forecasts on a periodic basis to ensure that no additional 
or unanticipated changes occur. 
o Strengthen federal, state, and local response capabilities. 
o Establish a disaster program with insurance options. 
o Identify and utilize strategic irrigation scheduling. 
o Use crop residue management for the control of soil erosion and dust 
storms. 
o Prioritize measures in terms of their effectiveness, considering all 
impacts and costs. 
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Step 5: Design Response Program 
It would be useful to consider the full range of options open to society, 
their advantages, disadvantages, and their potential impacts before adopting a 
program of response and implementation. The selection and implementation of a 
response might best occur in conjunction with studies designed to reduce any 
uncertainties surrounding impacts. Such studies might: (1) integrate the 
effects of climate change and their solutions into a broader, basinwide con-
text, including all those infrastructure problems confronting the agricultural 
economy; (2) inventory and better identify the water needs on a case-by-case 
basis; and (3) adjust and provide midcourse corrections to any measures that 
are implemented. 
Criteria that might help society to formulate the desired response in-
clude completeness, effectiveness, efficiency, and acceptability. Complete-
ness is the extent to which a given measure provides for all the investments 
or other actions necessary to ensure the realization of the planned effects. 
Effectiveness is the capability of the measures to alleviate specified 
problems. Efficiency is cost effectiveness. Finally, adaptive measures are 
acceptable to the degree that they are compatible with existing laws, regula-
tions, and public policies and are acceptable to state and local entities and 
the public. 
Step 6: Prioritizing and Phase Response 
The development of a strategy for effective implementation might be the 
final step in a water resource response to.climate change. In the short-term, 
it might be useful to concentrate on study and selective research in order to 
develop a long-term response and complete this by the year 2000. A 
cooperative approach of all interested publics would best ensure that the 
water management strategy identified best represents what is needed to satisfy 
the needs of the basin. 
Primary research and further studies that might be emphasized in the 
short-term include studies to: 
• Refine the decision data and firmly establish the goals and objectives 
of the basin. 
• Establish economic and technical criteria for measuring development. 
• Define the effects a response will have on existing water systems. 
• Improve the financing of a specific response. 
• Identify guidelines for selecting and prioritizing the strategy's 
components. 
Large-scale demonstration projects might be established as a key aspect 
of the research. Such demonstration projects could be undertaken in order to 
determine the desirability and effectiveness of various large-scale measures. 
It would be useful to mesh this with other basin programs, thereby minimizing 
any redundancy of effort. 
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Once developed the long-term portion of the program might constitute the 
final action and implementation effort in the basin. A number of changes 
might be necessary in the present approach to water management in the basin if 
such a long-term program was to become a reality. These changes might include 
modifications to existing practices and regulations, institutional 
adjustments, different authorities and/or responsibilities, updated methods 
for financing, etc. Whatever changes are necessary, water resource managers 
will have to redirect thier focus in order to help arrive at a unified, 
cooperative, and acceptable strategy to the future water resource conditions 
in the Red River basin. 
SUMMARY 
This paper has examined a water resource management approach for the Red 
River basin in the event of a carbon dioxide-induced climate change. The 
impacts on the water resources of the Red River basin from such a climate 
change would be relatively moderate on a scale of negligible, minor, moderate, 
and major. An additional water supply would be required to compensate for 
these impacts, which involve both reduced water resources and increased water 
demand. This additional supply would translate into a large dollar invest-
ment. Generally, lead times of up to thirty years would be required for the. 
most ambitious of these projects; however, this schedule can be accelerated 
under emergency conditions. 
The foregoing approach for reaction and adjustment does not involve a 
call for massive action in new directions. However, it does focus on the 
importance of efforts to ensure public and governmental awareness of the pos-
sibility of changed future environmental conditions. In this regard, strong 
leadership is required from government and the public if water resource 
systems are to respond to any such change. 
Efforts to evaluate adaptive responses to possible climate change are 
very useful, especially efforts to identify where our knowledge is certain and 
complete and where it is weak. For example, it is clear that more research 
and observation needs to be done, not only to define with more certainty the 
direction and magnitude of carbon dioxide-induced climatic change, but also to 
better define the most likely hydrological response to it. The lesson of this 
paper, however, is that one must not assume unchanging climate conditions. 
Water resource managers must anticipate such changes, not merely react to 
them. 
Note: This paper reflects the authors' opinions and is not to be taken as an 
official statement of the policy of Corps of Engineers or the U.S. government. 
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CAN COASTAL COMMUNITIES ADAPT TO A RISE IN SEA LEVEL? 
James G. Titus 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Washington, D.C. 
INTRODUCTION 
The greenhouse effect poses a fundamental question: will its adverse. 
consequences unfold more rapidly than our ability to address them? Although 
the authors of this book disagree on how we should address the challenge, we 
are united by a common cornrnittment to ensure that our ability to address the 
consequences prevails. The possible solutions fall broadly into two cate-
gories: (1) slow or prevent global warming; and (2) accelerate the process 
by which humanity learns to live on a warmer planet. Both of these efforts 
require considerable research and policy implementation. Williams et al., 
and Johansson and Williams examine technical solutions by which we might 
shift away from fossil fuel combustion. Mintzer and Miller and Ciborowski 
and Abrahamson discuss policy options through which such a shift could be 
encouraged. Crist and Reinartz, Riebsame and this paper examine options 
through which society could prepare for the consequence of a global warming. 
Until now, most policy-oriented discussions of the greenhouse effect 
have centered on efforts to stop or slow the warming. Such an emphasis has 
been warranted by the growing consensus that the greenhouse effect is the 
most serious environmental threat that confronts mankind, short of nuclear 
war. As Roger Revelle suggested decades ago, mankind is conducting a 
dramatic, uncontrolled experiment on the planet. The momentum behind this 
experiment is very great and is almost synonomous with industrial society. 
By contrast, the constituency that would like to slow or stop this experiment 
is very small. Unfortunately, discussions of a global warming appeal to a 
very limited audience; most people are not interested in the greenhouse 
effect, energy policy, or environmental policy, despite their importance. 
History may show that the smaller constituency, which includes most of the 
authors of this volume, was right. 
However, academic foresight alone will not solve this problem unless we 
can draw others into the constituency. Thus, the actions that are necessary 
to prevent a greenhouse warming from proceeding past the danger point include 
many of the actions that are necessary for society to adapt to the more 
moderate consequences that may occur in the meantime. Most important is the 
need for public awareness. Groups affected by the greenhouse effect must 
understand its implications before they can work to stop the warming or pre-
pare to live with it. 
This paper examines the impacts of sea level rise on particular com-
munities and the measures that can be taken to avert the more serious 
consequences. We focus on sea level rise not because it is the most impor-
tant consequence of global warming but because it is the consequence for 
which our understanding of the impacts, constituencies, and possible 
responses is greatest. We describe the probable impact of the greenhouse 
effect on sea level; the physical and economic impacts of sea level rise on 
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Charleston, South Carolina, and possible responses; the impacts on wetlands 
loss in Louisiana; and the relationship between efforts to adapt to a global 
warming and efforts to prevent it. We conclude with three recommendations. 
THE EMERGING IMPORTANCE OF RISING SEA LEVEL 
Since the beginning of recorded history, sea level has risen so slowly 
that, for most practical purposes, it has been constant. This slow rate of 
rise has allowed plants and animals to thrive along coasts. At the mouth of 
the Mississippi River, for example, it has permitted the sediments washing 
down the river to form a great delta with thousands of square miles of salt 
marshes and cyprus swamps supporting alligators, eagles, fur-bearing animals, 
water fowl, and half of the nation's shellfish catch. Civilization has pros-
pered along the water. Although society has long recognized the dangers of 
Neptune's occasional outbursts, it could always be confident that the waters 
would recede to their original level after each storm passed. 
Recently, however, the assumption that sea level changes are unimportant 
to today's activities has been called into question. Along much of the 
Atlantic and Gulf coasts of the United States, relative sea level rise, which 
accounts for subsidence, has been about 1 foot in the last century. Coastal 
geologists have estimated that significant erosion, such as has been exper-
ienced along most recreational beaches, would be expected from such a sea 
level trend: The problem has been most severe in Louisiana, which has been 
losing over 40 square miles of wetlands each year, largely due to a relative 
sea level rise estimated at 3 feet per century. Furthermore, reports by the 
National Academy of Sciences and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
have estimated that the global sea level could rise 1.5 to 5 feet in response 
to the expected greenhouse warming. By contrast, it has risen only 4 to 6 
inches in the last century. 
Local governments are beginning to formulate strategies in response to 
current sea level trends. The decisions they make could involve millions of 
dollars per mile of shoreline and may involve controversy regarding in-
dividual and community rights. These officials view the prospect of acceler-
ated sea level rise from greenhouse warming as a sword that could cut either 
way. It may provide them with the momentum necessary to enact measures that 
are necessary anyway; but it could also overwhelm their efforts, or, if 
subsequently proven to be a false alarm, make their foresight look foolish. 
They want to know more about sea level rise but fear that they may have to 
act before they know enough. 
THE IMPACT OF THE GREENHOUSE EFFECT ON SEA LEVEL 
The earth's temperature is primarily determined by the amount of sun-
light the earth receives, the amount of sunlight it reflects, and the amount 
of heat retained by its atmosphere. Visible light from the sun penetrates 
the atmosphere and warms the surface, which radiates heat back to space. 
Carbon dioxide, water vapor, oxygen, and a few trace gases absorb some of 
this outgoing radiation, keeping the earth about 30 degrees Celsius warmer 
than it would otherwise be. Because the atmosphere allows light to penetrate 
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but retains heat, much like the glass panels of a greenhouse, this phenomenon 
is known as the greenhouse effect. 
Our understanding of the greenhouse effect has become more important as 
we have come to realize that humanity is increasing the atmospheric concen-
trations of the greenhouse gases. Atmospheric concentrations of carbon 
dioxide are expected to double in the next century. The National Academy of 
Sciences has concluded that such a doubling will raise the earth's average 
temperature by 1.5 to 4.5 degrees Celsius (3 to 8 degrees Fahrenheit). 1 The 
World Meteorological Organization and others estimate that emissions of 
methane, nitrous oxide, chlorofluorocarbons, and other trace gases will 
further warm the planet an amount equal to 50 to 100 percent of the expected 
carbon dioxide-induced warming. 2 
The expected global warming could raise the sea level by three mechan-
isms: thermal expansion, melting, and deglaciation. First, the upper layers 
of the oceans would expand with additional atmospheric heating. Second, the 
warmer temperatures would melt mountain glaciers and polar ice, with melt 
water running off into the oceans. Finally, the West Antarctic, East 
Antarctic, and Greenland ice sheets could begin to melt or even collapse into 
the oceans as the atmosphere warms, raising sea level by displacing ocean 
water. For example, glaciologists have suggested that the West Antarctic Ice 
Sheet could completely disintegrate over a period of several centuries, rais-
ing sea level about 20 feet. 
Two recent reports have estimated the possible rise in sea level in the 
next century. In the recent National Academy of Sciences report, Revelle 
estimated a worldwide rise of 2.3 feet by 2080 from thermal expansion and the 
melting of Greenland and mountain glaciers. 3 While noting that the deglacia-
tion of Antarctica could add 6 feet per century, on an average, beginning in 
the middle of the next century, he declined to add any Antarctica contribu-
tion to his sea level projection. 
In a recent report by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Hoffman 
et al. developed a variety of scenarios which take into account each of the 
major sea level rise determinants and the uncertainties that attach to each. 4 
Although they covered a much wider variety of possibilities than Revelle to 
predict the rise from thermal expansion, their methods for projecting the 
contributions of glaciers were extremely crude. They did, however, consider 
the possibility that an increase in snowfall in Antarctica would offset melt-
ing and deglaciation. They concluded that the existing evidence indicates 
that increased melting in Antarctica would overwhelm additional snowfall, and 
they projected that the most likely rise in sea level would be 0.9 to 1.3 
feet by 2025 and 3.0 to 4.4 feet by 2075. However, they did emphasize the 
necessity of additional model runs, and stated that a rise as low as 1.8 feet 
or as high as 11.3 feet by 2100-cannot be ruled out. 
CHARLESTON CASE STUDY 
This section summarizes the results of a study directed by· the Environ-
mental Protection Agency. The study considered the physical and economic 
impacts of sea level rise, the actions that people could take in response to 
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these effects, and the value of policies that anticipate them. Timothy Kana 
and others with the Research Planning Institute estimated the physical 
impacts; Michael Gibbs of ICF Incorporated estimated the economic impacts; 
and Robert Sorenson of Lehigh Unversity, formerly of the U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers, defined various engineering responses. 5 
The case study of Charleston used four scenarios of sea level rise, 
shown in Table 1. The trend scenario assumes a continuation of Charleston's 
historical rate of change in relative sea level. The low, medium, and high 
scenarios are consisten with the estimates of Revelle and of Hoffman et al. 6 
The high and trend scenarios are both extremely unlikely but cannot be ruled 
out. 
Scenario 
Trend 
Low 
Medium 
High 
Table 1 
SEA LEVEL RISE SCENARIOS FOR CHARLESTON 
1980 TO 2075 
(in centimeters [feet]) 
1980 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2025 
11.2 [0.4] 
28.2 [0.9] 
46. 0 [1. 5] 
63.8 [2.1] 
2075 
23.8 [0.8] 
87.6 [2.9] 
159.2 [5.2] 
231.6 [7.6] 
The Charleston study area consists of the land around Charleston Harbor, 
which is formed by the confluence of the Cooper, Ashley, and Wando rivers 
(see Figure 1). It includes all of Charleston and parts of North Charleston, 
Mount Pleasant, Sullivans Island, and James Island. Lower Charleston 
Peninsula, in the center of the study area, has a maximum elevation of only 
20 feet above sea level and includes several low-lying areas that have been 
reclaimed from the harbor. North Charleston, on the upper part of the 
peninsula, has elevations up to 30 feet. West Ashley, to the west of the 
peninsula, has elevations of 10 feet or less, and Mount Pleasant has eleva-
tions between 10 and 30 feet. Sullivans Island is a narrow barrier island 
with an average elevation of less than 8 feet. 
Although the Charleston area does not have a history of extensive hurri-
cane damage, its 6-foot tidal range exposes parts of the area to periodic 
flooding. The only major flood protection structure in Charleston is the 
Battery, located at the tip of the Lower Charleston Peninsula. This sea wall 
provides protection from a ten-year, but not a one hundred-year, storm. 
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Figure 1 
CHARLESTON STUDY AREA 
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Reprinted with permission from T. Kana et al. in M. Barth and J. Titus, eds., 
Greenhouse Effect and Sea Level Rise: A Challenge for this Generation (New 
York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1985), page 107. 
The Impacts of Sea Level Rise if Charleston Fails to Prepare 
The physical consequenceG of sea level rise can be broadly classified 
into four categories: shoreline retreat caused by erosion and inundation; 
increased flooding from storms; higher water tables; and salt intrusion into 
surface and fresh water. A rise in sea level would cause shorelines to 
retreat for two reasons. First, low-lying land would be inundated. Second, 
some areas with elevation sufficient to avoid inundation could be lost to 
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erosion. Higher water levels would allow storm waves to erode beaches fur-
ther inland than present levels allow, and they would reduce the efficiency 
of calm waves that normally dredge material off the bottom and push sand back 
onto the beach. Coastal geologists have shown that a rise in sea level of 
one foot can erode beaches from one hundred to several hundred feet. 
Since the water levels evident during storms could increase in elevation 
by the amount of sea level rise, sea level rise also would increase storm 
damage. This would increase the area of land vulnerable to storm damage and 
increase flooding in areas that are already in flood plains. Furthermore, 
beach erosion from sea level rise could leave some areas much more vulnerable 
to damaging storm waves. The case study did not focus on salt intrusion. 7 
Kana et al. estimated shoreline retreat and flooding, assuming that no 
additional protective measures, for instance sea walls or bulkheads, would be 
implemented. They also assumed that the existing protective structures would 
withstand the increased stresses of sea level rise. Table 2 summarizes the 
impacts of sea level rise on shoreline retreat and on the ten- and one 
Scenario 
No change 
Trend 
Low 
Medium 
High 
Table 2 
CHARLESTON STUDY AREA: SUMMARY OF DIRECT PHYSICAL 
IMPACTS BY SCENARIO 
(In Square Kilometers [Percent of Total Area]) 
Area Lost to Area 
Shoreline in 10-Year 
Year Movement Flood Zonea 
1980 b 30.8 [32.9] 
2025 1.8 [ 1. 9 l 32.9 [35.1] 
2075 3.9 [ 4. 2 l . 34. 9 [37.2] 
2025 4.9 [5.2] 35.7 [38.1] 
2075 14.2 [15.1] 45.0 [48.0] 
2025 7.8 [ 8. 3 l 38.6 [ 41. 2 l 
2075 28.7 [30.6] 58.5 [ 62. 4 l 
2025 13.0 [13.9] 41.4 [44.2] 
2075 43.0 [45.9] 69.4 [74.1] 
Note: One square kilometer equals 0.38 squ~re miles. 
(a) Includes area lost due to shoreline movement. 
(b) Total area in 1980 is 275 square kilometers. 
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Area 
in 100-Year 
Flood Zonea 
59.2 [63.2] 
61.1 [65.2] 
62.9 [67.1] 
63.7 [68.0] 
71. 2 [76.0] 
66.0 [70.4] 
78.7 [84.0] 
68.4 [73.0] 
83.9 [89.5] 
hundred-year flood zones for the years 2025 and 2075 under the four 
scenarios. The study area would lose 4.2 percent of its land by 2075 were 
current trends to continue. Under the low scenario, it would lose 5.2 per-
cent of its land by 2025 and 15.1 percent by 2075; under the medium scenario, 
it would lose 8.3 percent by 2025 and 30.6 percent by 2075. The impacts of 
the high scenario in 2025 are slightly less than those in 2075 for the low 
scenario. 
Figure 2 illustrates the projected locations of mean spring high water 
(the area flooded once every two weeks), the seaward limit for development in 
the area under the low and medium scenarios for 2075. 
Figure 2 
SHORELINE RETREAT UNDER THE LOW AND MEDIUM SCENARIOS FOR 2075 
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Reprinted with permission from T. Kana et al. in M. Barth and J. Titus, eds., 
Greenhouse Effect and Sea Level Rise: A Challenge for this Generation (New 
York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1985), p. 133. 
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The developed portions of the Charleston Peninsula protected by The 
Battery would not be threatened by shoreline movement under the low scenario. 
However, this structure would not prevent the inundation of a significant 
portion of the peninsula by 2075 under the medium scenario. Although a 
substantial sediment supply makes it less vulnerable to erosion than the 
typical East Coast barrier island, Sullivans Island could lose the first one 
or two rows of houses along the ocean by 2025 in the medium scenario, and it 
would migrate landward by its own width by 2075, destroying virtually all 
existing development. 
About one-third of the study area is currently in the ten-year flood-
plain, and about two-thirds is within the one hundred-year floodplain. 
Almost half of the study area would be in the ten-year floodplain, and three-
quarters in the one hundred-year floodplain by 2075 under the low scenario, 
even though the projected effects on flood-zone boundaries are small for both 
the low and medium scenarios in 2025. Over 60 percent of the. study area 
would be within the ten-year floodplain by 2075, and 84 percent would be in 
the one hundred-year floodplain under the medium scenario. By 2075, a ten-
year storm would flood approximately the same area that a one hundred-year 
storm would flood today. 
Economic Impacts 
No one can predict how individuals and communities would respond to a 
rise in sea level. However, certain assumptions about the response are 
required to estimate economic impacts. Responses include sea walls, levees, 
beach nourishment, and other engineering approaches, as well as planning 
responses like changes in the developmental mix, the curtailment of develop-
mental activities, and the abandonment of vulnerable areas. In the low 
scenario, Gibbs assumed that actions would only be taken to reduce the rate 
of shoreline movement. For the medium scenario, he assumed that more actions 
would be taken because the physical impacts would be larger and apparent 
sooner: (1) in 2020, structures would be built to reduce shoreline movement 
in the peninsula and West Ashley-James Island areas; (2) a sea wall on-the 
peninsula would be built to stop shoreline retreat and to protect the 
peninsula from a one hundred-year storm in 2060; (3) a low levee system in 
the West Ashley-James Island area would be built to reduce the rate of 
shoreline movement by an additional 75 percent. 
Table 3 shows Gibbs' estimates of the economic impacts. Under the low 
scenario, the impact would be $1.2 billion through 2075, more than 17 percent 
of the projected economic activity in the area. This figure would exceed 
$1.9 billion, or 27 percent of the area's economic activity, under the medium 
scenario. 
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Table 3 
ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF THREE SEA LEVEL RISE SCENARIOS 
ON THE CHARLESTON STUDY AREA 
(In Millions of 1980 Dollars) 
Scenario 1980-2025 1980-2075 
Low 280 (4.9)* 1,250 (17.3) 
'Medium 685 (12.0) 1,910 (26.5) 
High 1,065 (18.7) 2,510 (34.8) 
Note: Evaluated at a 3 percent discount rate. 
*Impact as a percentage of total economic activity in the study area. 
Planning for Sea Level Rise 
The adverse impacts of sea level rise can be reduced if communities and 
individuals prepare for them. Various engineering and planning options are 
open to society in anticipation of sea level rise. Engineering responses to 
the physical impacts of sea level rise concentrate on holding back the sea. 
The "hard options" include bulkheads, sea walls, levees, revetments, and off-
shore breakwaters. Soft engineering methods include beach nourishment (pump-
ing sand) and dune and marsh building. 
Planning actions differ from engineering actions in that they do not 
attempt to influence the physical impacts of sea level rise; instead, they 
try to adapt to these impacts. Examples of planning responses include: 
• the establishment of land-use policies that permit only certain types 
of development in low-lying areas; 
• a requirement that sea level rise be taken into consideration in new 
construction; 
• the acceptance of new development only in areas that can be protected 
later or are unlikely to be affected by sea level rise; 
e the establishment of post-disaster plans that prohibit rebuilding or 
repairing storm-impacted properties likely to be lost to erosion from 
sea level rise; 
• conditional zoning and other mechanisms to postpone investment in 
areas of potential hazard until we know how much the sea level will 
rise. 
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Each of these actions may be valuable in the Charleston study area. For 
example, sea walls and bulkheads may be appropriate for the peninsula area. 
Post-disaster plans could be a reasonable approach for coastal barriers such 
as Sullivans Island. 8 
The Value of Anticipating Sea Level Rise 
Table 4 compares possible responses to sea level rise with actions that 
might be taken to prepare for sea level rise, as prepared by Gibbs. Under 
the low scenario, Charleston builds a sea wall around the peninsula by 2030; 
West Ashley-James Island undertakes an enclave strategy, in which all new 
development after 2050 takes place in a protected area around Wappo Creek and 
investments near the first bend in the Ashley River are reduced. The actions 
examined for the medium scenario are similar to those for the low scenario, 
but the community takes them sooner. 
The overall effects of the various anticipatory actions on the study 
area are as follows: 
• Charleston Peninsula: less area is lost to shoreline movement and 
less storm damage occurs because a sea wall is built sooner; 
• West Ashley-James Island: the enclave strategy results in a small, 
protected, and intensively developed area; 
• Mount Pleasant: losses due to shoreline movement are reduced by 
incorporating future sea level rise into current and future designs; 
• Sullivans Island: investment is reduced so that when losses do occur 
there is less development to be lost or damaged. 
Table 5 reports Gibbs' estimates of the economic impact were the sea 
level rise to be anticipated. The economic impact of the medium scenario sea 
level rise without such anticipatory responses would be $1.91 billion. 
Anticipatory responses to sea level rise could enable the community to reduce 
this impact by 62 percent. That is, the estimated value of anticipatory 
policies is $1.18 billion. 
Anticipatory actions would require cooperation among the jurisdictions 
in the area. Protection of the peninsula would involve the cities of 
Charleston and North Charleston and the federally owned naval facility. The 
area west of the Ashley River includes James Island, the City of Charleston, 
and some unincorporated land controlled by the county. The amount of time 
necessary to coordinate the diverse interests is so great that today is not 
too soon to begin considering actions necessary twenty-five years in the 
future. 
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Table 4 
ACTIONS TAKEN IN RESPONSE TO AND IN ANTICIPATION OF SEA LEVEL RISE 
Shoreline retreat 
Response 
Anticipation 
Storm surge 
Response 
Anticipation 
Investment 
Response 
Anticipation 
Shoreline retreat 
Response 
Anticipation 
Storm surge 
Response 
Anticipation 
Investment 
Response 
Anticipation 
(a) Elevation of 18 
(b) Elevation of 22 
Charleston 
Peninsula 
West Ashley/ 
James Island 
LOW SCENARIO 
Reduce rate 75% 
after 2050 
Reduce rate 
after 2030 
No action 
Stop below 100-year 
storm surge 
after 2030a 
No action 
No action 
Reduce rate 75% 
after 2050 
Enclave strategy 
after 2050 
No action 
No action 
No action 
No action 
~~EDIUM SCENARIO 
Reduce rate 50% 
after 2020 
Stop retreat in 2060 
Reduce rate 
after 2010 
Stop retreat in 2060 
for surges below 
100-year elevationb 
Stop below 100-year 
storm surge in 2010 
No action 
No action 
feet. 
feet. 
Reduce rate 50% 
after 2020, 
75% after 2060 
Enclave strategy 
No action 
No action 
No action 
No action 
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Mt. Pleasant 
No action 
Stop retreat 
in 1990 
No action 
No action 
No action 
No action 
Stop retreat 
in 2050 
Stop retreat 
in 1990 
No action 
No action 
No action 
No action 
Sullivans 
Island 
No action 
No action 
No action 
No action 
No action 
Stop in 2070 
No action 
No action 
No action 
No action 
Stop in 2070 
Stop in 2030 
Table 5 
THE VALUE OF ANTICIPATING SEA LEVEL RISE 
Economic Impact Value of 
Economic Relative to Planning for 
Activity Trend Scenarioa Sea Level Rise 
Low scenario 
No planning 5,969 1,250 
(65)b Planning 6,775 440 810 
Medium scenario 
No planning 5,305 1,910 
Planning 6,485 730 1,180 (62) 
High scenario 
No planning 4,705 2,510 
Planning 6,105· 1,110 1,400 (56) 
Note: Impacts are in millions of 1980 dollars evaluated for a 3 percent 
discount rate after inflation and taxes. 
(a) Value of economic activity in trend scenario was estimated at $7,215 
billion. 
(b) Value of planning as a percentage of the impact incurred in the zero 
planning case. 
THE IMPORTANCE OF SEA LEVEL RISE TO LOUISIANA 
The Mississippi Delta (see Figure 3) was formed over thousands of years 
as the river deposited sediment along the river's mouth at the Gulf of 
Mexico. On both sides of the main channel, high ridges gradually formed and 
advanced into the sea; low-lying marshes formed farther away from the 
channel. Since this process lengthened the river's course, the river occa-
sionally diverted its flow into a shorter route to the sea. Previous main 
channels include Bayou La Forche and a route through Lake Pontchartrain. 
Thus, coastal Louisiana has several thin ridges along present and former 
distributaries of the river, along which most development has occurred. In 
between are thousands of square miles of wetlands on which the seafood 
industry, the Cajun culture, many fur-bearing animals, and birds, including 
eagles, depend. 
Most of us learned in school that the Mississippi Delta is growing into 
the Gulf of Mexico. Unfortunately, this is no longer the case. The natural 
processes that created and sustained the wetlands are being thwarted by human 
activities. 9 For instance, occasional river flooding used to deliver 
sufficient sediment for the marshes to keep pace with natural subsidence, 
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estimated at a few feet per century, and with the slow rate of sea level 
rise. But levees have now been built along the distributaries to protect 
developments from floods, depriving the wetlands of sediment. These levees 
do not extend completely into the Gulf. However, channels for navigation 
purposes, upstream reservoirs, and the diversion of water away from the minor 
tributaries have all acted to prevent the outer marshes from receiving sedi-
ment. Hence , the sediment that does travel down the river appears to go 
mainly out the main channel and off the continental shelf. 
Figure 3 
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As a result, Louisiana is now losing over forty square miles of land per 
year (see Figure 4). The barrier islands are breaking up, salt marshes are 
eroding away, and freshwater swamps are turning into open water. Further-
more , salt is intruding into freshwater swamps. At the current rates, two 
coastal parishes may completely vanish in the next century, as will most of 
the wetlands in Louisiana. Public officials regularly discuss the pos-
sibility that Baton Rouge will be on the coast, that Interstate 10 will be a 
causeway through the Gulf of Mexico, and that the nation's largest wetlands 
system and the species and industries that depend on it will be destroyed . 
Louisiana , it should be noted, has half of America's coastal wetlands and 
produces over one-quarter of the nation's fish catch. 
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Figure 4. THE ACTIVE MISSISSIPPI DELTA, 1956 AND 1978 
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In response to this development, the state of Louisiana has created a 
$40 million trust fund to research and test methods of mitigating and halting 
marsh destruction. Individual parishes are also spending millions of dollars 
per year to develop their own strategies. They are seeking increased aid 
from the Corps of Engineers, which has been involved directly or indirectly 
with most activities involving wetlands creation and destruction. 
However, the state of Louisiana, along with its parishes, needs better 
sea level rise projections than are currently possible. 1° For instance, if 
the rise is likely to be 4 feet in the next century, the state will have to 
either resign itself to the loss of virtually all of its salt marshes and a 
major coastal dike, or immediately develop a master plan for the supply of 
sediment to its wetlands. On the other hand, the current progress may be 
sufficient to maintain at least part of the wetlands if the rise is going to 
be 1 foot. But even a 2-foot rise in sea level could drastically change the 
relative merits of the response strategies now being formulated for, for 
example, Terrebonne Parish, which has a life expectancy of seventy rather 
than one-hundred years under such a scenario. 11 Given the long lead time 
needed to gain a public consensus on the massive public works that would have 
to be developed and/or dismantled, the decisions that these officials plan to 
delay until 2020 might be necessary in the 1990s. 12 As a result, Terrebonne 
Parish has become the first local government in the nation to officially 
acknowledge the importance of the greenhouse effect to its own activities and 
to call for additional federal research. 13 
OTHER IMPACTS OF SEA LEVEL RISE 
Research has been undertaken on the impact of sea level rise on other 
activities. A 2.4-foot rise in sea level would allow salt water to intrude 
10 to 20 miles upstream in the Delaware River, possibly contaminating parts 
of the Potomac-Raritan-Magothy aquifer in New Jersey, as well as Philadel-
phia's surface water supply during drought. 14 Significant beach erosion 
would occur at important beach resorts, including Ocean City, Maryland, 15 and 
Sea Bright, New Jersey, 16 and elsewhere. 17 Public works such as seawalls and 
coastal stormwater drainage systems would require important design changes. 18 
A rise in sea level could also destroy much, if not most, of the coastal 
wetlands in the United States. 19 A 5-foot rise could drown 80 percent of the 
marshes in Charleston, South Carolina0 which are less vulnerable to sea level 
rise than coastal marshes elsewhere. 2 
PLANNING FOR SEA LEVEL RISE VERSUS PREVENTION 
The Charleston case study and the situation in Louisiana indicate that 
the greenhouse effect and sea level rise will have multibillion-dollar 
impacts on society. Our analyses indicate that better for~casts and planning 
could enable coastal communities to avoid a large portion of the economic and 
environmental losses associated with sea level rise. Nevertheless, we should 
not lose sight of the fact that many adverse impacts would not be avoided. 
Although planning could save Charleston hundreds of millions of dollars, 
hundreds of millions of dollars in damages would still be incurred. The 
majority of Louisiana's wetlands will still be lost, even though planning 
would allow Louisiana to save a portion. 
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Hence, coastal officials in Louisiana and other low-lying areas are 
aware that they would lose even if greenhouse warming proves to be beneficial 
to society at large. Then why are coastal communities trying to adapt to sea 
level rise rather than advocating reduced emissions of the greenhouse gases? 
Influence and expertise are probably the major reasons. Local officials have 
little control over the composition of the earth's atmosphere, but they can 
have a major impact on the location of new construction and on the destruc-
tion of marshes. The officials are not experts on the technologies necessary 
to prevent emissions of the greenhouse gases. But communities that witness 
shoreline retreat and marsh disappearance due to sea level rise understand 
the need to prepare for the possibility that these trends will accelerate. 
People who are not interested in long-term energy or climate issues will 
listen when told that they can save money or wildlife through near-term 
adaptation, a fact that may favor an adaptive over a preventive response. 
Finally, a rise in sea level of a foot or so is probably inevitable because 
of the long lags in social, oceanic, and glacial cycles. Coastal cities 
would be greatly aided by efforts to limit sea level rise in the future, but 
they must consider responses to the rise that cannot be avoided. 
Nevertheless, people who favor efforts to prevent a greenhouse warming 
should not view adaptive efforts as counterproductive. As coastal and other 
communities investigate adaptive measures in the next decade, they will learn 
which of the impacts are favorable, which can be mitigated through adaptive 
responses, and which must be avoided. If most of the impacts fall into the 
latter category, these people will make their voices heard. Then, and only 
then, will it be politically feasible to prevent a greenhouse warming. Thus, 
efforts to promote short-run adaptation need not divert attention from the 
need to prevent the greater warming that could occur in the long run. 
Rather, they will give the preventive argument a more thorough hearing, 
raising public awareness as to what the greenhouse effect means to particular 
individuals, resulting in better understanding of the overall net costs of 
climatic·change to society. 
CONCLUSION 
Case studies of Charleston and other coastal communities show that the 
impact of a couple of feet of sea level rise could be extremely costly. By 
anticipating these impacts, individuals and communities can avoid many of the 
adverse consequences, particularly if additional research is conducted to 
provide them with better forecasts. In the long run, society may decide to 
take actions to prevent a very large rise in sea level; but coastal commun-
ities nevertheless must plan for the effects of a small rise in sea level, 
which is unavoidable. Toward that end, we offer the following recommenda-
tions. 
First, we must be careful not to alarm or confuse the public. Press 
reports about a possible 20-foot rise from a disintegration of the West 
Antarctic Ice Sheet accomplish little when taken out of context, which they 
almost always are. Bottom-line estimates are always interpreted as either 
too awful to contemplate and plan for or too far in the future to arouse 
serious concern. By contrast, sea level rise from thermal expansion and 
incremental melting is better established, will occur sooner, and will have 
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very important impacts, but is moderate enough that local officials can plan 
for it, at least in the United States. 
Second, the parties likely to be affected by sea level rise should use 
the available estimates to determine which of their projects, if any, would 
be vulnerable to a rise in sea level. Alternative strategies should be 
developed--for instance, strategies to enable coastal communities to respond 
as better predictions become available. These analyses can be used to show 
public officials that climate and sea level research has a well-established 
payoff, and they may eventually reveal that the costs of sea level rise make 
efforts to prevent a global warming viable. 
Third, the research community should structure its major efforts with an 
eye toward the interim use of its results. The course of human events may 
depend very greatly on whether we can say by 2010 that the West Antarctic Ice 
Sheet will disintegrate by 2200, 3000, or somewhere in between. But in the 
meantime, the success of coastal projects worth billions of dollars--many 
times the nation's carbon dioxide/climate research budget--will depend on our 
near-term abilities to say with some certainty when the sea is likely to rise 
1 or 2 feet. 
We conclude by emphasizing that concern for the greenhouse effect is not 
a new ultra-liberal cause. We are concerned about the protection of the most 
fundamental of values--our heritage. There is legitimate scientific dis-
agreement about the danger of a greenhouse warming, but cautious people will 
plan for a rise in sea level because they have more to lose by failing to do 
so, especially given the current trend of a 1 foot rise per century along 
most coasts of the United States. If the National Academy of Sciences is 
wrong, the greenhouse warming never takes place, and we plan for a rise in 
sea level a few decades before it occurs, posterity will say that we were 
unwise. However, history will be far less kind if we fail to prepare and it 
really does happen. 
Note: This paper was written in the author's private capacity. 
expressed herein do not represent the official views of the U.S. 
mental Protection Agency or the U.S. Government. 
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Appendix A 
OFFERED BY: Hr. B. Bonvillain. 
SECONDED BY: Hr. W. Henry. 
RESOLUTION NO. 84-0794 
A Resolution supporting continual research 
investigating the forecast of sea-level rise. 
WHEREAS, Terrebonne Parish loses 17 acres of land per 
day due primarily to subsidence and salt intrusion and at this 
rate all of our erodable land will be gone in 100 years, and 
WHEREAS, the Environmental Protection Agency and others 
have estimated that the expectPd greenhouse warming could raise 
sea-levels several feet by the year 2075, which would 
substantially accelerate current erosion, and 
WHEREAS, the Environmental Protection Agency has shown 
that current scientific kno~ledge is insufficient to state 
whether the sea will rise a~ little as 1 foot or as much as 5 
feet, but that additional research could s~bst~ntially reduce 
these uncertainties, and 
WHEREAS, in the next decade our strategies to stop land 
loss will require decisions that depend critically on whether 
sea-level is expected to rise 1 foot, 2 feet or more, and 
WHEREAS, other coastal parishes in Louisiana face 
similar problems with coastal erosion, salt intrusion and 
·relative sea-level rise. 
NOW, THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED that the Terrebonne 
Parish Council supports efforts by the Environmental Protection 
Agency and polar research scientists to develop forecasts of 
sea-level rise in the next century; and 
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that the Terrebonne Parish 
Council strongly urges our congressional delegation to be briefed 
and work for increased federal support of research that will 
enable scientists to develop forecasts of how much sea-level will 
rise in the next 25, SO and 100 years. 
THERE WAS RECORDED: 
YEASt N. Bergeron, Jr., c. Duet, A. Bonvillain, w. 
Henry and B. Bonvillain. 
NAYS: None. 
NOT VOTING: L,_Klingman, Jr. 
ABSENT: W. Bonvillain, Jr. 
The Chairman declared the Resolution adopted on this 
6th day of ~• 19:?4. 
* * * * * * * * * * 
I, PAUL A. LABAT, c~erk of the Terrebonne Parish 
Council, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and 
correct copy of a Resolution adopted by the -arish Council in 
Regular Session on June 13, 1984, at which m..-eting a quorum was 
present. 
GIVEN UNDER MY OFFICIAL SIGNATURE AND SEAL 0:-' OFFICE 
day of June, 1984. /;;.,_, ., -._,£! 
~PAUL A:L"~'f'7\/i_lrd--
COUNCIL C:LERK 
TERREBONNE PARISH COUNCIL 
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SECTION 4: GREENHOUSE POLICY INTEGRATION 
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INTRODUCTION TO SECTION 4 
The preceding sections have considered the feasibility of preventive and 
adaptive responses. This section considers how one might choose between 
these two very different types of policy response. There are many ways the 
choice can be made. It can be based on the feasibility or infeasibility of 
any one response. It can be based on cost or on the separation of impacts 
and emissions in time. Some analysts suggest that benefit-risk calculus is 
the best framework for assessment. Others consider the timing of necessary 
actions and the implications of that timing for present policy or the impli-
cations of the problem's irreversibility. 
Using one approach, one might look at the institutional demands of 
different responses and how well they fit the outline of the climate change 
problem. As is evident from the preceding sections, both preventive and 
adaptive responses can be effected by either the market or governmental ac-
tion. The market seeks to optimize the use of resources; as the effects of 
resource depletion are incorporated into the costs of goods and services, the 
use of these resources declines. As the technology of resource exploitation 
improves, the costs of resource use decline and the rate of use increases 
proportionately. By adjusting production and consumption to depletion and 
changing technology, the market can change the rates at which resources are 
used. As a result of market forces, the rate of increase in carbon dioxide 
emissions has declined markedly in recent years. 
By contrast, state action is often directed to sources of significant 
market failure. In responding to perceived deficiencies in the operation of 
the market, the state seeks to resolve basic social problems by directing 
market forces through the use of incentives and penalties or through outright 
regulatory action and police power. 
One can find many examples of market failure in the climate change prob-
lem. The market responds to present, rather than future, conditions and is 
largely oblivious to the future effects of present-day activities. It takes 
no account of the welfare of future generations and little or no account of 
the condition, either in the short-term pr the long-term, of the biosphere. 
It does not act to ensure an equitable distribution of income and resources. 
It sometimes fails to price resources to reflect depletion. 
Mintzer and Miller note that the climate change problem is particularly 
ill-suited to resolution by the market, and they address the need for state 
intervention. They argue that, due to poorly defined property rights and 
other factors, the market is not competent to limit emissions of carbon 
dioxide. Although the rate of increase in fossil fuel use has fallen from 
4.5 percent per year fifteen years ago to about 1.5 percent per year at 
present, some interventionist action will'be needed; the market, acting 
according to its own internal logic, will not be able to effect long-term 
ameliorative action. ' 
By contrast, the authors note numerous examples of succcessful types of 
state interventions in the marketplace. As a result of interventions in 
energy markets, it has been possible to significantly increase ~he rate of 
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end-use efficiency improvements. As a result of regulatory actions, it has 
been possible to limit emissions of some of the chlorofluorocarbons. Due to 
the responsiveness of the energy sector to pricing and other policies, it has 
also been possible in the past to intervene in energy markets to a signifi-
cant degree for 9urposes of environmental and social policy. 
The authors advocate a "middle road" response to the climate change 
problem, one that would take into account the costs of environmental change, 
which have heretofore remained outside of the economic balance sheet. Rather 
than seeking a purely preventive or a purely adaptive response, the authors 
suggest heightened state intervention in both energy planning and in those 
sectors of society most likely to be affected by changing climate. The 
authors recognize the complementary nature of preventive and adaptive 
responses. The debate between those who advocate one or the other of these 
responses is troubled, they believe, by an all-or-nothing attitude. The 
authors suggest that the regulatory power of the state be used to facilitate 
adaptation to a changing climate in affected sectors and to implement preven-
tive measures that would yield economic benefits in and of themselves or 
impose no net cost on society. 
It is possible to broaden the policy inquiry beyond such minimalist 
responses to include consideration of much more stringent actions. Some 
changes in climate will not be well suited to minimalist responses. Based on 
two very dissimilar physical descriptions of the problem, Lave, and Ciborow-
ski and Abrahamson consider the policy implications of such climate changes. 
Lave assumes the worst case to be a warming of 4 degrees Celsius by the 
22nd century, and within that context he considers the responses of 
industrialized nations. He considers three cases successively: the best 
case, a median case, and the worst case. Given the size of the climate-
sensitive sectors of the economy, he suggests that the effect of changes in 
the median case would, in terms of lost productive capacity, be something 
less than 2 to 3 percent of gross world product. The effects in the less 
developed countries could be quite traumatic. 
The author then directs his attention to the policy implications of such 
changes, and, although he acknowledges the significance of the losses in 
gross world product, he also argues that this does not provide much guidance 
with regard to policy. It would need to be evaluated in light of the costs 
of avoiding climate change. Further, it does not constitute a clear catas-
trophe for society. In the absence of a clear indication of a catastrophic 
change in climate, it will not be politically possible to restrict the use of 
the fossil fuels. Given present uncertainties about the future rates of 
carbon dioxide release, about the climate's.response, and about the response 
of society to the climate, Lave argues that it is impossible to demonstrate 
the likelihood of a catastrophic change in the climate. To the degree that 
we must reconcile ourselves to what is politically possible, preventive 
intervention is not plausible as a response to the prospect of changing 
climate. 
Ciborowski and Abrahamson adopt a somewhat similar approach in their 
assessment of the situation. Building from a physical description of the 
problem, they assess the degree to which the uncertainties in the climate 
-264-
change problem limit a preventive response. However, in contrast to Lave, 
they suggest that, although uncertainties in the present physical description 
of the problem are significant, they cannot be shown to constrain preventive 
responses as severely as they are often thought to. 
Based on an assessment of the parameters governing the rate of climate 
change, the authors initially conclude that without preventive action an 
average global warming on the order of 5 to 6 degrees Celsius is likely to be 
realized in the next century in the base case. From this, the authors 
describe the most probable warming and assess impacts at this level of global 
warmth. They argue that the impacts at this level are significant. The 
authors consider worst case parameters, which, given the range of values sug-
gested by scientists for climate sensitivity, the contribution of the minor 
greenhouses gases, and other factors, suggest a worst case warming on the 
order of 9 degrees Celsius. 
Worst case parameters, the authors note, effectively introduce society 
into a climate about which, essentially, nothing is known, and which, 
therefore, holds the potential for worst case outcomes. They conclude that 
adaptation to the changes is a tenuous proposition if only the rate of cli-
mate change is considered. At the regional level, climate change will not 
take the form of a simple linear movement from the present state to some 
unitary future state but will present itself as_a number of different climate 
changes. This will be particularly true as the planetary warming rises 
beyond the 3 degrees Celsius level. The more closely these changes are bound 
together, the more difficult it will be for society to adapt to them. 
Noting that the tolerance of society for such a change is questionable, 
the authors investigate the policy implications of limiting the average 
global surface warming below this level of unacceptable change. Using a 4 
degrees Celsius c~iling as a baseline, they find that, given realistic esti-
mates for the parameters governing climate change, preventive action, if it 
is to be effective, would need to be implemented in the immediate future. 
As the authors note, this assessment points to the need for realistic 
estimates of the physical parameters of climate change. It also points to 
the need for a more reasonable approach to assessment than is normally 
applied to the climate change problem. Too often, they argue, the best case, 
rather than the base or median case, or even the worst case, is used in 
establishing policy, and too often assessments of each case's likelihood of 
occurrence go unused. If such assessments are employed, the authors con-
clude, it is difficult to deny the imperative of a preventive response. 
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LIVING IN A GLOBAL GREENHOUSE: A COALITION BUILDING APPROACH 
Irving Mintzer and Alan Miller 
World Resources Institute, Washington, D.C. 
INTRODUCTION 
Many economic activities, including energy use and production, have 
undesirable environmental and social consequences. In most instances, these 
social costs are not incorporated into the market prices of products or 
services. Since the 1972 Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment, 
increased attention has been focused on these market externalities as 
scientists, energy analysts, and policy-makers have come to realize that 
global environmental concerns are central, not peripheral, to energy and 
development problems. Holdren, 1 Erlich, 2 and others have suggested that the 
most appropriate response to the energy problem might involve a course that 
both avoids the economic consequences of the availability of too little 
energ3 and escapes the environmental consequences of the consumption of too 
much. Mounting evidence suggests that environmental costs, rather than the 
unavailability of resources or "purely" economic costs, will form the ulti-
mate constraint to the future rate and type of energy use, and perhaps to 
economic activity in general. 
The policy implications of this constraint are best understood upon 
identification and evaluation of the environmental risks of human activities. 
Here the focus is on the causal linkages by which activities lead to actual 
or potential environmental damage including the linkages between activities 
undertaken in the research, construction, operation, or decommissioning of 
economic production facilities, insults to the immediate environment, and the 
pathways by which these insults translate into environmental stress and 
damage. 4 · 
Complete descriptions of environmental consequences trace all causal 
linkages. However, such complete information rarely exists. The most 
difficult problems often arise in investigations of the ways human activities 
affect complex physical systems; for example the oceans or the atmosphere, or 
in analyses of dose-response relationships. Because of these difficulties, 
many environmental impact assessments merely measure the initial effects of 
human activities, for instance the number of tons of the emission of some 
substance, rather than the consequences_of the emission. However, without 
more complete analyses, such figures must often substitute for better 
measures of environmental damage. 
Climate change resulting from the emission of greenhouse gases consti-
tutes one such problem, and it can therefore best be considered in light of 
such initial effects and of other qualitative indicators of severity, rather 
than quantitative measures of local insults or damages. Some typical 
qualitative information that is useful includes that related to: (a) the 
distribution of damages over space, time, and classes of victims; (b) the 
degree of difficulty and the cost of preventing or mitigating the damage; (c) 
the degree to which such damage is irreversible; (d) the response of the 
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environment to emissions or climatic stress; and (e) the degree of uncer-
tainty in these characterizations. In the following paper, we address 
various policy instruments for responding to the greenhouse problem in light 
of several of these--irreversibility, equity, and uncertainty--which make a 
purely market solution to the problem impossible. 
THE GREENHOUSE EFFECT 
Over the last century, the concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmos-
phere has increased by about 25 percent, from ap~roximately 270 parts per 
million (ppmv) to its present value of 345 ppmv. 5 The trend is continuing. 6 
Global combustion of fossil fuels in 1981 and 1982 resulted in estimated 
annual atmospheric releases of over 5 billion tons (gigatons, or GT) of 
carbon as carbon dioxide. 7 The atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide 
will reach twice the preindustrial level by the middle of the next century if 
fossil fuel use continues to grow at approximately the rate it has for the 
last ten years. But if carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuel use level 
off at the current annual rate of 5 GT of carbon, such a doubling will not 
occur for well over one-hundred years. 
In addition to carbon dioxide, other trace gases, many of which are 
present in the parts per billion (ppbv) range, can contribute to the 
greenhouse effect. These include methane, nitrous oxide, the chloro-
fluoromethanes, and others. The rates of annual release for these greenhouse 
gases have not been pegged so precisely. Graedel and McRae estimate that 
methane concentration has increased from about 1.6 to 1.7 ppmv between 1968 
and 1975. 8 Based on an analysis of ice cores, Craig and Chow suggest that 
atmos~heric methane concentrations were on the order of 0.7 ppmv before 
1500. Nitrous oxide concentrations appear to have increased from 290 to 305 
ppbv between 1970 and 1980. Concentrations of the chlorofluoromethanes 
(CFMs) which are unknown in nature, have increased over the last thirty years 
from nothing to 320 and 190 parts per trillion (pptv) in the cases of 
dichlorofluoromethane (CFC-12) and trichlorofluoromethane (CFC-11) 
respectively. 
The world scientific community now agrees that significant changes in 
global climate will occur as a result of the atmospheric buildup of carbon 
dioxide and the other greenhouse gases. 10 Most scientists agree that a doub-
ling of the atmospheric level of carbon dioxide will be accompanied by a rise 
of 1.5 to 4.5 degrees Celsius in mean global surface temperature, with the 
largest increases observed at the poles. 11 Chamberlain et al. have estimated 
that mean global temperature would roughly double again, were the atmospheric 
concentrations of the major trace gases also to be doubled. 12 Generally, the 
effect of increased concentrations of each of these other gases is thought to 
be additive. For comparison, the annual mean surface temperature in the 
northern hemisphere has varied plus or minus 0.5 degrees Celsius since 
1579. 13 
The observed increase in atmospheric carbon dioxide is primarily due to 
fossil fuel use in the northern industrialized countries. 14 Carbon dioxide 
is emitted when any fossil fuel is burned. Noncombustive uses of fossil 
fuels (e.g., the use of petroleum or natural gas as a chemical feedstock) 
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contribute little to increased atmospheric levels of carbon dioxide. How-
ever, most analysts have identified the biosphere as a modest net source of 
carbon dioxide, with deforestation for slash-and-burn agriculture, the clear-
ance of pastureland, and fuelwood releasing perhaps Oto 2 GT of carbon per 
year. 15 
No consensus has yet emerged regarding the main sources of nitrous 
oxide, methane, and other minor gases. Chamberlain identifies bacterial 
action in soils, industrial fixation, and fossil fuel combustion in the case 
of the former gas. 16 Biological processes, including anaerobic digestion in 
rice paddies and swamps, enteric fermentation in the digestive tracts of 
cows, 17 and anaerobic fermentation by termites, 18 are thought to contribute 
to the present upward trend in the atmospheric methane concentration. 
According to some analysts, other sources, for instance the ocean floor19 and 
the outer continental shelf, 20 also may be important. Increased tropospheric 
ozone concentrations are associated with an increase in the terrestrial emis-
sion of another gas, carbon monoxide, which competes with ozone for a limited 
atmospheric photochemical sink and hence helps to reduce the rate at which 
ozone is destroyed in the troposphere. The CFMs, which are used as aerosol 
propellants, in foam-blowing applications, as cleaning and degreasing agents 
in the semiconductor industry, and as refrigerants, are released to the 
atmosphere during routine manufacturing processes, spray can use, and through 
leakage from or the destruction of refrigeration units. 
The scientific attention directed toward the greenhouse gas buildup is 
motivated primarily by a concern for the risks resulting from changes in the 
global climate. Such changes would result in increased planetary heating, 
which will expand the upper layer of the ocean and transfer-water mass from 
continental glaciers to the sea. 21 Revelle estimates that the sea level 
could rise by as much as 70 centimeters (cm) in the next one-hundred years as 
a result. Analysts at the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency project a 
much larger rise in sea level, about 2 meters, associated with a 3 degree 
Celsius increase in mean global surface temperature. 22 In addition, some 
analysts have suggested that the Arctic sea ice could disappear in the summer 
and that the West Antarctic Ice Sheet could disintegrate, 23 although a major 
breakup of the West Antarctic Ice Sheet, which alone would raise sea level 5 
to 7 meters, is unlikely in the next two~hundred years. 24 
Such a large global climate change will also affect regional climates, 
which could in turn significantly affect the productivity of agriculture, 
forests, and fisheries. 25 These sectors are particularly sensitive to cli-
mate variations. Increased temperatures during critical growth periods can 
decimate key agricultural crops in certain regions. Changes in the timing 
and quantity of precipitation and in the rate of evaporation from the soil 
can affect local microclimates, especially soil moisture and its availability 
to shallow-rooted plants. Unseasonal rains can alter the productivity of 
rain-fed agricultural lands. Reductions in regional rainfall can render some 
irrigation systems less useful and promote the mining of groundwater. Hence, 
climatic changes could have a significant impact on the world's principal 
agricultural regions. In the wake of a global warming, growing seasons may 
increase in certain regions, but these may lack rainfall during critical 
periods, or may lack fertile, productive topsoil, which makes the larger 
global agricultural response, as well as the world food situation, something 
of a crapshoot. 
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THE PROBLEM FOR POLICY-MAKERS 
The formulation of policy is a difficult but important task for 
decisionmakers, particularly with regard to the greenhouse problem, which 
requires prudent public policies to forestall or cope with anthropogenic 
climate changes. But persistent uncertainties and unquantifiable measures of 
the severity of the impact of climate change suggest to many that any action 
is premature until further research is done. They assume that the signals of 
the market.are sufficient to guide society's choice of energy technologies 
and sources of supply. 
Unfortunately, it is extremely unlikely that market mechanisms alone 
will internalize the costs of a greenhouse gas buildup given the significant 
and unavoidable gaps in our present understanding. As a result, it will be 
impossible to incorporate environmental externalities into the price of 
energy services and other goods in the absence of governmental intervention 
in the marketplace. Fortunately, the government can direct market forces 
through various policy instruments (e.g. subsidies or preferential taxation), 
and thereby influence economic choices. 
The fundamental information problem has several elements. First, per-
sistent uncertainties continue to pervade our understanding of many aspects 
of the carbon dioxide problem, inhibiting the development of anything like a 
complete description of the physical processes involved. These uncertainties 
begin with the simplest pieces of information on the generation of the vari-
ous greenhouse gases and enlarge themselves into a cascade of uncertainties 
as one follows the chain of physical causation from carbon dioxide emission 
to potential local environmental change. For instance, the photochemical 
interactions of the various greenhouse and non-greenhouse gases are poorly 
understood at best. But it is clear that increased tropospheric ozone 
concentrations are related to increased carbon monoxide and methane concen-
trations; that methane results in part from increased surface emissions of 
carbon monoxide; and that carbon dioxide derives in part from increased 
methane emissions. The terrestrial sources of many of the gases are not well 
understood and the response of these sources to rising mean global tempera-
ture is poorly known, although it is believed possible that a warming could 
cause wetlands and continental shelf sediments to release significant amounts 
of methane and peatlands to release carbon dioxide. 
In addition, a large number of minor gases have only recently been 
identified, and their sources and future rates of release are not well under-
stood. The potential biotic contribution to increasing atmospheric carbon 
dioxide concentrations is also controversial. Some analysts suggest a net 
contribution of 5 GT per year through deforestation. 26 The debate is 
important, since this contribution figures as an important term in calculat-
ing the fraction of emitted carbon dioxide that remains airborne. This is 
typically estimated at 40 to 50 percent in conventional analyses but can be 
as low as 30 percent if high deforestation estimates are employed. 27 
Some other uncertainties, among many not mentioned, involve: possible 
changes in the fraction of emitted carbon dioxide that remains in the atmos-
phere as the upper layer of th~ ocean becomes saturated with dissolved carbon 
dioxide, the ocean's circulation slows, and the density of the polar waters 
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decreases with glacial melt; the overall sensitivity of the climate to 
increased carbon dioxide concentrations; countervailing effects (e.g., the 
effect of desertification-related tropospheric dust); the effect of unidenti-
fied processes involving the earth's major biogeochemical cycles; and poten-
tial changes in local temperature and precipitation, which might induce local 
environmental changes like desertification. There is no unequivocal measure 
of the probable impact on commercially important cereal-producing regions or 
fisheries; the dose-response relationships for most crops, forest species, 
and fish are not well known. It is not clear whether fundamental non-
linearities will occur in response to increasing levels of environmental 
stress, although such threshold levels have not yet been identified. Finally, 
since the current scientific understanding of the ocean/atmosphere system is 
limited, in the next several decades it probably will not be possible to 
predict the regional distribution of climate change or impacts. 
Second, without a comprehensive and systematic long-term record, it will 
be difficult to establish popular agreement about the reality of the carbon 
dioxide problem. Atmospheric scientists cannot reach a consensus about 
whether a distinct carbon dioxide signal can be identified in the recent 
record of climatic change. 28 They also disagree about the strength of the 
trend. With so much disagreement over the identification of potential 
sources of stress, policy-makers and others may be tempted to merely wait and 
see. 
Third, the problem is complicated by the inherently stochastic nature of 
the global climate. Even if humanity's activities did not modify the bio-
geosphere, natural interannual variation would occur in regional and local 
climates, and such variations can make it hard to associate specific local or 
regional effects with any one of the many potential sources of climate 
change. Hence, the establishment of strong causal connections between speci-
fic activities in one locale and variations in climate regimes in any other 
will be difficult, if not impossible. The problem of tracing causality is 
further complicated by time lags. Insults to the atmosphere today may not be 
expressed as climatic alterations for years or even decades to come. 2Y 
In addition, no obvious technical fix can be inexpensively applied to 
ameliorate the carbon dioxide/climate problem. Although several prominent 
American physicists assert that some method of scrubbing carbon dioxide or 
other greenhouse gases out of the atmosphere or from the ocean may be found, 
none has yet been identified. A reversal of climate changes will be diffi-
cult once a global greenhouse warming has occurred. 
A related problem, the CFC/ozone depletion problem, also complicates the 
analysis. The chlorofluoromethanes, which are very efficient absorbers of 
infrared radiation, are removed from the atmosphere through a set of upper 
atmospheric chemical reactions, .which also tend to result in the destruction 
of significant amounts of stratospheric ozone. This tends to increase the 
hard ultraviolet radiation received at the Earth's surface and therefore has 
important health and agricultural impacts. The rate of ozone destruction 
varies with stratospheric temperatures, which an increase in atmospheric 
carbon dioxide should depress. This places policy measures to limit global 
warming in opposition to the measures designed to prevent ozone depletion. 
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These problems combine with an incomplete or inappropriate recognition 
of property rights to create a typical "tragedy of the commons" effect. 
Since causal relationships between specific insults and observed damages to 
the common property cannot be established, liability would be difficult to 
assess, and the incorporation of the costs of observed damages into indi-
vidual market transactions would be difficult. Few individuals would have an 
incentive to absorb the costs of the emission of the greenhouse gases, even 
if responsibility for environmental impacts could be attributed to the 
commission of certain acts (e.g., the burning of fossil fuel in a car or a 
furnace). Nor would it be easy to establish a mechanism whereby the bene-
ficiaries or sellers of energy services could find, much less compensate, the 
"victims" of climate change. Even if the victims could be found, the mone-
tary value of the damages or the extent of any party's liability would be 
difficult to assess. What rules would apply? Should everyone who knowingly 
burned fossil fuels be held equally culpable? Should a penalty be applied to 
each transaction in proportion to the amount of carbon in the fuel consumed? 
Should the selling price for goods or services include a consideration for 
impacts from carbon dioxide that might have been released in materials pro-
duction or manufacturing operations? Should compensatory intergovernmental 
payments account for differences in national populations and fossil fuel use? 
If so, who should pay whom? 
With inappropriate or unrecognized property rights and only incomplete 
information linking buyer, seller, and victim, market mechanisms alone are 
not likely to capture these externalities. Nor are scientists likely to 
resolve the persistent uncertainties in the next few decades. Thus, prudent 
public policy must either be formulated to incorporate market-like mechanisms 
to influence economic choices among energy technologies and industrial 
compounds or otherwise deal with the large potential consequences of a green-
house warming in the face of risk, ambiguity, and uncertainty. 
THE CURRENT POLICY DEBATE: TWO POLAR VIEWS 
In recent years, two schools of thought have emerged regarding policy 
responses to the greenhouse problem. These two schools--one stressing adap-
tation to what it perceives as inevitable climate changes and the other 
emphasizing preventive approaches to the atmospheric accumulation of the 
carbon dioxide--are often treated as mutually exclusive. The adaptive 
approach reflects a series of assumptions which we oversimplify here for 
discussion purposes. This approach presupposes the inevitability of global 
warming due to the buildup of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases in 
the atmosphere, and hence presupposes the need for society to prepare for a 
new climate regime. Many believe that energy demand is inflexible and 
unresponsive to policy changes and that timely reductions in fossil fuel use 
are all but impossible. 30 They perceive few or no alternatives to fossil 
fuels that are either economically attractive or can penetrate the market 
fast enough to make a difference before the middle of the next century, when 
the atmospheric conc.entration of carbon dioxide is likely to have doubled. 
Some proponents of the adaptive approach forecast a rather slow rate of 
change in the climate, with a correspondingly long transition period. They 
argue that it may be possible to adapt incrementally to a warmer climate 
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through gradual poleward extension of agricultural production, forestry 
activities, and the infrastructure required for commercial development. 
Others stress the need to prepare immediately for the effects of un-
checked global warming. To prepare for hot, dry years in the cereal-growing 
regions of the midwestern United States, for example, some contend that it 
may be necessary to breed new crop species through genetic engineering. It 
is believed essential to develop drought-resistant varieties through 
selective breeding programs and to improve water-use efficiency and water 
management practices. As a hedge against the breakup of the West Antarctic 
Ice Shelf, some advocate planning for the relocation of coastal cities in-
land, while others focus on the need to exercise extreme care when siting 
long-lived facilities and new infrastructure. 
Advocates of prevention would preserve the Earth and its atmosphere as 
we know them, seeking not only to reduce the rate of increase in fossil fuel 
use but also to reduce the absolute amount of carbon dioxide and other 
greenhouse gases annually released into the atmosphere. The more extreme 
preservationists would reduce fossil fuel use at all costs, either through 
the widespread use of renewable energy sources or through significantly 
increased energy end-use efficiency. Coal combustion is a special target, 
since about twice as much carbon dioxide is released per unit of energy 
supplied during the combustion of coal as during the combustion of natural 
gas (24.6 million metric tons [MTe] of carbon per exajoule compared with 13.7 
MTe), and about 1.4 times as much carbon dioxide is released per unit of 
ener~i supplied during the combustion of coal as during the combustion of 
oil. There has also been discussion of preventive solutions involving 
fission technologies, which, it might be noted, would produce other environ-
mental risks at least as threatening as a greenhouse warming. A more 
mainstream approach would reduce the use of fossil fuel through improved 
energy efficiency and through the use of renewable energy sources wherever 
they can compete economically with fossil fuel. 
Some advocates of prevention would also control the release of the other 
greenhouse gases. However, the costs and difficulty of limiting trace gas 
emissions are not well known at this time. Methane and nitrous oxide may 
prove difficult to control, since the sources and sinks for these gases have 
not yet been well identified or quantified. Alternative compounds for some 
important industrial uses of the chlorofluorocarbons have not yet been 
identified, though economically competitive alternatives exist for some CFM 
applications, notably aerosol propellants and cleaning agents in semi-
conductor manufacturing. 
FINDING A MIDDLE ROAD 
In view of the potential global impacts of a greenhouse warming, we 
believe that systematic and comprehensive policies must be formulated now to 
enable society to respond to the prospect of anthropogenic climate change. 
Although uncertainties and ambiguities in the atmospheric research persist, 
only quick action will minimize the risks inherent in such a climate change 
and allow us to mitigate some of the negative impacts. Such action need not 
necessarily be exclusively of a preventive or adaptive nature; the choice 
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between adaptive and preventive strategies is useful only as a classification 
device. However, some policy action is necessary, since we risk exacerbating 
the problem through delays incurred while all the ambiguities are resolved. 
The carbon dioxide problem is only one element of a linked network of 
policy questions related to energy policy, global climate change, and clean 
air. The carbon dioxide buildup cannot be treated separately from the 
accumulation of other greenhouse gases, since the effects of an atmospheric 
buildup of other greenhouse gases would be similar to those of carbon 
dioxide-induced warming. Policy reponses to the larger greenhouse problem 
also cannot be evaluated in isolation. It is important to design national 
energy strategies and global development programs that address many other 
interlocking issues--for instance, the ongoing changes in the chemical 
composition of the atmosphere, as raised by acid rain and ozone depletion. 
The middle road proposed here involves a least-cost solution to the 
greenhouse problem, one that takes account of the social and environmental 
costs that have not until now appeared on the economic balance sheet. The 
main elements of this program, which evolved at the World Resources Institute 
(WRI) Conference on the Global Possible, follow from three functional goals: 
(1) the preservation of the basic physical and chemical characteristics of 
the atmosphere through measures that are both technically feasible and 
economically efficient; (2) the timely identification of the impacts of human 
activities on the atmosphere; and (3) the mitigation of disruptive changes in 
climate, whether from a greenhouse warming or other causes. 
PROPOSALS FOR ACTION 
Although large and significant uncertainties remain, scientists now know 
enough about atmospheric problems to propose immediate action to hedge 
against plausible risks. Below, we propose such a program of immediate 
action built upon recent research which suggests that it may be possible, 
although costly, to prevent some of the impending climate changes through 
changed energy and industrial policies, and through measures that facilitate 
societal adaptation. 
Improving the Efficiency of Energy Use 
Efforts to improve the efficiency of energy use constitute the most 
important step toward the control of carbon dioxide emissions, and hence 
toward the amelioration of future climate changes. Such an effort would need 
to be pursued internationally, since fossil fuel combustion is increasing 
worldwide. Tax, trade, and fiscal policies can be used to encourage the 
elimination of outright waste and increase the efficiency with which energy 
is used. 
Such policies provide multiple benefits. A more efficient use of oil 
lessens dependence on petroleum imports. Conservation and the use 'of alter-
native fuels to coal and petroleum reduce the amount of acid rain, carbon 
dioxide, nitrogen dioxide, and other trace gases produced in or released to 
the atmosphere, especially when coal is replaced by non-fossil fuel alterna-
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tives. Conversely, most air pollution clean-up programs reduce emissions of 
one or more greenhouse gases while restricting the emission of particulate, 
lead or other non-greenhouse gases. For example, controls on the emissions 
of the chlorofluoromethanes would limit the degree of possible future climate 
change and limit CFM-induced destruction of stratospheric ozone. 
Numerous studies in recent years have demonstrated the potential for 
substantially improved energy end-use efficiency. Williams et al. have 
identified numerous technically feasible measures to improve the efficiency 
of energy use in the industrial, residential, transportation, and commercial 
sectors. 32 Non-fossil alternative technologies could satisfy heating and 
cooling demands and supply electricity, shaft power, and liquid fuels in 
wide-ranging end-use applications. In some applications, these technologies 
need cost no more per unit of energy saved than fossil fuels per unit of 
energy supplied. The Congressional Research Service (CRS) has compared two 
strategies for meeting the U.S. demand for electrical services through the 
year 2000. 33 One plan was based on traditional investments in large central 
station power plants and the other on a·combination of investments in im-
proved efficiency, load management, waste heat recovery (cogeneration), and 
renewable energy supply technologies. CRS concluded that alternatives to 
additional central station electrical generation capacity were available at a 
cost of about half that of new power plants, even without continued plant 
cost escalation. 
Numerous studies have produced similar results for specific regions, 34 
for specific sectors, 35 and for specific states. 36 In each case, the least-
cost approach requires no additional base load power plants. Hence, although 
the economic feasibility of the rapid and widespread introduction of such 
conservation measures has not yet been completely and systematically eval-
uated, it appears to be possible to substantially improve energy end-use 
efficiency, as is suggested by recent research and by the uncoupling, over 
the last decade, of total energy use and regional economic growth. 37 
The effectiveness of such measures has also been considered. One recent 
study has suggested that annual U.S. emissions of carbon dioxide could be 
reduced by as much as 30 percent without reducing the physical output of 
goods and services. 38 This would involve. the widespread use of currently 
available energy conservation measures and the substitution of solar and 
wind-electric systems for a fraction of the oil and gas-fired electricity 
generation capacity. 
Of course, net reductions in energy use will not be possible among the 
poorest segments of the world's population, which will require more energy. 
The electrical generating capacity of the less developed countries will 
probably also need to expand, and hydroelectric systems and other renewable 
energy technologies may not be available or economical in many cases. How-
ever, development should be possible with less energy than is consumed in the 
now-industrialized nations, a fact of considerable importance to future 
atmospheric carbon dioxide levels. 39 Also important is the fact that a rela-
tively small number of countries are resgonsible for a significant percentage 
of the world's fossil fuel consumption. 4 Even allowing for significant 
growth in the developing countries, this relationship will continue for some 
time. Thus, action by relatively few countries could make a substantial 
difference. 
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Chlorofluoromethane Control and Reforestation 
The chlorofluoromethanes are extremely efficient absorbers of infrared 
radiation. Emissions of chlorofluoromethanes can be controlled through 
measures that restrict their aerosol uses. The marginal cost of such 
measures has been investigated and shown not to be economically prohibitive 
in the United States, where a ban reduced emissions more than 50 percent. 
The effect of measures taken in the United States, Canada, and elsewhere is 
evident in annual emissions of CFC-12 and CFC-11, which dropped from an 
estimated 0.4 and 0.33 million tons, respectively, in 1973 to approximately 
0.36 and 0.27 millions tons, respectively, in 1979. 41 Much smaller reduc-
tions have been achieved in some countries and in some of the other major 
uses, suggesting that significant further reductions can still be implemented 
at a low cost. Studies done for the Environmental Protection Agency have 
also demonstrated that at least some reductions in nonaerosol emissions can 
be achieved at a reasonable cost. 42 
Controls on deforestation constrict a source of carbon dioxide, and net 
reforestation withdraws carbon from the atmosphere and permanently stores it 
in the terrestrial biota. By the same token, provisions for unpredictable 
weather require many of the same steps as adaptation to climate change, 
whether the change be induced by greenhouse gases, increased volcanic 
activity, or long-term variations in solar output. 
Recommendations 
The following recommendations reflect all these considerations: 
• Energy planning must account for the possibility of global warming. 
This requires a significant effort to promote conservation and improve 
the efficiency of energy use. A high priority must be placed on the 
flexibility and diversity of supply, and on an increased reliance on 
solar and other non-carbon energy sources. Due attention must be 
given to the inadvertent environmental impacts of these alternatives. 
• Research is needed to help all nations meet their energy needs without 
increasing the risks of a global climate change. Long-term energy 
needs are best understood through the analysis of energy end-use 
services. Special attention must be given to energy efficiency oppor-
tunities in the industrial countries, as well as to mechanisms to help 
developing countries meet their energy supply needs. Nations should · 
not be forced to choose between energy shortages and increased risks 
of climate change. 
• Nations should be encouraged to avoid policies that result in the sub-
sidization of fossil fuels use or that commit the world to the large-
scale, long-term use of coal or oil shale. Coal has an important 
transitional role to play in the energy future of many countries, but 
its use should be governed by the need to limit the atmospheric build 
up of carbon dioxide to tolerable levels. Industrialized countries of 
the northern hemisphere, as the largest emitters of carbon dioxide, 
must take the lead in reducing rates of fossil fuel use. Special 
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attention should be directed to policy instruments that encourage 
full-cost (including environmental costs) pricing of energy tech-
nologies and supplies and that eliminate preferential subsidies. In 
this process, adequate consideration must be given to the needs of the 
poor, although not necessarily through the subsidization of energy 
prices. 
o Global deforestation trends should be reversed and reforestation 
efforts encouraged. 
o Since not all climate change can be prevented, systematic plans are 
necessary to help society adapt to the changed frequencies of drought 
and other extreme weather events and to a slow rise in sea level. 
Appropriate policies include: improved water management in agricul-
tural and industrial areas; expanded emergency preparedness programs; 
low-cost credit program for disaster relief; and careful siting for 
long-lived facilities such as dams and toxic waste dumps. 
Proposals for Further Research 
Much recent research on atmospheric contaminants has been conducted in a 
crisis-response mode and has been in response to government concern about the 
consequences of such contaminants. However, an intensified long-term program 
of study of atmospheric processes might constitute a far more effective 
approach, perhaps broadening pre-crisis insights into the physical aspects of 
atmospheric problems. Early studies might also help avoid some of the 
polarization inherent in crisis calculations, whether that polarization be 
industry against environmentalists or rich countries against poor countries. 
Research on the role of the oceans and the biosphere in the emission and 
storage of carbon dioxide, and on the effect and rates of release of non-
carbon dioxide greenhouse gases, should be greatly expanded. Programs should 
be established to investigate the regional implications of increased mean 
global surface temperature, especially the effects on rainfall and soil arid-
ity, and the synergistic effects of multiple environmental stresses on human 
health and ecosystems. Research is not now directed toward the possible 
interactions between ultraviolet radiation, carbon dioxide, drought, and 
other factors. Research on new techniques for improving water-use efficiency 
should be pursued, especially since it may be essential to any effort to 
maintain productive agriqulture and forest areas in dry years. Expanded 
research and selective breeding is also necessary to identify and develop 
drought-resistant varieties of major agricultural crops. 
The quality of the present global monitoring network should also be sub-
stantially improved. More stations are needed, as are increased efforts to 
obtain consistent, reliable data on the trends in atmospheric chemistry and 
in sea-surface and other temperatures. 
Other important research is more closely related to policy evaluation. 
Greater efforts should be made to develop new ideas and new methods for the 
capture and disposal of combustion-derived carbon dioxide. Economic and 
environmental research should be pursued to better quantify the value of any 
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damages due to climate change, especially since such research will provide 
the basis for cost-benefit analyses of the various control options for carbon 
dioxide and other greenhouse gases. Such research may also provide the basis 
for evaluating competing adaptive and preventive responses. 
Existing mechanisms for the official exchange of scientific information 
tend to be ad hoc and slow. This results from the narrow disciplinary bounds 
within which the flow of information is often constrained. In addition, com-
munication with the centrally planned economies, which is vital in any effort 
to slow the present increase in the atmospheric concentration of carbon 
dioxide, has tended to be less than effective. The developing countries have 
not been well informed of their stake in these issues. 
A number of mechanisms might be created to rectify this situation. The 
United Nations Environmental Programme's Climate Impact Study Program and the 
World Meteorological Organization's World Climate Program should be expanded 
and given regular, long-term funding. The proposed International Biosphere-
Geosphere research program sponsored by the International Council of 
Scientific Unions should be given strong support. A formal, multi-year 
exchange program for energy analysts and atmospheric scientists from the 
United States, the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, Japan, and 
the European Community should be initiated immediately to study energy 
conservation opportunities and plan coordinated responses to the greenhouse 
problem. All these measures may substantially increase the exchange of 
scientific and policy information, and hence should be pursued. 
REASONS FOR OPTIMISM 
Several cogent arguments have been advanced as to why we should expect 
opposition to a program like that which we propose. First, analysts have 
noted that such proposals require action in advance of a clear demonstration 
of the damage caused by climate change, and perhaps in advance of evidence of 
a clearly distinguished upward trend in global temperatures. Governments, on 
the other hand, have historically been slow to respond to environmental 
problems until their seriousness has been categorically proved. It has been 
noted that initiatives to encourage changes in energy use patterns, such as 
those we have offered, will have to be implemented in the context of numerous 
other societal goals (e.g. economic growth, national security, other 
environmental concerns), some of which may conflict with the pursuit of 
substantial reductions in fossil fuel consumption. Some analysts also have 
questioned whether government policies forceful enough to significantly cur-
tail the use of fossil fuels can be implemented. 43 Since economic growth and 
patterns of energy use imply continually increased emissions, they argue that 
the prospects for significantly reduced emissions are virtually nil over any 
time horizon of interest. The considerable energy price increases already 
experienced are cited as evidence that high taxes or other meaningful con-
trols on fossil fuels will not be easily implemented. 
It is also noted that proposals similar to ours require a cooperative 
international solution of the kind that is most likely to evolve in the 
presence of information that identifies the major greenhouse gas emitters as 
the nations that are most likely to be adversely affected--a condition that 
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cannot be satisfied at present. This has opened the door for optimism with 
regard to future regional climate changes, some of which, it is argued, might 
be beneficial to strategically placed powers, making them potential "net 
winners" and less inclined to preventive action. Lastly, resistance to 
preventive action is cited as an obstacle, since such action, it is thought, 
could require major changes in energy production and use and significant new 
investments or changes in behavior on the part of established economic 
interests. 
We address some of these considerations in this last section, with 
special attention given to the constraints to the formulation of domestic 
energy policies and the development of an international consensus. These are 
considered in light of various precedents, which suggest that the various 
constraints need not necessarily constitute insurmountable obstacles to 
policy action. 
Precedents for Effective Government Policies 
We have already addressed various issues relating to the technical 
feasibility of the program we support. These might best be promoted through 
substantially increased energy prices--for instance, through the use of var-
ious taxation schemes. 
The prospect for direct government regulation of fossil fuel use, at 
least in the short term, is much more doubtful. Many government energy 
programs have had only marginal impact, particularly when compared to the 
influence of price increases. 44 However, government policy indisputably 
influences the choice of technologies deployed in industry, the schedules for 
investment in electrical generation capacity, and other key determinants of 
energy use. Some government research and conservation programs, such as 
support for the development of photovoltaic cells and minimum efficiency 
standards for appliances, have undeniably affected energy use and constitute 
more effective policy instruments than is often allowed. 45 
Precedents for International Action: The CFMs 
Precedents for international cooperation in response to global environ-
mental problems are rarer. Relevant precedents include actions on fisheries, 
acid rain, and regional seas. Most past successes have involved no more than 
the agreement to exchange information. The willingness to fund and undertake 
cooperative research is less frequent, particularly when the problem involves 
a potential future risk rather than a palpable damage is involved. The 
process of developing multilateral consensus is a painfully slow and diffi-
cult one and has often broken down over political issues only peripherally 
related to the environmental problems under discussion. 
The effort to reduce the risk of stratospheric ozone depletion consti-
tutes one interesting and relevant analogy to efforts to control or adapt to 
the greenhouse effect. The effort.to promote international cooperation, 
including preventive steps, began in the mid-1970s, soon after scientists 
warned of the risk of ozone depletion from anthropogenic emissions of various 
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gases, first in the context of a debate over the supersonic transport and 
subsequently as a consequence of chlorofluoromethane emissions. 46 Eventually, 
these efforts resulted in multilateral and international agreements on 
research and information exchange. In addition, several countries unilater-
ally reduced CFM emissions, despite the knowledge that only global reductions 
would fully address the problem. 47 · 
In the last three years, the governments most concerned about ozone 
modification have supported an international convention to protect the ozone 
layer. 48 The general concept of a convention has received very broad sup-
port, but a proposed protocol that would require cutbacks in emissions has 
been controversial. Some opposition has arisen as a result of lower esti-
mates made recently of the expected rate of ozone depletion. 49 However, the 
role of unilateral actions in significant emission reductions has been 
important; international agreement has become less pressing due to the 
effectiveness of these unilateral actions. 
This precedent suggests that the evolution of international efforts is 
likely to be slow and piecemeal but not necessarily ineffective. Public 
debate, example, and the slow accumulation of experience with sets of limited 
measures seem, in this case at least, to have created the conditions for the 
formation and continued consolidation of a politically significant consensus. 
As is often the case, expanded research efforts seem to have been approved 
only after·a significant debate over the need for action. This is similar to 
what has happened in the United States with government- and utility-supported 
acid rain research, which has grown enormously in response to the debate over 
the need to restrict sulfur dioxide emissions. Without this controversy, 
proposals to expand research on acid rain would have stood little chance of 
approval. 
Pressure for broader international agreement seems to have resulted at 
least in part from the example of the unilateral actions of individual 
countries--especially those involving substantial, and sometimes costly, 
commitment. Thus, the aerosol ban adopted in the United States and several 
other countries undoubtedly had an exemplary effect and contributed to 
significant unilateral reductions, even by countries opposed to a total ban. 
Experience with limited actions now seems likely to evolve into resolute, 
even "radical," measures, perhaps because small steps seem to imply an 
initial agreement that the atmospheric problem warrants government attention 
and legitimize further action. The regulation of nonaerosol uses of 
chlorofluoromethanes is now being discussed in the United States. Such 
restrictions, which will cost more than did controls on aerosol uses, were 
not seriously discussed until the ban on CFMs in aerosols had generated a 
consensus on the problem's severity. 
All of these factors suggest a much less bleak prognosis on inter-
national cooperation than is usually suggested. 
Successful Incremental Approaches 
The same as has been true for international cooperation on CFMs has also 
been true for most environmental policies, the adoption and implementation of 
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which has been an incremental process. In short, expanded research tends to 
follow calls for action, and significant unilateral action tends to follow 
modest initial steps; international action seems to be a possible extension 
of unilateral action in the case of important environmental problems--for 
example the CFM-ozone depletion problem. Hence, policy responses to the 
greenhouse problem need not immediately and fully eliminate all risks of cli-
mate modification to be worthwhile. Relatively modest initial steps by even 
a few countries can have a real impact. Although reductions of perhaps 20 
percent in emissions of carbon dioxide and perhaps 50 percent in CFMs will 
not eliminate the risk of climate modification, they will buy time until more 
aggressive actions become politically realistic. Since some modest initial 
steps must precede more sweeping measures, initial steps should be taken as 
soon as possible. 
The Fallacy of the "Net Winners" 
The notion of winners and losers in the larger carbon dioxide problem is 
highly misleading, since it is not at all clear that any country will be a 
net winner on~e the social costs, infrastructure investments, and types and 
quality of information needed to take advantage of changes in climate are 
fully considered. Given the regional distribution of impacts, it is not 
unwarranted to expect all nations to suffer at least some short-term disloca-
tion as society adapts to climate changes, whether they are beneficial or 
harmful over the long term. Such dislocation can involve significant costs 
even in the former case; it could be especially serious in the latter case. 
Anticipatory adaptation can help ameliorate losses but requires much more 
precise information than does a preventive policy, including information on 
the nature, distribution, and timing of climate change. To be a net winner, 
a country would have to make major investments in irrigation, water storage, 
and agricultural land development. It would not be enough to know that a 
particular region might be warmer and wetter; to justify such large agricul-
tural investments, investors would have to know the expected distribution of 
rainfall and the likelihood of crop destruction from extreme weather events. 
Given this situation, it is difficult to imagine the conditions under 
which a government would oppose preventive action based on the expectation of 
benefits from a changed climate. The existing uncertainties, particularly 
those concerning the nature, timing, and extent of the effects, ought to be 
sufficient to shatter any government's hopes of profiting significantly from 
climate modification. Hence, the concept of winners and losers only clouds 
the debate. 
Other Reasons for Optimism 
As the previous discussion indicates, a considerable basis exists for a 
meaningful a short-term international action program. At least four addi-
tional factors provide a basis for optimism. First, many of the potential 
solutions to the carbon dioxide problem do much more than prevent or mitigate 
global warming.SO Energy conservation, renewable energy utilization, more 
efficient irrigation technology, and the development of crop varieties that 
flourish in a wider range of climate conditions are all economically 
desirable, whether or not a global warming occurs. 
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Second, many of the proposed actions can be promoted without threatening 
existing economic interests. Conservation does not have to completely sub-
stitute for coal to have a major impact. 51 Renewable energy technologies can 
help reduce carbon dioxide emissions without resulting in the loss of jobs in 
the coal industry. Moreover, many large energy companies are likely to par-
ticipate in and profit from these alternatives. Insofar as these investments 
are (as expected) cost effective, the global economy will benefit, not 
suffer. 52 
Third, many valuable and effective steps can be taken without a formal 
international agreement. 
Fourth, the sectors that require the principal attention--agriculture 
and energy--are those in which most governments have traditionally had a 
major role, so the prospect of further governmental intervention is not un-
thinkable. The responsiveness of these sectors to pricing and other policies 
has also been repeatedly demonstrated--a fact that, in conjunction with the 
considerations already noted, leaves us a good deal more sanguine about the 
prospects for effective governmental action than are most analysts. 53 
CONCLUSION 
We have no illusions about the obstacles that might impede an effective 
response to the atmospheric buildup of greenhouse gases. Indeed, regardless 
of what we do in the future, it already may be too late to prevent a serious 
climate change. 
However, we are convinced that the initial steps in both an adaptive and 
a preventive program of response are now justified. ~any control strategies 
are both technically feasible and economically justified. Governments should 
adopt energy policies that encourage investments in increased energy 
efficiency and renewable energy technologies, thereby limiting the rate of 
fossil fuel combustion. International cooperation will ultimately be neces-
sary, but unilateral actions can affect the rate of fuel consumption and are 
probably a prerequisite to extensive cooperative efforts. 
In addition, it is imperative to expand the range of interests support-
ing a carbon dioxide action program. Although a program of global response 
to climate change is often thought to be supported by only a small band of 
well-informed scientists and environmentalists, it is evident that the 
potential constituency for such a program is much larger. As the body of 
knowledge concerning potential climate effects grows, the number of countries 
with an identifiable interest in such a prpgram of action will increase. Re-
cent developments suggest that coalition building among concerned industries 
may have already begun. In July 1984, the forest products industry sponsored 
a seminar on the consequences of climate change. This industry is accustomed 
to long planning horizons and is well aware of the sensitivity of forestry to 
environmental influences. The agricultural industry is less sensitive to the 
need to prevent long-term environment-related losses, but it too is a poten-
tial source of political support. Clearly, diverse and broad-based economic 
interests are at risk. 
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THE GREENHOUSE EFFECT: THE SOCIOECONOMIC FALLOUT 
Lester B. Lave 
Carnegie-Mellon University, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 
INTRODUCTION 
My assignment is to visualize a worst-case carbon dioxide/climate 
scenario during the early part of the twenty-first century, when there would 
still be time to take some action and the worst climate effects would not yet 
have come to pass. •"Worst" is something of an ambiguous concept here, since 
it could refer to the worst climate effect or to worst outcome for any par-
ticular climate effect. The former notion focuses on Mother Nature and what 
she might do, given our current ignorance about atmospheric processes and the 
effects of increased atmospheric carbon dioxide. The latter notion focuses on 
human reactions to whatever climate changes do occur. 
To ensure that my task is not too pedestrian, I am also asked to think 
about techniques for estimating risks and how well they might work. Would any 
such techniques be able to anticipate a carbon dioxide catastrophe reliably 
enough that scientists would believe the forecast and be able to convince 
political leaders and the general public? If so, can anything be done to 
avoid the catastrophe or at least to moderate the damage? I do not think of 
myself as modest, but I was a bit taken aback by the organizers' notion of a 
short essay. If I had the least good sense, I would stop at this point, throw 
myself on your mercy, and not undertake such an impossible assignment. But it 
is tempting to think about these issues ... 
A BEST-CASE CARBON DIOXIDE SCENARIO 
To provide the setting for the extreme worst-case scenario, I want to 
sketch the outlines of an extremely benign scenario, one in which increased 
atmospheric carbon dioxide would have little or no effect on the climate. 
While this best-case scenario would appear to merit little attention, I beg 
your indulgence. 
Major uncertainties about the effect of increasing atmospheric carbon 
dioxide concentrations form one of the central foundations upon which I will 
construct my best-case scenario. Such uncertainties have long been a part of 
the carbon dioxide issue. However, if such uncertainties continue, there will 
be no way to disentangle the usual variations in climate from the possible 
effects of increasing atmospheric carbon dioxide. Thus, were there to be a 
drought or unusually hot weather, some people, and even some scientists and 
the governments of some nations, would claim that this was the result of 
increased atmospheric levels of carbon dioxide and demand action. Lest this 
seem farfetched, I remember endless discussions during the 1950s of how each 
instance of bad weather was due to the atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons. 
Many people blamed every storm or drought on nuclear testing, although even at 
the time there was little scientific uncertainty about the degree to which 
such testing could affect the weather. Perhaps an even better example might 
-287-
involve the concern about the health effects of pesticides--for instance Agent 
Orange or ethylenedibromide--or from low-level radiation from nuclear power 
plants. 
Public hysteria, even when it is in opposition to reasonably well-
established scientific fact, can lead to extreme government action, such as 
the prohibition of various substances. When the scientific evidence is less 
firm, the actions can be even more extreme, as in the case of Love Canal or 
Times Beach. Frustration at an inability to understand the scientific basis 
of the hardware essential to our daily lives tends to produce extreme, 
irrational reactions. 
Thus, one could sketch a worst-case outcome to even the best-case 
scenario, even one in which increased atmospheric carbon dioxide concen-
trations had no effect on climate. A cyclic drought, flood, or change in 
temperature could cause intense public feeling, which might be translated into 
extreme or even irrational government actions. Suppose, for instance, that in 
2010 there were a reoccurrence of the dust bowl--half a decade of intense 
drought in the nation's breadbasket. Surely some people would ascribe this 
drought to the effect of increased atmospheric concentrations of carbon 
dioxide; they might be led by scientists claiming that the drought was due to 
the greenhouse effect. Models predicting precisely this midcontinent drought 
might form the basis of their "proof." If many people were to believe that 
increased atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations were the cause of the 
drought, it is possible there would be precipitous action to shut down fossil 
fuel power plants, to stop coal exports, and to warn the Soviet Union and 
China that their failure to take similar actions would constitute a cause for 
war. From there it is not hard to continue the scenario right up to nuclear 
war. 
But that scenario is absurd. Or is it? Current models do indicate that 
a midcontinent drought is a likely outcome. There is ample precedent for a 
severe prolonged drought. There are scientists now who ascribe current 
climate effects to increased atmospheric carbon dioxide. If the people of 
Minnesota, Iowa, Kansas, and so on were to be assured by credible scientists 
that drought could be due to elevated carbon dioxide concentrations, might 
they not demand immediate action of the sort I have sketched? China and the 
Soviet Union would be the focus of U.S. action, since our three countries have 
almost 90 percent of the world's coal reserves. In a twenty-first century con-
text, the world is likely to be much more dependent on coal than at present. 
Oil would certainly not be the dominant fuel. Dependence on coal is likely to 
be highest in the three nations with the greatest coal reserves. Indeed, 
think of what our allies and trading partners might say were we suddenly to 
prohibit coal exports, which might by then have become their staple fuel. I 
don't know about you, but this scenario is worth one or two sleepless minutes 
to me some night. And this is the scenario with no carbon dioxide/climate 
effects. 
A MID-RANGE SCENARIO 
Now, consider instead carbon dioxide effects that are about the mid-range 
of what current atmospheric models predict. By the early part of the twenty-
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first century, there would be about a 40 percent increase in the atmospheric 
concentration of carbon dioxide relative to the preindustrial level. This 
would give rise to perhaps a 1.5 degree Celsius increase in average global 
temperature, with perhaps a 4 degree Celsius warming at the poles and no 
warming at the equator. This warming is somewhat greater than the temperature 
range observed in this century but smaller than the temperature range observed 
during the last thousand years. Changes in storm patterns could be more 
significant than the temperature rise, leading to precipitation changes. How-
ever, even such a change in precipitation patterns could easily be within the 
range of variation observed in the twentieth century. 
Disruption In the United States Would be Small 
What sorts of stress would such changes impose on the economy in particu-
lar and on society in general? Without seeming to be a linear descendant of 
Dr. Pangloss, I tend not to be terribly concerned about stress in the United 
States. Particularly in the post-World War II period, farmers have coped well 
with climate changes, and society seems to have averted catastrophes. This is 
not to say that there haven't been large costs associated with droughts, heat 
waves, and floods. However, the associated economic losses and loss of life 
have been tiny compared to the background levels and variation that would have 
been expected in the absence of the unfortunate events. 
It is important to distinguish between the adjustments the individual 
worker, farmer, and distributor can make and the adjustments that require 
social action. Individual farmers can change the cultivars they plant or 
their cropping patterns. They can stop flooding their fields and utilize 
trickle irrigation. But they cannot undertake huge water projects that would 
bring millions of acre-feet of water from a thousand miles away. 
Individual adjustment is likely to proceed more smoothly than social 
adjustment, since individuals will experiment and successful innovators will 
be copied. In contrast, the decision to commit billions of dollars to a water 
project is a large step. There must be general agreement that the project is 
socially desirable, funds must be available to pay for it, and water rights, 
the transport route, and the distribution of the water at its destination must 
be negotiated. One cannot experiment with such projects to determine social 
need and then slowly develop consensus on the best way to proceed. Thus, 
there is a good possibility that social adjustment would be slower, more pon-
derous, and less helpful than individual adjustment. Although I have vast 
faith in American farmers, I do not have the same level of trust in the 
institutions that would have to decide on water projects. 
But will twenty-first century farmers, for example, be as good at coping 
with climate stress as current farmers? Again, I would observe that things 
seem to have gotten better, especially as a result of the extensive education 
of farmers, and also as a result of information and early warning, and of new 
equipment for coping with problems, including new stress-resistant cultivars. 
There is no firm assurance that this progress will continue, but I would put 
my money on the American farmer and other affected individuals. 
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World Disruptions Would Be Larger 
When I look outside the United States, I am not sanguine. The Japanese 
are determined to grow large quantities of rice; consequently, they subsidizfr 
agriculture. Even a moderate climate change could make it much more difficult 
to grow rice in Japan. One can picture some stubborn Japanese farmer con-
tinuing to plant rice, no matter what occurred. Nor is it hard to imagine a 
stubborn Japanese government that continues to subsidize the production of 
rice even with domestic rice five to ten times more expensive than foreign 
rice. Or picture the French wheat grower: neither the resolutions of the 
French governments nor pressure by the Common Market appear to have had the 
slightest effect on the determination of French farmers to continue producing 
crops at costs significantly above world prices. 
Fortunately, agriculture represents only a tiny proportion of these 
economies. Hence, not even a doubling or tripling of costs would sink the 
economies of Japan or France. The farmers of Japan and France seem to be able 
to ward off imports better than our steel or auto makers. Each nation has its 
sacred cows, and each seems extraordinarily willing to dump virtually 
unlimited amounts of money into defunct industries, thereby saving them from 
the rigors of competition. I do not criticize--that would be uncharitable, 
narrow-minded, and characteristic of someone who did not fully understand 
local reasons. However, I do note the possibilities for vastly increased 
agricultural subsidies in the developed countries, and for policies that 
direct niuch of the economic surplus into such a "rat hole." 
Possible Disaster for the Less Developed Countries 
The developed countries will survive--even survive handsomely. More 
worrisome are the less developed countries, whose gross national products 
(GNP) are dominated by agriculture (up to 90 percent of the GNP in some 
cases), and where there is less of a tradition of quick adaptation to change. 
The less developed countries possess much less of a resource base in educated 
farmers, agricultural extension services, and companies to invent and dis-
tribute new equipment, for instance irrigation, and cultivars that are better 
adapted to new climates. If one compares the drought in the Sahel with that 
in the U.S. midwest, one cannot help being struck with the triviality of the 
effects in the United States compared with the devastation wrought in Africa. 
The lesson here is that the effects of increased atmospheric carbon 
dioxide will have much more to do with people than with climate. If humans 
and human institutions were to adapt quickly and competently, then even large 
climate changes would be likely to cause only a minor ripple in human events. 
If humans were to misperceive the events and their behavior were to prove 
dysfunctional, even the absence of climate effects could prove devastating. 
This is my central message, and I will repeat it in a number of ways. It is 
the lesson I want to take into the construction of a worst-case carbon 
dioxide/climate scenario, my assigned topic. 
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A Less Panglossian Assessment 
Before doing that, it is worth examining whether I have pushed this 
observation too far. What would be the effect of a moderate climate change? 
Would it have no effect on farmers, the recreation industry, and society in 
general? 
The costs of climate change would be large. Changed cropping patterns 
could lower the incomes of individual farmers significantly and cause many 
bankruptcies. Surviving farmers would have to spend large amounts of money 
adapting to the changed climate. However, since agriculture currently rep-
resents about 10 percent of the GNP, the magnitude of loss (with capital 
expenditures spread out over the lives of the investments) would be less than 
1 to 2 percent of the GNP. Although this is a large amount of money, it is 
certainly not a catastrophe. Even after accounting for disruptions in trans-
portation, the relocation of populations and industries, and effects on the 
recreation industry, the total loss would be unlikely to be as much as Z to 3 
percent of the GNP. 
I hasten to add that a loss of 2 to 3 percent of the GNP is quite 
significant. However, it is not a disaster. Such a loss would have to be 
evaluated in terms of the probability of its occurrence and the cost of 
avoiding future climate changes. I will argue that the cost of avoiding 
climate change and the current estimates of the probability of its occurrence 
would not lead to definitive action. That would be warranted only if a 
genuine catastrophe were threatened. 
A WORST-CASE SCENARIO 
In view of the argument so far, it should be clear that a worst-case 
scenario is defined more in terms of human reactions than climate effects. 
Short of climate changes that make the world virtually uninhabitable, which no 
one is suggesting, human adaptation is more important than the changes to 
which humans have to adapt. This is certainly true for the early twenty-first 
century, when carbon dioxide/climate effects would necessarily be relatively 
small. But it is also true for the twenty-second century, when climate change 
could be really important. By then, we could have a full doubling of 
atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations, a 10 degree Celsius increase in 
temperature at the poles, and a 4 degree Celsius temperature increase averaged 
over the globe. Precipitation and storm patterns could be greatly affected, 
with areas like the Great Plains in a permanent drought. 
Sylvan Wittwer notes that a doubling of atmospheric carbon dioxide cannot 
be all bad for plants. They grow much better in high carbon dioxide environ-
ments. The elevated temperature is likely to produce more precipitation, al-
though not necessarily in the same spots as at present. However, we transport 
water over great distances now. We also manage to grow crops in desert areas, 
such as the Imperial Valley in California or the Negev desert in Israel. 
Trickle irrigation uses a tiny proportion of the water ordinarily required for 
irrigation. There is clearly a trade-off between capital and other costs and 
water use. Trickle irrigation requires a substantial capital expenditure. 
Plastic stretched over the ground slows evaporation. Some cultivars are less 
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sensitive to heat and require less water. 
climate changes could be managed with the 
countries. It also seems likely that the 
less well than the developed countries. 
It seems likely that even dramatic 
knowledge and capital in developed 
less developed countries would fare 
So, we are back to my central theme: how will people react? Will their 
behavior be responsive and helpful or will it be dysfunctional? Will they 
have sufficient resources--scientific and economic-.-to react properly or will 
the capital requirements of, for instance, trickle irrigation, exceed their 
means? Will they be able to construct multibillion dollar projects to bring 
in water for irrigation? Will they be able to solve the agronomic problems 
encountered in a carbon dioxide-induced climate change, including those 
relating to insects, weeds, and disease? Will they be willing to shift their 
diet toward foods that grow best under the changed climate conditions, such as 
wheat rather than rice? Will they be able to cope with new patterns of 
international trade, with new nations exporting food? 
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT AND RISK ASSESSMENT 
Not having a crystal ball, I have no ready answers to my conundrum. But 
I do have some predictions, or at least ways of thinking the problem through. 
A good deal of money is currently being spent to improve the models used to 
predict the climate effects of increased carbon dioxide concentrations. I 
wonder whether that should be the focus of present research and development. 
On the straight science side, there is much to be done in exploring techniques 
for trapping water and bringing it in for irrigation. What is the next gener-
ation after trickle irrigation? There is a need to develop cultivars that are 
more heat and drought resistant. There is a need to develop ways of coping 
with pests. As the climate warms, areas further north will no longer have a 
hard winter freeze to kill pests. The warmer climate will change the micro-
ecology of our best farm land. There are a long list of questions needing 
answers, and many of these answers would be valuable in some areas today under 
the current growing conditions. 
The larger need is to understand how cultures and institutions react to 
particular stresses. How adaptable are current institutions? What can be 
done to make them more adaptable? Which nations are likely to be most at 
risk, with the gravest consequences? I cannot promise results, and especially 
not helpful results, from the behavioral research. But it is easy to conclude 
that the other solutions won't matter unless the behavioral problems are 
solved. 
It seems obvious that the less developed countries will be hardest hit by 
climate change. Even a "beneficial" climate change will cause problems if .the 
developing countries continue to plant the old crops in the old ways. Al-
though a catastrophe for the developed countries is unlikely, there is a far 
greater chance of catastrophe for the less developed countries. One scenario 
that could translate into catastrophe for the United States might involve 
Third World terrorism, even nuclear terrorism, perhaps designed to convince 
the United States to stop the burning of fossil fuel and help the starving 
nations. ·One way or another, something would have to be done by the developed 
nations to help the less developed nations. , 
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Forecasting and Assessing the Risk 
Current risk-assessment techniques focus on two basic problems: (1) an 
estimation of the probability of a particular undesirable event occurring--for 
example a boiler explosion or an airplane crash; and (2) an estimation of the 
probability of a disease resulting from exposure to toxic substances. In the 
former case, the outcome is easy to specify; what is difficult is imagining 
the ways each element interacts with others to affect the probability of a 
mishap. In the latter case, we know that exposure to some substances at high 
doses is likely to cause disease in rodents. We do not know what happens to 
humans at low exposures; assumptions are involved when one extrapolates from 
rodents to humans and from high to low doses. Although both issues involve 
various assumptions, more assumptions are required in the latter case. 
The effects of carbon dioxide are more like the latter case than the 
former. At present, we do not know the extent of future carbon dioxide 
emissions, the effect of carbon dioxide emissions on the climate, or how 
society will cope with climate change. Thus, three levels of uncertainty 
interact to obfuscate analysis. 
As a result, no confident predictions can be given. This inability to 
predict is combined with the enormous cost of carbon dioxide emissions' 
reductions. Fossil fuels are by far the cheapest current source of energy. 
In the developed countries, there is a widespread reluctance to increase 
reliance on nuclear power, even apart from the increased cost. A decision to 
terminate fossil fuel combustion in the United States would be a momentous one 
in terms of cost, life style, and the acceptance of new technologies and their 
dangers. But over a period of several decades, it would be possible to imple-
ment such a decision. In the less developed countries, such a decision would 
be impossible to implement. Even if the developed nations offered to pay for 
a switch to non-fossil fuels and provide the expertise for doing so, one might 
forgive the developing countries for being suspicious and reluctant to com-
pletely entrust their fate to the United States, the Soviet Union, and the 
former colonial powers. Furthermore, technologies such as nuclear power are 
unsuited to the life styles encountered in developing countries and are not 
really substitutes for fossil fuels. Thus, if the world found itself in a 
situation in which it was desirable or necessary to stop all fossil fuel 
combustion, the developed countries would probably resist due to the cost and 
fear of nuclear technology, and the less developed countries would probably be· 
reluctant to throw themselves at the feet of the developed countries or adopt 
technologies unsuited to their ways of life. I doubt that a worldwide switch 
to non-fossil fuels could be accomplished without a major war. 
Far short of that, it is difficult to believe that the developed nations 
would curtail the use of fossil fuels, or even curtail the growth of fossil 
fuel use, without convincing evidence of major and undesirable carbon dioxide-
induced climate effects. Given the cost of action, I am pessimistic that 
anything would be done until the climate effects had been demonstrated, and 
this would require a substantial further increase in atmospheric carbon 
dioxide concentrations. If you were advising the president or Congress, what 
level of assurance would you want before advocating a program costing hundreds 
of billions of dollars and requiring substantial decreases in energy use, 
major changes in life style, and principal reliance on nuclear energy? 
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CONCLUSION 
Let me state the theme one last time: significant climate change could 
impose large costs on the U.S. economy, possibly on the order of 2 to 3 
percent of the GNP. The costs in other developed countries could be even 
larger, particularly in countries that seek to continue producing crops that 
would have to be grown under increasingly artificial conditions. However, 
with adaptation, the cost would_be much smaller. In view of the monetary and 
other perceived costs associated with a limitation on fossil fuel use, I doubt 
that the United States would be willing to stop or even significantly diminish 
fossil fuel burning until the effects of atmospheric carbon dioxide buildup 
were shown to be large and costly. Only a threatened catastrophe, which seems 
unlikely in the developed countries, would motivate immediate action. 
The costs and catastrophes associated with the greenhouse effect are 
specific to the poor countries. There, even a moderate climate change 
threatens disaster and vast changes in their current cultures. However, the 
change from fossil to nonfossil fuels creates special problems for these 
countries, since they do not have the required technology and the technologies 
tend to be unsuited to their life styles. 
If a catastrophe is in store for the developed countries, it is likely to 
be in the form of war or terrorism stemming from attempts to compel other 
nations, developed or poor, to stop large-scale fossil fuel combustion. 
If the costs of climate change are to be kept to bearable levels, empha-
sis must be placed on adaptative measures, particularly measures which make 
individuals and institutions adaptable and which provide for the transfer of 
farming practices and cultivars adapted to a changed climate. A great deal of 
research and development is required, almost all of which would be of value 
today. The agenda for current action is different from the one that is 
usually advocated. 
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THE GREENHOUSE PROBLEM: THE ROLE OF UNCERTAINTY 
Peter Ciborowski 
University .of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota 
Dean Abrahamson 
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INTRODUCTION 
The combustion of any fossil fuel releases carbon dioxide to the atmos-
phere. Carbon dioxide is a greenhouse gas and acts to alter the energy 
balance of the planet. Large-scale fossil fuel energy systems emit an enor-
mous amount of this gas, which can accumulate in significant concentrations in 
the atmosphere. Given significant accumulations, the Earth's climate will 
change. 
A number of governmental and quasi-governmental bodies have examined the 
issues surrounding the release of carbon dioxide to determine whether suf-
ficient information is now available for society to establish a policy on 
further emissions. The widely held view, as perhaps best represented by the 
National Academy of Science's Carbon Dioxide Assessment Committee (NAS-CDAC), 
holds that this information is still lacking. 1 
An assessment of the adequacy of the available information depends on the 
information that is thought to be important, and this can entail subjective, 
even political, judgements. Hence, many different assessments may be pos-
sible. We examine the evidence below, concentrating on those issues which 
either are thought to be too poorly defined to inform the issue at hand or are 
thought to confirm the NAS-CDAC's judgement as to the inadequacy of the avail-
able information. To focus the discussion, we have narrowly constrained it to 
a single issue: the advisability of the continued release of carbon dioxide. 
In so doing, we find that, although uncertainty is an important element of the 
problem, it by no means precludes a policy response. 
THE CARBON DIOXIDE PROBLEM 
The carbon dioxide problem results from the emission of carbon dioxide to 
the atmosphere. 2 Carbon dioxide is a by-product of the combustion of fossil 
fuels. Carbon dioxide is important principally as an infrared active gas; it 
is essentially transparent to short-wave solar radiation, but is opaque to 
long-wave radiation or heat. Once present in the atmosphere, carbon dioxide 
allows short-wave solar radiation to penetrate relatively unimpeded to the 
surface of the earth, and to warm it, but impedes the escape of infrared 
radiation, or heat, to space. In increasing concentration, it acts to in-
crease the atmosphere's resistance to the loss of heat, thereby raising global 
surface temperatures. Due to society's present commitment to the fossil 
fuels, a doubling or tripling of the present atmospheric concentration of 
carbon dioxide is not thought unlikely. Such an increase in the atmospheric 
level of carbon dioxide would substantially raise the surface temperature of 
the earth. 
-295-
Carbon dioxide is not the only pollutant that is important for the future 
of the climate. Particulates can act to cool the planet. Other gases, like 
methane and the chlorofluorocarbons, act in the atmosphere like carbon dioxide 
and tend to warm the planet. The effect of particulates is small. The warm-
ing contributed individually by the other gases is relatively small, although 
in aggregate the other gas warming may be large. 3 It is generally agreed that 
the rate of atmospheric accumulation of carbon dioxide is the single most 
important factor governing the future of the climate. In conjunction with the 
other gases, it will result in a climate change broadly analogous to the larg-
est changes of the last twenty or so million years. 
THE CARBON DIOXIDE ASSESSMENT BOARD 
Inherent in the carbon dioxide, or greenhouse, problem, one finds not one 
policy problem but many. Some that come readily to mind revolve around the 
legal ramifications of long-term environmental change and around considera-
tions and mechanisms of international equity. Others center on the role of 
international institutions and on questions of intergenerational equity. 
Still others focus on the political relevance of the problem. 
One policy question stands before all others: should present policies 
that promote, or do not hinder, releases of carbon dioxide be continued? It 
is often suggested that the uncertainties that surround these releases make 
any realistic policy assessment impossible. The NAS-CDAC concludes that the 
uncertainties in the physical science of climate change and our inability to 
predict future economic and technolo~ical developments render hopeless any 
current attempt to formulate policy. Welfare economics, it notes, offers 
little guidance regarding either the utility of control measures or, if 
controls are to be implemented, the stringency of controls. It concludes 
that, rather than preemptive preventive act,ion, a well-developed program of 
research.should be instituted to narrow the uncertainties. 
The NAS-CDAC stresses the risks of unnecessary action. It notes our 
inability to forecast technological change or those market conditions that 
will govern the future rate of fossil fuel use, concluding that actions taken 
now to reduce carbon dioxide emissions may be unnecessary. It notes that the 
existence of uncertainties in the physical science underlying our understand-
ing of climate change may lead to the same conclusion. Given the risks of 
unnecessary action, the NAS-CDAC categorically rejects the preventive 
~esponse. 
To reject the preventive response, it is necessary to propose an 
alternative, and the NAS-CDAC advocates an adaptive response. Due to the 
assumptions it makes about the sensitivity of mean global temperature to 
carbon dioxide, and about the rate of its atmospheric accumulation, the NAS-
CDAC assumes a very limited warming, about 1.5 to 3 degrees Celsius over the 
next ninety years. Thus, it is able to assume a fairly narrow assemblage of 
impacts. By assuming a relatively small warming, and future boundary condi-
tions not much different than those of the present, the NAS-CDAC is able to 
conclude that adaptation is feasible. To the degree that adaptation is 
reasonably certain, the NAS-CDAC is able to largely ignore the risks of 
inaction and to center its argumentation on the risks of unnecessary action. 
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But there is some question as to whether a 1.5 to 3 degrees Celsius mean 
global warming is a reasonable warming against which to weigh policy. There 
is evidence that the climate sensitivity that was employed to make this esti-
mate might have been better chosen to more appropriately bound the uncertain-
ties.5 In addition, carbon dioxide is the only gas considered, and the other 
gases like methane, which the NAS-CDAC suggests might be more easily limited 
than carbon dioxide, are left out of the calculation. There is little reason 
to believe that releases of most of these gases are controllable, but much 
evidence to suggest that these gases are best treated as background changes 
upon which the effect of a changing atmospheric carbon dioxide concentration 
will be superimposed. 
In addition, the NAS-CDAC assumes an ease of societal adjustment to 
climate change which makes its analysis suspect. Arguing from an analogy to 
the historical movements of peoples across climatic boundaries, the NAS-CDAC 
suggests that a change in climate would not be a new experience to the indi-
vidual but a common one born of sporadic cross-country relocations. From 
this, as well as from such pieces of logic, as "there is probably some posi-
tive association between what we can predict and what we can accornrnodate, 116 
the NAS-CDAC concludes that human beings and societies are highly adaptable. 
But the analogy is not persuasive, since the unit of interest is not the 
individual but society, and the latter is much more complex than the 
individual, and its operation is less well understood. Neither is the NAS-
CDAC's appeal to successes in two iimited areas--Arnerican agriculture and the 
Netherlands' effort to hold back the sea--convincing. The NAS-CDAC does not 
consider the economic costs of an adaptive response, and makes no effort to 
rigorously address its nature or preconditions. 
Taken together, these considerations render the NAS-CDAC analysis sus-
pect. The assessment addresses the risks of unnecessary action but not the 
risks of inaction. It advocates that society direct its collective specula-
tive faculty to future adaptations as a means to inform policy, but fails to 
ask the hard questions regarding the informational requirements of adaptation 
or the magnitude and rates of climatic change to which adaptation is best 
suited. Most problematic of all, in assuming a warming of less than 3 degrees 
Celsius in about a century, it never has the opportunity to test its 
analytical approach against a realistic.estimate of the impending changes. 
To test our own analytical approach, we attempt in the following sections 
of this paper to rethink the policy response in light of more realistic 
estimates. In the first section, we present a physical description of the 
problem. In the second, the conditions that might possibly justify inaction 
are considered. In the third, the most important physical science uncertain-
ties are treated, and in the fourth section, the policy responses that are 
open to society are considered in light of uncertainty, the intensity of the 
expected changes in climate, irreversibility, and other considerations. In 
the final sections, objections to the preventive response are treated. 
ESTIMATING FUTURE CLIMATES AND IMPACTS 
Policy will be made based on climate changes taking place on at least 
three different time-scales: the next twenty to thirty years; the entire 
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period of anthropogenic change (e.g., the next several hundred years); and the 
next 100 years. Below the effects of climate changes on these three different 
time-scales are considered. 
An Algorithm for Estimating Future Warming 
The rate of future warming is controlled by a limited number of para-
meters. These include: the climate sensitivity; the fractional increase in 
the atmospheric level of carbon dioxide; an other gas parameter; and the ocean 
thermal delay. The climate sensitivity determines the climate response to an 
increase in the atmospheric level of carbon dioxide. The carbon dioxide 
concentration is controlled by the rate of fossil fuel combustion and the 
emission of carbon from other sources, many of which are temperature sensi-
tive. The other gas parameter, a scaling parameter that amplifies the carbon 
dioxide-induced warming by some fractional amount, accounts for the effect of 
gases like methane. The ocean thermal delay adjusts for the time of warming. 
Given a projected atmospheric buildup of carbon dioxide, it is a reasonably 
simple matter to calculate the climate response to it, and an approximate 
value for the other gas warming, resulting in a rough estimate of the 
resultant warming, and then place it effectively in time. The relationship 
between the· climate response and the atmospheric level of carbon dioxide is 
logarithmic; that between the other gas warming and the carbon dioxide-induced 
warming is· roughly linear and additive. The "other carbon emission" can be 
treated as a constant unit increase in the level of carbon dioxide at the time 
of a doubling. 
Rough estimates for each of the controlling parameters, or for their 
principal components, are given in Table 1. To provide a benchmark around 
which to ground the discussion, the warming that might be experienced at the 
time of a doubling of the atmospheric carbon dioxide level is also given. 
Table 1 
PARAMETERS GOVERNING FUTURE WARMING 
Parameter 
Climate sensitivity to a doubling of CO2 
Other gas warming 
Other carbon emission 
Ocean thermal delay 
Warming at the time of a doubling 
Value 
2-4 degrees C 
100-150% of CO2 
75-125 ppmv 
15-40 years 
4-5 degrees C 
Adapted from: P. Ciborowski and D. Abrahamson, this volume. 
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The Next One-Hundred Years 
Based on contemporary energy forecasts, the emission of carbon dioxide to 
the atmosphere from fossil fuel combustion will raise its atmospheric concen-
tration to about 440 to 480 parts per million (ppmv), 540 to 600 ppmv, and 670 
to 760 ppmv by 2025, 2050, and 2075, respectively. 7 In response, mean global 
temperature would rise on the order of 1 to 2, 2 to 4 and 3 to 6 degrees 
Celsius, respectively, and the other gases would double this. 8 From Table 1, 
the ocean's heat capacity will delay the full response from fifteen to forty 
years. Thus, by 2075, a 4 to 5 degrees Celsius rise in mean global surface 
temperature would result. 
Over the short-term, the next thirty years, mean global temperature might 
rise 1 to 1.5 degrees Celsius. In response, a generally drier middle latitude 
climate would result. 9 The largest effects would be on agriculture. The 
results of crop-weather models for the changes in climate that are likely in 
thirty years are shown in Table 2. While worrisome, they are probably not of 
a sufficient magnitude to elicit a policy response. 
The same cannot be said of the one-hundred year change. By 2075 the cli-
mate will be very different from that of the present, probably something akin 
to the climates of 5 to 40 million years ago when, during the late Tertiary, 
the Arctic basin was without the present floating ice cap.lo The clearance of 
ice from the Arctic basin probably marks a point at which the climate under-
goes radical reordering. The removal of the pack ice, first occasionally in 
summer, then permanently in summer, and finally year-round, would funda-
mentally alter the boundary conditions on climate, and this suggests a 
schedule of radical, discontinuous changes and climates remarkably different 
from those of the present. 11 
Not a great deal is known about the particulars of the climate under such 
conditions. Geological evidence extracted from past climates suggests a pole-
ward recession of climatic boundaries in the middle and hifh latitudes many 
hundreds of kilometers (km) from their present position. 12 But, by and 
large, the conditions of such a change in climate are a mystery, and it is 
particularly from this mysterious quality that many of the most disturbing 
aspects of the change arise. 
Finally, based on a realistic portrayal of the delays resulting from the 
heat capacity of the oceans, 15 and on a slightly wider range of parameter 
estimates than is given in Table 1, 16 the mean global temperature rise would 
be on the order of 0.5 to 1 degree Celsius per decade (see Figure 1). 17 
*These included a more northerly placement than at the present of the bound-
aries of subtropical (600 to 1200 km) and temperate (800 to 1200 km) cli-
mates;13 easterly displacement of arid climates in North America (850 to 1300 
km, from central Texas, eastern New Mexico and Utah, and eastern Oregon to 
southern Alabama, central Missouri, and eastern Montana); and displacement of 
the arid zone in the European sector (800 to 1500 km, from Gibraltar, Sicily, 
and Greece to central France, Poland and the Ukraine). 14 
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Table 2 
IMPACTS BY LATITUDINAL REGION 
Increase 
in Regional Change in 
Region or Country Temperature Rainfall Change in Agricultural 
and Latitude (degrees C) (in percent) Yields (in percent) 
35-42 N United States 2 -5 corn, soybeans -1oa 
35-48 N United States 2 -10 winter, spring wheat -lOb 
48-52 N Canada 2 0 spring wheat +4a 
40-53 N U.S.S.R. (20-45 E) 1 -5 winter wheat +0.1 to _9b,c 
45-60 N U.S.S.R. (45-90 E) 1.4 +6 spring wheat +7d 
25-30 N India 0.75 0 wheat _4d 
7-12 N India 0.75 +2 rice -o.5d 
22-32 s Brazil 0.75 +2 corn, soybeans -2d 
22-32 N China 0.75 +2 rice -0.5d 
32-40 N China 1 +2 wheat +l. 5d 
33-38 S Argentina 1 +2 wheat 
-3.5d corn _3d 
30-37 s Australia 1 +2 wheat -4.5 
(a) See National Defense University, as reported in R. Shaw, "Climate Change 
and the Future of American Agriculture," in The Future of American 
Agriculture as a Strategic Resource, S. Batie and R. Healy, eds. 
(Washington, D.C.: Conservation Foundation, 1980). 
(b) See Climatic Impact Assessment Program, Impacts of Climatic Change on the 
Biosphere, CIAP monograph 5 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of 
Transportation, 1975). 
(c) The effect of a 5 percent reduction in precipitation is assumed to be the 
average of the yield response for cases in which precipitation is reduced 
0 percent and 10 percent. 
(d) National Defense University, Crop Yields and Climate Change to the Year 
2000, vol. 1 (Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C.: National Defense 
University, 1980). 
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Figure 1 
PROJECTED MEAN GLOBAL SURFACE WARMING FOR THREE CLIMATE SCENARIOS 
7 
6 
1935 1945 1955 1965 1975 1985 1995 2005 2015 2025 2035 2045 2055 2065 2070 
Year 
□-□ =Case A (high case): fossil fuel-related carbon dioxide emissions in-
creasing 2 percent per year, 4.2 degrees Celsius climate sensitivity, 
and an other gas (OGG) warming equal to 150 percent of the carbon 
dioxide-induced warming. 
•-•=Case B (medium case): fossil fuel-related carbon dioxide emissions in-
creasing 2 percent per year, climate sensitivity of 3.5 degrees Celsius, 
and an OGG warming equal to 100 percent of the carbon dioxide-induced 
warming. 
+-+ Case C (low case): fossil fuel-related carbon dioxide emission increas-
ing 1.5 percent per year, climate sensitivity of 2 degrees Celsius, and 
an OGG warming by 2070 of 2.2 degrees Celsius. 
The Very Long-Term Warming and Its Impacts 
Complete combustion of the fossil fuels would result in ari atmospheric 
level of carbon dioxide approximately four to six times the present level and 
in a warming of 4 to 10 degrees Celsius. 18 If we account for the other gases, 
the long-term warming at its peak would be at least three to four times 
greater than the warming addressed by the NAS-CDAC. 
The decay times associated with· any high atmospheric level of carbon 
dioxide are typically estimated in many hundreds of years; about 700 years is 
needed for a one-third decay of any particularly high atmospheric level of 
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carbon dioxide. 19 In the case of a sustained global surface warming, this 
would be delayed somewhat by the emission of carbon dioxide from the oceans, 
which when warm are able to hold less dissolved carbon dioxide and the bio-
sphere. Soil respiration increases with surface temperature. 20 The estimates 
suggest long-term releases on the order of 700 to 1300 gigatons (GT). 21 Upon 
its final decay, approximately one-seventh of all carbon dioxide added to the 
atmosphere during the industrial age will remain, leading to a steady-state 
level in the case of the combustion of 100 (50) percent of economically 
exploitable fossil resources of about 550 (415) ppmv. 22 
Over long periods, a substantial warming would affect the earth's ice 
sheets. The resultin~ three hundred-year rise in sea level might be as much 
as 4.6 to 9.7 meters. 3 Over shorter periods, 110 years, sea level would rise 
perhaps 1.5 to 2 meters. 24 Cities that would be affected by a sea level rise 
of Oto 3 meters (0 to 10 feet) are shown in Table 3. 
Mean global surface temperature will remain substantially elevated for a 
lengthy period of time--as much as 1 to 4 degrees Celsius even after steady-
state levels are achieved. It is in this essential irreversibility that the 
policy significance of the very long-term warming resides. 
Impacts of the One-Hundred Year Warming 
The potential impacts of the one-hundred year warming will be pervasive 
and affect nearly all sectors of society. Below we consider the nature of the 
impacts, their sign, and their intensity. 
Sensitivity of Society to Climate Change: From a global perspective, 
temperature and water availability represent the principal climate constraints 
to human activities. Constraints of extreme cold limit the populations of the 
cool and cold climates to but a small fraction of global population. Most of 
humanity can be found in tropical and subtropical climates, and here the 
effects of persistent heat and water scarcity represent the dominant climatic 
barriers to development. 
In the future, most of humanity will continue to live in the tropics and 
subtropics, if only due to the population dynamics in the developed, or middle 
and high latitude, nations, which are likely to favor only slight changes in 
population, or to international barriers to migration.* A global warming will 
tend to increase heat-related constraints in tropical and subtropical regions, 
and, given the distribution of global population, this will represent the 
principal effect on the global population. 
Economic Impacts: The economic impacts have been estimated for some 
climate-sensitive activities, including salt water intrusion control and 
coastal water consumption, 25 coastal flood control, 26 tourism, 27 coastal and 
*To represent a significant trend, migration from the south to the north 
would need to be on a scale that, were it to be directed toward Canada or the 
Soviet Union, would overwhelm existing populations and, in this sense, is 
politically impossible. 
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estuary development and recreational use, 28 agriculture, 29 electrical con-
sumption, other consumption and wage rates, 30 streamflow-dependent activities 
(e.g., irri~ation, power generation), 31 and beach erosion and snow removal 
activities. 2 
Table 3 
WORLD CITIES AT SEA LEVELS BELOW VARIOUS EXPECTED SEA LEVEL RISES 
Approximate 
Sea Level 
Rise 
(in feet) 
0-2 
3-4 
5-6 
7-8 
8-10 
11 
Cities 
Cartagena; Kochi, Japan. 
Bahrain; Hampton, U.K.; Pandang, Indonesia; Severodvinsk, 
U.S.S.R.; Szczecin, Poland; Tokoshima, Japan; Venice, Italy. 
Amsterdam; Apia, Samoa; Dunedin, N.Z.; Galveston, U.S.; Miami 
Beach, U.S.; Mobile, U.S.; New Orleans, U.S.; Papeete, French 
Polynesia; Tuticorn, India. 
Calais, France; Coatzacoalcus, Mexico; Daytona Beach, U.S.; 
Florianopolis, Brazil; Fort Lauderdale, U.S.; Fukuoda, Japan; 
Georgetown, Guyana; Gdynia, Poland; Key West, U.S.; Leningrad, 
U.S.S.R.; Nigata, Japan; Saint Augustine, U.S.; Semarang, Indo-
nesia; Trieste, Italy; U. Pandang, Indonesia; Ganjul, Gambia. 
Abadan, Iran; Alicante, Spain; Alborg, Denmark; Annaba, Al-
geria; Atlantic City, U.S.; Bandar Seri, Begwan; Basra, Iraq; 
Bilbao, Spain; Bremen, West Germany; Bridgeport, U.S.; Cannes, 
France; Charleston, U.S.; Charlottetown, Canada; Chinwangtoa, 
China; Delft, Netherlands; Gillingham, U.K.; Guayaquil, Ecua-
dor; Haarlem, Netherlapds; Hialeah, U.S.; Hollywood, U.S.; 
Hull, U.K.; Iwaki, Japan; Keelung, Taiwan; Kurashiki, Japan; 
Lagos, Nigeria; La Spezia, Italy; Livorno, Italy; Libreville, 
Gabon; Malmo, Sweden; Messina, Italy; Miami, U.S.; Natal, 
Brazil; Newport, U.S.; Niteroe, Brazil; Norfolk, U.S.; Noumea, 
New Caledonia; Okajama, Japan; Palm Beach, U.S.; Peterborough, 
U.K.; Pontianik, Indonesia; Port Arthur, U.S.; Portsmouth, 
U.S.; Seattle, U.S.; Tel Aviv-Jaffa, Israel; Utrecht, Nether-
lands; Valencia, Spain; Vallejo, U.S.; Veracruz, Mexico; 
Visakhapatnam, India; Victoria, Brazil; Yokkaichi, Japan; 
~onkers, U.S.; Zaanstad, Netherlands. 
Gibraltar, U.K.; Tientsin, China; Yingkow, China. 
Source: V. Showers, World Facts and Figures: A Collection of Comparative 
Information about Cities, Countries, and Geographical Features of the World 
(New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1974). 
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Climate-related economic impacts result from a number of factors. 
Impacts can result from changes in the yields of biological resources or of 
water yields in drainage basins. 33 Other impacts can result from the direct 
effects of increased temperature on heat-sensitive activities, such as space 
heating or cooling. Human performance is affected by heat and humidity, and 
impacts on biological, water, or labor yields affect the location of produc-
tion centers. 
Efforts to remedy the effects of climate change on human activities can 
also involve significant economic costs, a few of which have been estimated 
(see Table 4). These suggest that the secondary costs of some regional cli-
matic changes could be large. Examples of particularly costly adaptations 
include: the expansion of the operating parameters of water projects to 
account for all possible future climate states; and the planned relocation of 
primary agricultural and forestry lands and sensitive human populations. 
Regional Carrying ·Capacities: Climate impact assessment has focused on a 
few isolated economic activities and has rarely considered the cumulative 
effect on society of sustained multiple economic and ecological pressures. 
This is problematic, if only because systems-level responses, for instance the 
long-term response of the economic system to inter-regional capital movement, 
can be among the most important regional consequences of a change in climate. 
Effects accumulate; pressures from multiple impacts build and create new, 
larger, and more complex problems; the net effect can exceed the sum of all 
the individual effects. 
Change in regional carrying capacity is a good indicator of such systems-
level change. Many spring and summer activities in the midwestern and western 
United States, for example, are climate sensitive (see Table 5). The expected 
change in the United States is toward a warmer, much drier climate.* Average 
regional temperatures in the central United States will be 4 to 10 degrees 
Celsius warmer. 35 Reductions in available spring and summer soil moisture of 
15 to 50 percent are thought likely in response to increased surface evapora-
tion,36 and, since precipitation in continental interiors tends to vary with 
available soil moisture, summer precipitation should also decline.** The 
frequency of summer drought should increase. 
Initial calculations also suggest reduced surface runoff and reduced 
streamflows and lake levels for the five month spring and summer period. 37 If 
evaluated solely in terms of precipitation change, the decline in summer run-
off in arid regions might, with a 10 percent reduction in precipitation, be 
about 50 percent; 38 if more terms are entered into the equation, reductions in 
*For purposes of estimating impacts, Tertiary-like changes are taken to be 
the likely changes. 34 
**Globally, precipitation is expected to increase about 7 percent. But sum-
mer precipitation constitutes, on average, 40 percent of the annual rainfall 
total throughout the heart of the region (from west Texas and New Mexico to 
North Dakota and eastern Montana), which therefore seems unlikely to experi-
ence much of an increase in storable water. 
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Table 4 
SOME EXAMPLE ECONOMIC COSTS OF ADAPTING TO GLOBAL WARMING 
Example U.S. Impact, 2 to 3 Degrees 
Celsius Warming, 2000 to 2025 
Agricultural relocationa 
Increased electrical generating capacityb 
Corn belt irrigationc 
Capital costs 
Operating costs 
Ogallala-Missouri-Arkansas transfersd 
Superior-Missouri transferse 
Cost 
(in billion $) 
$27 (1971 $) 
$7-12 (1985 $) 
$21-32 (1982 $) 
$0.8-1.3 per year 
$3.6-20 (1977 $) 
$20 (1982 $) 
(a) See J. Niedercorn, "The Capital Costs of Climatically Induced Shifts in 
Agricultural Production: The Example of the American Corn Belt," in The 
Urban Costs of Climatic Modification, T. Ferrar, ed. (New York: John Wiley 
and Sons, 1976). 
(b) This assumes a 10 percent increase in needed capacity. See E. Larson, D. 
Abrahamson, and P. Ciborowski, "Effects of Atmospheric Carbon Dioxide on 
U.S. Peak Generating Capacity," IEEE Technology and Society Magazine, 
December 1984. Present capital costs are assumed to be $570 per kilowatt 
of installed capacity. See F. Horn and M. Steinberg, "Control of Carbon 
Dioxide Emissions from a Power Plant," Fuel 61 (1982): 415. Present 
generating capacity is 98,765 megawatts of electricity, and is assumed to 
increase 1.5 percent per year to 2030. 
(c) Assumes a capital cost of $400 to 600 per acre, and 59.5 million presently 
unirrigated acres in the corn belt, lake states and northern plains pro-
ducing region; see W. Sundquist, K. Menz, and C. Neumeyer, A Technology 
Assessment of Commercial Corn Production in the United States, Agri-
cultural Experiment Station, Station Bulletin 546-1982 (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota, 1982). Ten percent of present acreage with 
present cultivars is assumed to go without irrigation; see T. Blasing and 
A. Solomon, "Response of the North American Corn Belt to Climatic 
Warming," Progress in Biometeorology 3 (1984): 311. 
(d) See High Plains Associates, "Six-State High Plains-Ogallala Aquifer 
Regional Resources Study," a report to the U.S. Department of Commerce and 
the High Plains Study Council, Six State High Plains-Ogallala Study, 
Austin, Tex., 1982. 
(e) See J. Bulkley, S. Wright, and D. Wright, "The Diversion of 283 cubic 
meters per second (10,000 cfs) from Lake Superior to the Missouri Basin, 
Journal of Hydrology 10 (1982): 22. 
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Table 5 
CLIMATE SENSITIVE ACTIVITIES AFFECTING FUTURE REGIONAL CARRYING CAPACITY 
Activity 
Animal agriculture 
Grain and vegetable agriculture 
Ranching and grazing 
Natural fiber production 
Chemical use in agriculture 
Forestry 
Inland sport fishing and hunting 
Water-based recreation 
Inland water transport 
Water dependent industrial production 
Hydroelectrical power generation 
Sewage disposal and water quality protection 
Tourism 
Water dependent inland energy production 
Urban and rural water consumption 
Summer ene·rgy consumption 
Water supply activities and flood control 
Environmental protection 
Desertification control 
Sensitive Climate 
Variable 
Summer dryness 
Peak heat, dryness 
Summer dryness 
Summer dryness 
Season length 
Dryness, peak heat 
Summer dryness 
Dryness, season length 
Dryness, season length 
Summer dryness 
Summer dryness 
Summer dryness 
Dryness, peak heat 
Summer dryness 
Summer dryness 
Peak heat 
Summer dryness 
Heat, summer dryness 
Summer dryness 
runoff in the western and midwestern U.S. will be more intense.* Measured 
against the withdrawals projected for the year 2000, a 40 to 50 percent 
reduction in runoff results in streamflow demand-to-supply ratios in some 
basins in the western and plains states well in excess of unity, 43 along with 
a lengthening of the typical two~month summer period in which off-stream uses 
of plains' water exceed 90 percent of streamflows. 44 In the southern sector 
of the region, a northward displacement of the boundary of winter snow cover 
will exacerbate late spring and summer moisture availability problems. Since 
irrigation in the high plains constitutes an important source of present pre-
cipitation,45 long-term depletion-related decline of high plains' irrigation 
will further exacerbate the situation. 
*With no change in precipitation, a 6 degree Celsius warming will result in 
negative changes in runoff of 40 to 50 percent or more. 39 Precipitation ef-
fects are similar. The effects of heightened ambient carbon dioxide on 
transpiration rates can lessen these. But, for instance, to reverse the sign 
of the change in the case of precipitation decline, annual rainfall could 
decline no more than about 10 percent. 4° Changes in transpiration rates can 
have little effect on runoff in the case of winter precipitation, and spring 
snowmelt and runoff. 41 The latter is an important source of water for most 
western rivers, and changes in the time of snowmelt are an important cause of 
runoff decline in the models. 42 
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These changes point to a significant future change in the level of likely 
land-use. Agriculture in the plains states and in some midwestern states 
probably could not be maintained at the present high level of intensity, as is 
evident from typical yield responses and crop requirements46 and from the 
types of cultivars which can be economically grown without irrigation in 
steppe climates, where present spring and summer soil moisture conditions are 
about 70 to 80 percent of plains levels. As dry steppe climates expand east-
ward into the Great Plains, and prairie climates are displaced into middle 
western producing regions, production must fall. Increased maximum summer 
temperatures will also restrict the areas suitable for several cultivars.* 
Wind erosion may exert a similar influence. 
Given the suggested northern and eastern invasion of desert and steppe 
climates, forestry and water-dependent activities in the southern and north-
central states would likewise seem to be in trouble. 48 
The present density of settlement probably could not be maintained, given 
water supplies, peak heat considerations, and other factors. With a Tertiary-
like climate change, a 500 to 1,000 km northward expansion of the area of 
average peak July-to-August temperature of 99 degrees Fahrenheit, the most 
often cited temperature threshold for heat-related illness and death among the 
elderly, might be expected.** Current population trends in the southwest 
could not be sustained without substantial new sources of fresh water. 
Taken together, these impacts suggest a marked change in the economic 
viability of the region, 49 and given its political importance, national social 
and political impacts will follow. 
Adapting to this Change: Planned or anticipatory adaptation is assumed 
in most or all attempts to estimate the impacts of climate change. Planned 
adaptation assumes that society can ameliorate impacts through technological 
intervention and timely relocation of production centers, actions which depend 
on the rate of change in the environment. 50 
Several characteristics of the adaptive response are notable. First, the 
characteristic times of national capital. stocks are typically long. The life-
times of most public works capital investments exceed several decades; the 
time required for major changes in technological systems varies between twenty 
and fifty years, and major water projects have lead-times of between thirty to 
fifty years. 51 Second, the adaptive response requires relatively certain 
projections of long-term local trends in precipitation, drought frequency, and 
the like, and at ~resent we do not possess these and are not likely to possess 
them for decades. 2 
*With a 5 to 7 degree Celsius regional warming, the geographical area of 
agronomically injurious June-July maximum daily temperatures (90 and 95 de-
grees Fahrenheit respectively for wheat and corn), expands to include the 
region from northern Texas to northeastern Nebraska and central South Dakota 
and Iowa (wheat), and from southwestern Oklahoma into North Dakota and the 
lake states (corn). 47 
**From the Texas-Mexico border. 
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Hence, most planned changes in technological or other capital-intensive 
systems that could be directed at climate change probably involve time-scales 
for design and construction that themselves would be substantially longer than 
the time-scales of most climate impacts. 
A case in point involves precipitation change. Rainfall is the most 
difficult aspect of the climate to model. Past changes in rainfall have been 
very noisy. We think that in the central region of North America it will grow 
increasingly dry a$ it warms. But we cannot attach any date to the impending 
drying--whether it will be experienced in 2005 or will be postponed to as late 
as 2040. We cannot say that once a drying trend sets in it will not be 
reversed, and we do not know whether a trend toward a drier climate will set 
in suddenly as an abrupt change or will only gradually envelop the region. 
The effects of climate change.will probably be experienced most intensely 
through changes in rainfall (see Table 5). The principal mechanisms of adap-
tation would, therefore, be directed to precipitation change. If adverse 
changes in precipitation are experienced early in the next century, society 
will be unable to adapt through infrastructural changes involving surface 
water diversions53 and the like. If it is delayed until 2025, it would still 
be impossible to adapt, given the time-scales of change in this infrastructure 
and of climate modeling. On the other hand, if adverse changes in precipita-
tion occur later in the century, but are subject to quick reversal as the 
warming continues, they would rapidly render investments in infrastructural 
changes obsolete. In either of these three cases, an anticipatory response 
would be frustrated. 
Public and private monies are committed to long-term projects on the 
basis of an expected return on investment. The certainty of that return is 
important. Faced with highly uncertain outcomes, neither the public nor the 
private decision-maker is in a position to commit sizable resources to public 
undertakings. The system is geared to minimize risk. Given other competing 
short-term uses to which the economic surplus might be put with more certain 
benefits, it is unlikely that the anticipatory response will be widely 
. d * patronize . 
*If we take the upper end of the accepted ranges for the parameters governing 
the rate of future warming (a 2.5 percent per year increase in carbon dioxide 
emissions, a climate sensitivity to doubled atmospheric concentrations of 
carbon dioxide of 4 to 5.5 degrees Celsius, and a warming due to the other 
gases at 300 percent that of carbon dioxide) and compute the expected change, 
the case against the adaptive response is even more evident. In such a case, 
a Tertiary-like change in climate could be expected in forty to forty-five 
years, which, even if we assume that adaptive measures would need to be 
directed only at Tertiary-scale changes, would leave society but a decade or 
two (e.g., 2010 to 2025 or 2030) in which to institute the entirety of its 
program of adaptation. A continued rise in mean global temperature would 
bring it to 6 to 7 degrees Celsius above the preindustrial value after mid-
century, introducing society to a climate about which essentially nothing is 
known and to which, as a result, it would be impossible to adapt in an 
anticipatory fashion. 
-308-
Of course, more traditional non-planned adaptations are available. Some 
examples of these include: changed soil or water management practices in 
agriculture, water-use controls, strengthened drought relief programs, or en-
hanced preparedness for floods or hurricanes. But business-as-usual responses 
are probably poorly matched to Tertiary-scale climate changes. At best, they 
could be employed by society in responding to the short-term crisis aspects of 
climate change; they do not address the resource base underlying the effects 
of climate change on regional economies. 
It is possible that, were the change in climate to be stretched out long 
enough, the marketplace could effectively adapt society through incremental 
changes in the capital and technological base of society. Like the anticipa-
tory response, the market is limited by informational constraints: it cannot 
adapt to what cannot be forecast. So an effective market response depends on 
a slow rate of change in the climate. At present, a slow rate of warming 
cannot be demonstrated. 
Finally, there are a number of other constraints: to anticipatory adap-
tation arising from the impacts to representative institutions and to the 
efficiency of markets of heightened state intervention in society; and to the 
market response from the accelerating nature of the warming. If Figure 1 is 
correct, later in the next century the climate will change so rapidly that 
none of the conditions that might prevail at any one date could probably be 
assumed to prevail just a decade later, leading even short-term climate-
defensive investments not to be made. These constraints act to further 
constrict the prospects for the adaptive response. 
Net Economic Effect: Various researchers have offered estimates of the 
aggregate economic costs of future climatic changes (see Table 6). These 
estimates were derived indirectly from evidence of the climate sensitivity of 
economic activity in the developed world, around coastlines, and in agricul-
tural regions, and from the costs of adaptation. They are by their nature 
incomplete and at best very approximate estimates. However, most of them do 
tend in the same direction, especially when the larger changes in climate are 
considered. They also compare favorably with middle latitude heat wave· 
effects. As these studies assume climate changes much smaller than those 
envisioned for the next century, they probably underestimate the economic 
impact. This impact, it might be noted, would add to the losses from the 
present interannual variability of temperature and precipitation--currently 
estimated at about 1 percent of gross production. 54 
Effects to Yet be Considered: To date, impact assessments have con-
sidered only a limited set of effects. As this set expands, the perceived 
importance of climatic change will change. Sectors for which effects have yet 
to be considered in any detail include: forestry, 55 animal agriculture, 56 
hurricane losses, 57 estuarine fisheries, 58 off-shore fisheries, 59 hydro-
electrical production, fire losses, Great Lakes shipping, 60 river transport, 
wetlands loss, 61 ground water availability, 62 capital turnover times, 63 the 
incidence of inland flooding, 64 wilderness and protected areas, migration, 65 
minin~7and energy production, the productivity of outdoor labor, 66 and species 
loss. . 
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Table 6 
ESTIMATED ECONOMIC COSTS OF CLIMATIC CHANGE 
Author 
Laurmannb 
Laurmannb 
Lavee 
Schellingd,e 
CIAPf 
Nordhausg 
1980 Heat Wavei 
Average Global Warming 
(degrees Celsius) 
2.5 
5 
2 
2-3 
0.5 
1.5-3 
Change in Gross World 
Product (in percent)a . 
-3 
-8 
-2 to -3 
-2 
slight benefit 
_3h 
-0. 8j 
(a) Change in gross output in some targeted year and in each of the ten to 
twenty years that bracket the target year. 
(b) For relocation of production regions, all capital stocks. J. Laurmann, 
"Assessing the Importance of COrinduced Climatic Change Using Risk-
Benefit Analysis," in Interactions of Energy and Climate, W. Bach, J. 
Pankrath, and J. Williams, eds. (Dordrecht, Netherlands: D. Reidel 
Publishing Co., 1980). 
(c) L. Lave, this volume. 
(d) T. Schelling, "Climatic Change: Implications For Welfare and Policy," in 
Changing Climate, Carbon Dioxide Assessment Committee, National Research 
Council (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1983). 
(e) For agriculture and sea level rise effects only. 
(f) Climatic Impact Assessment Program, Economic and Social Measures of 
Biologic and Climatic Change, CIAP monograph 6 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Department of Transportation, 1975). 
(g) W. Nordhaus, Thinking about Carbon Dioxide: Theoretical and Empirical 
Aspects of Optimal Control Strategies, Cowles Foundation discussion paper 
565 (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University, 1980). 
(h) With a range of uncertainty of (+)5 to (-)7-12 percent. 
(i) Assessment and Information Service, U.S. Impacts of the Great 1980 Heat 
Wave and Drought (Washington, D.C.: Assessment' and Information Service, 
1980). 
(j) The impacts may have been over-reported, but even 50 percent over-
reporting still gives a lower limit approaching 0.5 percent of 1980 U.S; 
GNP. 
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Ecological Change: A change to a Tertiary-like climate would result in 
profound ecological changes. In the Arctic and sub-Arctic, the displacement 
of ecological regions by hundreds of kilometers would accompany a 4 to 5 
degree warming, 68 making it possible that entire ecological regimes could 
contract to insignificance or disappear. Species that depend on the present 
ice pack will find survival difficult; those that depend on the existence of 
the tundra may survive, but only in narrow bands at the very furthest polar 
reaches. Evidence from the last interglacial is unequivocal: the Eurasian 
tree line stretched to the Arctic coast and only the wooded tundra survived. 69 
Elsewhere, ecological changes depend on large-scale changes in moisture 
availability and the degree to which human activities allow species migration, 
the means by which nature has sustained species diversity during past climatic 
changes. Given the ubiquitous human settlement of the planet, it seems likely 
that many species will simply disappear as the climate warms. The diversity 
of species may recover, although the time-scales for such a recovery must be 
very long. 
Impact on Agriculture in Less Developed Countries: Many developing 
countries are experiencing high population 5rowth rates, which require sus-
tained annual increases in food production7 from agricultural systems which 
appear fragile in the face of changed precipitation patterns. 71 
Two considerations are of interest with regard to a significant climate 
change: heat affects on outdoor labor productivity and temperature and 
moisture effects on crop yields. A limited number of studies suggest that 
significant reductions in labor productivity, perhaps as high as 10 percent, 
are possible in the humid tropics with increased effective temperatures, 72 
implying the possibility of reduced agricultural productivity independent of 
the crop response. 
Regarding the crop response, an increase in tropical and subtropical 
temperatures will, on avera1e, negatively affect yields by about 4 or 5 
percent per degree Celsius. 3 
Increased moisture availability cou~d compensate somewhat for heightened 
temperatures. However, we cannot at present forecast the direction of region-
al soil moisture change. The most that can be said is that soil moisture 
seems as likely to decline as to increase at most locations in the tropics and 
subtropics, and that regional responses are sufficiently varied so as to 
ensure that some nations will be negatively affected. Given the expected 
population increase, adverse changes in some populous nations are inevitable. 
The consequences of adverse changes in agricultural productivity in the 
developing world range from economic loss to subsistence crises or large-scale 
movements of people. 
Higher Order System Change: Social and political systems, the inter-
national economic system, and the strategic balance between the superpowers 
all will be affected by climate change. As highly complex systems, these are 
all subject to various instabilities--recessions, social unrest, revolution, 
and military conflict--from which derives at least some risk as the climate 
changes. As the past record demonstrates, political and social systems, par-
ticularly in the developing world, have sometime~ grown quite unstable in the 
face of periodic or sustained drought or other natural climatic fluctuations. 
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Higher order effects are difficult to assess. Relatively little is 
understood about the conditions leading to instability in human systems. Such 
effects depend on the particular approaches that society takes in response to 
changing climate (e.g., whether in trying to manage impacts on the economy it 
does so through a cooperative approach or through many autarkic approaches). 
We simply do not understand the implications of sustained aggregate economic 
impacts such as are suggested in Table 6. Nor do we understand the implica-
tions of the convergence of a climate change with existing environmental 
pressures (see Table 7). It is possible that we facing a new era of large-
scale migrations. If so, what might be the implications? The most that can 
be said at present is that, by increasing the pressure on society, climate 
change probably will increase the potential for serious systems failures. 
Table 7 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS WHICH MAY BE EXACERBATED BY GLOBAL WARMING 
Tropical Africa: deforestation; deforestation-related flood damage and soil 
destruction; species destruction; mangrove destruction; per capita avail-
ability of food; availability of safe, potable water; temperature-related 
disease incidence; fertilizer/pesticide-related stream pollution; incidence of 
surface water-related diseases; chronic poverty. 
Sahelian, Saharan, and North Africa and Horn of Africa: soil erosion; 
desertification; fuelwood crisis; per capita availability of food and water; 
availability of safe, potable water; societal sensitivity to drought; tempera-
ture-related disease incidence; soil salinization and alkalinization; 
fertilizer/pesticide-related stream pollution; incidence of surface water-
related diseases; chronic poverty. 
Southern Asia and the Middle East: same as semi-arid Africa, plus species 
extinction; deforestation-related flood damage and rill erosion in the Ganges 
basin; and deterioration of urban conditions. 
Sources: G. Barney ed., The Global 2000 Report to the President of the U.S., 
vol. 1 and 2 (New York: Pergamon Press, 1980); International Institute for 
Environment and Development and World Resources Institute, World Resources 
1986 (New York: Basic Books, 1987). 
The Policy Implications of This Change: The nature and number of impacts 
resulting from a 4 or 5 degree Celsius warming suggest that warming will re-
sult in significant disruption. To the degree that it is the role of govern-
mental policy to minimize disruption, governmental intervention to limit the 
rate of warming would logically follow. However, the nature and-number of 
impacts do not in themselves determine policy. The importance of.any one 
impact or set of impacts will be evaluated in light of the feasibility and 
ease of response, the present-day valuation of the future benefits of action, 
and other terms in what can often be a lengthy, well-elaborated decision 
analysis. Depending on the larger structure of argumentation, a 4 to 5 degree 
Celsius warming over one hundred years may call for an interventionist, pre-
ventive approach centering on emissions control, or benign neglect. Hence, to 
continue our analysis, we must turn to the larger structure of argumentation 
on which the inactive response rests. · 
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THE CONDITIONS OF AN INACTIVE RESPONSE 
Inaction appears to be reasonable only to the degree to which a set of 
rather stringent conditions can be fulfilled. There must be considerable 
uncertainty about impacts, particularly about their overall sign. The change 
in climate must not be of a scale or intensity that would overwhelm that 
uncertainty or that, given that effects tend to vary broadly with the inten-
sity of climate change, would make an intuitive estimate of severe negative 
impact likely. There needs to be an explicit lack of concern for impacts on 
future generations or for the irreversibility dimension of the problem. Due 
to the high number of future generations affected, concern for any future 
effects may, in absence of an explicit disavowal of the future, overwhelm 
other considerations. Social and time discounting techniques often form a 
basis for inaction. 
It is a further condition of the inactive response that little consid-
eration be given to the possibility of high-risk, low-probability outcomes. 
Ideally, the likelihood of a climate change of any kind would itself be 
subject to question. Measured against the supposed uncertainty of climate 
change, the certainty of the present-day effects of emissions controls 
dominates the decision-making process. 
If it is not possible to completely discount the problem on the basis of 
scale or probability of occurrence, it is necessary to discount it on the 
grounds that action is infeasible. To sustain an argument based on the 
infeasibility of response, it is necessary to show that, for a limited climate 
change, the response most economically fitted to it--a limited response--will 
have little net effect on the overall rate of the accumulation of carbon 
dioxide in the atmosphere. In absence of a limited warming, it is necessary 
to affirm a robust estimate of society's ability to adapt to climate change. 
Finally, if it cannot be shown unequivocally on the grounds of scale, 
infeasibility, or ease of adaptation, that action can be avoided, it will be 
necessary to show that there are enough uncertainties in the basic physical 
aspects of the problem that action may prove unnecessary and would best be 
delayed until further study could clarity the matter. If one is arguing that 
we should wait and study the problem more fully to ascertain its exact dimen-
sions, it helps to show that in doing so we would not significantly forfeit 
our ability to act. 
In the following section, we consider the first of these requirements, 
that of uncertainty. The others follow in subsequent sections. 
UNCERTAINTY IN THE PHYSICAL PARAMETERS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 
The degree to which uncertainties in the physical science underlying our 
understanding of climate change do or do not constitute an insurmountable 
obstacle to policy formulation depends on the nature of the uncertainties and 
whether they can be bounded. Three parameters governing the rate and 
intensity of future climatic changes are of special interest: the future 
atmospheric buildup of carbon dioxide; the emission of and warming due to the 
other gases; and the climate parameter. 
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Carbon Dioxide 
The projected atmospheric carbon dioxide level depends largely on the 
rate of the expected increase in fossil fuel combustion, and on the fraction 
of each incremental unit of carbon dioxide that remains in the atmosphere once 
emitted from the surface. There is significant debate over likely future 
values for either of these factors. But, whereas uncertainties as to the 
precise value for the fraction of emitted carbon dioxide that remains airborne 
might account for a variation in the projected atmospheric carbon dioxide 
level on the order of 50 to 150 ppmv over the next century, the range of pos-
sible future energy trajectories is wide and accounts for a variation in the 
projected atmospheric carbon dioxide level three to four times this. 74 The 
wide range of possible future atmospheric levels of carbon dioxide is not, 
strictly speaking, the result of scientific uncertainties but an extension of 
the wide range of possible energy trajectories and policies. 
The scientific uncertainties that are in evidence can be modeled and the 
uncertainty appropriately bounded. These scientific uncertainties include the 
rate of release of carbon from non-fossil sources and the rate of atmospheric 
retention of emitted carbon dioxide. 
Estimates for the rate of retention, or airborne fraction, are given in 
Table 8. A lower limit to the rate can be established at 0.4. This rate will 
rise with any long-term increasing rate of emission greater than 1 to 1.5 per-
cent per annum, 75 and will decline at constant 1985 fossil energy production. 
This effect can be approximated through the use of a cumulative airborne 
fraction (i.e., the average airborne fraction from 1985 to 2075) roughly 5 
percent higher than the assumed 1985 value in the case of annually increasing 
emissions, 76 and 5 percent lower in the case of constant 1985 emissions. This 
gives a lower limit to the average long-term airborne fraction of 0.35 to 
0.45. 
Based on the estimated cumulative airborne fraction, and on the estimated 
future non-fossil sources of carbon, a total future carbon input into the 
atmosphere can be suggested for different energy strategies. One is given in 
Table 9 for a 2 percent per year fossil path. 
The effects of uncertainty in the airborne fraction are estimated from 
Table 9. As is evident, variation in the rate of atmospheric retention does 
not serve to alter the fundamental nature of the problem. In 2070, a doubling 
of the atmospheric carbon dioxide level is still realized, despite the employ-
ment of a low rate of retention. Estimates for the non-fossil carbon input 
from sources like deforestation and methane decay are also shown in Table 9. 
These are more speculative. But the number of potential sources is large, and 
the calculated total input of carbon to the atmosphere is big enough to be 
interesting. Assuming that the estimates are wrong by even 50 percent, the 
net input to the atmosphere would still be on the order of 50 to 75 ppmv, and 
we take this as a lower bound to .the "other carbon" input. 
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Table 8 
ESTIMATES OF THE AIRBORNE FRACTION 
Type of Estimate 
Estimates from ocean modelsa 
Deforestation-based estimatesb 
Estimates from sources of errorc 
Apparent airborne fractiond 
Best rangee 
Airborne Fraction 
0.57-0.80 
0.34-0.53 
0.38-0.70 
0.55-0.58 
0.40-0.70 
(a) See: C.F. Baes, Jr., A. Bjorkstrom, and P. Mulholland, "Uptake of Carbon 
Dioxide by the Oceans," in Atmospheric Carbon Dioxide and the Global 
Carbon Cycle, DOE/ER-0239, J. Trabalka, ed. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Department of Energy, 1985), table 5. 3; and J. Trabalka et al. , "Human 
Alterations of the Global Carbon Cycle and the Projected Future," ibid., 
table 10.16. 
(b) See G. Woodwell, "Biotic Effects on the Concentration of Atmospheric 
Carbon Dioxide: A Review and Projection," in Changing Climate, Carbon 
Dioxide Assessment Committee, National Research Council (Washington, D.C.: 
National Academy Press, 1983). 
(c) See H. Oeschger and M. Heimann, "Uncertainties of Predictions of Future 
Atmospheric CO2 Concentrations," Journal of Geophysical Research 88 
(1983): 1,258. 
(d) See J. Trabalka et al., in note (a) above; and C. Keeling, "The Oceans and 
Biosphere as Future Sinks for Fossil Fuel Carbon Dioxide," in Interactions 
of Energy and Climate, W. Bach, J. Pankrath, and J. Williams, eds. 
(Dordrecht, Netherlands: D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1980). 
(e) The lower value is based on the deforestation estimates of Houghton et 
al., "Carbon Dioxide Exchange Between the Atmosphere and Terrestrial 
Ecosystems," in Trabalka, note (a) above. 
-315-
Table 9 
ESTIMATED FUTURE SOURCES OF ATMOSPHERIC CARBON DIOXIDE 
Source 
Fossil fuel combustiona 
Deforestationb 
Biotic respirationc,d 
Global soilse 
Methane decayf 
Cement productiong 
Mixed oceanic layerh,d 
Average 
Low 
High 
airborne fraction, 1980-2070i 
(45) 
(70) 
Net Increase in Atmospheric Carbon 
Dioxide (ppmv) 
2030 
104 
10-45 
7-12 
6-13 
2-4 
4 
2070 
318 
45-72 
15-20 
17-35 
7-17 
8 
(-) 81 
(+)118 
Eventual 
125-250? 
? 
Note: The net amount of carbon dioxide added to the atmosphere from the list-
ed sources is calculated for an airborne fraction of 0.56, and the aggregate 
amount from all sources is adjusted in the last two lines for higher and lower 
airborne fractions. 
(a) Assumes that emissions from fossil fuels increase 2 percent per year. 
(b) See World Climate Programme, An Assessment of the Role of co2 on Climate 
Variations and Their Impact (Geneva: World Meteorological Organization, 
1981); G. Woodwell, "Biotic Effects on the Concentration of Atmospheric · 
Carbon Dioxide: A Review and Projection," in Changing Climate, Carbon 
Dioxide Assessment Committee, National Research Council (Washington, D.C.: 
National Academy Press, 1983); R. Revelle and W. Munk, "The Carbon Dioxide 
Cycle and the Biosphere," in Energy and Climate, Geophysics Research 
Board, National Research Council (Washington, D.C.: National Academy of 
Sciences, 1977); and J. Trabalka et al., "Atmospheric co2 Projections with 
Globally Averaged Carbon Cycle Models," in The Changing Carbon Cycle: A 
Global Analysis, J. Trabalka and D. Reichle, eds. (New York: Springer-
Verlag, 1986). Complete tropical deforestation would add about 70 to 75 
ppmv. 
(c) Respiration increases about 20 to 30 percent per degree Celsius. See G. 
Kohlmaier et al., "The Role of the Biosphere in the Carbon Cycle and Biota 
Models," in Carbon Dioxide: Current Views and Developments in Energy/ 
Climate Research, W. Bach et al., eds. (Dordrecht, Netherlands: D. Reidel 
Publishing Co., 1983), table X, high scenario, respiration releases less 
carbon incorporated into living biomass as a result of a temperature-
induced rise in Net Primary Productivity. 
(d) Assumes a mean global warming of 2.4 and 4.5 degrees Celsius at 2025 and 
2070, respectively, from Figure 1. 
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(e) One-hundred to two-hundred gigatons per degree Celsius. See R. Loomis, 
"CO2 and the Biosphere," in Workshop on the Global Effects of Carbon 
Dioxide From Fossil Fuels, W. Elliot and L. Machta, eds., CONF-770385 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Energy, 1979). 
(f) Assumes a four- to nine-year residence time for atmospheric methane, and 
an increase in the atmospheric methane level to 6 to 7 ppmv from a 
continuation of present trends in agricultural activities (1.5 ppmv), 
increased rates of anaerobic respiration (1.2 to 1.5 ppmv), and methane 
release from clathrates (1.1 to 2.2 ppmv). See M. Khalil and R. 
Rasmussen, "Causes of Increasing Atmospheric Methane: Depletion of 
Hydroxyl Radicals and the Rise of Emissions," Atmospheric Environment 19 
(1985): 397; .S. Hameed and R. Gess, "Impact of a Global Warming on 
Biospheric Sources of Methane and Its Climatic Consequences," Tellus 35B 
(1983): 1; P. Guthrie, "Biological Methanogenesis and the co2 Greenhouse 
Effect," Journal of Geophysical Research 91 (1986): 10,847; R. Revelle, 
"Methane Hydrates in Continental Slope Sediments and Increasing Atmos-
pheric Carbon Dioxide," in Carbon Dioxide Assessment Committee, note (b) 
above. (For a similar estimate of the increase in atmospheric carbon 
dioxide from the decay of methane, see Revelle ibid.) 
(g) The upper value assumes a continuation of 1970 to 1980 growth rates (3.4 
percent per year) in cement manufacture; the lower value assumes a 2 per-
cent per year increase. 
(h) See F. MacIntyre, "On the Temperature Coefficient of pco2 in Seawater," 
Climatic Change 1 (1978): 349. 
(i) The average airborne fraction for the period from 1980 to 2070 is cal-
culated with an approximate 10 percent increase in the airborne fraction 
between the present and 2070. 
Other Gas Emissions 
The uncertainties that surround the.other gas emissions can be bounded 
through an assessment of the sources of present and future releases and 
through argumentation about what might constitute a reasonable estimate of 
future releases. As noted elsewhere in this volume, 77 the effects of these 
releases are now typically approximated through the use of a sensitivity, or 
scaling, parameter that amplifies the projected carbon dioxide-induced warming 
by some constant factor. This is necessary due to: 
• the large number of gases involved; 78 
• uncertainties over the future rate of surface emission of each 
individual gas; 
• the future effects of photochemically active gases on the OH chemistry 
of the troposphere, and the effects on infrared absorbing gases that 
are scavenged from the troposphere through interactions with OH (a 
large number of these may be involved); 79 
• the effects of temperature dependencies on the release of methane; 80 
• the large number of candidate infrared absorbing gases whose absorp-
tion band strengths have not been determined; 81 
• uncertainty in the projected long-term rate of global industrial 
expansion and in the nature of future regulation. 
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Estimates for this scaling parameter that account for some of these 
effects are shown in Table 10. By and large, they do not account for the 
temperature dependency of methane and they largely ignore the potential 
effects of candidate infrared absorbing gases. A lower bound of about 50 
percent is suggested. 
Table 10 
ESTIMATED AGGREGATE WARMING FROM THE OTHER GREENHOUSE GASES 
Author 
Chamberlain et al. 
Dickinson and Cicerone 
Flohn 
MacDonald 
Machta 
Ramanathan 
Ramanathan et al. 
Volz 
Wang 
Wang et al. 
WMO 
Present trenda 
(a) See Table 11. 
Effect of the OGGs 
Possible 
100 
100 
2 
as a Percent of the CO2 Effect 
Best Guess Full Range 
100 
125-144 
50-100 
80-120 
80 
115 50-300 
46-123 
· 112-128 
50-100 
150 
Sources·: J. Chamberlain et al. , "Climate Effects of Minor Atmospheric Con-
stituents," in Carbon Dioxide Review: 1982, W. Clark ed .. (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1982); R. Dickinson and R. Cicerone, "Future Global Warming 
from Atmospheric Trace Gases," Nature 319 (1986): 109; H. Flohn, Possible 
Climatic Consequences of a Man-Made Global Warming, RR-80-30 (Laxenburg, 
Austria: International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, 1980); G. 
MacDonald, Climate Change and Acid Rain, MP86W00010 (McLean, Vir.: The Mitre 
Corporation, 1986); L. Machta, "Effects of Non-CO2 Greenhouse Gases," in 
Changing Climate, Carbon Dioxide Assessment Committee, National Research -
Council (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1983); V. Ramanathan, 
"Climatic Effects of Anthropogenic Trace Gases," in Interactions of Energy and 
Climate, W. Bach, J. Pankrath, and J. Williams eds. (Dordrecht, Netherlands: 
D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1980); V. Ramanathan et al., "Trace Gas Trends and 
Their Potential Role in Climate Change," Journal of Geophysical Research 90 
(1985): 5,547; A. Volz, "Climatic Effect of Trace Gases, Aerosols, Land-Use 
Changes and Waste-Heat Release," in Carbon Dioxide: Current Views and 
Developments in Energy/Climate Research, W. Bach et al. eds. (Dordrecht, 
Netherlands: D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1983); W.-C. Wang, "Climatological 
Effects of Atmospheric Ozone: A Review," in Atmospheric Ozone, C. Zerefos and 
A. Ghazi eds. (Dordrecht, Netherlands: D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1983); W.-C. 
Wang et al., "Greenhouse Effects Due to Man-Made Perturbations of Trace 
Gases," Science 194 (1976): 685; World Meteorological Organization, Global 
Ozone Research And Monitoring Project, Report of the Meeting of Experts on 
Potential Climatic Effects of Ozone and Other Minor Trace Gases, report 14 
(Geneva: World Meteorological Organization, 1982). 
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Control of the other gases will be difficult due to such factors as the 
temperature dependency of methane release, the number of yet-to~be-evaluated 
gases, and the effects of global industrialization. The latter favors 
effective decentralization of chlorofluorocarbon (CFC), chlorocarbon, and 
fluorocarbon production. Under such conditions, the potential for emissions 
control is limited. Not only are the effects of individual gases small 
(tenths to hundredths of a degree Celsius), but production is subdivided many 
times over. This fragmentation makes it impossible for any one nation to 
limit the warming due to any one gas by more than a few hundredths of a degree 
Celsius and, to this degree, makes such action unworkable. The importance of 
yet-to- be-evaluated gases (CFC-21, CFC-114, PAN, Halon-1301, and perhaps 
fifteen or twenty others) is suggested by their number. If only a few are 
found to be important future infrared absorbers, the other gas parameter would 
move upward, making control more difficult. 
For a global surface warming of about 5 degrees Celsius, the methane 
temperature dependency is estimated to result in releases from which an addi-
tional warming on the order of 0.4 to 0.5 degrees Celsius could result. 82 
At present, the atmospheric concentrations of the other gases are 
increasing annually 1 to 6 percent (see Table 11). If continued, this would 
result in a warming roughly equal to 150 percent of the warming induced by a 
doubling of the atmospheric level of carbon dioxide.* (In the case where 
controls are imposed on carbon dioxide emissions, the other gas warming as a 
percent of the carbon dioxide-induced warming certainly would be on the order 
of 100 to 150 percent.) With stringent emissions controls on CFC-11 and CFC-
12, the other gas warming as a percent of the carbon dioxide warming would be 
on the order of 100 percent. 
Dickinson and Cicerone suggest that, as an upper limit, by 2050 the other 
gas effect could be as much as 4.8 degrees Celsius. 84 (As a point of refer-
ence, a 1.5 to 3 degree Celsius warming by 2050 from increased concentrations 
of the other gases might be thought to represent a lower bound on their 
** effect. ) 
*A warming by 2050, calculated at equilibrium, of 2.1 to 4.2 degrees Celsius, 
compared with 1.4 to 2.8 degrees Celsius for atmospheric carbon dioxide in-
creased to 535 ppmv over the same period. 83 
**Assuming a climate sensitivity of 2 degrees Celsius per doubled atmospheric 
concentrations of carbon dioxide, the warming might be distributed as fol-
lows: methane contributes 0.4 degrees Celsius; nitrous oxide, 0.1 degrees 
Celsius; tropospheric ozone, 0.3 degrees Celsius; the chlorofluorocarbons, 
0.3 degrees Celsius; and others, 0.2 degrees Celsius. 85 
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TABLE 11 
OTHER GREENHOUSE GASES: RATES OF INCREASE AND CONTRIBUTION TO GLOBAL WARMING 
Climate Sensitivity Date of Increase at 
Present Change Tempera- Present Rate of Growth 
Rate of in tur·e Twice 
Increase Concen- Change Today's 
Greenhouse Gas (%/yr)a tration (degrees c)b 1 ppbv 2 ppbv Level 
Tropospheric ozone 1 2x 0.6-1.2 2055 
CFC-11 and CFC-12 5 2 ppbv 0.3-0.6 1995 2010c 
CFC-22 10-14 1 ppbv 0.05-0.1 2005 2010 
Carbon tetrachloride 1 1 ppbv 0.08-0.16 distant 2070 
Carbon tetrafluoride 3 1 ppbv 0.06-0.12 2080 
Methyl chloroform 6 1 ppbv 0.02-0.04 2015 2025 
Methylene chloride 5 1 ppbv 0.03-0.06 2055 2070 
Nitrous oxide 0.2-0.4 2x 0.4-0.8 distant 
Methane 1 2x 0.3-0.6 2050 
CFC-116 6 1 ppbv 0.13-0.26 2070 
Stratospheric ? 2x 0.6d distant 
water vapor 
(a) See P. Ciborowski and D. Abrahamson, "The Global Greenhouse Problem," this 
volume, Table 4. 
(b) Taken from V. Ramanathan et al., "Trace Gas Trends and Their Potential 
Role in Climate Change," Journal of Geophysical Research 90 (1985): 5,547. 
The first of these paired values is scaled to a climate sensitivity of 1.8 
degrees Celsius, and then is doubled to account for a more representative 
range of climate sensitivity. 
(c) Calculated with a 3 percent per year increase after Ramanathan et al., 
note (b) above. 
(d) See D.R. Blake and F.S. Rowland, "Continuing World-wide Increase in 
Tropospheric Methane, 1978 to 1987," Science 239 (1988): 1,129. 
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Climate Sensitivity 
Of the parameters of interest in the climate change problem, the climate 
sensitivity parameter is the most studied. It is an indication of the amount 
of surface warming that would result from a given increase in the atmospheric 
carbon dioxide level. It is estimated for a doubling of this level. Given 
estimates for the other parameters (other gases, airborne fraction, etc.), it 
is possible to evaluate the importance of the uncertainties in the present 
estimates of this parameter by estimating what the climate sensitivity would 
need to be were the climate change problem not to be problem, and then com-
paring this to what in fact would constitute a lower bounds estimate of the 
climate parameter. A global surface warming of 2 to 3 degrees Celsius can be 
used as a measure of whether or not a problem exists. To meet such a ceiling, 
a doubling of the atmospheric carbon dioxide level could yield no more than a 
1 to 1.2 degrees Celsius warming. Estimates for the lower bound to climate 
sensitivity are higher than this by a factor of about 1.5 (see Table 12). 
A broader discussion of a more exact estimate of climate sensitivity is 
given elsewhere in this volume. 86 Climate sensitivity is estimated through 
various mathematical models. There are advantages and disadvantages ·to the 
use of different model types. Suffice it to say that the results of the 
latest generation of general circulation models (GCMs) are to be preferred in 
estimating climate sensitivity. 
The response of mean global temperature to changed concentrations of the 
greenhouse gases is made up of two distinct processes: the direct radiative 
effects and the subsequent response of the climate system to these effects. 
There is no question as to the correct estimate for the former. 87 . A warming 
of about 1.3 degrees Celsius would result from the direct radiative effects of 
a doubling of the atmospheric carbon dioxide leve1. 88 
The climate response is more uncertain. The response of the climate 
system will amplify the warming initiated by the direct radiative effects. 
The degree of the amplification could range from 50 to 200 percent. Of the 
feedbacks that determine the climate response, the response of cloud cover is 
the most uncertain; the equations that govern the ice-albedo, water vapor, and 
other feedbacks are relatively well understood. The cloud feedback parameter 
is comprised of three distinct components: cloud height, cloud distribution, 
and cloud optical thickness, and is complex. In the most advanced generation 
of GCMs, the feedback is estimated to be positive. But it is suggested that 
it could, in total, reduce the climate sensitivity by up to 50 percent. 89 
Evaluated against the climate sensitivities of the most advanced GCMs (3.5 to 
4.2 degrees Celsius), this yields an effective lower bound of 1.8 to 2.1 
degrees Celsius. 90 (It is unlikely to be as low as 1.5 degrees Celsius. 
Climate sensitivity in the zero-order feedback case is 1.3 degrees Celsius, or 
essentially equivalent to this low value.) 
Aside from the cloud problem, all the objections to the basic calculation 
that have suggested significantly lower sensitivities than are given above 
have been answered. 91 
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Table 12 
CLIMATE SENSITIVITY TO DOUBLED ATMOSPHERIC LEVELS OF 
CARBON DIOXIDE: SUMMARY OF RECENT ANALYSES 
Climate Model Type 
One- and two-dimensional models 
Schneider 
Kandel 
Watts 
General circulation models 
Schlesinger and Mitchellb 
Schlesinger 
Full range of model types 
World· Climate Programme 
National Research Counc.il 
Budyko, Vinnikov and Yefimova 
Bolin et al. 
Warming from Doubled Levels 
of Carbon Dioxide 
(degrees Celsius) 
Possible 
0.75-6a 
<1-5 
2.2-6.3 
Likely 
1. 5-3 
3.4-4.2 
2-3 
2-3 
1.5-4.5 
2.5-3.5 
1.5-5.5 
(a) Schneider estimates that, due to unknown or improperly modeled feedback 
mechanisms, the range of likely climate sensitivity could be higher or 
lower by several-fold. 
(b) Review of advanced GCMs. 
Sources: B. Bolin, et al., eds., The Greenhouse Effect, Climate Changes and 
Ecosystems (Chicester, U.K.: John Wiley and Sons, 1986); M. Budyko, K. ya. 
Vinnikov, and N. Yefimova, "The Dependence of the Air Temperature and Precipi-
tation on the Carbon Dioxide Concentration in the Atmosphere," Meteorology and 
Hydrology 4 (1983): 5; R. Kandel, "Simple Climate Models and the Greenhouse 
Effect," in Carbon Dioxide: Current Views and Developments in Energy/Climate 
Research, W. Bach et ai., eds. (Dordrecht, Netherlands: D. Reidel, Publishing 
Co., 1983); National Research Council, Carbon Dioxide and Climate: A Scien-
tific Assessment (Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Sciences, 1979); M. 
Schlesinger, "Simulating CO2-Induced Climate Change with Mathematical Climate 
Models: Capabilities, Limitations and Prospects," in Carbon Dioxide, Science 
and Consensus, CONF-820970 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Energy, 
1983); M. Schlesinger and J. Mitchell, "Model Projections of the Equilibrium 
Climatic Response to Increased Carbon Dioxide," in Projecting the Climatic 
Effects of Increased Carbon Dioxide, M. MacCracken and F. Luther, eds., DOE/ 
ER-0237 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Energy, 1985); S. Schneider, 
"On The Carbon Dioxide-Climate Confusion," Journal of the Atmospheric Sciences 
32 (1975): ·2,060; R. Watts, "Climate Models and CO2-Induced Climatic Changes," 
Climatic Change 2 (1980) : 387; World Climate P.rogramme, An Assessment of the 
Role of co2 on Climate Variations and Their Impact (Geneva: World Meteor-
ological Organization, 1981). 
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Regional Climate Change 
By contrast, efforts to model local and regional climate changes are 
problematic. Despite the ability of the models to duplicate some of the gross 
features of past changes in temperature and precipitation, the models do not 
possess sufficient resolution capacity to incorporate small-scale weather 
processes. The distance between grid points in the models is on the order of 
500 km. Processes of smaller spatial dimensions must be treated statistically 
rather than as physical processes. Since the processes that dominate regional 
weather are determined by sub-grid phenomena like precipitation and local 
cloud amounts, projections of regional changes in climate are largely specu-
lative. 
Uncertainties in the Societal Response 
The response of society will, in part, depend on the unpredictable ways 
in which people react. But something can be said about the response based on 
the conditions under which market and administered decision-making systems do 
and do not function well. From the analysis we have presented, it can be 
determined that the prospects for adaptation are in fact limited. Other con-
straints to the adaptive response are reviewed in the Introduction to Section 
3 of this volume, and other guidance can be taken from the better critiques of 
societal decision-making. 92 On the basis of these, a pessimistic assessment 
of society's ability to respond to a warming seems warranted. 
THE EFFECTS OF UNCERTAINTY 
Any attempt to limit the intensity of the future warming will depend on 
the actions that society takes to restrict fossil fuel combustion. The degree 
to which the warming might be limited under any one set of governmental 
actions will depend on the sensitivity of the climate to increased atmospheric 
levels of carbon dioxide and other factors. Hence, the energy policy effects 
of uncertainty can be taken as an indication of the overall importance of 
uncertainty to policy formulation. 
Table 13 shows the results of an analysis in which the total amount of 
fossil fuel carbon that might be added to the atmosphere under a 4 degrees 
Celsius ceiling on the mean global temperature rise, is shown. Given an esti-
mate of the as yet unrealized effects of gases released from 1860 to 1985, 93 
it is possible to calculate backward what carbon dioxide concentrations might 
need to be to realize a ceiling on a carbon dioxide-induced warming. Sub-
tracting out the effects of carbon released from deforestation and other 
lesser sources, 94 it is then possible to estimate the total amount of fossil 
fuel carbon dioxide that might be emitted at different ceilings. By varying 
the non-fossil fuel parameters controlling the aggregate rise in mean global 
temperature (e.g., the climate sensitivity, the other gas parameter, the 
airborne fraction) it is possible to estimate the amount of carbon that can be 
added to the atmosphere in the best, worst, and average cases, and the degree 
to which the variation in the parameters affects this total carbon input. 
-323-
Case 
Base 
Basel 
Base2 
Base3 
Base4 
Base5 
Worst 
Table 13 
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS: ACTION INITIATION TIMES (AITs) AND 
CEILINGS OF FOSSIL FUEL CARBON DIOXIDE FOR A 4 DEGREE CELSIUS 
CEILING ON AVERAGE GLOBAL TEMPERATURE CHANGE 
Climate Other Gas Non- Ambient Fossil 
Sensitivity Warming Airborne Fossil CO2 CO2 
(to 2 x CO2, (% of coi Fraction CO2 Ceilin~ Ceiling 
degrees C) Warming) (%)b (ppmv)c (ppmv) (ppmv) 
3 150 45 Base (105) 456 351 
4 150 45 Base (98) 417 319 
2 150 45 Base (105) 546 441 
3 300 45 Base (105) 411 306 
3 so 45 Base (98) 549 451 
3 150 35 Low (70) 456 386 
4 300 65 High (175) 388 213 
AITe 
1985 
1985 
1985/1995 
1985 
1985/1995 
1985 
1985 
Best 2 so 35 Low (58) 724 668 2005/beyond 
2020 
Other 2 100 55 Base (128) 612 484 1985/2000 
Other 3 100 55 Base (128) 489 361 1985 
Other 4 100 55 Base (121) 437 316 1985 
(a) See Table 10. 
(b) See Table 8. 
(c) Carbon released through deforestation, cement manufacture, enhanced biotic 
respiration, and methane decay. For details on emissions, see Table 9. 
The temperature-sensitive estimates given here are recalculated for a 4 
degree Celsius increase in mean global temperature. The carbon emission 
from methane decay is adjusted for internal consistency with the other gas 
warming. 
(d) Accounts for the yet unrealized warming from past emissions. 
(e) Estimated from Laurmann, this volume, and A. Perry, "Carbon Dioxide Pro-
duction Scenarios," in Carbon Dioxide Review: 1982, W. Clark, ed. (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1982). (For details, see ref. 95). 
Action initiation times (AITs) are a useful measure of the sensitivity of 
energy policy to the total allowable carbon input to the atmosphere. Since 
there is no effective technical fix through which to control emissions of 
carbon dioxide after combustion, the accumulation of carbon dioxide in the 
atmosphere can be limited only through an abandonment of the present fossil 
energy system in favor of a non-carbon based system. Action initiation times 
designate the date at which a non-fossil energy system must begin to displace 
the present fossil fuel system. 
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i 
From Table 13, it is clear that the various uncertainties, if properly 
accounted for, cannot act as a significant obstacle to a preventive strategy--
at least at an assumed ceiling of 4 degrees Celsius on allowable change in 
mean global temperature. In most cases, the level of allowable fossil fuel 
carbon input is quite low. Action initiation times generally fall at, near, 
or before the current date; in most cases, action initiation times fall well 
before the year 2000. Due to the lengthy amount of time required for 
individual nations, and then sets of nations jointly, to take decisions about 
preventive action and then to develop and implement preventive programs, 
action initiation times that fall within the next fifteen years imply the 
necessity of immediate policy action. Only in the case of unlikely combina-
tions of parameters (low climate sensitivities, low other gas contributions, 
low airborne fractions, etc.) do action initiation times fall outside of this 
time period, implying that the policy imperatives of the climate change 
problem are relatively invariant to the physical science uncertainties. 
This analysis demonstrates the error in the contention that uncertainties 
in the physical science underlying our understanding of climate change, if 
properly accounted for, can act as a significant obstacle to a preventive 
response--at least at an assumed ceiling on the rise in mean global tempera-
ture of 4 degrees Celsius. Only in the fairly unlikely event that the most 
optimistic estimate for all the governing parameters were in fact realized 
could one sustain the opposing position. 
This analysis also makes it clear that a wait-and-see response is incon-
sistent with an ultimate warming of less than 4 degrees Celsius. This is a 
substantially _different conclusion from those that have been arrived at in the 
past. 96 Raising or lowering the ceiling level only marginally affects the 
results.* 
THE ROLE OF OTHER CONSIDERATIONS 
Future Generations 
Social and time discounting techniq~es constitute the principal mechanism 
for the differential valuation of generations in contemporary public decision-
making. Under the terms of social and time discounting, future generations 
are valued at a rate that is substantially lower than the rate at which 
present generations are valued. This makes it difficult for society to 
respond to any impacts of present activities other than those that are very 
proximate in time. 
But to what degree must such techniques make irrelevant any effort to 
control present-day releases of the greenhouse gases? Social and time 
discounting is premised upon an assumed consensus across generations of the 
*Evaluated against a ceiling of 3.5 degrees Celsius, action initiation times 
in the case of the most 
the period beyond 2030. 
in the case'of ceilings 
or at the present date. 
optimistic assessment of parameters would fall into 
Base and worst case action initiation times would, 
in the range of 5 to 6 degrees. Celsius, fall before 
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essential rightness of such discounting. It requires that we know that such a 
consensus will hold over very long periods of time. However, like the theo-
logical truths of the past, the time-scales of economic thought are historical 
in nature. They come and go with changes in the material and social bases of 
society. Thus, we cannot at present know that discounting can be extended to 
the greenhouse problem. At present at least, the assumption that it can be so 
extended is unwarranted. 97 
Aspects of Scale 
Not all climate changes are acceptable. Some changes are of such inten-
sity that they are manifestly unacceptable. In this vein, ceilings of 3 to 5 
degrees Celsius on mean global temperature change have been offered. 98 
The argument for limiting the average global surface temperature rise to 
less than 4 degrees Celsius is comprised of three components. The rate of 
global surface warming in the case of any rise in temperature greater than 4 
degrees Celsius implies that later in the next century the rate of warming 
will begin to approach 0.5 to 1·degrees Celsius per decade. This is almost 
certainly too rapid a pace to be sustained by society. 
At such a rate of change, climate would, at warmings in excess of 4 or 5 
degrees Celsius, be forced through a series of fundamental chanies in boundary 
conditions that suggest closely spaced step-changes in climate. Since nearly 
all human systems have long characteristic times, a sequence of such step-
changes would be difficult to accommodate. 
Finally, a warming greater than 4 or 5 degrees Celsius would move climate 
into .a climate space about which, essentially, nothing is known. The physical 
basis of such a change is, with few exceptions, a mystery. To this degree, 
such an extreme rise in mean global surface temperature would enormously 
expand the set of possible climate outcomes to which society might need to 
adapt. The impact of a 6 to 9 degree warming must be assumed to be at least 
as bad as, and probably a good deal worse than, the impact of a 4 degrees 
Celsius change. Tropical heat effects would place lowland conditions some-
where near the tolerance level;lOO initial modeling efforts suggest an inten-
sification of middle latitude drying; a warming of around 7 degrees Celsius 
appears to be intense enough to result in tropical or near-tropical climates 
in Western Europe. 101 But beyond this, little can be said. 
Thus bounded only at the lower end of the range of possible effects, 
where one finds at best a bad situation, but not at all on the high end, the 
situation is one of nearly complete uncertainty. It can be only ill-advised 
to allow the climate to move off into such unknown territory. 
*At such rates of warming, a rapid succession of one qualitatively different 
climate by another, and then by a third, might reasonably be expected, asso-
ciated with change from a fully ice-covered Arctic, to a summer Arctic melt, 
to annually ice-free Arctic. 99 Somewhere in a warming of 4 to 7 degrees Cel-
sius, these successive changes should be realized. 
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The context of likely future conditions (e.g., global population reaching 
8 to 10 billion, and extreme pressure on land and biotic resources) assures us 
of the reasonableness of this assessment. 
Feasibility Aspects 
An effective preventive response can be affected only through a gradually 
declining rate of fossil fuel combustion. The means by which the rate of 
combustion might be constrained include: increased energy end-use efficiency; 
the incorporation of environmental costs into the costs of energy services; 
the elimination of subsidies to fossil fuel production; subsidization of non-
carbon fuels; the taxation of combustion; and coal export restrictions. 
Society's ability to significantly reduce the rate of atmospheric accumulation 
is estimated either through the use of energy-economy models or through more 
intuitive estimates of what might possibly be achieved through different 
energy use arrangements than presently prevail. 
Various estimates of the technical potential for long-term limits on the 
rate of accumulation are given in Table 14. These establish a lower bound on 
what could potentially be achieved. The table also shows the estimated 
effects of enhanced end-use efficiencies. As a point of reference, end-use 
efficiency increased by 1 to 2 percent per year in the decade subsequent to 
the 1973 oil embargo. 102 Also shown are results gleened from energy-economy 
models. Taken together, these results suggest that in 2050 the atmospheric 
concentration of carbon dioxide could be constrained to 400 to 440 ppmv. 
These are in sharg contrast to the projected levels in the uncontolled case, 
510 to 550 ppmv.l 3 -
These estimates are taken from a wide variety of approaches to underline 
the apparent potential that exists for a successful interventionist response. 
Other estimates could as easily be substituted for those included in Table 
14_104 
Probabilistic Reasoning 
Given the parameters governing the rate of future warming, different 
rates of warming have different probabilities of occurrence. A limited 
warming, for example 2 or 3 degrees Celsius, is rather improbable. Policy 
cannot be based on such improbably low estimates. It is possible to do so 
only upon a willingness to play long odds with regard to the physical des-
cription of the problem. As others have pointed out, probabilistic reasoning 
ought to form the principal basis for decision-making with regard to- the 
climate change problem. This approach suggests that policy respond to impacts 
at the much higher levels of warming that, in absence of preventive action, 
would accompany the realization of the base case parameters of Table 13. 
There is but one exception to this rule: that extra weight be given to worst 
case events to express our aversion to high-risk outcomes. 
If we use this reasoning as a guide to policy formulation, the basis for 
an inactive response, which, again, assumes relatively minor changes in 
climate, effectively disappears. 
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Table 14 
ESTIMATES OF FEASIBLE LIMITS ON FUTURE CARBON DIOXIDE LEVELS 
Carbon Dioxide 
2020 
Technical potential 
Williams 11 TW Caseb 388 
Lovins 8 TW Casec 370 
Fossil fuel limitation 
Coal, oil shale, tar sands 
Oil and natural gas 
Energy efficiency gainf 
High gain (1.8 % per year) 408 
Base gain (1.2 % per year)g 412 
Full cost coal pricingh,i 400 
Alternative OECD/LDC 
development modelk 405 
$150/mtce tax (1975 $) 1 
Energy-.economy scenarios 
Rose et al. Case E1.,m 383 
Rose et al. Case Ji,n 379 
Edmonds and Reilly0 402-410 
(a) Assumes an airborne fraction of 0.56. 
(b) See R. Williams et al., this volume. 
2050 
370 
468 
414-440 
428 
410 
452-482 
(1rnmv) a 
Ultimate 
431-49ld 
l,489-7,455e 
Cost 
(percent 
of GDP) 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
lj 
? 
? 
2 
2 
? 
(c) See A. Lovins, "Economically Efficient Energy Futures," in Interactions of 
Energy and Climate, W. Bach, J. Pankrath, and J. Williams eds. (Dordrecht, 
Netherlands: D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1980) . 
. (d) The carbon content of remaining conventional oil and natural gas is taken 
from W. Haefele et al., Energy in a Finite World (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Ballinger Publishing Co., 1981). 
(e) Coal resources are estimated after World Energy Conference, World Energy 
Resources 1985-2020: An Appraisal of World Coal Resources and Their 
Availability (Guildford, U.K.: IPC Science and Technology Press, 1978). 
Best guess and upper limit speculations for the carbon content of oil 
shale and tar sands are from R. Rotty and G. Marland, "Constraints on 
Fossil Fuel Use," in Bach, Pankrath, and Williams, note (c) above. 
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(f) W. Chandler, Energy Productivity: Key to Environmental Protection and 
Economic Progress, Worldwatch paper 63 (Washington, D.C.: Worldwatch 
Institute, 1985). 
(g) 1.8 percent per year from 1985 to 2000, and 1.2 percent per year from 2000 
to 2025. 
(h) Incorporating the full environmental costs of coal combustion into the 
sale price. 
(i) See D. Rose, M. Miller, and C. Agnew, Global Energy Futures and CO2-
Induced Climate Change, MITEL 83-015 (Cambridge, Mass.: Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology Energy Laboratory, 1983). 
(j) Incorporating the full environmental costs of fossil fuel combustion into 
the selling price should result in no economic costs to society. The 
given value does not fully represent environmental costs as a determinant 
of the rate of future economic growth. 
(k) Assumes the present ratio of rural to urban populations and much enhanced 
efficiency of energy end-use in Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) economies. See U. Columbo and 0. Bernardini, "A Low 
Energy Growth 2030 Scenario and the Perspective for Western Europe," re-
port prepared for the Commission of the European Communities, Panel on Low 
Energy Growth, European Economic Community, Brussels, 1979. The atmos-
pheric carbon dioxide levels associated with the Colombo and Bernardini 
modeling effort are taken from W. Bach, Our Threatened Climate: Ways of 
Averting the co2 Problem Through Rational Energy Use (Dordrecht, 
Netherlands: D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1984). 
(1) Assumes an average decadal response of 0.1 to 0.136 ppmv per dollar per 
metric ton coal equivalent (mtce) taxation, and that permanent taxation is 
implemented in the year 2000. See W. Nordhaus and G. Yohe, "Future Carbon 
Dioxide Emissions from Fossil Fuels," in Changing Climate, Carbon Dioxide 
Assessment Committee, National Research Council (Washington, D.C.: 
National Academy Press, 1983), taxation experiments (permanent 1980 tax, 
and permanent stringent year 2000 tax). 
(m) Low solar electric costs ($2.05/watt), full-cost coal pricing, and an oil 
and gas tax of about 50 percent. 
(n) Case E plus higher end-use efficiency improvements (1 percent per year), 
and the embargo of Middle East oil exports. 
(o) See J. Edmonds et al., Uncertainty in Future Global Energy Use and Fossil 
Fuel CO2 Emissions 1975 to 2075, DOE/NBB-0081 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Department of Energy, 1986). 
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Time to Much Better Information 
Given the time-scales of required action, under nearly any set of 
parameters, a delay in the effort to initiate action may foreclose the pos-
sibility for action. By contrast, the amount of time required for society to 
significantly improve its understanding of the regional climate response may 
be long. Significantly improved information depends on the development of a 
realistic ocean GCM. Further, it depends on greatly enhanced resolution of 
the atmospheric GCMs. Given the physical dimensions of storms and clouds, it 
is probably necessary to reduce the distance between grid points by at least 
one-half. We will also need, somehow, to be able to discount the effects of 
potential surprises arising from our limited understanding of much of 
nature. 105 
A good ocean GCM is at least two decades away. 106 Better resolution with 
regard to some weather parameters may come more quickly. But detailed, 
reliable physical descriptions of precipitation changes depend on local cloud 
responses. Current descriptions of these are primitive. The long-term pro-
gram of research suggests that several decades or more of research will be 
involved. 107 The past rate of progress on cloud responses suggests that the 
resolution of unknowns here might take a like amount of time. 108 It may never 
be possi~le to resolve the unknowns at warmings greater than 5 degrees Cel-
sius. 
A MORE REASONABLE RESPONSE 
Given the above analysis, it can be shown that an inactive response to 
the climate change problem does not fit the physical and time dimensions of 
global warming. Inaction depends on the ultimate rightness of action initia-
tion times decades into the future. This cannot be shown. It depends on the 
employment of time and social discounting techniques, and, as D'Arge et al. 
have shown, 109 distributional issues are probably best treated through an 
equal valuation of present and future generations. Finally inaction requires -
an unreasonable treatment of the probability of the occurrence of a warming. 
A better approach might involve the employment of a provisional response. 
In order to effectively respond to global warming over the short-term, society 
can act with long-term resolution to restrict emissions; it can do nothing; or 
it can act to preserve society's long-term options with regard to the release 
of the greenhouse gases. Since a warming in the range of 4 to 5 degrees Cel-
sius appears to introduce us to the margin of change at which catastrophic 
events become an important consideration, a provisional response designed to 
preserve our options must also be a preventive response. To implement such a 
response, initial actions to limit the long-term rate of accumulation must be 
taken soon. 
A provisional response has the virtue of allowing scope for future re-
vision of the parameter estimates given above. Provisional responses can be 
reversed, but there can be no recouping of ground lost through inaction. 
But beyond this, a better approach might involve some effort to meld 
present actions into the longer-term logic of global energy supply. The 
transition from petroleum to another energy base is inevitable. In the long-
term, a coal-based system is not an option. The discussion over the future of 
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coal is fundamentally constrained by the dilemma of a changing climate; the 
issue is not whether coal constitutes a long-term option but only when a tran-
sition away from it can be affected. Given this, it is only reasonable, in 
considering the long-term imperative for a movement from coal, to fold-in our 
concern for the timeliness of that movement. It makes little sense, from a_ 
strategic point of view, to continue our present coal use, knowing that, in 
the end, it will have to be discontinued, and that, in addition to high 
capital costs, the cost of transition, if delayed, will also include the 
climate impact costs of a warming. 
Regardless of whether we reason from the present forward on the basis of 
risk or from the future backward, it is impossible to escape the imperative of 
a preventive response. In a sense, the sheer physical scale of the problem 
assures this. At what seem to be likely parameter estimates, if we are to 
avoid warmings that no one thinks we can live with, an enormous reduction in 
carbon dioxide emissions is necessary. If we look at the worst case, large 
amounts of carbon have to be withdrawn from the atmosphere. The degree of 
intervention that is required is a measure of the enormity of the problem. 
The estimated response of global temperatures to industrialization is now so 
large as to require wholesale transformation of the energy base of industrial 
society. Or, stated another way, the scale of possible changes is now so 
large that, in order to assess the sign of the impacts, we need not even be 
able to describe individual impacts; the scale of the change virtually ensures 
that the sign will be negative. Estimated against any standard benefit-cost 
calculus (assuming no social and time discounting), this must convince us of 
the logic of the preventive response. 
The only question that arises relates to the time of action. At many of 
the parameter combinations given in Table 13, each and every year that passes 
without action makes it less likely that the rise in average global tempera-
ture could be limited to even as high a level as 6 to 7 degrees Celsius. This 
is not the type of changes that we should will to future generations. 
The most efficient preventive response involves the proper pricing of 
energy services and enhancement of the efficiency of energy end-use. This 
might be pursued first. Over the longer term, in order to roll the emission's 
curve over, it may be necessary to resort to taxation. This can be determined 
as the long-term emissions response becomes clear. 
Objections 
Cost Constraints: It has been suggested that the costs of action consti-
tute an irresistible constraint to action. 110 There is, however, little 
evidence to support this contention. Estimated with global energy-economy 
models, the costs of the policies noted in Table 14 might serve to lower gross 
world product on the order of 1 or 2 percent by 2050 (or at an average rate of 
-0.02 to -0.04 percent per year) and, hence, are are small in comparison to 
the costs of climate change. 111 The costs of significantly enhanced end-use 
efficiency are consistent with the estimates of Nordhaus. 112 The postulated 
annual increase in end-use efficiency is thought to be attainable with 
moderate stimuli and good information. The costs of full-cost coal pricing 
are known axiomatically: full-cost pricing is an expression of the polluter-
pays principle, which, in theory at least, maintains efficiency in energy and 
other markets. As a point of reference, historical subsidies to energy 
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production in the United States have been estimated at about $44 billion ~er 
year (in 1984 dollars), or about 1.5 percent of gross national product. 11 
Ability to Set a Threshold: As noted elsewhere, below the 4 degrees 
Celsius level of change, it is difficult to establish a particular threshold 
of unacceptable change. There is no way to distinguish between different 
levels of warming in any believable way. Below this level of change, the 
history of the greenhouse problem suggests that it is exceedingly difficult to 
convince the body politic that action is necessary. 
But, although this is true, the case for a preventive response at a warm-
ing of 7 or 9 degrees Celsius is, nonetheless, manifest. No one has suggested 
that such a warming could be sustained. And, since a 6 degree Celsius warming 
is largely indistinguishable, in a quaiitative sense, from the slightly more 
intense warmings, the same can be said of this type of warming. Hence, while 
some approaches do founder in confusion at the 2 to 3 degree Celsius range of 
change, 114 no fundamental constraint to the analysis leading to the establish-
ment of a ceiling on permissible mean global temperature change is in fact 
evident. 
International Aspects of Control: It has been suggested that the inter-
national requirements of the preventive response render it infeasible. 115 Due 
to the wide geographical distribution of fossil fuel consumption, long-term 
limits on combustion demand some sort of cooperative agreement. This, it is 
suggested, is unlikely. 
We have no doubt that it will be difficult for the international commun-
ity to agree to limit fossil fuel use. However, at present, emissions from 
the industrialized West account for about 50 percent of all carbon added to 
the atmosphere, which gives the West a controlling influence on future atmos-
pheric carbon dioxide concentrations so long as rates of growth in fossil fuel 
use remain below 1 or 1.5 percent per year elsewhere (see Table 15). Since 
Western nations do often act in concert, it is not inconceivable that OECD 
action could form the basis for a long-term preventive response. 
Effects of Long Time-scales on Rates of Accumulation: The feasibility of 
longer-term limits on atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations is often ques-
tioned on the grounds of the long time-scales of the problem. 116 An enormous 
amount of carbon could potentially be released through the combustion of the 
world's coal resources. Over long periods of time, this must accumulate in 
the atmosphere. 
However, the future atmospheric level of carbon dioxide is very sensitive 
to a host of assumptions about the structure and the long-term rate of matura-
tion of the global economy, the price of presently exotic liquid and gaseous 
fuel sources, the degree of environmental degradation with which a post-
industrial society would be willing to live, and other factors.* At present, 
*For instance, the results of the Edmonds and Reilly model (1983) depend to a 
degree on the estimated cost of shale oil and synthetic oil, which, according 
to the model together will contribute about 20 percent to the net atmospheric 
carbon dioxide increase between 1980 and 2100. -No shale oil and synoil would 
be produced according to the model were the prices for these fuels in the 
next century to be lower by just one-sixth to one-third. 117 
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only speculative assessments or estimates can be offered for most of these. 
Our understanding of the long-term relations between energy use and future 
developments in the global economy is limited. 118 The energy-economy models 
have been consistently wrong over the last fifteen years, and those projecting 
high energy growth rates continue to yield results for future use that diverge 
widely from recent experience. 119 Although releases during only the next 
fifty years could be as much as 400 to 450 GT carbon (resulting from 12,000 
gigawatt years per year of coal consumption120), it is also possible that 
enactment of environmental legislation to control the worse effects of com-
bustion activities will limit long-term coal use, or that over the long-term 
the coal export trade will fail to develop. 121 
Therefore, we do not believe that the results of such models can be 'taken 
as particularly demonstrative of the inevitability of a high future atmospher-
ic level of carbon dioxide but only as illustrative of the degree to which our 
present mode of projecting future conditions is mismatched to problems which 
have very long time horizons. 
Table 15 
ATMOSPHERIC LEVELS OF CARBON DIOXIDE IN 2050 WITH VARIATIONS IN 
FOSSIL FUEL GROWTH RATES FOR VARIOUS OECD NATIONS 
(in ppmv) 
Annual 
Percent 
Change in 
Emissions USWE USWEJ USWEJCa 
+2 539 542 541 
+1 510 509 506 
0 492 490 485 
-1 481 477 472 
Note: It is assumed that trends in fossil fuel use outside of the OECD are 
based on historic trends. See R. Rotty, G. Marland, and N. Treat, The 
Changing Pattern of Fossil Fuel CO2 Emissions, DOE/OR/21400-2 (Washington, 
D.C.:. U.S. Department of Energy, 1984). For Council on Mutual Economic 
Assistance (CMEA) nations, emissions would increase initially 1.8 percent per 
year, but the rate of increase would itself decline about 6 percent per year. 
For China, emissions would initially increase annually 3.25 percent per year, 
but the rate of increase would decline 6 percent per year until it reaches 1.5 
percent per year, where it is assumed to stabilize. Emissions from the devel-
oping market economies would increase 4 percent per year, consistent with the 
average annual rate of increase in fossil fuel use from 1972 to 1983. Present 
rates of increase in emissions from Canada, Japan, and Australia and New Zea-
land are 1.9, 1.17, and 2.7 percent per year, respectively. 
(a) US= United States; WE= Western Europe; J = Japan; C = OECD Commonwealth 
Nations. 
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Other Releases: Finally, it has been suggested that sources of climate 
change· other than carbon dioxide from energy use might be the targets of an 
effective preventive response. Carbon dioxide could be controlled by control-
ling deforestation. Likewise, controls could be imposed on surface emissions 
of the other greenhouse gases. Finally, society could employ various tech-
nical fixes that might allow a fossil fuel-based economy to go forward with 
limited effects on climate. 
At present, none of these alternatives appears to hold much promise. Net 
emissions of carbon from the biosphere are principally related to demographic 
pressures in developing tropical and subtropical regions and to the need for 
land for agriculture and wood for fuel. 122 Of the various pressures leading 
to the emission of the greenhouse gases, demographic pressure is by far the 
most difficult with which to deal, since, for political reasons, controls on 
population growth seem the least likely of any controls to be implemented. 
This, along with the pace of present demographic pressures, suggests that 
long-term emissions from biospheric sources are inevitable. 
Temperature-related emissions of methane and carbon dioxide can be 
controlled only to the degree that the overall rate of global warming is 
controlled. No intervention outside of such long-term control is possible. 
The surface sources of the chlorofluorocarbons, methyl chloroform, 
methylene chloride, carbon tetraflouride, and carbon tetrachloride are mainly 
related to manufacturing activities (see Table 16). As noted above, long-term 
trends in global industrialization may make control of these releases exceed-
ingly difficult. The feasibility of emissions control has been demonstrated 
with regard to the chlorofluorocarbons. 123 However, even at constant present-
day rates of release of CFC-11 and CFC-12, concentrations will still approach 
3 parts per billion (ppbv) in the long term. (At a 15 percent reduction, 
concentrations would approach 2.5 ppbv. 124) And although it is possible to 
control CFC-11 and CFC-12, other infrared active gases like methyl chloroform 
and CFC-22 are believed likely to be introduced as substitutes. Hence, al-
though some measure of control can be purchased, only a part of the future 
effects of these gases can in fact be forestalled. 
To the degree that some of the emissions of these gases result from 
combustion, long-term limits on combustion will help to limit the long-term 
accumulation of gases like methane and ozone. At present, about 15 to 20 
percent of surface methane emissions result from activities associated with 
the production, transportation, and combustion of coal and natural gas. 125 
Tropospheric ozone is produced in situ in the atmosphere consequent to the 
surface emission of carbon monoxide and methane. Anthropogenic emissions of 
carbon monoxide result from incomplete combustion of fossil fuels and from 
wood burning in deforestation. 126 Although the former should increase in 
importance with the gradual disappearance of the tropical forests, it now 
accounts for no more than half of the observed increase in concentrations. 
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Table 16 
SOURCES OF SOME OTHER GREENHOUSE GASES 
Gas 
CFC-11, CFC-12, CFC-22 
Methyl chloroform 
Methylene chloride 
CFC-13, CFC-113, CFC-114, 
CFC-115 
Carbon tetrafluoride 
Carbon tetrachloride 
CFC-116 
Nitrous oxide 
Tropospheric ozone 
Stratospheric water 
vapor 
Sources of Increasea 
Use as aerosol propellants, leakage from 
refrigerator units, foam blowing 
Industrial solvent use, landfills 
Industrial solvent use 
Industrial solvent use 
Aluminum refining, steel production 
Chlorofluorocarbon production 
Aluminum industry 
Combustion, fertilizer use 
Carbon monoxide, NOx, methane emissions 
Tropical tropopause warming from presence 
of chlorofluorocarbons 
(a) See V. Ramanathan et al., "Trace Gas Trends and Their Potential Role in 
Climate Change," Journal of Geophysical Research 90 (1985): 5,547. 
If we account for limited contribution of combustion activities to future 
rates of increase, then the level of possible control is quite minor. We 
estimate the other gas-induced warming by 2070 at 2.2 to 6.2 degrees Cel-
sius.127 Levels of potential control are estimated in Table 17 for the other 
gases. Estimates for some other measures of control are also included. 
There is no economically feasible way of removing carbon dioxide either 
from the effluent streams of power plants or directly from the atmosphere. 128 
It has been suggested that, in response to climatic change, society will gen-
erate a technical fix. 129 However, it has yet to be demonstrated that the 
physical potential for any single technological remedy exists. To base policy 
on the hope that one day a technological fix will be developed is to go beyond 
the bounds of credibility. 130 
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Table 17 
FEASIBILITY FOR LIMITING WARMING FROM OTHER SOURCES 
(degrees Celsius) 
Other gases by 2070a 
Temperature sensitive releasesb 
Deforestation carbon in 2070c 
Carbon dioxide removed through 
stack scrubbing by 2050d 
Potential 
Limitation 
0.3-2.2 
? 
0.1-0.4 
Warming, 
No Control 
2.2-6.2 
0.4-0.8 
0.2-0.5 
1.6-5.le 
(a) Chlorofluorocarbon, nitrous oxide, methane, and tropospheric ozone levels 
in the uncontrolled case are estimated at 2.7 to 7.8 ppbv, 400 ppbv, 6 to 
7.5 ppmv, and double present tropospheric ozone level, respectively. 
Chlorofluorocarbon levels are taken from R. Dickinson and R. Cicerone, 
"Future Global Warming from Atmospheric Trace Gases," Nature, 319 (1986): 
109. In the controlled case, CFC-11 and CFV-12 levels are assumed to 
stabilize at about 2.5 ppbv. 
(b) Assumes a 20 ppmv increase of carbon dioxide through respiration and a net 
methane increase of 2.2 to 3.5 ppmv. 
(c) Assumes a net addition of 50 to 70 ppmv of carbon dioxide to the 
atmosphere. 
(d) Assumes that control is limited to the electrical sector and that, due to 
the distance of much electrical capacity from coastal regions, half of 
electrical generation capacity would be affected; control is forseen only 
in the case of capacity added after 1995. 
(e) An equilibrium carbon dioxide-induced warming assuming a 1.5 to 2 percent 
per year increase in fossil carbon emissions. 
CONCLUSION 
The past few years have seen increasingly sophisticated scientific des-
criptions of the warming that will result from present and future releases of 
the greenhouse gases. As a result of these, it is no longer reasonable to 
employ relatively minor global warmings of 1 or 2 degrees in estimating the 
importance of future warming. In conjunction with the emissions of the other 
gases, unrestricted combustion of the fossil fuels will result in a warming 
three to four times greater than this. 
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As a result, it is possible to demonstrate that, if global warming is to 
be limited to less than 4 degrees Celsius, action to restrict the expansion of 
fossil fuel combustion is necessary in the very near future. Further, it is 
possible to show that, under the changed conditions of the problem, the usual 
imperatives of uncertainty no longer hold sway in the policy calculus. At 
realistic estimates of change, we can define something of a lower limit to the 
broad scale of climatic and environmental disruption, and this suggests that 
at best the situation is a bad one. But no upper limit can be described. In 
such a situation, only a safety-first preventive response is reasonable. 
Past assessments have failed to appreciate the degree to which changes in 
the physical dimensions of the greenhouse problem have, since the late 1970s, 
transformed it. As a result, many people have come to the conclusion that at 
this stage intervention is not warranted. These conclusions have lost much of 
their past relevance. 
Uncertainties certainly exist, and will continue to exist long into the 
future. But in those cases where uncertainties do exist, they can be bounded, 
and in the process can be shown not to constitute an insurmountable barrier to 
policy intervention. In conjunction with the effect that the projected 
intensity and rate of future warming has had on our perception of the impor-
tance of global warming, this should bias policy toward a more interventionist 
response. 
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Parameter Estimates for Figure 1 
Parameters 
Fossil fuel co2 emissions' 
, growth rate (%/yr.) 
Initial airborne fraction 
Climate sensitivity (degrees 
C/2 x CO2) 
Other gases(% of CO2) 
Other carbon (ppmv) 
Lag in response (yrs.) 
Case A 
2 
65 
4.2 
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45 
Case B Case C 
2 1.5 
65 40 
3.5 2 
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150 65 
40 12 
Growth rates in fossil fuel use are taken from A. Perry, "Carbon Dioxide 
Production Scenarios," in Clark in note 11 above; and H.-H. Rogner, 
"Long-term Energy Projections and Novel Energy Systems," in Trabalka and 
Reichle in note 7 above. The estimates for climate sensitivity are taken 
from Table 12, this paper. The estimates for the other gas parameter are 
~aken from the "best" estimate category of .. Table 10, this paper. 
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Other Gas Warming, Case C, 2070 (degrees C) 
Gas 
Ozone 
Methane 
CFC-11, CFC-12 
Nitrous oxide 
Others 
Total 
Warming 
0.6 
0.8 
0.3 
0.2 
0.3 
2.2 
Sources for the net emission of "other carbon" include: deforestation, 
methane decay, cement production, oceanic out-gassing, and an enhanced 
rate of biotic respiration. A range of possible emissions is given in 
Table 9, this paper. The values given above are rounded and adjusted for 
the appropriate airborne fraction. Values for the present airborne frac-
tion are taken from Table 8, this paper. The airborne fraction can be 
expected to rise about 10 percent over the time period of interest. See 
S. Seidel and D. Keyes, Can We Delay a Greenhouse Warming? (Washington, 
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The delay in the climate response is for a 100 percent delay, estimated 
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CO2 accumulation at which the equilibrum warming from that accumulation 
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pattern of estimated delay for Case C is taken from K. Bryan et al., 
"Transient Climate Response to Increasing Atmospheric Carbon Dioxide," 
Science 215 (1982): 56. For Cases A and B, the pattern of response is 
approximated from Hansen et al., note 15 above. 
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tion of 0.4, which takes into account any net flux of carbon into an 
otherwise expanding biosphere. An airborne fraction of 0.4 assumes an 
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and use for the present airborne fraction the apparent airborne fraction 
(0.56), with a B factor of 0.2, atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations 
would be about 600 ppmv at 2070, or roughly similar to those calculated 
for Case C. 
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Net Carbon Dioxide Added (in ppmv) to the Atmosphere for Different 
Rates of Increase in Methane Levels and Different Airborne Fractions 
Annual Rate of Increase 
Airborne Fraction(%) 1. 29 1. 63 1. 89 
35 14-29 17-35 20-40 
45 18-36 22-45 
65 26-52 31-65 
The atmospheric methane concentration is increasing about 1.1 percent per 
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For an airborne fraction of 0.56, in ppmv it would be: 
Deforestation 
Cement 
Respiration 
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45-72 
8-17 
17 9: 
In Table 13, the net rise in the atmospheric carbon dioxide concentration 
(in ppmv) is assumed as follows: 
Best Case (airborne fraction 0.35) 43 
Worse Case (airborne fraction 0.65) 123 
Base Case (airborne fraction 0.45) 71 
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Tropospheric ozone 
Methane 
Others 
Warming 
0.4-1.2 
0.2 
0.6 
0.7-0.8 
0.3 
CFC-11 and CFC-12 levels are taken from the 2050 values suggested by 
Dickinson and Cicerone in note 17 (e) above. For nitrous oxide, see Hao 
et al. in note 85 above. The suggested tropospheric ozone levels assume 
a long-term rate of increase slightly less than the observed rate, after 
G. MacDonald, Climate Change and Acid Rain repo~t MP8600010 (McLean, 
Vir.: The Mitre Corp., 1985). The suggested methane levels assume a 
continuation of the present rate of increase due to agricultural 
activities, a four-fold increase in NOx emissions (and a corresponding 
reduction in the base 1985 methane level of perhaps 15 percent), and an 
additional 2.3 to 3.7 ppmv increase in the methane level as a result of 
increased anaerobic respiration from flooded fields (1.2 to 1.5 ppmv) and 
methane release from clathrates (1.1 to 2.2 ppmv). 
For the close historic fit of population growth to methane levels, and a 
suggested 0.8 percent per year increase in the atmospheric methane level 
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from continued population growth, see Khalil and Rasmussen in note 85 
above. For the influence of climatic warming on the area climatically 
suitable for rice cultivation, see Stansel and Huke in note 85 above. 
For methane release asp result of increased rates of anaerobic respira-
tion, see Hameed and Cess in note 80 above, and P. Guthrie, "Biological 
Methanogenesis and the co2 Greenhouse Effect," Journal of Geophysical 
Research 91 (1986): 10,847. For methane emission from clathrates, see 
Revelle in note 82 above. For the NOx influence, see Hameed, Cess, and 
Hogan in note 85 above. 
In the controlled case, the accumulation of nitrous oxide is assumed to 
be about half of the uncontrolled case, or equal in percent to the 
accumulation of carbon dioxide in the controlled case as a percent of the 
uncontrolled accumulation (see Table 14). In the case of tropospheric 
ozone, surface emissions leading to in situ production.are only partially 
accounted for by combustion activities. From Hameed, Cess, and Hogan, 
this note, methane and NOx might account for perhaps half of the 
increase. NOx emissions will continue to increase even at low rates of 
energy growth. See M. Kavanaugh, "Estimates of Future CO, N20, and NOx 
Emissions from Energy Combustion," Atmospheric Environment 21 (1987): 
463. No control is envisioned for methane release. Of the remainder of 
the increase suggested for the uncontrolled.case, perhaps half--that part 
associated with carbon monoxide released as a result of fossil energy 
consumption--might be controlled. For the percent of anthropogenic 
carbon monoxide emissions resulting from fossil energy consumption, see 
Logan et al., note 126 above. 
128. M. Steinberg and A. Albanese, "Environmental Control Technology for 
Atmospheric Carbon Dioxide," in Bach, Pankrath, and Williams in note 18 
above; and M. Steinberg, An Analysis of Concepts for Controlling Atmos-
pheric Carbon Dioxide, DOE/CH/00016-1 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department 
of Energy, 1983). 
129. Schelling in note 115 above. 
130. For discussion of intentional aerosol loading of the' stratosphere to 
reduce the amount of incoming radiation, and some of its consequences, 
see W. Broecker et al., "S02 : A Backstop Against a Bad co2 Trip?" 
unpublished manuscript, Lamont Doherty Geological Observatory, Columbia, 
University, 1983. For a discussion of the infeasibility of other tech-
nical "biospheric" fixes, see F. Dyson and G. Marland, "Technical Fixes 
for the Climatic Effects of CO2," in Elliot and Machta in note 20 above. 
-358-
SECTION 5: THE INDUSTRIALIZED NATION RESPONSE 
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INTRODUCTION TO SECTION 5 
The position of the individual nation in the policy calculus is the sub-
ject of Section 5. Decisions will be made about emissions or other responses 
to climate change by individual nations, acting alone. Always anxious for 
unbridled'freedom of decision and action, states gravitate toward individual 
action. Action is tied to internal necessity. Decisions about the future 
life of society are taken with the interests of the individual state in mind, 
and they rarely depart from those interests. In a word, public action is 
effected through the individual state, which seeks to alienate none of its 
sovereignty and arrogates all action to itself. It avoids multilateral action 
and allows no long-term international planning to structure the life of its 
society. It acts alone. 
The fit of policy responses to climate change to such a world is ambig-
uous. To the degree that they are feasible, adaptive responses fit well. 
Action is assumed to follow from the individual decisions of nations. No 
international cooperation is assumed, and each nation, no matter its con-
dition, is assumed to be best able to fit its own resources to climatic 
conditions. But adaptation also sets up severe informational needs, and, as 
can be inferred from Riebsame, these cannot now be met. 
By contrast, the preventive response is technically plausible but stands 
contrary to the realities of individual action. Due to the distribution of 
fossil fuel consumption, the actions of one nation can only partially effect a 
preventive response. No one nation has a large enough share of the present 
global consumption of fossil fuel to noticeably limit the long-term atmo-
spheric accumulation of carbon dioxide. Preventive action by single actors 
can swing the increase in long-term carbon dioxide levels but a few percentage 
points. Even dramatic action, after Williams et al., by the world's largest 
emitter, the United States, would result in only marginal reductions (7 to 15 
percent) during the period from 1980 to 2070. Unilateral actions affecting 
supply would be equally ineffectual. Only in the case of oil are the 
remaining deposits reasonably concentrated among a few nations, and since the 
economics of production and consumption. favor complete combustion, even here 
no limiting action is foreseen. The distribution of the global demand for oil 
is such that the exit of any one consumer from the market would be followed by 
the entry of another, resulting in little net change in consumption. 
The heart of the problem can be found in the disparity between the large 
costs of action and its meager effects. To have an effect anywhere near that 
possible for the United States, the typical Western European democracy would 
need to abandon the combustion of fossil fuel altogether, and do so immediate-
ly. Having foregone the benefits of its fossil fuel sector, it would be 
parent to at best a miniscule reduction in the rate of warming. 
The situation is somewhat redeemed by the smallness of the set of states 
that would need to act under the terms of a cooperative response. Due to the 
present dominance of the developed world in global energy markets, a preven-
tive response at present would only need to involve the industrialized 
nations. At present, these nations control the rate of atmospheric accumu-
lation of carbon dioxide. In the period relevant to current decision-making, 
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the next few decades, this should continue to be the case. The atmospheric 
effects of industrialization in the developing world will be felt only later, 
if they are felt at all. About two-thirds of all present energy consumption 
takes place in eleven countries--France, West Germany, the United Kingdom, 
Italy, the United States, Canada, Japan, Australia, Poland, East Germany, and 
the Soviet Union--a fact that would vastly simplify any effort at cooperative 
action. 
But the situation is complicated by the effect of nations that do not 
participate in multilateral action but still benefit from it. These "free 
riders" breed resentment and an unwillingness on the part of the other nations 
to participate. Given the enormous disparity between the costs of action to 
any one nation and its limited benefits, preventive action carries a built-in 
incentive to cheat. 
The preventive option thus leaves the individual nation in an ambiguous 
position. Confronted with the likelihood that action to limit its own 
emissions will be without resuLt, the individual nation, if it is to act, must 
act cooperatively. But, although it might be possible for a limited number of 
states to take effective preventive action, factors like the free rider 
problem limit the ease with which multilateral action might be implemented. 
More important, as a strategy, multilateral action violates the canons of 
individual ·state action. To the degree that no means is found to work around 
this, multilateral action will be unworkable and preventive action will be a 
dead letter. 
The literature suggests several such means. The most interesting of 
these, and certainly those with the greatest potential for effect, stress the 
market and the importance of actions that make good economic sense in their 
own right. above and beyond any use to which they might be put in controlling 
carbon dioxide emissions. Actions that make sense in their own right need 
involve no direct action of a multilateral nature. The market is increasingly 
international. Measures with an obvious economic appeal will be taken up by 
the market. Measures taken by one economy because they make economic· sense 
often spread rapidly to other similar economies, and, to the degree that the 
operation of the market is independent of the state, require no individualized 
or other governmental action. 
Measures that might possess such dual appeal include actions that, in an 
era of resource depletion, facilitate more efficient use of resources, and the 
use of competitive substitutes for the chlorofluorocarbons and chlorocarbons. 
In many cases, major investments would be required to develop such substitutes 
or the technology of more efficient use. But there is evidence for the 
evolution of the latter under conditions of sharply rising prices, and the 
technology for the more efficient use of energy seems likely to continue 
developing for sound economic reasons. 
Measures with a somewhat different effect, but which may also help 
society to avoid the hurdle posed by national sovereignty, include actions 
taken in response to environmental problems that are more properly domestic in 
scope and that result from the combustion of fossil fuels or from related 
industrial releases. Responses that are of particular interest are those in 
which little net cost accrues to society and for'which a case for successful 
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intervention can be made on the basis of domestic impacts in rich industrial-
ized countries. Ameliorative action on acid precipitation and forest death is 
one such response. It seems unlikely that action will not be taken on this 
problem in the next decade. The same may be true of measures to limit the 
depletion of the stratospheric ozone column. Ameliorative action by the major 
industrialized nations would result in reduced greenhouse emissions. 
Finally, one finds the pyramiding of problems, like the climate change 
problem and the petroleum and energy security problems. Nations may need to 
intervene in the fossil energy sector for reasons relating to energy, rather 
than environmental, policy. The petroleum and energy security problems, along 
with the larger energy problem, which will soon require a transition to a fuel 
other than petroleum and natural gas regardless of the decisions that are 
taken as a result of climate change, present persuasive arguments for action 
that will be before the industrialized West for a long time. Together with 
the reasons for action already noted, they offer a slim chance that the 
industrialized world may yet maneuver around the sovereignty constraint to 
action. 
In this section, Johansson and Williams provide the technical information 
that forms the basis of this chain of reasoning. Their paper investigates the 
energy policy response of the individual industrialized nation. Their work is 
represented as an existence theorem, making it clear that the technical poten-
tial for preventive action among individual industrialized nations indeed 
exists. 
Concentrating on the potential for energy efficiency improvements, the 
authors find a significant potential for large reductions in total energy use. 
Some of this potential results from structural changes in the Western 
economies, which have shifted increasingly toward services, and, within the 
goods-producing sectors of their economies, toward fabrication and finishing. 
These activities use much less energy than basic industries. The potential 
for significantly improved energy efficiency within the industrial sector is 
considered, as is the potential for energy savings through the deployment of 
the most energy efficient existing technology in the residential, commercial, 
and transportation sectors. Building from a set of examples involving energy 
use in Sweden and the United States, the authors estimate that per capita 
energy use in Western industrialized nations could be reduced up to 50 percent 
in 2020 over what it is projected to be even with a doubling of per capita 
income. 
As the authors indicate, some of this potential will be exploited through 
the natural operation of the market. But some directed governmental action 
will be needed. Action will be needed to ensure energy price stability, 
thereby providing a stable investment climate. Change will be needed in 
energy pricing policies to ensure that energy prices reflect the marginal 
costs of bringing forth new supply. There is also a role for government in 
the provision of information about efficiency improvements, the regulation of 
energy performance, and the support of private sector firms that market energy 
efficiency improvements. None of these changes needs to be draconian in 
nature. To the degree that they move the state out of the energy supply 
business, they would have the opposite effect, reducing governmental inter-
vention and presumably making policy change a more digestable, feasible 
alternative. 
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AN END-USE ENERGY STRATEGY FOR INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES 
Thomas B. Johansson 
University of Lund, Lund, Sweden 
Robert H. Williams 
Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey 
INTRODUCTION 
In this paper, we describe an end-use oriented energy strategy for 
industrialized countries which takes into account the implications for future 
energy demand of both ongoing economic structural changes and opportunities 
for more cost-effective provision of energy services. 
Following a general analysis along these lines, we illustrate the 
quantitative implications of an end-use energy strategy with long-range pro-
jections of Swedish and United States energy demand. We show in both cases 
that the end-use approach to energy can lead to future levels of energy 
demand far below both official forecast levels and present levels, even with 
greatly increased economic output. 
STRUCTURAL CHANGES 
A discussion of future energy use should be carried out in the context 
of expected future levels of social welfare or well-being. This necessarily 
entails some discussion of likely future structural changes in the economy 
that might significantly affect future energy use. The mix of economic 
activities contributing to gross domestic product (GDP),* a common measure of 
social welfare, can be expected to differ markedly in the future from what it 
has been in the past as industrialized countries continue to develop into 
post-industrial economies. 
This continuing development has major implications for future energy use 
levels. In particular, a sharp departure from the historical trends of the 
last few decades, in which energy consumption increased dramatically with the 
prosperity of the industrialized world, can be expected as levels of consumer 
services associated with especially energy-intensive activities approach 
saturation. The approach to saturation in consumer services is reflected in 
continuing shifts from goods to services production and, within the goods-
producing sector, from basic materials production to production involving 
emphasis on fabrication and finishing. Both changes imply continued long-
term reductions in energy demand per dollar of value added. 
*Total added value of goods and services plus gross investment. Although 
there is no simple relationship between energy use and social welfare, or 
even between true social welfare and various existing measures of material 
well-being, we shall occasionally use the GDP as a measure of social welfare, 
essentially because it is the only measure available. 
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The Growing Importance of the Service Sector 
The shift to services (e.g. finance, insurance, education, communica-
tions, marketing, information, medical, and recreational services) has been 
underway for decades, as is evident from long-term trends in employment in 
Sweden and the United States (see Figure 1). In the early years of indus-
trialization, the shares of employment accounted for by manufacturing and 
services grew at the expense of employment in agriculture. More recently, 
services have grown at the expense of manufacturing, mining, and construc-
tion. 
The increasing importance of services is also reflected in the slower 
growth of goods production. The output of the goods-producing sector 
(measured by gross product originating (GPO] or value added) grew just 0.83 
and 0.60 times as fast as the gross national product (GNP) in the period from 
1970 to 1980 in the United States and Sweden, respectively. 
Figure 1 
DISTRIBUTION OF EMPLOYMENT BY SECTOR IN THE UNITED STATES AND SWEDEN* 
(in percents) 
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*For the United States, the employment measure is the number of full-time 
equivalent employees. For Sweden, it is the number of employees working more 
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The Growing Importance of Fabrication and Finishing 
A shift is also evident within the goods-producing sector, away from the 
extraction and processing of basic materials to fabrication and finishing 
activities, which involve much lower inputs of energy per dollar value added 
than the processing of basic materials (see Figure 2). 
Consider the situation in the United States, which has a largely closed 
economy, with the consumption of goods and services approximately equal to 
production in most sectors. The industrial sector here can be disaggregated 
into: mining, agriculture, and construction (MAC); the basic materials pro-
cessing (BMP) subsector of manufacturing; and other manufacturing. In 1978, 
these sectors accounted for about 25, 25, and 50 percent of industrial out-
put; for 15, 73, and 11 percent of final energy use in industry; and required 
3, 14, and 1 units of energy per dollar of output, respectively. In Sweden, 
these sectors accounted for about 35, 37, and 28 percent of industrial 
output; 10, 82, and 8 percent of final energy use in industry; and 1, 7.5, 
and 1 units of energy per dollar of output respectively. Thus while other 
manufacturing, which involves the fabrication and finishing of basic mater-
ials, is economically important in both countries, the BMP subsector of 
manufacturing dominates energy use. 
Shifts in output among these sectors toward less materials-intensive 
activities have been pronounced. In the United States, for example, the rate 
of growth of industrial output (GPO) for fabrication and finishing activities 
averaged 2.5 percent per year from 1973 to 1984, compared to 0.5 percent per 
year for the BMP subsector and 0.7 percent per year for MAC. In Sweden, 
fabrication and finishing activities grew in the 1970s at an annual average 
rate of 2.0 percent per year, compared to 1.1 percent per year for industry 
as a whole and 1.2 percent per year for the primary metals sector, and a 1.4 
percent per year rate of decline for the cement industry 
There is strong evidence that the shift to fabrication and finishing is 
associated with a cessation of growth in the per capita consumption of 
materials, as indicated in a recent analysis of the long-term history and 
future outlook for a representative sampling of basic materials. For both 
traditional materials (steel, cement, paper) and modern materials (aluminum, 
ethylene, chlorine, and ammonia), per capita consumption stopped growing and 
in most cases began to decline in the United States and Western Europe in the 
1970s (see Figures 3a and 3b). 1 The trends appear to be due to a combination 
of factors, including materials substitution, more efficient use of 
materials, saturation in markets for bulk materials, and a shift in consumer 
preferences at high income levels to value-added intensive goods. The first 
two factors have been important throughout the history of materials use, 
although they are more important now because of today's high materials and 
energy costs. The latter two are relatively new phenomena which signal the 
beginning of a new postindustrial era. That these recent trends are likely 
to represent permanent structural changes is indicated for the U.S. situation 
by market analyses which show that for nearly all materials indicated in 
Figure 3 the outlook for volume growth is poor and that only markets for high 
value-added specialty products appear promising. While it is unclear whether 
growth in these markets will be adequate to offset the declines in markets 
for high-volume bulk products, the evidence for at least a cessation of 
growth in per capita demand is strong. 2 
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Figure 3b 
TRENDS IN APPARENT CONSUMPTION (PRODUCTION PLUS NET IMPORTS) 
PER CAPITA FOR WESTERN EUROPE* 
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Shifts to fabrication and finishing, which typically require an order of 
magnitude less energy per unit of output than the processing of basic mater-
ials, can have profound effects on industrial energy use. For the United 
States, such shifts accounted for an annual rate of decline in industrial 
energy use per dollar of GNP of 1.6 percent from 1973 to 1984, out of a total 
rate of decline of 3.6 percent per year in this period. 3 
These ongoing trends, which began well before the energy crises of the 
1970s, can be expected to continue, and perhaps also to accelerate, in 
response to sharply increased energy prices. 
OPPORTUNITIES FOR ENERGY PRODUCTIVITY IMPROVEMENT BY SECTOR 
The shift to less energy-intensive economic activities might be comple-
mented by increased use of technologies that make more efficient use of 
energy supplies in providing energy services. The energy price increases of 
the 1970s have encouraged the commercialization of new, more energy-efficient 
technologies, as well as research and development efforts that will lead to 
even more efficient technologies in years to come. Opportunities exist for 
major improvements in energy productivity for all major energy-intensive 
activities in buildings, transport, and industry. We illustrate the possi-
bilities with examples from each energy-using sector. 
Residential Buildings 
Space heating, accounting for between 60 and 80 percent of final energy 
use in residential buildings in industrialized countries, warrants especially 
close attention and indeed has been the focus of ongoing residential energy 
conservation programs. Higher energy productivity for space heating can be 
achieved through improvements in both the building shell and in the heating 
equipment. 
Shell Modifications in New Houses: Heat losses can be reduced by 
increasing insulation, adding more gl~zing (extra panes of glass) to the 
windows, and reducing natural air infiltration. Good indoor air quality can 
be maintained in a "tight house" through forced ventilation with heat 
recovery instead of natural ventilation; a heat exchanger can be used to 
transfer heat from stale exhaust air to incoming fresh air or to other useful 
purposes. 
Table 1 lists the energy performances of various groups of new houses 
having major energy-saving features. (Here energy performance is measured by 
the energy output required of a house's heating system, corrected for floor 
area and climate variation.) While typical new houses use much less energy 
than houses in the existing stock, much more can be accomplished with atten-
tion to energy-conserving design features. Well-built new houses with such 
features in both Sweden and the.United States require less than one-third as 
much energy for space heat as existing houses, while very energy efficient 
''superinsulated houses" being built require an order of magnitude less 
energy. 
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Table 1 
SPACE HEAT REQUIREMENTS IN SINGLE FAMILY DWELLINGS 
(In Kilojoules per Square Meter per Degree Day) 
United States 
Sweden 
Average housing stocka 
New (1980) constructionb 
Mean measured value for 97 houses in 
Minnesota's Energy Efficient Housing 
Demonstration Prograrna 
Mean measured value for 9 houses built in 
Eugene, Oregonc 
Calculated value for a Northern Energy Horne, New 
York City aread 
Average housing stocke 
Hornes built to conform to the 1975 Swedish 
Building Codef . 
Mean measured value for 39 houses 
built in Skaneg 
House of Mats Wolgasth 
Calculated value for alternative versions of 
the prefabricated house sold by Faluhusi 
Version 1 
Version 2 
160 
100 
51 
48 
15 
135 
65 
36 
18 
83 
17 
Note: Space heat requirement is the required output of the space heating 
system (i.e., heat losses less internal heat gains less solar gains) per unit 
floor area per heating degree day. 
(a) See R. Williams, G. Dutt, and H. Geller, "Future Energy Savings in U.S. 
Housing," Annual Review of Energy 8 (1983): 269. 
(b) As reported by the National Association of Horne Builders. See J. Ribot 
et al., "Monitored Low-Energy Houses in North America and Europe: A 
Compilation and Economic Analysis," in What Works: Documenting Energy 
Conservation in Buildings: Proceedings of the Second Summer Study of 
Energy Efficient Buildings at Santa Cruz, California, August, 1982, J. 
Harris and C. Blumstein, eds. (Washington, D.C.: American Council for 
an Energy Efficient Economy, 1983) pp. 242-256. 
(c) One-story houses with an average floor area of 103 square meters, 15 
square meters of double-paned windows, 15 centimeters (30 cm) of fiber-
glass insulation in the walls and floor (ceiling), and an average air 
infiltration rate of 0.25 air changes per hour. The energy performances 
are adjusted to standardized conditions: an internal heat load of 1.0 
kilowatts (kW) and an indoor temperature of 20 degrees Celsius. See 
Ribot et al., in note (b) above. 
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(d) The Northern Energy Horne (NEH) is a superinsulated home design which is 
sold in the Northeast. The NEH design is based on modular construction 
techniques. The house is constructed of factory-built wall and ceiling 
sections (120 x 240 cm x 23 cm) which are mounted on a post and beam 
frame. The calculations presented here were carried out by Dan McMillan 
of the American Council for an Energy Efficient Economy using the Com-
puterized Instrumented Residential Audit computer program for a house 
with the following features: 120 square meters of floor area; 12 
percent of wall area (14 square meters) in windows, with 60 percent on 
the south side; triple-glazed windows with night shutters; 20 cm of 
polystyrene insulation in walls, 23 cm in ceiling; 0.15 air changes per 
hour (ACH) natural ventilation plus 0.35 ACH forced ventilation plus 70 
percent efficient air-to-air heat exchanger; internal heat load of 0.65 
kW, corresponding to the most energy-efficient appliances available in 
1982 plus 3.06 occupants on average. The indoor temperature is assumed 
to be 21 degrees Celsius in the daytime, set back to 18 degrees at 
night. The New York climate is characterized by 2,700 degree days. 
(e) Average 1980 fuel consumption for space heating, floor area, and number 
of heating degree days of 98.5 gigajoules (GJ), 120 square meters, and 
4,474 degree days, respectively, for oil-heated single family dwellings. 
Here a 66 percent average furnace efficiency is assumed. See L. 
Schipper, "Residential Energy Use and Conservation in Sweden," Lawrence 
Berkeley Laboratory, Berkeley, Calif., 1982. 
(f) A single-story house with 130 square meters floor area, no basement, 
electric resistance heat, an indoor temperature of 21 degrees Celsius, 
and 4,010 degree days should consume this much for space heating. See 
Schipper in note (e) above. 
(g) Average for thirty-nine identical, four-bedroom, semi-detached houses 
(112 square meters of floor area; 3,300 degree days). · 
(h) Heated floor space, 130 square meters; 27 and 45 cm of mineral wool 
insulation in the walls and ceiling, respectively; quadruple glazing; 
low natural ventilation plus forced ventilation through air preheated in 
ground channels. Heat from the exhaust air is recovered through a heat 
exchanger. The local climate is characterized by 3,800 degree days. 
See P. Steen et al., Energy: For What and How Huch? (Stockholm: Liber 
Forlag, 1981), in Swedish. Summarized in Johansson et al., "Sweden 
Beyond Oil--The Efficient Use of Energy," Science 219 (1983): 355. 
(i) Floor area of 112 square meters. Version 2 (with extra insulation and 
heat recuperation) costs 3,970 SEK (U.S. $516) per square meter compared 
to 3,750 SEK (U.S. $488) per square meter for Version 1. The annual 
electricity savings for the more efficient house would qe 8,960 kilowatt 
hours (kwh) per year. The cost of saved energy (assuming a 6 percent 
discount rate--the value used by the Swedish Energy Commission for 
assessing alternative energy technologies--and a thirty-year life for 
extra investment) would be 0.20 SEK per kwh (U.S. $0.026 per kwh). 
Electricity rates for residential consumers in Sweden consist of a large 
fixed cost independent of consumption level (about 1,200 SEK [U.S. $156] 
per year) plus a variable cost of 0.25 SEK per kwh ($0.032 per kwh). 
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The costs of improved energy performance tend to vary with the builder 
and the experience of the builder, but for a wide range of circumstances, the 
cost of saved energy (CSE) is less than the price of the energy supply 
displaced by investments in energy efficiency.* · 
Even for superinsulated houses, which one might expect to be very expen-
sive, there is a growing body of evidence suggesting that the net extra cost 
may not be very large in comparison to the cost of conventional houses 
because of synergisms whereby the added costs of extra insulation can be 
offset to a considerable degree by savings in the heat generation and distri-
bution systems. 4 Some particularly good data on the cost of superinsulated 
houses are provided by the prefabricated houses offered by Faluhus in Sweden. 
The more energy-efficient version, one of the most energy-efficient houses 
available, has an associated CSE less than the present Swedish electricity 
price, even though present hydropower-based Swedish electrical rates are 
exceedingly low and far below marginal costs for new electricity sources (see 
Table 1, note i). 
Shell Modifications for Existing Houses: Attention to existing houses 
is important, since such houses will dominate the housing stocks of 
industrialized countries for many decades, both because of the long life of 
existing structures and because of the expected slow net growth of the hous-
ing stock. However, since many features cannot be readily changed once a 
house is built, thermal design improvements are generally more costly for 
existing than for new houses. 
Nevertheless, there are a number of cost-effective conservation measures 
widely available to homeowners today, including extra insulation, storm win-
dows, clock thermostats, etc. The opportuniti.es in this area are evident in 
the Swedish government's ten-year plan for the retrofit of buildings, which 
has targeted about a one-third reduction in the energy use of the 1978 build-
ing stock. The plan was initiated in 1978 and is optimized for an energy 
price 30 percent below 1981 energy prices. 
The Modular Retrofit Experiment (MRE) conducted by gas utilities in the 
state of New Jersey demonstrated state-of-the-art possibilities that go 
beyond such conventional measures and exploit low-cost opportunities that can 
be identified through the use of sophisticated diagnostic equipment. 5 In the 
MRE, which was based on a "house doctor" concept, the measured savings 
associated with the one-day, two-person house doctor visit were, on av.erage, 
equal to 19 percent of gas use associated with space heating. Subsequent 
*The cost of saved energy is an index in units of energy price which permits 
a ready economic comparison between investments in energy efficiency and 
energy supply alternatives. For a typical situation in which energy saved is 
financed through banks or other loans, the CSE is the annual repayment cost 
(principal plus interest), with the term of the loan equal to the expected 
lifetime of the equipment or structure being financed. Investments in energy 
efficiency improvement are cost-justified up to the point where the CSE is 
equal to the cost of the extra energy supply that would otherwise have to be 
purchased. 
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more conventional shell modification retrofits bring the total fuel savings 
to an average of 30 percent, for an average total investment of about $1,300; 
the associated real internal rate of return in fuel savings was nearly 20 
percent, for an assumed life cycle gas price equal to $8 per gigajoule (GJ), 
which is equal to the heating oil price in 1982. 6 
The achievements demonstrated in the MRE do not represent the limit of 
what can be achieved with shell improvements of existing dwellings. One 
important experiment exploiting additional unconventional opportunities 
resulted in an energy savings of two-thirds in a U.S. house which prior to 
modification was regarded as thermally tight by U.S. standards. 7 Also, over 
a period of several decades, the energy savings potential from retrofits 
should be much greater than that which can be achieved immediately. Some 
important energy-reducing shell improvements are much more cost effective if 
carried out in conjunction with other needed structural changes (e.g., the 
installation of energy-efficient windows at the time of the scheduled retire-
ment of old windows). Moreover, new technical opportunities for energy 
demand reduction can be expected to be developed continually. 
Space Heating Equipment: The efficiencies of space-heating equipment 
can be much improved. 8 For gas furnaces, conversion efficiencies have 
increased in the U.S. from an average of about 69 percent for new units sold 
in 1980 to more than 90 percent for new condensing furnaces, so called be-
cause heat is extracted from flue gases past the point where the water vapor 
condenses out. Heat pumps with coefficients of performance (COP) up to 2.5 
for air-to-air units and up to 3 for water-to-air or water-to-water units 
have also become available on the market. For comparison, the average COP of 
heat pumps in the existing U.S. stock is less than 2 and that of resistive 
electric heating units is 1 or less. 
Other End Uses: There are also many opportunities to improve energy 
productivity cost effectively f~r air conditioning, domestic water heaters, 
refrigeration, lighting, and cooking. 9 Opportunities relating to 
refrigerator-freezers in the United States are summarized in Table 2. 
Total Residential Final Energy Use: An indication of the overall poten-
tial for energy savings is given in Table 3, which shows per capita final 
residential energy use, first for average households in the United States and 
Sweden at present and second for hypothetical all-electric households having 
a full set of major energy-using amenities and the most energy-efficient 
technologies commercially available in 1982. While these hypothetical house-
holds have a higher level of amenities than average households today, they 
would use only about 300 watts per capita, which is only about one-fifth of 
the present level of final energy use (fuel plus electricity) and is even 
less than the present level of electricity use. With more efficient tech-
nologies under development, energy use could be reduced even further. 
-375-
Table 2 
ELECTRICITY SAVINGS POTENTIAL FOR TWO-DOOR 
REFRIGERATOR-FREEZERS WITH AUTOMATIC DEFROST IN THE UNITED STATES 
Electricity use by the average unit 
in the existing stock 1,700 kwh/year 
Average electricity requirements 
for new models, 1983 1,200 kwh/year 
Electricity requirements for the most efficient 
model commercially available as of April, 1984a 880 kwh/year 
Electricity requirements of 500-liter (18 cubic 
foot) prototype that has been field tested 650 kwh/year 
Number of baseload power plants (@ 1,000 megawatts [MW] 
each) required to drive U.S. refrigerators in 1980b 31 
Number of power plants (@ 1,000 MW each) saved if instead 
every unit in the United States were replaced with the 
most efficient unit available on the market in 1984c 15 
Extra first cost per unit associated with top-rated 
models (relative to conventional, less efficient 
units with similar features) $ 50 - $ 100 
Annual electricity savings with top-rated models 
Cost of saved energyd 
Average residential electricity price 
300 500 kwh 
$0.01 - 0.03 per kwh 
$0.07 per kwh 
(a) A 490-liter (17 cubic foot) Kenmore 86377*0 or Whirlpool ET17HKXM. See 
American Council for an Energy Efficient Economy, "The Most Energy 
Efficient Appliances: Fall-Winter 1984-1985," Washington, D.C., 1984. 
(b) Electricity requirements for 93 million refrigerators and refrigerator-
freezers in the United States of 156 billion kwh in 1980. Assuming 11 
percent transmission and distribution losses, this corresponds to the 
output of 30.8 gigawatt electricity (GW[e]) of generating capacity 
operated at 65 percent capacity factor. See R. Williams, G. Dutt, and 
H. Geller, "Future Energy Savings in U.S. Housing," Annual Review of 
Energy 8 (1983): 269. 
(c) If all 93 million units had instead consumed 880 kwh each in 1980, the 
savings would have been 14.7 GW(e) of baseload generating capacity 
operated at a 65 percent capacity factor. 
(d) Assuming a nineteen-year lifetime and a 10 percent real discount rate. 
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End Use 
Space heat 
Air cond. 
Hot water 
Refrigerator 
Freezer 
Stove 
Lighting 
Other 
Total 
Table 3 
FINAL ENERGY USE IN THE RESIDENTIAL SECTOR 
(In Watts per Capita) 
All Elect., 4-Person 
Hshlds. with the Most 
Efficient Technology 
Average Household at Present Available in '82/83a 
Sweden 
U.S. 1980b 1978/82c,d U.S. Swedenc 
890 900 60e 6sf 
46 65g 
280 180 43h 11oi 
79 17 25 8 
23 26 21 17 
62 26 21 16 
41 30 18j 9j 
80 ___fil. 
....12 41 
1,501 1,242 328 266 
(a) With 100 percent saturation for the indicated appliances plus dish-
washer, clothes washer, and clothes dryer. 
(b) The total consists of 360 watts (w) of electricity and 1,140 w of fuel. 
(c) For details, see Johansson et al., Perspectives on Energy: On 
Possibilities and Uncertainties in the Energy Transition, Report to the 
Swedish 1981 Energy Commission, Ministry of Industry, DsI 1983: 18 
(Stockholm: Liber Forlag, 1983), in Swedish. 
(d) This total consists of 350 W of electricity and 890 W of fuel; 50 per-
cent of the electricity is for appliances and 50 percent is for heating 
purposes. 
(e) For an average-sized, detached, single family house (150 square meters 
of floor space); average U.S. climate (2,600 degree days); a net heating 
requirement of 50 kilojoules (kj) per square meter per degree day (see 
Table 1); and a heat pump with a seasonal average coefficient of perfor-
mance (COP)= 2.6 (the highest efficiency for new air-to-air units). 
(f) For a Faluhus (see Table 1) in a Stockholm climate (3,810 degree days). 
This house uses a heat exchanger to transfer heat from the exhaust air 
stream to the incoming fresh air. 
(g)' For the average cooling load in air-conditioned U.S. houses (27 gj per 
year) and a COP= 3.3 (the COP on the cooling cycle for the most 
efficient heat pump available in 1982). 
-377-
(h) For 59 liters per capita per day of hot water (at 49 degree Celsius or 
910 kwh per year per capita) and the most efficient (COP= 2.2) heat 
pump water heater available, 1982. 
(i) For 1,000 kwh per year per capita hot water energy use through resistive 
heat. Ambient air-to-water heat pumps are not competitive at the low 
Swedish electricity prices. 
(j) Savings achieved by replacing incandescents with compact fluorescents. 
Commercial Buildings 
The commercial buildings sector is comprised of a heterogeneous mix of 
office and public buildings, schools, hotels and motels, retail stores, 
restaurants, hospitals, assembly buildings, churches, warehouses, etc. The 
energy budgets of commercial buildings, like those of residences, are dom-
inated by the requirements for space conditioning; but for these buildings, 
shell improvements other than for day lighting and sun control are much less 
important. Most of the opportunities for improved energy performance involve 
the use of more energy-efficient equipment and a better matching of energy 
supplies to service requirements through the use of better control tech-
nology. 
New Commercial Construction: While new American and Swedish commercial 
buildings are less energy intensive than the existing stock, the energy 
performance of some new buildings is far better than that for typical new 
construction (see Table 4). 
The Folksam Building in Farsta, near Stockholm, is perhaps the most 
energy-efficient commercial building constructed in the late 1970s. With an 
ordinary design, this building in winter would require heating at night but 
cooling in the daytime to compensate for overheating by lights and other 
internal heat loads. But with the Folksam design, excess heat produced in 
the daytime is stored for use at night, when heating is needed, or for morn-
ing warm-up of the building. Storage is accomplished through the Thermodeck 
concept, which involves the movement of office ventilation air through long 
tubular cores in the massive concrete floor slabs on its way to the offices. 
With this storage scheme, the air temperature rise in the offices during the 
day is only about 2 degrees, so that cooling is unnecessary. In summer, the 
system stores heat in the slabs during the day, as in winter, but the slabs 
are cooled with outside air at night. 
At the time of this writing, the most energy-efficient commercial 
building in Sweden was the Harnosand Building in northern Sweden, constructed 
in 1981. By utilizing the Thermodeck principle, preheating ventilation air 
with solar panels, and using microprocessor controls for better matching 
energy supply and demand, the structure's builders and operators were able to 
reduce its energy use to a value about half as large as that of the Folksam 
Building (see Table 4). 
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Table 4 
SITE ENERGY INTENSITY FACTORS FOR COMMERCIAL BUILDINGS 
(In GJ per Square Meter per Year) 
United States 
Average 1979 building stocka 
Current U.S. practiceb 
American Institute of Architects 
Research Corporation Redesignsb 
American Institute of Architects 
Minimum Lifecycle Cost Designsb 
Enerplex South, Princeton, N.J.c 
Sweden 
Average 1982 building stockd 
Swedish norm for new constructionb 
Folksam Building, Farstae 
Harnosand Building, Harnosandf 
Fuel 
0.82 
0.16 
0.07 
0.04 
0.66 
0.57 
0.07 
0.12 
Electricity 
0.49 
0.57 
0.40 
0.28 
0.31 
0.38 
0.19 
0.39 
0.13 
Total 
1. 31 
0.73 
0.47 
0.32 
0.31 
1.04 
0.76 
0.46 
0.25 
(a) For an average of 2,700 heating degree days. See Energy Information 
Administration, U.S. Department of Energy, Non-residential Buildings 
Energy Consumption Survey: 1979 Consumption and Expenditures; Part 2: 
Steam, Fuel Oil, LPG, and all Fuels (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1983). 
(b) See Solar Energy Research Institute, A New Prosperity: Building a Sus-
tainable Energy Future (Andover, Mass.: Brickhouse, 1981), Table 1.12 
and Figure 1.61. 
(c) For 2,700 heating degree days. These are calculated, not measured 
values. See L. Norford, "An Analysis of Energy Use in Office Buildings: 
The Case of Enerplex," Phd. thesis, Department of Aerospace and 
Mechanical Engineering, Princeton University, Princeton, N.J., 1984. 
(d) Consumption corrected to normal weather (4,010 heating degree days). L. 
Carlsson, National Energy Administration, Sweden, personal communication 
to T. Johansson, March, 1984. 
(e) Measured values for the representative period from December, 1978, to 
December, 1979 (3,810 heating degree days). "Fuel consumption" is the 
energy actually delivered by the district heating system. See K. Wel-
mer, "A Method to Make use of a Building's Heat Storage Capacity in a 
Controlled Manner to Save Energy," Swedish Building Energy Council, BFR 
report Rl04:1981, Stockholm, 1981, in Swedish. 
(f) Measured values for 4,600 heating degree Celsius days. See personal 
communication K-Konsult to T. Johansson, February, 1984. 
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Existing Commercial Buildings: Improved energy management involving 
little or no capital investment (e.g., night setbacks of thermostats, adjust-
ments in ventilation to better match needs, etc.), typically results in 
savings of 20 to 30 percent in existing commercial building in Sweden. 10 In 
the United States, the average measured savings in 184 buildings was 23 per-
cent, and the corresponding cost of saved energy for fifty-six buildings for 
which cost data were available was $2.8 per GJ (1982 dollars), assuming a 
ten-year retrofit life and a 10 percent real discount rate. 11 These savings 
fall short of the economic potential, however, since there is probably much 
more that can be done for a cost of saved energy less than the average price 
of energy, some $8 per GJ for U.S. commercial buildings in 1979. 12 In a 
survey of experienced architects and engineers conducted by the Solar Energy 
Research Institute, the consensus judgment was that a 50 percent reduction in 
energy use per square meter was an achievable target for exising U.S. commer-
cial buildings by the year 2000. 13 
Transportation 
In 1982, transportation accounted for 53 percent of all oil consumption 
in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
nations. 14 Accounting for over 60 percent of all oil use in transport, 
automobiles and light trucks warrant special attention. 
Light Vehicles: It is feasible to improve the fuel economy of auto-
mobiles and light trucks from present average values of 12 to 8 liters per 
100 kilometers (km) (20 to 30 miles per gallon [mpg]) to the range 4 to 2.3 
liters per 100 kilometers (km) (60 to 100 mpg) in the decades immediately 
ahead by increasing engine/drive train efficiency and reducing vehicle weight 
and aerodynamic and rolling resistances. 
Engine efficiencies are typically low. For example, the model year 1981 
gasoline-powered Volkswagen (VW) Rabbit with manual transmission has an aver-
age engine/drive train efficiency in converting fuel to mechanical energy at 
the wheels of only 13.5 percent.15 One possibility for improving efficiency 
involves use of a diesel engine: The diesel version of the Rabbit has an 
energy performance on the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) combined 
driving cycle of 5.3 liters per 100 kilometers (km) (45 mpg), compared to 7.9 
liters per 100 kilometers (km) (30 mpg) for the gasoline version. The cost 
of saved energy for this $525 engine switch, assuming a 10 percent real dis-
count rate and an annual average driving distance of about 16,000 kilometers 
(about 10,000 miles) per year, would be just $0.22 per liter ($0.78 per 
gallon) of gasoline equivalent. 
While the addition of energy-saving features can result in increased 
initial investment, energy efficiency improvement does not necessarily imply 
higher first costs. Just as there are often synergisms at work to keep down 
the first costs of superinsulated houses, so too synergisms can work to keep 
down the first cost of energy-efficient cars. For example, by emphasizing 
the use of lightweight materials, it is possible, without sacrificing 
acceleration, to use a less powerful and less costly engine> which in turn 
requires even less materials for the supporting structure. 10 
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Additional improvements in the VW Rabbit, based on proven technology, 
such as reduced aerodynamic drag and rolling resistance, use of a direct-
injection diesel rather than a prechamber diesel, use of a continuously 
variable transmission, weight reduction, and addition of an engine-off 
feature during coast and idle, would improve its fuel economy to 2.6 liters 
per 100 kilometers (km) (89 mpg). 17 Many of these features have been incor-
porated into prototypes, of which the Volvo Light Component Project 2000 (LCP 
2000) car and the VW Experimental Car 2000, with fuel economies of 3.6 and 
3.8 liters per 100 kilometers (km) (65 and 62 mpg), respectively, are notable 
examples (see Table 5). 
Among further improvements possible with advanced technology, the effi-
cient adiabatic diesel engine is especially promising. The Volvo LCP 2000, 
with a three-cylinder, heat-insulated, direct-injection, turbocharged engine 
is an advance in this direction. 18 
Researchers at Ford Motor Company, in describing what an "average" 
vehicle in the late 1990s could be like, describe it as "a four- or five-
passenger vehicle in the 2,000-pound (900 kilogram [kg]) inertia weight class 
with an aerodynamic drag coefficient of 0.2 or less .... Electronics would 
control a turbocharged, ceramic, adiabatic diesel engine and continuously 
variable transmission to provide smooth effortless performance and fuel 
economy in excess of 100 miles per gallon on the highway. 1119 
Concern has been raised about the safety of super-mpg cars. However, a 
lightweight car need not be unsafe, as is indicated by the safety features 
built into Volvo's LCP 200o. 20 Also, lightweight cars can be built with 
large bodies that provide crush space, thereby giving the occupants some 
protection in the event of collision. This idea is a key feature of the 
design for the Pertran car, which has been proposed by automotive researchers 
at the Battelle Memorial Institute in Columbus, Ohio. The diesel version of 
the Pertran would be a 545 kg, five-passenger car, comparable in length and 
height with the General Motors X-Car or Chrysler K-Car (current designs) but 
somewhat narrower. The estimated fuel economy of this car on the U.S. EPA 
urban driving cycle is 2.3 liters per 100 km (100 mpg). 21 Lastly, super-mpg 
cars are not necessarily lightweight. Researchers at the Cummins Engine 
Company and the NASA Lewis Research Center have described the design of a 
1,360-kg (3,000-pound) passenger car having an adiabatic diesel engine with a 
turbo-compound bottoming cycle which would have a fuel economy of 3.0 liters 
per 100 kilometers (km) (79 mpg) and would thus be a "heavy" super-mpg car. 22 
Diesel air pollution is another concern. However, spark-assisted ver-
sions of diesels would be able to use clean-burning methanol fue1 23 without 
loss of efficiency. 24 The engine in the Cummins/NASA Lewis vehicle thus 
would be able to use methanol as fuei. 25 · 
Truck Freight: For trucks, it appears feasible to reduce energy use per 
ton-km by 50 percent relative to the present U.S. average for long-haul 
trucks through a combination of measures such as the development of adiabatic 
di~sel engines and bottoming cycles, reduction in aerodynamic drag, and tire 
improvements. 26 Additional savings might be achieved through increased load 
factors. 
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Table 5 
FUEL ECONOMY FOR FOUR-PASSENGER AUTOMOBILES 
Car 
1981 W Rabbit 
Gasoline 
Diesel 
Honda City Car 
Gasoline 
W Experimental 
Car 2000a 
Volvo LCP 2000b 
Volvo LCP 
Potentialc 
Cummins/NASA Lewis 
Card 
Status 
commercial 
commercial 
commercial 
prototype 
prototype 
design 
design 
Fuel Economy 
(in liters per 
100 km [mpg)) 
7.9 (30) 
5.3 (45) 
5.0 (47) 
3.8 (62) 
3.6 (65) 
2.75 (85) 
3.0 (79) 
Power 
(kw) 
55 
39 
46 
33 
66 
51 
Curb Wgt. 
(kg) 
945 
945 
655 
786 
707 
Drag 
Coef. 
0.42 
0.42 
0.40 
0.25 
0.27 
Diesel Pertrane design 2.3 (100) 
1360 
545 . 0.25 
Note: The· world 1978 average automobile fuel economy was 13 liters per 100 
km (18 mpg). 
(a) Three-cylinder, direct-injection, turbocharged diesel engine; more 
interior space than the Rabbit; engine off during idle and coast. 
(b) Two-passengers plus cargo or four-passengers; three-cylinder, heat-
insulated, direct-injection, turbocharged engine with multi-fuel 
capability. See Volvo, "Volvo LCP 2000--Light Component Project," Volvo 
Personvagnar AB, S-405 08, Gothenburg, Sweden, 1984. 
(c) The Volvo LCP 2000 features plus continuously variable transmission 
(CVT) and engine off during idle and coast. See R. Mellde, Volvo Car 
Corporation, personal communication to F. von Hippel, February, 1985. 
(d) Four to five passengers; four-cylinder, direct-injection, spark-assist-
ed, multi-fuel capable, adiabatic diesel with turbo-compounding; CVT; 
1984 model Ford Tempo body. See R. Sekar, R. Kamo, and J. Wood, "Ad-
vanced Adiabatic Engine for Passenger Cars," SAE Technical Paper series 
840434, International Congress and Exposition, Detroit, Mich., 1984. 
(e) Pre-chamber diesel engine with supercharger; CVT; flywheel for energy 
storage in braking. See S. Fawcett and J. Swain, "Prospectus for a 
Consumer Demonstration of a 100 MPG Car," Battelle Memorial Institute 
paper, Columbus, Ohio, 1983. 
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Air Passenger Travel: For passenger aircraft, the high cost of fuel, 
accounting for as much as 30 percent of the operating costs of U.S. commer-
cial airlines, provides a strong incentive for seeking fuel economy improve-
ments. It appears feasible to reduce fuel intensity in the United States by 
50 percent relative to 1977 levels through a combination of measures such as 
completing the shift to wide-bodied jets with high-bypass turbofan engines, 
improved wing design, reduced weight through use of composites, and other 
factors. 27 
Industry 
The energy price shocks of the 1970s resulted in much larger relative 
price increases in the industrial sector than in other energy-consuming 
sectors. Within the industrial sector, the energy-intensive basic materials 
processing industries, which accounted for 70 percent of industrial energy 
use in OECD countries in 1979, experienced much larger relative price 
increases than the average for all industry. A measure of the relative 
economic impact of high energy prices on different manufacturing activities 
is the ratio of energy costs to value added, which in the United States in 
1980 ranged from 15 to 76 percent for various basic materials processing 
sectors and subsectors but averaged only 3 percent for other manufacturing 
activities. 28 
Economic conditions thus provide a powerful motivation for the pursuit 
of improvements in energy productivity. As in other sectors, there is a wide 
range of technical opportunites for making such improvements. It is useful 
to classify these opportunities in terms of good housekeeping measures, 
fundamental process changes, product changes, and new energy conversion tech-
nologies. 
Good Housekeeping: During the era of low-priced energy, little atten-
tion was given to the details of energy use in industry, and as a consequence 
there was often widespread energy waste. 
However, much can be accomplished simply through the elimination of 
leaks in and the insulation of steam lines, the turning off of energy supply 
systems when not in use, etc. Simple good housekeeping measures such as 
these can be promoted effectively, for instance, by: the direct metering of 
major energy-using sections of industrial facilities; charging energy costs 
to production departments instead of to general overhead; using sophisticated 
inspection and maintenance equipment, such as infrared scanners; establishing 
training programs in energy conservation techniques for the operation of 
energy-intensive equipment; and using automatic control systems for energy-
intensive equipment. The potential for energy savings here are typically on 
the order of 10 to 20 percent at little or no capital cost. 
Process Innovation: The history of modern industry tells us that new 
processes are most likely to overcome resistance to technical change and 
displace existing processes if they offer opportunities for simultaneous 
improvements in several factors.of production--for instance, reduced labor, 
capital, materials, and energy requirements. 29 This has been a powerful 
phenomenon, resulting in reduced energy requirements through technological 
innovation even during periods of declining energy prices. 
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The goal of process innovation is not to minimize the cost of providing 
energy services, but rather to minimize the total cost of production. Never-
theless, energy requirements are typically reduced in process innovation, and 
the energy savings are often much greater than what can be achieved by simply 
retrofitting existing processes with energy conservation devices such as heat 
recuperators. 
One example of the importance of process change is illustrated in Figure 
4, which shows that the energy required to produce a ton of ammonia has been 
reduced by about a factor of 5 since the turn of the century. Another exam-
ple is the recent introduction of the float-glass process, which by now has 
captured most of the market for flat glass. Previously, the manufacture of 
high-quality flat glass involved extensive grinding and polishing, which con-
sumed 10 to 20 percent of the glass. The elimination of these steps not only 
reduced costs but also saved the energy that formerly was used in grinding 
and polishing and in the production of the glass that was ground into waste. 
Figure 4 
THE ENERGY REQUIREMENTS FOR PRODUCING AMMONIA AS ALTERNATIVE 
PROCESSES WERE INTRODUCED OVER TIME 
Tons of oil equivalents per 
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New processes are being continuously developed. Important research and 
development areas from which industrial process innovations are likely to 
emerge include powder metallurgy, plasma metallurgy, computer-assisted design 
and manufacturing, laser processing of chemicals; biotechnology, membrane 
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p 
separation technology, and the use of microwaves for localized rather than 
volumetric heating. Improvements in all such areas will make it possible to 
produce more with fewer inputs of the various production factors, including 
energy. We now illustrate the possibilities with two examples. 
Steel: About five-sixths of all steel is produced in industrialized 
countries, where it accounts for a major fraction of all manufacturing energy 
use, for instance, one-sixth in Sweden and one-seventh in the United States. 
The minimum energy theoretically required to produce a ton of steel is 7 GJ 
from iron ore30 and 0.7 GJ from scrap. At present, steel-making in Sweden 
and the United States is based on a fifty-fifty mix of iron ore and scrap, so 
that the theoretical minimum is about 3.9 GJ per ton of raw steel. For com-
parison, the actual energy used to produce raw steel was 27 GJ per ton in 
1980 in the United States and 22 GJ per ton in 1976 in Sweden. 
The markedly better energy performance of the Swedish steel industry 
arises from the need of this relatively small industry to be innovative to 
secure its niche in the global steel market. However, the Swedish steel 
industry is not the most energy efficient. The Japanese are probably the 
leaders in this regard, since a ton of their steel in 1978 required only 
about 17 GJ of energy inputs. 31* 
The potential for increased energy productivity in steel production is 
illustrated in Table 6 with four alternative technological structures for the 
Swedish steel industry. Structure I is based on current plans of Swedish 
industry for the 1980s. In structure II, presently commercial technology for 
heat recovery is fully exploited, mostly through the use of combustible gases 
in cogeneration. Structures III and IV are based on iron-making processes 
now under development in Sweden. In both cases, the objective is to reduce 
overall costs and ameliorate environmental problems through: the use of 
powdered ores (concentrates) directly, without agglomeration of the ore into 
sinter or pellets; the use of ordinary steam coal instead of coke derived 
from much more costly metallurgical coal; and the integration of the various 
individual operations. 
The Plasmasmelt process may be especially appealing to coal-poor, hydro-
rich countries, while in countries where electricity prices are high (e.g., · 
the United States), it may be preferable to focus on less electricity-
intensive processes like Elred or iron-making processes that produce solid, 
direct-reduced iron and not molten metal. Direct reduction processes convert 
iron ore in various forms into sponge iron at temperatures much below the 
melting point, using a wide variety of reductants other than metallurgical 
coke. 
*The performance of the Japanese industry relative to Sweden's is better than 
indicated by these numbers, because the ore fraction in Japanese steel was 75 
percent. 
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Electricityh 
Oil and gas 
Coal 
Total 
Table 6 
UNIT ENERGY REQUIREMENTS FOR RAW STEEL PRODUCTION 
IN SWEDEN, WITH A COMPARISON TO PRESENT U.S. PRACTICE 
(In gj per ton) 
Alternative New Technologies 
I II III IV 
Sweden U.S. Modern Maximum 
1976, 1980, Tech- Energy Plasma 
Averagga Averageb nolog:y:c Recover:y:d Elrede smeltf 
2.9 2.0 1. 8 1. 8 1. 3 4.2 
7.6 7.5 4.3 2.2 1. 3 1. 3 
11.9 17.5 --2.....Q_ --2.....Q_ 9.4 _ll_ 
22.3 27.0 15.1 13.0 11.9 8.7 
Note: The data in this table assume a fifty-fifty mix of iron ore and scrap 
feedstocks, approximately the present average for both Sweden and the 
United States. 
(a) See Johansson et al., "Sweden Beyond Oil: The Efficient Use of Energy," 
Science 219 (1983): 355. 
(b) For 108 million tons of produced raw steel. For energy consumption by 
energy carrier see Energy and Environmental Analysis, "The Iron and 
Steel Industry," in Industrial Energy Productivity Project Final Report, 
vol. 4, prepared for the Assistant Secretary for Conservation and Renew-
able Energy, DOE/CS/40151-1 (Washington, D.C.: Department of Energy, 
1983). 
(c) These are consistent with changes planned for the mid-1980s by the 
Swedish steel industry. 
(d) Same as "Modern Technology" except that the potential for energy re-
covery with presently commercial technology has been fully exploited. 
(e) Same as "Modern Technology" except that the blast furnaces are replaced 
by a process called Elred, which is under development by Stora Koppar-
berg A.B. See S. Eketorp et al., "The Future Steel Plant," National 
Swedish Board for Technical Development, Stockholm, 1980. 
(f) Same as "Modern Technology" except that the blast furnaces are replaced 
by a new process called Plasmasmelt, which is under development by SKF 
Steel A.B. See S. Eketorp et al., in note (e) above. 
(g) Here electricity is evaluated at 3.6 megajoules (mj) per kwh (i.e., 
losses in generation, transmission, and distribution are not included). 
-386-
s 
t 
C 
The various new iron-making processes at or near commercialization are 
by no means the end of the line as to what might_eventually be achieved in 
terms of energy and total productivity improvements in the steel industry. 
Other promising advanced processes that integrate now-separate operations to 
save on capital, labor, and energy costs include direct casting, direct 
steel-making, and dry steel-making. The dry steel-making process, which ends 
up with the final product in powder form (i.e., there would be no melting), 
holds forth the promise of very low capital costs, suitability for small-
scale operations, and a ~otential 40 percent energy savings relative to 
conventional processes. 32 
Chemicals: The chemical industry, which accounts for about one-fourth 
of industrial energy use in OECD countries, is an energy-intensive industry 
characterized by a broad diversity of products and continuing process 
innovations, spurred in recent decades by rapid demand growth. There have 
been continual reductions in the energy intensity of chemicals production 
throughout the history of the chemical industry (see Table 7). The energy 
intensity of the U.S. chemical industry declined at a rapid average annual 
rate of 3.8 percent from 1972 to 1979; even when feedstocks are included in 
the calculation of energy inputs, the result is an impressive annual average 
rate of improvement of 2.8 percent in this period. The efficiency improve-
ments achieved in this period were due largely to improved housekeeping. 
Very little of the improvement can be attributed to major capital investment 
and fundamental process change. 
Table 7 
HISTORICAL ENERGY REQUIREMENTS PER UNIT OF OUTPUT FOR 
SELECTED CHEMICALS PRODUCED IN THE UNITED STATES 
Soda Ash 
(Solvay process) 
Energy 
Date (in gj/ton) 
1868 
1894 
1911 
1925 
1942 
1970 
60 
31 
28 
17 
15 
14 
Ethylene Dichloride 
Date 
1967 
1973 
Index 
100 
15 
Ammonia 
(Haber-Bosch process) 
Energy 
Date (in gj/ton) 
1917 
1923-50 
1965 
1972 
1978 
93.0 
81.0 
52.0 
46.5 
41.2 
Ethylene Oxide 
Date Index 
1970 
1973 
1974 
100 
85 
79 
Chlorine 
(diaphragm cells) 
Electricity 
Date (in kwh/ton) 
1916 
1947-73 
1980 
4,400 
3,300 
2,400 
Polyethelene 
Date Index 
1956 
1973 
1975 
100 
40 
18 
Source: R. Ayers, "Final Report on Future Energy Consumption by the Indus-
trial Chemicals Industry," SIC 28, prepared for the Energy Productivity 
Center, Mellon Institute: Appendix to vol. 5. 
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While the diversity of the chemical industry makes a thorough discussion 
of the technical opportunities for process improvement very difficult, some 
insights into the future possibilities can be gleaned from a discussion of 
generic opportunities in two areas: reaction chemistry and separation and 
concentration processes. 
To drive a chemical reaction, enough energy must be supplied to break 
existing chemical bonds and/or to form new ones. Typically, however, far 
more energy is used than is theoretically required. Much energy is wasted in 
exciting the wrong bonds, and often reactants must be heated to very high 
temperatures before the desired reaction will take place. There is much that 
can be done to better direct energy inputs to the targeted reactions using 
catalysis, laser chemistry, and biotechnology. An example f such an inno-
vation, now exploited, involves the use of catalyzed ammonia production in 
place of an old non-catalyzed process and has resulted in a three-fold 
improvement in energy efficiency. 33 The laser holds forth the promise of 
selective control over chemical reactions by making it possible to provide 
electromagnetic energy inputs at discrete wavelengths chosen to match the 
energy required to weaken or break specific bonds as needed to achieve a 
desired chemical result. 34 
For typical chemical reactions, 70 percent of the capital costs and 80 
percent of the energy consumed are in separation and concentration 
processes. 35 Often these separation processes are energy-intensive and 
incomplete, involving "brute force" techniques. Some of the more promising 
alternative approaches involve membrane separation, 36 supercritical fluid 
extraction, 37 and freeze crystallization. Membrane separation requires much 
less energy than do "brute force" methods. For example, desalinating sea-
water requires some 280 megajoules (MJ) per ton of fresh water produced 
through distillation but only 60 MJ per ton through reverse osmosis. 38 
Product Change: One way product design can lead to reduced energy use 
if it facilitates materials recycling; this is especially important for 
metals. Only 35 percent as much energy is consumed in the production of 
finished steel from recycled steel as from iron ore; recycled aluminum uses 
less than 10 percent as much. Product design can also lead to reduced energy 
use if it extends product life, facilitating repair, remanufacture, and 
reuse. 
Significant energy savings are possible through product weight reduc-
tion. But sometimes the use of lightweight materials can increase manufac-
turing energy use--for example, when aluminum is substituted for steel in 
cars. But such increases are usually offset by the much greater reduced 
operational energy use, as would be the case with the Volvo lightweight car, 
the LCP 2000. 39 
Some of the most exciting possibilities for energy-saving substitutions 
involve entirely new primary materials. One candidate is a "super cement" now 
under development, which, like ordinary concrete, has a relatively low energy 
intensity (a cubic meter of ordinary concrete requires six times and twenty-
nine times less energy to produce than a cubic meter of polystyrene and 
stainless steel, respectively) and hence would constitute a desirable 
substitute for more energy-intensive materials. To date, the substitution 
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possibilities have been quite limited, largely because cements tend to have 
low tensile strength and low fracture toughness. However, the new super 
cement under development is a macro-defect-free (MDF) cement, which differs 
from ordinary cement in that the pores in the cement are reduced from milli-
meter to micrometer size. This dramatically increases tensile strength and 
fracture toughness; super cement can be made highly resistant to impact 
through reinforcement with fibers. These fibers can be inexpensive organic 
materials because cement is manufactured at low temperatures. Strips of 
fiber-reinforced MDF cement can be made pliable and bent like strips of 
metal. 40 
New Energy Conversion Technologies: More efficient energy conversion 
technologies also can help reduce the industrial-use of energy. These 
technologies typically yield savings on the order of 20 to SO percent. 
While such relative savings tend to be less dramatic than that which can 
often be achieved with process innovation or product change (where two- to 
four-fold or even larger savings are sometimes possible), the savings oppor-
tunities associated with many improved energy conversion devices are often 
widely applicable throughout industry, so that the aggregate savings can be 
significant. The measures and devices here include better insulation of 
furnaces, the use of radiation reflectors, heat recovery devices, induction 
heating of metals, microwave heating, better mechanical drive systems, and 
cogeneration. 
To illustrate the possibilities, in what follows we discuss mechanical 
drive technology and industrial cogeneration. 
Mechanical Drives: In both the United States and Sweden, industrial 
motor drives account for about three-fourths of total industrial electricity 
use. A superficial inquiry into the opportunities for energy efficiency 
improvements indicates that most industrial motors are fairly efficient, so 
that only modest electricity savings are possible through the use of high-
efficiency motors. A 1976 study estimated that if all new and replacement 
motors in the United States were high-efficiency devices, savings could be 
realized by 1990 equivalent to about 7 percent of all electricity used by 
motors. 41 · 
Far greater savings are achievable, however, through efforts to better 
match motor output to load through the use of new semiconductor motor control 
technology for variable-load situations involving pumps, compressors, fans. 
For example, constant-speed, overpowered motors are typically used to move 
gases, and the gas flow is regulated by baffles; similarly, throttling valves 
are used to control liquid flows. An alternative to throttling involves the 
use of an alternating current (AC) variable-speed drive (VSD). 42 With VSD, 
the voltage and frequency are varied simultaneously, maintaining a constant 
voltage-to-frequency ratio, so as to efficiently modulate a standard induc-
tion motor. The VSD thus allows a motor-drive process to be controlled by 
reducing the energy input to the motor rather than by dissipating the 
unwanted portion of the motor's output. Energy savings of 20 to SO percent 
or more can be realized with the VSD technology. Important VSD applications 
exist not just in industry but throughout the energy economy. It has been 
estimated that half of AC motor usage in the United States could be econom-
ically affected by the use of VSD controls by 1990, with an average savings 
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of 30 percent for the motors affected. 43 The attraction of VSDs for both new 
and retrofit applications is cost. Paybacks of one to three years are 
possible in a wide variety of applications. Even in applications where the 
savings are modest (on the order of 20 percent or less), good rates of return 
can often be achieved. Due to improvements in solid state technology, the 
reliability of VSD devices has improved in recent years, costs have tumbled, 
and they can be expected to continue falling. 44 
Industrial Cogeneration: Cogeneration involves the combined production 
of heat and electricity. Cogeneration can be an effective way to efficiently 
provide space heating for buildings or clusters of buildings through district 
heating. However, the cogeneration application with the largest fuel savings 
potential is in the steam-using, basic materials processing industries such 
as the pulp and paper, chemical, and petroleum refining industries. Since 
these industries typically have large steam loads which are fairly constant, 
day and night and year-round, the electricity they produce tends to be base-
load electricity. Thus, industrial cogenerators can produce power which is 
similar in quality to baseload electricity produced by large central station 
coal or nuclear power plants. The extra fuel required to produce cogenerated 
electricity typically amounts to only about one-half of the fuel required to 
produce electricity at conventional thermal electric power plants.' In addi-
tion to.fuel savings, cogeneration installations often require less capital 
per unit of electrical output than central station power plants. 
Although historically utilities have discouraged the development of 
cogeneration systems,* industrial cogeneration offers distinct advantages in 
the new era of high-cost central station power and uncertain future demand. 
The lead-time for cogeneration facilities is only two to three years, 
compared to the eight to twelve years for conventional power plants. If 
utilities were involved with cogeneration projects, they could plan the 
addition of new capacity in small increments as they see how demand is 
evolving. Cogeneration thus offers utilities a means through which to escape 
dependence on dubious long-term electricity demand forecasts, and hence the 
risk of having the excess generating capacity--the situation at present in 
many industrialized countries--which results from overbuilding large plants 
with long lead times. 
The amount of electricity that might be produced through cogeneration 
depends on the technology deployed. With the steam turbine system, the most 
familiar cogeneration technology, the power-generating potential.of indus-
trial cogeneration is quite limited. However, with alternative electricity 
intensive cogeneration technologies such as the gas turbine, the gas turbine/ 
steam turbine combined cycle, or the diesel engine, the potential can be 
quite large. 45 For the United States, the cogeneration potential based on 
these technologies in six basic materials processing industries characterized 
by relatively steady process steam loads has been estimated to be equivalent 
to about one-quarter of total 1980 electricity generation. 46 The recent 
commercialization of steam-injected gas turbines for cogeneration applica-
tions, which extends the economic advantages of gas turbine cogeneration to 
*Through excessive rates charged for backup power, refusal to provide backup 
power, and/or refusal to purchase at fair rates elec~ricity produced in 
excess of on-site needs. 
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variable steam load applications, could significantly increase the overall 
cogeneration potential. 47 
TWO INTEGRATED EXAMPLES: SWEDEN AND THE UNITED STATES 
In this section, we describe what the ongoing structural changes and 
exploitation of opportunities for energy productivity improvement could mean 
for Sweden and the United States, two highly industrialized but quite dif-
ferent modern economies. 
Sweden is a small, affluent country with a cold, northern European 
climate. It has an open economy with a sizable basic materials-processing 
sector dominated by steel and paper. It is often regarded as a very energy-
efficient country. The United States, on the other hand, is a large, 
affluent country with diverse climates that range from essentially sub-
tropical climates to climates as cold as those of the northernmost reaches of 
Europe. The United States also has one of the world's most energy-intensive 
economies, measured in terms of either per capita energy use or energy use 
per dollar of GNP. Yet, despite the wide differences in these economies, our 
analysis indicates that in each case it would be feasible, through end-use 
oriented energy strategies, to reduce per capita energy use by about a factor 
of two, even with continued economic expansion. 
An End-Use Oriented Energy Future for Sweden 
In 1982, 60 percent of all energy used in Sweden was imported oil; hydro 
power supplied 14 percent; biomass, 12 percent; nuclear power, 9 percent; and 
coal, 5 percent. Primary and final energy use per capita were 5.5 kilowatts 
(kW) and 4.7 kW, respectively; and per capita GDP was $11,900 in 1982 
dollars. Swedish energy policy follows from a 1981 energy policy decision of 
the Swedish Parliament, which calls for reduced dependence on oil and no use 
of nuclear power after the year 2010. The energy supply system, according to 
the decision, should be based on sustai~able domestic, and preferably renew-
able, energy sources, with the least possible environmental impact; energy 
demand should be at the lowest possible level compatible with economic and 
social goals. 
A study published in 1981 explored what might be meant by lowest pos-
sible energy demand compatible with economic and social goals. 48 While the 
use of different task definitions and fuller exploitation of the technical 
opportunities for energy efficiency improvements might have led to projec-
tions of lower energy demand levels for the long term, the results of this 
1981 study nevertheless suggest future energy demand levels far below those 
indicated by conventional wisdom, with far-reaching implications for 
investments in the energy system. In this section, we summarize the demand 
analysis presented in the 1981 study, the results of which, it should be 
stressed, are not forecasts of what will happen but of what could happen. 
Methodology: The analysis was separated into three parts to facilitate 
the identification and understanding of the most important factors that bear 
on future energy demand. First, the overall development of society was des-
cribed and structural changes that might have a major influence on future 
energf demand were identified. Here, physical arid economic parameters for 
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energy-intensive activities were treated explicitly, so that the 
more easily grasp the implications of changing these parameters. 
potential impacts of new energy-efficient and now cost-effective 
technologies were explored. Finally, consideration was given to 
of time required for such technology to come into common use. 
reader could 
Next, the 
end-use 
the amount 
The total energy demand under different assumptions was obtained by 
multiplying the activity levels in all sectors by their corresponding energy 
intensities and then summing up to cover all activities in society. The 
overall volume of activity was treated as an exogenous variable. A twenty-
four-sector, input-output model of the Swedish economy was used to associate 
a specific level and mix of private and public consumption with output from 
different production sectors in society, thereby resulting in a consistent 
description of the economy. The model was extended to cover the total 
economy, including investments and foreign trade. 
Energy intensities for 1975 were identified for the twenty-four sectors. 
To quantify the impact of the use of new energy-efficient and now cost-
effective technology, two sets of specific energy demand numbers were identi-
fied. One set refers to presently known best technology, or technology that 
is, or is judged to be, economical in the present marketplace. (Presently 
known best technology is not the most energy-efficient existing technology in 
the narrow engineering sense. Less energy demand could always be achieved, 
but at.an extra cost.) The other set refers to advanced technology where 
some success is assumed in the ongoing research and development efforts to 
improve end-use efficiency. Again, advanced technology is judged to be in a 
cost bracket of economic interest and does not represent a technological 
limit. In both cases, estimates of cost effectiveness are based-on energy 
prices fixed at present levels. 
Since the level of future economic growth is uncertain, calculations of 
total energy use were performed for various combinations of end-use tech-
nologies and different levels and mixtures of final demand for goods and 
services. Attention was focused on those cases in which the overall volume, 
of goods and services is 50 percent and 100 percent higher than in 1975, with 
a mix of activities similar to that of 1975. 
In areas in which saturation effects are apparent, activity levels are 
expected to increase, but not to the same degree (in percentage terms) as the 
overall volume of goods and services. The same is true for cases in which 
obvious physical limitations constrain activity. Specifically, it is assumed 
that for a 50 percent (100 percent) increase in the overall volume of goods 
and services: commercial floor space would increase 30 percent (60 percent); 
automobile travel would increase only 25 percent (SO percent), because of 
time constraints on auto travel; the volume of truck freight would increase 
only 12.5 percent (25 percent), owing to the ongoing shift away from 
materials-intensive production; the production of paper and pulp would be 
limited to a 50 percent increase, because of the limited availability of the 
required feedstock from Swedish forests; iron and steel output would increase 
only 23 percent (44 percent), because of stiff foreign competition to the 
export-oriented Swedish iron and steel industry. 
Energy-Efficient Technology: In this section, we highlight some of the 
energy-efficient end-use technologies assumed in the Swedish study. 
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Buildings: The government's 1978 ten-year retrofit plan provides the 
basis for the assumed presently known best retrofit technology. The level of 
energy use achieved in a single family home (the house of Mats Wolgast, Table 
1) outside the city of Uppsala was taken as an example of presently known 
best technology for new residential buildings. Comparable energy performance 
is now achieved with some commercially available prefabricated houses (e.g, 
version two of the Faluhus, Table 1). The energy performance of the Folksam 
building in Stockholm, completed in 1977, is taken to be representative of 
presently known best technology for new office buildings, although much 
better performance has been demonstrated in the Harnosand building, con-
structed in 1981 (see Table 4). Enhanced heat recovery in ventilation air 
and more efficient use of hot water was assumed for the level of advanced 
technology. 
The results of the analysis for buildings are summarized in Table 8, 
which shows that associated with a 50 percent (100 percent) increase in the 
consumption of goods and services, final residential energy use would decline 
to 35 percent (43 percent) of the 1975 level were current best technology to 
be used, and to 25 percent (30 percent) of the 1975 level were advanced tech-
nology to be employed. Similar reductions would be realized for commercial 
buildings. 
Table 8 
SCENARIOS FOR PER CAPITA FINAL ENERGY USE 
IN SWEDEN AND THE UNITED STATES (In kW) 
Swedena United Statesb 
wLGDP ner canita wLGDP ner canita 
1975 un 50% un 100% 1980 un 50% un 100% 
Residential 1.40 0.34 0.41 1.50 0.57 0.57 
Commercial 0.53 0.15 0.16 0.88 0.34 0.34 
Transportation 2.90 1. 33 1.53 
Domestic 0.89 0.55 0.65 
Int' 1. bunkers 0.18 0.10 0.11 
Industry 2.40 1. 60 2.00 3.70 2.01 2.16 
Totals 5.30 2.80 3.30 9.00 4.20 4.60 
(a) Based on advanced technology. If introduced at the rate of capital 
turnover, this technology could become average technology by 2015-2020. 
See Johansson et al., "Sweden Beyond Oil--The Efficient Use of Energy" 
Science 219 (1983): 355. 
(b) Realized in the year 2020. It is assumed that as the capital stock 
turns over and grows, investments are made in the most energy-efficent 
technologies available that are judged to be cost-effective. Most of 
the technologies considered are commercially available today; a few are 
advanced technologies which could be available within about a decade. 
See J. Goldemberg et al., Energy for a Sustainable World (New Delhi: 
Wiley-Eastern, 1987). 
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Transportation: The average fuel economy of automobiles on the road in 
Sweden is presently 10.5 liters per 100 km (22 mpg), and 1981 models averaged 
9 liters per 100 km (26 mpg). Automobiles now on the market with a fuel 
economy of about 5 liters per 100 kilometers (47 mpg), were selected to 
represent presently known best technology. Further improvements can be 
achieved through the use of more efficient engines, lighter materials, and 
more efficient transmissions, and through reduced air drag and rolling resis-
tance and other factors. Advanced designs which achieve fuel economies of 3 
liters per 100 km (79 mpg) (see Table 5) were assumed to represent advanced 
technology. 
Based on a combination of technical and organizational improvements, the 
energy intensity of truck freight was assumed to be reduced 22 percent and 48 
percent for best available and advanced technology, respectively. 
Table 8 shows for transportation that, associated with a 50 percent (100 
percent) increase in the consumption of goods and services, final energy use 
would decline to 80 percent (93 percent) of the 1975 level were current best 
technology to be used, and to 61 percent (71 percent) of the 1975 level were 
advanced technology to be used. 
Industry: The largest industrial energy users are the paper and pulp 
industry and the iron and steel industry, accounting for two-fifths and one-
fifth of total industrial energy use, respectively. 
The analysis of the pulp and paper industry is based on a set of model 
Swedish plants designed in 1977. 49 These designs represent what should have 
been ordered for new plants at that time. Since these plants were designed 
before the 1979-80 energy price increases, we assume a further 12 percent 
reduction in the energy intensities for paper and pulp production to charac-
terize best available technology. Energy intensities with advanced technol-
ogy were taken to be 18 percent less than with best available technology. 
Overall, energy intensity for the pulp and paper sector would be 54 and 62 
percent lower than in 1975 were presently known best technology and advanced 
technology to be introduced, respectively. 
For the iron and steel industry, the analysis is based on the four 
alternative industrial structures described for the Swedish steel industry 
(see Table 6). The measure of presently known best technology was taken to 
be an average of the energy performances for structure I (based on current 
steel industry plans for the 1980s) and structure II (the same as structure I 
except with full exploitation of the potential for heat recovery); that for 
advanced technology, an average of the energy performances of structure III 
(Elred technology) and structure IV (Plasmasmelt technology). Energy use in 
the Swedish steel industry in 1976 would have been lower by about one-third 
and one-half had best available and advanced technology been used, respect-
ively. 
For other industries, a variety of generic energy-saving technologies 
(e.g., added insulation, heat recovery, heat pumps, new lighting technology, 
variable-speed motor control devices) were considered. For the industrial 
sector as a whole, a shift in the mix of output toward less materials-
intensive products, along with the adoption of more energy-efficient tech-
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nology, would, for a 50 percent (100 percent) increase in the consumption of 
goods and services, result in a reduction in final energy use by industry to 
81 percent (100 percent) of the 1975 level with present best technology and 
to 67 percent (83 percent) with advanced technology. 
Total EnerRY Demand: Alternative future energy demand scenarios for 
Sweden are summarized in Table 8 and Figure 5, which show the results in 
relation to the existing situation in 1975 and to a forecast for 1990 made by 
the National Industrial Board. Compared to a total energy use of 1,400 
petajoules (PJ) in 1975, the level of annual energy use with a 50 percent 
(100 percent) increase in the level of goods and services production would be 
about 910 PJ (1,100 PJ) with best available technology and 720 PJ (870 PJ) 
with advanced technology. This overall reduction in energy demand would be 
accompanied by an increase in electricity's share of final demand from 19 
percent in 1975 to 32 to 35 percent with these alternative, more energy 
efficient futures. 
Figure 5 
FINAL ENERGY DEMAND IN SWEDEN FOR FOUR LEVELS OF ENERGY INTENSITY AT 100, 
150, AND 200 PERCENT OF THE 1975 LEVEL OF CONSUMPTION OF GOODS AND SERVICES 
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Sensitivity Analysis: The sensitivity of the level of future energy 
demand to changes in parameters other than the overall level of goods and 
services and the choice of end-use technology was explored. Figure 6 
displays the results of this sensitivity analysis relative to a base case 
with a 50 percent increase in the overall level of goods and services and 
best available technology. 
Figure 6 
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS SHOWING THE CHANGES IN FINAL ENERGY DEMAND 
FOR SWEDEN ASSOCIATED WITH ALTERNATIVE ASSUMPTIONS, RELATIVE TO 
A BASE CASE SCENARIO, WHERE THE OVERALL LEVEL OF CONSUMPTION OF 
GOODS AND SERVICES IS 1.5 TIMES THE 1975 LEVEL AND PRESENTLY 
KNOWN BEST END-USE TECHNOLOGY IS DEPLOYED 
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The mix of exports was one parameter whose effect was investigated. 
Sweden traditionally has been a large exporter of basic materials such as 
steel, iron ore, paper, and pulp. In the base case, the present contribution 
of each of these to total exports was assumed to change from 1975 levels: 
for fabrication and finishing, from 38 to 53 percent; for iron and steel, 
from 7.4 to 3.4 percent; for paper and pulp from 14 to. 11 percent; for trans-
portation, from.8 to 5 percent; for chemicals, from 5 to 7 percent; and for 
shipbuilding, from 5.5 to 1.5 percent. If instead the mix of exports were 
the same as in 1975, annual energy use would be about 10 percent higher. 
Alternatively, annual energy demand would be reduced by about 8 percent were 
all the increase in exports to be shifted to engineering products (i.e., 
products involving considerable value added in fabrication and finishing). 
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International economic relations, which for a small open economy like 
Sweden are important, also were·considered. Two important indicators of 
these relations are internationalization and terms-of-trade. The degree of 
internationalization (total imports divided by total domestic demand) was 
assumed to be 47 percent in the base case. If this index were as low as 29 
percent (the 1975 level), energy demand would be 3 percent lower; energy 
demand would instead be 3 percent higher than in the base case were the 
degree of internationalization to be 65 percent. This indicates that the 
energy intensities of exports and imports are roughly equal (excluding energy 
items). The impact of a deterioration in the terms-of-trade would be more 
significant, with a 1.5 percent per year decline potentially increasing 
energy demand by 10 percent.22* This situation would be unacceptable in the 
long run, since it implies that by 2000 exports of $4 in value would be 
required to pay for every $3 of imports. 
A doubling of public expenditures (which would require that private 
spending be 26 percent higher than in 1975 in order to keep the overall level 
of economic output 50 percent higher) would reduce energy demand by 6 
percent. 
To illustrate the importance of the mix of household expenditures, the 
total increase in household expenditures was alternatively assigned to the 
six most and the six least energy-intensive of thirteen categories. Total 
energy demand was higher and lower by 8 percent in the former case and latter 
case, respectively. 
Uncertainties: Aside from the effects of different levels of economic 
output and the choice of end-use technology, uncertainties relating to key 
assumptions in this analysis could possibly change the estimates of future 
energy demand presented here. 
A future society with a mix of personal consumption expenditures only 
modestly changed from that of today was assumed. This assumption ignores the 
possibility that more resource-conserving life styles may become more 
widespread. 
Constant coefficients were assumed for the input-output analysis and 
only very limited consideration was given to changes in the mix of industrial 
output (e.g., the production of the pulp and paper and iron and steel 
industries was assumed to be constrained). Hence, the study only partially 
accounts for the ongoing shift in industrial production to less materials-
intensive and less energy-intensive activities. 
Also, the relative prices for the factors on production were assumed to 
remain fixed at 1975 levels. The base year for this analysis (1975) predated 
the second oil price shock, and.in 1975 the economy had not yet fully 
*Terms-of-trade is the ratio of the index of export prices to the index of 
import prices. In 1979, the Swedish government commission set up to study 
the consequences of dispensing with nuclear power projected that terms-of-
trade would deteriorate by 1.5 percent per year during the 1980s. 
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adjusted to the oil price increases of 1973 and 1974. Therefore, the pro-
jected demand for energy-intensive products may not be fully consistent with 
today's price structure, although this shortcoming may be partially compen-
sated for by the assumption that the growth in demand for buildings and 
transportation services would be less than the growth in the total volume of 
goods and services. 
These considerations suggest that, in spite of the uncertainties and 
simplifications in the approach·used, the calculated levels of total energy 
demand are likely to be high rather than low. 
The Issue of When: The third step of the analysis centered on the pace 
of energy efficiency improvement. 
Assuming that the more energy-efficient options will be chosen if they 
are found to be cost effective, the pace at which new technology is adopted 
will depend on the rate of turnover of the capital stock for major energy-
using activities. Machinery and equipment in industry have economic life-
times of ten to twenty years, depending on the sector of industry. The 
automobile fleet is renewed approximately every fifteen years. The struct-
ural components of buildings have very long lifetimes, fifty to one-hundred 
years, but many energy-related installations in buildings have shorter 
lifetimes, for example, ten to thirty years for furnaces, windows, ventila-
tion systems, and facades. Using these rates of capital turnover, the impact 
on average specific energy demand levels was calculated for both presently 
known best technology and advanced technology, which were assumed to be 
routinely installed beginning in 1985 and 1995, respectively. It was 
concluded that, if this more efficient technology were introduced at the 
rates of normal capital turnover, best available technology might become 
average technology around the turn of the century and the present advanced 
technology might become average technology during the first decade of the 
next century. 
While many of the new energy-efficient technologies will be introduced· 
in this manner, it is unlikely that all the more energy-efficient technol-
ogies would be adopted solely in response to market forces, given major 
institutional obstacles to widespread utilization of the most cost-effective 
technological choices. This is especially true for energy efficiency 
improvements for buildings and the automobile. Hence, new government 
policies will be needed to overcome these obstacles and thereby realize the 
full potential savings. 
Conclusions: Our end-use analysis shows that at the 1975 level of con-
sumption of goods and services, per capita final energy use could be reduced 
cost effectively from the actual 1975 value of 5.4 kW to 2.6 kW with 
presently known best technology and to 2.1 kW with advanced technology. For 
a 50 percent (100 percent) increase in the consumption of goods and services, 
final energy use would instead be about 3.5 kW (4.2 kW) using best available 
technology and 2.8 kW (3.3 kW) using advanced technology. 
These findings imply that, despite the fact that it has no known fossil 
fuel resources, it would be feasible for Sweden to meet its long-term energy 
needs largely with domestic resources (mainly biomass and hydropower), and to 
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do so without pushing these resources to limits that precipitate significant 
ecological damage.so 
An End-Use-Oriented Energy Future for the United States 
With per capita primary energy use averaging 10.4 kW in 1984, two-and-
one-half times that for Western Europe and Japan and ten times that for 
developing countries, the United States sets a global standard in energy use. 
that would be difficult to achieve for the majority of the world's popula-
tion. However, the energy price shocks of the 1970s have sharply curbed the 
growth in energy use in the United States. The rate of primary energy use in 
1984 was 10 percent lower than the peak rate of 11.6 kW in 1973, even though 
per capita GNP was 17 percent higher in 1984 (see Figure 7). In what fol-
lows, we show that the potential for decoupling energy and economic growth is 
actually far greater than is suggested by this recent experience, taking into 
account both ongoing structural changes in the economy and opportunities for 
energy efficiency improvement. 
Methodology: Total final energy demand Ef for the scenario is obtained 
through the sum: 
Ef - ~ (activity level, activity j) x (energy intensity, activity j) 
all j 
The projected activity levels for major energy end uses in this sum are based 
on extrapolations of recent trends, while the energy intensities assigned to 
these activities involve the use of energy-efficient technologies introduced 
at the normal rates of turnover and expansion of the energy-using capital 
stock. 
The scenario is focused on the year 2020. That date is sufficiently far 
in the future that it would be feasible to bring into wide use energy-
efficient technologies now available or in an advanced state of development. 
Yet it is sufficiently close that it has a bearing on energy decision-making 
today. 
The resulting scenario should be regarded neither as indicating the 
upper limit on the potential impact of energy efficiency improvements on the 
U.S. economy nor as a forecast of what will happen. The improved technol-
ogies considered are either already commercially proven or are based on 
prototypes or advanced developments that could lead to commercial products in 
the near future. In all cases, efficiencies are far below thermodynamic 
limits, and in most instances, possibilities for further improvement are 
apparent. 
At the same time, while the scenario is based on end-use technologies 
which are judged to be cost effective, the economy will not necessarily adopt 
these improvements automatically. The scenarios probably overstate what can 
be accomplished through market forces acting alone. New public policy 
initiatives are needed to facilitate a transition to energy-efficient 
technologies. 
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Figure 7 
RECENT TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES IN VARIOUS ENERGY USES AND IN GNP 
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The Economic and Demographic Context: Alternative economic scenarios 
are considered, involving 50 percent and 100 percent increases in per capita 
GNP between 1980 and 2020. In the former, the average annual growth rate for 
per capita GNP is 1 percent per year--the average for the period from 1973 to 
1983. In the latter, it is 1.7 percent per year, which is consistent with a 
return to 4 percent unemployment and the average labor productivities for the 
goods- and services-producing sectors for the period from 1953 to 1978. If 
the population grows from 228 million in 1980 to 296 million in 2020 (the 
middle population series projected by the U.S. Census Bureau in 1982), this 
implies that aggregate GNP would grow for the two scenarios at average annual 
rates of 1.7 and 2.5 percent per year respectively between 1980 and 2020. 
Modeling Future Energy-Using Activities: In the residential and 
transport sectors, the major energy-using activities are relatively few in 
number, fairly well defined, and, for the most part, well established. (Most 
less well defined, rapidly changing activities in these sectors contribute 
little to overall energy demand.) For these sectors, long-term projections 
are made of each of the major energy-using activities, and the associated 
energy intensities are indicated explicitly, based on the analysis of end-use 
technologies presented above and discussed in more detail elsewhere. 51 For 
the commercial and industrial sectors, a more aggregated approach is taken. 
Future Energy Demand by Sector: Given the above assumptions, energy 
futures can be defined, sector by sector. 
Residential Sector: We assume for both scenarios that the number of 
households increases from 82 million to 119 million, arising from a 30 
percent increase in the population and a decline in the average household 
size from 2.8 persons today to 2.4 persons in 2020. Further, we assume that 
the average heated floor space per household remains constant at the 1980 
level of 139 square meters (slightly higher than the average of 135 square 
meters for the period from 1980 to 1984), which implies an increase of one-
sixth in the living space per capita. We also assume for both scenarios 100 
percent saturation for all major household appliances except air condition-
ing. For air conditioning, the assumed saturation level is only two-thirds, 
because in most parts of the country where air conditioning is not already 
common, it is not needed. The assumption that the level of major energy-
using amenities in the home becomes independent of GNP greatly simplifies the 
analysis in a manner involving little loss of generality, given the already 
high average level of major energy-using amenities in the home. The 
household amenities which are sensitive to income are characterized either by 
low power usage (e.g., home entertainment systems and computers) or high 
power usage but very low load factors (e.g, power equipment for the shop and 
yard) and are of minor consequence in the overall household energy budget. 
Because the housing stock turns over so slowly, it is estimated that 
three-fifths of the housing stock built before 1981 will be standing in 2020, 
accounting for two-fifths of all houses at that time. For space heating 
retrofits in those houses that are fuel heated, a 30 percent average reduc-
tion between 1980 and 2020 is assumed for the required output of space 
heating systems. This norm is based on the average measured cost-effective 
savings achieved for the twenty-nine houses retrofitted in the 1981 utility-
based Modular Retrofit Experiment described above. 52 No corresponding 
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savings are assumed for existing electrically heated houses, which are 
characterized by much lower heat losses. 
The space-heat load norm for new houses built after 1990 is assumed to 
be the average climate-adjusted measured energy performance achieved for the 
ninty-seven houses built under Minnesota's Energy Efficient Housing Demons-
tration Program, a 50 percent reduction in space-heating requirements 
relative to typical new construction (see Table 1). 
Besides these heat load reductions, the norm for heating system per-
formance in 2020 is assumed to be equal to that of the most efficient 
furnaces and heat pumps commercially available in 1982: an annual fuel 
utilization efficiency of 95 percent for condensing gas furnaces and a 
seasonal average coefficient of performance of 2.6 for electric heat pumps. 53 
For end uses other than space heating, energy performance in 2020 is assumed 
to be that of the most efficient technology commercially available at 
present. 54 
With these assumptions, aggregate final residential energy use per 
capita would be reduced by three-fifths. Per household would be reduced by 
two-thirds, corresponding to an average rate of reduction of 2.7 percent per 
year from 1980 to 2020. While this is a rapid rate, it is much less than the 
average of 7.6 percent per year for the U.S. housing stock in the period from 
1978 to 1982. 55 
Commercial Buildings: The growth of the commercial buildings sector is 
closely coupled to the expansion of the service sector. Here the linear 
relationship established in the period from 1970 to 1979 between commercial 
floor space and service sector employment is assumed to persist, so'that in 
both scenarios the volume of commercial floor space would expand SO percent 
from 1980 to 2020. 
As in the residential case, it is estimated that three-fifths of the 
commerical building stock built before 1981 will be standing in 2020, when it 
would account for two-fifths of the total. For retrofits of these buildings, 
a 50 percent reduction in final energy use per square meter is assumed 
relative to 1980 levels, based on the results of a Solar Energy Research 
Institute survey designed to ascertain the judgments of experienced archi-
tects and engineers as to the retrofit potential by the year 2000. 56 
The assumed norm for buildings constructed after 1990 is based on the 
average energy performance of the three buildings designed in a life cycle 
cost minimization exercise of the American Institute of Architects Research 
Corporation (see Table 4). 
With these assumptions, final energy use per capita for commercial 
buildings in 2020 would be less than two-fifths of that in 1980 (see Table 
8). 
Transportation: The potential for demand growth for automobiles and 
light trucks, which account for 60 percent of transport energy use in the 
United States, is small. Since the average American already spends an hour a 
day in the car, future levels of light-vehicle use are not likely to increase 
much with per capita GNP. Thus, it is assumed for both scenarios that the 
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number of light vehicles per adult remains constant at the present level of 
0.8 and that the average light vehicle is driven the same amount as today 
(17,000 km per year). 
In contrast to the automotive situation, there is no evidence that air 
travel demand is reaching saturation levels. In accordance with a relation-
ship to GNP established in the period from 1970 to 1979, it is assumed that 
air travel per capita increases between 1980 and 2020 2.1-fold (3.3-fold) as 
per capita GNP increases 50 percent (100 percent). 
The mix of freight between truck and rail is assumed to remain fixed at 
the 1980 level, and the total volume of freight is assumed to grow slightly 
more slowly than GNP, as it did in the 1970s. 
The average light vehicle on the road in 2020 is assumed to have a fuel 
economy of 3.1 liters per 100 km (75 mpg). This fuel economy could be 
achieved with present technology in lightweight cars (e.g., a VW Rabbit 
diesel modified with reduced aerodynamic drag, reduced rolling resistance, an 
open chamber instead of a prechamber diesel, a continuously variable trans-
mission, and a 16 percent weight reduction to 775 kg57 ) or with advanced 
technology in heavier cars (e.g., the design for a 1,360 kg car with an 
adiabatic diesel engine described by Cummins Engine Company and NASA Lewis 
researchers--see Table 5). 
For both truck and air passenger transport, it is assumed that by 2020 
the energy intensity is reduced 50 percent, taking into account the oppor-
tunities for energy efficiency improvement described earlier. 58 
Under the above conditions, total energy use per capita in transporta-
tion in 2020 would be reduced to 45 percent (52 percent) of the 1980 level if 
per capita GNP were increased 50 percent (100 percent) (see Table 8). 
Industry: Modeling the mix of future industrial activities and the 
energy demand associated with these activities is an especially difficult 
task for the United States, because th~ U.S. industrial base is diverse and 
because it is being fundamentally reshaped as the country continues the 
transition to a post-industrial economy. Thus, the mix of industrial 
activities several decades from now can be expected to be quite different 
from today's. Because of this difficulty, the industrial sector is modeled 
here with relatively aggregated descriptors.· 
Consider first the the growth of total industrial output. If in the 
future industrial output grows Q.83 times as fast as GNP, as it did in the 
1970s, reflecting the ongoing shift from goods to services production, the 
industrial sector as a whole would expand 1.8-fold (2.3-fold) as per capita 
GNP increases 50 percent (100 percent) between 1980 and 2020. 
Within the industrial sector, different growth paths are assumed for (1) 
the energy-intensive basic materials processing (BMP) and the mining, agri-
culture, and construction (MAC) subsectors, and (2) the value-added intensive 
fabrication and finishing activities that make up "other manufacturing" 
(OMFG). For the BMP and MAC subsectors of industry, it is assumed that 
output grows only as fast as population, or 30 percent from 1980 to 2020, 
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reflecting the shift away from the use of basic materials, a shift which 
appears to imply saturation in the use of basic materials (i.e., zero growth 
in kilograms consumed per capita) in the United States. 59 Together with the 
assumption made about total industrial output growth, this implies that the 
OMFG subsector would grow 2.3-fold (3.3-fold), while per capita GNP increases 
50 percent (100 percent) from 1980 to 2020. 
To these assumptions about output growth is added the assumption that 
the energy intensity of each subsector (in megajoules [MJ] per dollar of 
value added) is reduced by half between 1980 and 2020. The corresponding 
average improvement rate of 1.7 percent per year is less than the average of 
2.6 percent per year for the period from 1973 to 1984 (see Table 9). It is 
also well within the range of practical feasibility in light of both the 
large potential for energy efficiency improvement in industry discussed 
briefly above and in more detail elsewhere, 60 little of which has been cap-
tured to date, and the three-fold increase in the average price of final 
energy for industry from 1972 to 1982, 61 which provides a strong incentive to 
exploit the untapped potential for much greater efficiency. Moreover, even 
in historical periods when prices were low and falling, energy requirements 
per ton of typical basic materials declined at rates of the order of 1 per-
cent per year (see Table 10), owing to the fact that industrial innovations 
typically improve all factors of production simultaneously. 62 
Table 9 
HISTORICAL AND PROJECTED TRENDS FOR SELECTED INDUSTRIAL 
INDICATORS: AVERAGE ANNUAL GROWTH RATES 
(Percent per Annum) 
Indicator 
GNP 
Industrial GPO 
MAC 
BMP 
OMFG 
Total industry 
Final 
Fuel usea 
Electricity use 
Energy usea 
Final energy use/GNP 
Rate of change in final 
energy intensity due to 
efficiency improvements 
Average Historical Rate 
{1973-1984) 
+ 2.5 
+ 0.7 
+ 0.5 
+ 2.5 
+ 1.5 
- 2.0 
+ 1.9 
- 1. 6 
- 4.1 
- 2.6 
(a) Includes industrial wood use. 
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Scenario 
{1980-2020) 
+ 2.5 
+ 0.7 
+ 0.7 
+ 3.0 
+ 2.1 
- 1.1 
+ 1.3 
- 0.7 
- 3.2 
- 1. 7 
These assumptions imply that final energy demand in industry would 
decline at an average rate of 0.7 percent per year (0.9 percent per year) 
from 1980 to 2020 were per capita GNP to increase 50 percent (100 percent) in 
this period. For comparison, final energy use in industry declined at an 
average rate of 1.6 percent per year from 1973 to 1984 (see Table 9). 
If it is also assumed for both scenarios that the historical trend 
toward electrification continues, increasing from 11 percent in 1980 to 25 
percent in 2020, then aggregate electricity demand by industry would grow at 
an average annual rate of 1.1 percent per year (1.3 percent per year) from 
1980 to 2020 were per capita GNP to increase 50 percent (100 percent) during 
this period. 
Table 10 
TRENDS IN THE PRE-ENERGY CRISIS ENERGY INTENSITIES FOR BASIC 
MATERIALS PROCESSING INDUSTRIES IN THE UNITED STATES 
Material 
Raw steel 
Portland cement 
Chlorinec 
Aluminumd 
Papere 
Period 
1947:1971 
1947-1971 
1947-1971 
1954-1971 
1954-1971 
Average Rate of Decline in Energy 
Use per Ton Produced 
(percent per year) 
Final Energya 
1.41 
1.17 
0.40 
2.83 
0.14 
Primary Energyb 
1.19 
1.09 
0.42 
1.89 
-0.11 
Source: Taken from R. Williams, E. Larson, and M. Ross, "Materials, Afflu-
ence, and Industrial Energy Use," Annual Review of Energy 12 (1987): 99. 
(a) With electricity counted as 3.6 mj per kWh of electricity consumed. 
(b) Electricity is counted as that amount of fossil fuel energy required to 
produce it. 
(c) For 1 ton of chlorine plus 1.13 tons of caustic soda in 50 percent 
solution. 
(d) Electricity use per kilogram of primary aluminum declined 0.4 percent 
per year during this period. 
(e) For purchased fuels and electricity only. 
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Integrated Results: The results of the demand_analysis are summarized 
in Table 8, which shows that, by pursuing opportunities for energy efficiency 
improvement throughout the economy, per capita final energy use (at levels of 
per capita GDP SO percent [100 percent] higher than 1980 levels) could be 
reduced between 1980 to 2020, from 9.0 to 4.2 kW (4.6 kW). This overall-
reduction in energy use would be accompanied by slow growth (0.3 to 0.5 
percent per year) in the aggregate demand for electricity and electricity's 
share of final demand would increase from 12 percent in 1980 to between 21 
and 22 percent in 2020. 
The energy intensities assumed for commercial buildings and automobiles 
and the growth of the basic materials processing sector of industry are per-
haps the most uncertain quantities underlying this projection. 
For commercial buildings, there has been a tendency to underestimate new 
building loads, especially for office computers and the air conditioning 
systems required for their·support. 63 It is uncertain whether this is a 
long-term problem or will become unimportant with technological advances that 
reduce the energy intensity of computers and other office machinery. How-
ever, if the average final energy intensity of commercial buildings were 1.0 
GJ per square meter per year, two-thirds of the 1980 average and double what 
was assumed, aggregate U.S. energy use in 2020 would be up only 7.5 to 8 
percent. · 
The 75 mpg fuel economy assumed for the automobile in 2020 could be 
achieved for large cars only with the commercial success of certain advanced 
technologies (e.g., the adiabatic diesel engine). With present technology, 
75 mpg could be achieved only with some down-sizing. In light of uncertain-
ties about future technologies and the American love affair with large cars, 
the 75 mpg target might not be achieved even with supportive new public pol-
icies. However, if the average fuel economy were 50 mpg instead of 75 mpg, 
U.S. energy use in 2020 would be only 4 to 4.5 percent higher. 
For industry, it was assumed that the BMP and MAC sectors grow in pro-
portion to the population. While there is good evidence that consumption 
will grow this fast, there are strong indications that, for at least the 
period to the year 2000, aggregate production of basic materials will not 
grow at all. 64 If this expected trend should continue, so that there would 
be no net growth in the BMP and MAC sectors between 1980 and 2020, the result 
would be aggregate energy use being 9 to 10 percent lower than that projected 
for 2020. 
This sensitivity analysis shows that the finding that final energy use 
can be reduced in half at the same time that per capita GNP doubles is not 
very sensitive to changes in some of the boldest assumptions involved. 
Since typical new energy-using buildings and equipment tend to be much 
more efficient than the existing stock, many efficiency improvements will be 
made naturally as the capital stock turns over. Accordingly, because of 
technological changes already set in motion, it is very likely that the 
recent downward trend in per capita energy use (Figure 7) will continue. But 
to bring about a reduction in per capita energy .use of the magnitude indicat-
ed here (Table 8) new policy initiatives would be required, both to make 
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markets work better than they do today and to correct inherent market short-
comings--issues to which we now turn. 
PUBLIC POLICY ISSUES 
Our analysis has shown that there are many opportunities for large and 
cost-effective reductions in energy use. While some of these opportunities 
will be exploited under present market conditions, the dramatic reductions in 
energy demand identified here as feasible would probably not be realized 
without directed government action. This is attributable to institutional 
obstacles to energy efficiency improvement, including improper energy price 
signals; inadequate consumer information about energy savings opportunities 
and their cost effectiveness; unavailability of capital for investments in 
energy efficiency; and, generally, the difficulties that arise when the 
industrial infrastructure needed to deliver energy efficiency improvements is 
not yet well established. 
To overcome these problems and facilitate the adoption of cost-effective 
energy-saving technologies it will be necessary to implement broad-gauged 
policies designed to realize a more evenhanded treatment of investments in. 
energy efficiency and energy suppy in the marketplace, and policies targeted 
at particular sectors or end uses. A more extensive discussion of policy 
options for promoting end-use energy strategies is presented elsewhere. 65 
Here we merely sketch some of the highlights of what we think is called for. 
Among broad-gauge policy options, economic efficiency would be improved 
were energy prices to properly reflect the marginal costs of bringing forth 
new energy supplies. It is also important to create a more predictable 
investment climate for investments in energy efficiency by bringing stability 
_ to the consumer oil price, which has fluctuated wildly in alternate spasms of 
shock and glut since the oil embargo of 1973. This might be accomplished if 
the governments of oil-consuming countries were to levy excise taxes on oil 
that would vary with the world oil price and general inflation so as to keep 
consumer prices constant or slowly rising in real terms. It is also desir-
able to eliminate the subsidies that promote energy supply expansion. Such 
market-distorting subsidies facilitate the flow of capital resources to 
energy supply, making it scarcer for alternative investments. 
There are also important roles for government in improving the flow of 
information to consumers about the energy performance and cost effectiveness 
of alternative energy end-use technologies. For example, laws requiring the 
labeling of energy performance information may be desirable, for automobiles, 
for consumer appliances, and even for houses (both new and existing), say, at 
the time of sale. 
Regulation of energy performance can also be an important policy 
instrument for promoting energy efficiency improvement. Regulation can be 
especially important in generating social benefits that are not likely to be 
realized with the price mechanism alone. A case in point involves automotive 
fuel economy. · 
A shift to super-mpg cars throughout the industrialized world would lead 
to large reductions in the dependence of the industrialized market economies 
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on imported oil, resulting not only in direct oil savings but in reduced costs 
for oil not saved as well, as a result of a lower world oil price. 66 Market 
forces acting alone would probably not be adequate to bring about such a 
shift, in part because over a wide range of fuel economy improvements the 
savings in reduced fuel costs is approximately offset by the extra first costs 
incurred in making the fuel economy improvements (see Figure 8). In addition, 
for fuel economies better than about 8 liters per 100 km (30 mpg), the cost of 
fuel is only a small fraction of the total cost of owning and operating a car. 
Since the individual consumer would thus be little motivated to seek high fuel 
economy, although society as a whole would be better off if he or she did, 
some form of market intervention to promote high fuel economy (e.g., fuel 
economy standards or "gas-guzzler" taxes) may be desirable. 
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While the subsidy is a politically attractive instrument for promoting 
particular technologies, subidies should be used cautiously. One of the most 
serious shortcomings of subsidies that target particular technologies is that 
that they can stifle innovation by excluding innovations that are not defined 
in the qualifying rules--an especially serious problem for the diverse range 
of technologies associated with energy end-uses. Moreover, institutional 
obstacles can often be removed with less costly market interventions--by 
improving the flow of information, by making capital more readily available, 
etc. Subsidies should be restricted to the pursuit of social goals that 
cannot readily be met otherwise. Because the market is inherently incapable 
of looking after the needs of the poor and after the long-term, energy 
efficiency investments needed by the poor and research and development are 
prime targets for subsidies. 
Public policy should foster the development of an industry that markets 
energy efficiency the way energy supplies are marketed today--an industry that 
provides information, financing, and installation services relating to energy 
efficiency improvements and stands behind its services. Efforts to convert 
utilities from being simply purveyors of energy supplies into purveyors of 
energy services would be steps in this direction, as would efforts to develop 
entirely new energy service industries. 
While many policy reforms are needed, the required efforts are certainly 
not draconian and would probably require much less government intervention 
than what is usually called for in the way of massive subsidies to facilitate 
an energy supply oriented path to the post-petroleum era. 
CONCLUSION 
The discussion in this paper indicates that, because of ongoing struc-
tural shifts in their economies and the opportunities for using energy more 
efficiently, it would be technically and economically feasible to reduce per 
capita energy demand by about 50 percent in Sweden and the United States while 
considerably increasing per capita consumption of goods and services. 
Much of what we have learned from our analyses of the Swedish and U.S. 
situations is probably applicable to most other industrialized countries as 
well, especially to many of the OECD countries. In light of the paucity of 
data available to us concerning patterns of energy use in industrialized 
communist countries, the extent to which our findings are relevant to the 
Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) countries is less certain. But 
since average per capita energy use levels are comparable in OECD and CMEA 
countries, while the levels of amenities made possible by energy are probably 
higher, on the average, in the West than in the East, it may be true that what 
can be achieved in countries like the United States and Sweden is an existence 
proof of what can be achieved in any industrialized country. 
Low energy demand futures offer considerable flexibility in putting 
together the energy supply mix, obviating the necessity of pushing all energy 
supply options to the limit. Low energy demand futures make it possible to 
avoid or reduce dependence on the more troublesome supply options, thereby 
reducing the scope and intensity of those global problems (carbon dioxide-
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induced climate change, nuclear weapons proliferation, etc.), the seriousness 
of which increases with the overall level of dependency on particular energy 
sources. 67 
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